Religion and the Making of Nigeria by Vaughan, Olufemi

r eli gi o n 
a n d 
t h e  m a k i n g  o f 
n i ger i a
religious cultures of african and african diaspora  people
series editors. Jacob K. Olupona, Harvard University
Dianne M. Stewart, Emory University and Terrence L. Johnson, Haverford College
The book series examines the religious, cultural, and po liti cal expressions of African, African 
American, and African Ca rib bean traditions. Through transnational, cross- cultural, and 
multidisciplinary approaches to the study of religion, the series investigates the epistemic 
bound aries of continental and diasporic religious practices and thought and explores the 
diverse and distinct ways African- derived religions inform culture and politics. The series 
aims to establish a forum for imagining the centrality of black religions in the formation of 
the “New World.”
r eli gi o n 
a n d 
t h e  m a k i n g  o f 
n i ger i a
o lu fem i  vau gh a n
Duke University Press  Durham and London  2016
© 2016 Duke University Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of Amer i ca on acid- free paper ∞
Designed by Courtney Leigh Baker
Typeset in Garamond Premier Pro by Westchester Publishing Services
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Vaughan, Olufemi, [date] author.
Title: Religion and the making of Nigeria / Olufemi Vaughan.
Other titles: Religious cultures of African and African diaspora  people.
Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2016. | Series: Religious cultures of African  
and African diaspora  people | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: lccn 2016021449 (print)
lccn 2016023797 (ebook)
isbn 9780822362067 (hardcover : alk. paper)
isbn 9780822362272 (pbk. : alk. paper)
isbn 9780822373872 (e book)
Subjects: lcsh: Religion and state— Nigeria. | Church and state— Nigeria— History. |  
Islam and state— Nigeria— History. | Po liti cal culture— Nigeria— Religious aspects.
Classification: lcc bl65. s8 v38 2016 (print) | lcc bl65.s8 (ebook) | ddc 322/.109669— dc23
lc rec ord available at https:// lccn . loc . gov / 2016021449
Cover art: Stephen Folaranmi, Tolerance, 2016. This work depicts a cross, a crescent and 
star, and an Opon Ifa (Yoruba Ifa divination plate).
Duke University Press gratefully acknowledges the support of Bowdoin College, Office of 
the Dean, which provided funds toward the publication of this book.
in memoriam: Gladys Aduke Vaughan 
(Otun- Iyalode, Ibadan), 1920–2014
This page intentionally left blank





one. Islam and Chris tian ity in the 
Making of Modern Nigeria
13
two. Islam and Colonial Rule 
in Northern Nigeria
39
three. Chris tian ity and the Transformation of 
Colonial Southern and Northern Nigeria
69
four. The Politics of Religion in 
Northern Nigeria during Decolonization
89
five. Religion and the Postcolonial State
112
six. Religious Revival and the State: 
The Rise of Pentecostalism
139
seven. Expanded Sharia: 
The Northern Ummah and the Fourth Republic
158
eight. Expanded Sharia:  
Re sis tance, Vio lence, and Reconciliation
181
nine. Sharia Politics, Obasanjo’s pdp  










ac k n ow l ed g m en ts
I have accumulated considerable debt to many friends and colleagues during 
the years this book was in the making. I am grateful to  these wonderful  people 
for their support and kindness. Zach Warner and I had many interactions on 
conceptual and contextual questions that undergird the entangled histories 
of Chris tian ity, Islam, indigenous religious beliefs, and the Nigerian state. A 
generous and excellent scholar, Zach provided insightful critiques and ideas 
that enhanced the overall quality of the book. I am grateful to Zach for his un-
flinching commitment to the objectives of this book. During the initial stages 
of the book’s research, I benefited from the support of several young friends 
who worked as my research assistants. Rory Brinkman, Suraiya Zubair Banu, 
Tony Perry, Tyler Silver, Renee Velkoff, and Sarah Watts worked with me to 
analyze extensive archival materials, many documents of religious institutions, 
and piles of newspaper reports. I am grateful to Rory, Tony, Tyler, Renee, 
Suraiya, and Sarah for their assistance and support. Discussions with many 
friends in several humanistic social science disciplines informed an essential 
cross- disciplinary perspective that, I believe, gave this book greater scope and 
depth. Some of  these friends read the finished work and offered insightful cri-
tiques: my special thanks to Wale Adebanwi, Niyi Afolabi, Okon Akiba, A. B. 
Assensoh, Peniel Joseph, Insa Nolte, Ebenezer Obadare, Deji Ogunnike, Funke 
Okome, Joel Rosenthal, Samuel Zalanga, and Nimi Wariboko. I am grateful 
to Patty McCarthy for providing excellent editorial assistance. Patty is a pa-
tient and thoughtful editor who reminded me that a book of this nature must 
not only speak to scholars in the field, but must also be accessible to students, 
policy makers, and intelligent lay learners who are willing to wade through the 
muddled  waters of religion and state making in Nigeria. And to Eileen John-
son, I express my gratitude for the excellent maps contained in this book. 
The scholarship on religion and society in Nigeria is authoritative in African 
studies. As a student of Nigerian history and politics, I benefited enormously 
from the stellar works of many scholars in this impor tant field. While my cita-
tion  will show the extent of my intellectual debts, I would like to acknowledge 
x Acknowl edgments
the impor tant contribution of the following scholars whose works  shaped my 
thoughts on a wide range of complex issues analyzed in this book: Rowland 
Abiodun, Afe Adogame, Laolu Akande, Pade Badru, Toyin Falola,  T.  G.  O. 
Gbadamosi, Rosalind Hackett, Johannes Harnischfeger, Robin Horton, John 
Hunwick, Julius Ihonvbere, Simeon Ilesanmi, Kelechi Kalu, Ogbu Kalu, Matthew 
Kukah, Ricardo Rene Larémont, Murray Last, Paul Lubeck, Ruth Marshall, 
Moses Ochuno, Mathews Ojo, Jacob Olupona, John Paden, John Peel, Frank 
Salamone, and Nimi Wariboko.
The intellectual perspective for this book was refined while I was a fellow 
at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2006–2007. In 
spring 2013, I returned to the Wilson Center as a public policy scholar to com-
plete the book manuscript. In both of my residencies at the Wilson Center, I 
had the good fortune of developing lasting friendships with some remarkable 
 people in the center’s Fellowship Program and Africa Program: Arlyn Charles, 
Lindsey Collins, Kim Conner, Lucy Jilka, Bob Litwak, Steve McDonald, 
Monde Muyangwa, Andrew Selee, and Mike Van Dusen. I am grateful to  these 
special friends for their kindness and generosity over the years. Seun Ajayi is a 
blessing and a joy— thank you, Seun, for your kind hospitality during my sec-
ond residency at the Wilson Center. The research for this book proj ect required 
extensive archival work, and I would like to thank the archivists and librarians 
who provided assistance during the early stages of my research. I am particularly 
grateful to the archivists and librarians of the Wilson Center Library; the Li-
brary of Congress; Rhodes House Library, Oxford; Center for Mission Studies, 
Oxford; and the University of Ibadan Library. I would also like to thank my 
colleagues at Bowdoin College’s Africana Studies Program and History Depart-
ment for their collegiality and friendship. Bowdoin College’s Committee for 
Faculty Development provided supplementary funding to support a critical sab-
batical leave in 2012–2013. I am grateful to the college for this generous support.
Jacob Olupona, the editor of the series in which this book is published, 
along with his colleagues, Dianne Stewart and Terrence Johnson, believed 
that this work can make an impor tant contribution to Africanist scholarship 
and at the same time encourage a serious dialogue on religious reconciliation 
in a post-9/11 world. I am indebted to them for their steadfast support for 
this work. The remarkable professional expertise of Miriam Angress, associate 
editor at Duke University Press, is second to none. Miriam diligently marshaled 
the manuscript through vari ous stages in the publication pro cess with excep-
tional professionalism. I am grateful to Miriam for her kindness and support. I 
should also thank two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and 
critiques of the manuscript.
Acknowl edgments xi
Many relatives and friends in Nigeria, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom opened the doors of their homes to me while I was conducting 
field and archival research for this book. My expression of thanks does 
not adequately capture the extent of my gratitude to  these special  people. 
I am particularly grateful to Segun and Desi Abegunrin, Kolade and Yinka 
Adebayo- Oke, Gbenro and Funso Adegbola, Soji and Fran Adelaja, Jide and 
Ama Eniola, Bassey and Consola Ewa-Henshaw, Dawari and Data Long-
john, Fidelis and Priscilla Oditah, Bode and Emelda Oladeji, Tony and Diana 
Oyekan, and Charles Small for their love and support over the years.
Fi nally, my loving gratitude to my wife, Rosemary, our  children, Moni, 
Ayo, and Olu— and to our extended  family in Ibadan (particularly Ronke 
Adefope, Biola and Funso Osideinde, Biodun Pomary, Shubu Vaughan, Wole 
Vaughan, and Iyabo Yerima). In addition to her steadfast devotion to our 
 children, Rosemary’s love and support for my work is boundless. If I have 
attained any professional success, it is in large mea sure  because of Rosemary’s 
resolute support and encouragement. Thank you, Makamba, for engaging my 
endless discussions on African studies and African diaspora studies— and for 
all your love over  these wonderful years.
In April 2014, right around the time I finished the final draft of this manu-
script, my  mother, a grand daughter of early cms (Church Missionary Society) 
converts in Ibadan in the second half of the nineteenth  century, passed on (the 
role of the cms in Ibadan is covered in chapter 3 of this book). She was already 
in her late eighties when I began working on the book, and I discussed vari ous 
aspects of it with her during our many telephone conversations and my brief 
summer visits to Ibadan. In retrospect, I can now see how her life and work— 
along with other forebears— might have inspired my commitment to the ex-
cavation of the crucial role of religion in Nigerian history and politics. It is 
something of a cliché to underscore the bond between  mothers and sons, but in 
this one case, I hope this tie  will live on in the legacy she left  behind. I am grate-
ful for her remarkable life and cherish her amazing work in Ibadan. As a token 
of my gratitude for her life and work, I dedicate this book to her memory. It is 
certainly not my place to recite her oríkì (lineage praise verses), but I know she 
 will allow me to evoke this first line for this special purpose: Àdùké Òpó Omo 








































































































































Emirates - Mainly Muslim
Emirates - Some Indigenous
Emirates - Many Indigenous
Independent Indigenous District





































































Map 7. The Twelve States of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1967–1975





































Map 9. Northern Nigeria’s Sharia States, 2000s
i n t ro d u c t i o n
Nigeria holds po liti cal and economic prominence in Africa. A major oil pro-
ducer with a population of 180 million (in 2015) and more than 250 ethnic groups, 
Nigeria is home to millions of Christians, Muslims, and adherents of indigenous 
religions. With complicated relations between Christians and Muslims in the 
Northern and central regions of the country, Nigeria is one of the world’s major 
laboratories for the study of religious- based conflict and reconciliation. While 
many scholars have focused on recurring Christian- Muslim confrontations as 
an aspect of endemic sectarian conflict in Nigeria— showing how an obdurate 
po liti cal class exploits ethno- religious divisions to mobilize collective po liti cal 
action1— I contend that Christian, Muslim, and indigenous religious struc-
tures are integral to the formation of the modern Nigerian state and society. 
Specifically, I  will analyze how the under pinnings of religious doctrines, the 
nature of social structures, and the proclivities of the po liti cal class have  shaped 
the evolution of modern Nigeria since the turbulent nineteenth  century. I am 
persuaded that the intersections of  these competing religious traditions— Islam, 
Chris tian ity, and indigenous religions— are decisive in the making of modern 
Nigeria.
Starting with a major Muslim reformist movement— the Sokoto Jihad—
in con temporary Nigeria’s vast Northern Region, and a Christian evangelical 
movement, propelled by the influential En glish missionary organ ization called 
the Church Missionary Society (cms), in Atlantic Yoruba communities in 
southwestern Nigeria during the nineteenth  century, I argue that Muslim and 
Christian structures made up the foundation on which the Nigerian colonial state 
was grafted in the early twentieth  century. In what  later became the Northern 
Nigerian Protectorate, the Sokoto Jihad of 1804–1808 transformed not only 
the Hausa city- states, but also  shaped the geopolitics of their neighbors to the 
south, especially the diverse communities in con temporary central and north-
eastern Nigeria (modern Nigeria’s  Middle  Belt region) as well as the Yoruba 
region in the southwest. As the Sokoto Jihad consolidated a theocratic con-
federacy (the Sokoto Caliphate)  under the control of Fulani Muslim  reformers 
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in the northern Hausa region by the mid- nineteenth  century, Christian evan-
gelical movements, fueled by the activities of Yoruba cms returnees from 
Sierra Leone, penetrated Nigeria’s Southwest, steadily transforming the social 
structure of Southern and central Nigerian communities by the late nineteenth 
 century.  These two world religious currents, along with their entangled social 
and po liti cal histories, set the stage on which Muslim and Christian structures 
would shape the pro cesses of state- society formation in colonial Nigeria since 
the imposition of British rule at the turn of the twentieth  century. Conse-
quently, Islam and Chris tian ity fundamentally  shaped— and have been  shaped 
by— local religious, social, and po liti cal structures since the transformative nine-
teenth  century.
Drawing from an interdisciplinary Africanist scholarship, I contend that 
the impact of  these Muslim and Christian movements on Nigerian communi-
ties did not simply serve as a precursor to British colonial rule, but provided 
essential structural and ideological frameworks for the rationalization of co-
lonial society throughout the first half of the twentieth  century. My analyses 
emphasize how  these two major religions  shaped collective po liti cal and social 
action and complicated Nigeria’s tapestry of identities, especially ethnic and re-
gional forms of identifications. Given the transformative impact of  these world 
religious movements on structures of society, I  will analyze their manifestations 
in their broad historical, po liti cal, and so cio log i cal contexts,2 emphasizing the 
dialectical tensions between local and global forces. This perspective under-
scores how the per sis tence of Muslim and Christian structures has consistently 
produced contending— and competing— doctrines, practices, and ideologies 
to transform Nigeria’s complicated social and po liti cal landscape.
The history of the communities in this West African region is characterized 
by interwoven religious, social, and po liti cal strands that reflect entrenched hi-
erarchies of power integrated into communal, kinship, gender, and class iden-
tities3 and conditioned by spatial and demographic  factors. In this dynamic 
pro cess, Nigeria’s formidable Muslim and Christian structures are at the cen-
ter of the country’s history, expanding Nigeria’s chronology to fully incorpo-
rate the critical religious, social, and po liti cal developments of the turbulent 
nineteenth  century into the pro cesses of Nigerian state formation. Simply put, 
Muslim and Christian movements have flourished in modern Nigeria  because 
their institutions and doctrines are consistently embedded in the structures of 
society, shaping social relations and the configuration of power.
Given the decisive impact of  these two world religious currents on the di-
verse communities in the Nigerian region, it is useful to draw on landmark the-
oretical analyses that explain the conversion of local communities in the region 
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from indigenous religions to Chris tian ity and Islam.4 For more than four de-
cades, anthropologists Robin Horton and John Peel’s intellectualist paradigm 
has  shaped the theoretical debate on this conversion pro cess.5 Focusing on the 
cosmological rationale for traditional West African religions to “explain, pre-
dict and control” the challenges that confront local  people, Horton argues that 
the pro cesses of conversion from indigenous religions to Chris tian ity must be 
articulated in a specific nineteenth- century context of rapid social and po liti cal 
change.6 Preoccupied with parochial conditions in isolated communities be-
fore the complex transformation of the nineteenth  century, Horton contends 
that local deities that underscore microcosmic cosmologies essentially domi-
nated the everyday world of local  people in small- scale locales. As West African 
communities took on the more complicated social, po liti cal, and economic 
conditions at the intersection of local, regional, and global forces in a tumultu-
ous nineteenth  century, prevailing local cosmologies shifted from their small- 
scale (microcosmic) preoccupation to large- scale, macrocosmic framework that 
could explain the rapidly changing conditions of the time. In short, Horton 
stresses that age- old West African cosmologies expanded their scope to accom-
modate the more complicated regional and global forces unfolding in the re-
gion in the nineteenth  century. Accordingly, this shift in focus encouraged the 
macrocosmic worship of the “cult of the Supreme Being,”7 opening the door 
to the mono the istic Christian faith evangelical missionaries introduced along 
with other far- reaching Western social, economic, and po liti cal transforma-
tions starting in the early 1800s. While  these shifts in religious practice  were 
often characterized as conversion from indigenous religions to Chris tian ity by 
the turn of the twentieth  century, Horton contends that this phenomenon re-
flected trends that  were already in motion in much of the nineteenth  century.8
In the case of the Yoruba  people of southwestern Nigeria, Peel argues that 
the new emphasis on the “cult of the Supreme Being” was crucial in the con-
version experience of Yoruba communities from their indigenous religion to 
Chris tian ity starting in the second half of the nineteenth  century. This com-
plicated pro cess of conversion provided a new narrative that  shaped the way 
the Yoruba embraced the promise of a better  future following the cataclysmic 
upheavals from prolonged regional warfare in much of the nineteenth  century. 
This dialogue that integrated indigenous cosmology to Chris tian ity ultimately 
explains the remarkable success of the Yoruba Christian church movement, 
Aladura, during the period of colonial rule in the first half of the twentieth 
 century.9
Drawing from Southern African case studies to complicate Horton and Peel’s 
intellectualist theory, historian Terence Ranger argued that the  macrocosmic 
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framework already was prevalent in indigenous cosmologies by the time they 
came into contact with mission Chris tian ity in the mid-1800s, and that the 
concept of a Supreme Being subsequently reified in world religions was, in 
many instances, reflected in microcosmic conditions.10 For Ranger, indigenous 
religious systems had long possessed adaptive cosmological qualities to explain 
larger- scale regional transformations. Consequently, the Christian missionary 
impact that accompanied Western- induced social, po liti cal, and economic 
conditions should not be seen as the only radical development that expanded 
the scope of indigenous African cosmologies. While Ranger agrees that the 
nineteenth  century was a critical turning point in African history, he asserts 
that the radical shifts from a microcosmic to macrocosmic framework start-
ing in the nineteenth  century cannot fully explain the conversion of Africans 
from indigenous religions to Chris tian ity. Ranger concludes that “much of the 
continuing history of religion in Southern Africa,  whether of Chris tian ity or 
of African religion, lies in the working out of this dialectic between the local 
and the central.”11 Thus the new Christian doctrines that  were embedded in 
indigenous cosmologies to articulate the rapidly changing social conditions in 
the early years of colonial rule  were following trends that had been established 
in earlier moments of major transformations in the region. Despite this revi-
sion of a paradigm that underscores the integration of mission Chris tian ity to 
African cosmologies in the context of the rapid social transformation at the 
turn of the twentieth  century, Ranger’s analy sis still falls within the framework 
of Horton and Peel’s intellectualist imperative in the conversion of Africans 
from indigenous religions to world religions.
In this context, with the imposition of colonial rule in Southern Nigeria, 
mission Chris tian ity and its trappings of modern education provided appealing 
religious explanations in an increasingly novel world. The appeal of Chris tian-
ity, from this perspective, was not simply in its emphasis on the transcendent 
“macrocosm,” but rather in its relation to and ability to “explain, control, and 
predict” the dynamic conditions of the time. Indigenous religions, as Jack 
Goody reminds us, have serious limitations in the modern world  because of 
their inability to generate requisite modern institutions, professional skills and 
technical expertise essential to navigate the major social, economic, and po liti cal 
developments of the twentieth  century— attributes that world religions, espe-
cially mission Chris tian ity, possess in abundance  because of their long history of 
transregional networks, scientific engagement, professionalization, and extensive 
traditions in literacy.12 Incorporated into indigenous cosmologies, Chris tian-
ity and Islam provided frameworks for large- scale modes of identity as well as 
instruments for an “intellectualist paradigm” that reflects the rapidly chang-
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ing conditions that  were becoming prevalent starting in the second half of the 
nineteenth  century.13 “The changing social environment in which conversion 
so often unfolds is not simply a product of material forces,” Robert Hefner per-
ceptively notes; it also reflects a “sense of self- worth and community. . . .  [The] 
prob lem of dignity and self- identity in a pluralized and po liti cally imbalanced 
world lies at the heart of many conversion histories.”14 This was the dynamic so-
cial, po liti cal, and economic context in which the world religions— especially 
Chris tian ity— flourished in vari ous Nigerian communities immediately  after 
the imposition of colonial rule.
Given this dynamic pro cess in the transformation of Nigerian communities 
since the nineteenth  century, my methodological emphasis is at the intersec-
tion of historical, po liti cal, and so cio log i cal analyses. Focusing on the enduring 
structures of precolonial Nigerian communities, I  will emphasize the longue 
durée of Muslim and Christian movements15 in the making of Nigeria, analyz-
ing how the historical evolution of three major Nigerian geocultural regions— 
notably the Hausa- Fulani Muslim North, the non- Muslim  Middle  Belt, and 
the Yoruba Muslim- Christian crossroads of the southwest— have consistently 
intersected since the nineteenth  century to complicate the formation of the 
Nigerian state and society.
Following Peel’s contention that precolonial West African po liti cal and so-
cial relations are  shaped by hierarchies of communities,16 I contend that the 
Islamic reformism of the Sokoto Jihad established a precolonial state- society 
system that presided over the allocation of resources such as tributes, taxes, and 
slaves, and controlled trade routes and markets in a vast and heterogeneous 
region that included Hausa- Fulani Muslims and adherents of indigenous reli-
gions (the so- called pagan tribes of Northern Nigeria). Starting in the second 
half of the nineteenth  century, the dominant power of Hausa- Fulani Muslim 
rulers was complicated by the advent of mission Chris tian ity in the southern 
fringe of the Sokoto Caliphate along the confluence of the Rivers Niger and 
Benue. With the growing influence of mission Chris tian ity by the turn of the 
twentieth  century, non- Muslim communities some of whom had been brought 
 under the suzerainty of the Sokoto Caliphate— especially new converts to 
Chris tian ity— made use of Chris tian ity’s universal doctrines to challenge the 
dominance of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and assert their autonomy  under 
colonial rule. In this intense po liti cal environment, conversion from indige-
nous religions to Chris tian ity by missionary socie ties was far from a  simple re-
ligious act; Christian conversion became a crucial medium of collective action 
against Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers. Nevertheless, since the Sokoto Caliphate 
provided the framework on which the British colonial system of indirect rule 
6 Introduction
was constructed, Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers consolidated their power base 
 under British rule during the first half of the twentieth  century.
This pro cess in which Muslim and Christian structures  were integral to 
state- society formation encouraged the development of ethno- national identi-
ties in Nigeria’s emergent geocultural regions. In the Hausa region that served 
as the epicenter for Britain’s Northern Nigerian Protectorate, Fulani Muslim 
reformism of the Sokoto Caliphate effectively appropriated the dominant 
Hausa culture and language as the essential structural framework for Hausa- 
Fulani ethno- religious identity. This large- scale ethno- national identity was 
instrumental in the mobilization of Hausa- Fulani Muslim consciousness in 
colonial Nigeria  after the conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate by the British in 
1903. As this pro cess of modern Nigerian state- making unfolded  under British 
colonial rule, Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers consolidated their control over their 
non- Muslim neighbors as the “pagan”— and consequently the Christian— 
other throughout the region. While British colonial authorities traced Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim hegemony to its precolonial status as natu ral ruler of “backward 
pagan” vassals, especially  those in the southern bound aries of the Sokoto Ca-
liphate, British colonial policy inadvertently encouraged the formation of a 
new regional sociopo liti cal identity— Middle  Belt regional identity—by the 
late colonial period.17 Drawing on highly subjective local and regional narra-
tives and mythologies18 that sought to legitimate this emergent  Middle  Belt 
regional identity in contradistinction to Hausa- Fulani Muslim identity, mis-
sion Chris tian ity’s modern institutions and doctrines emerged as a formidable 
medium of “infrapolitics” for non- Muslim communities to resist Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim hegemony throughout the region.19 However, since the British colo-
nial system of indirect rule was grafted on the prevailing Hausa- Fulani emir-
ate system, British rule inevitably intensified the structural imbalance between 
Hausa- Fulani emirates and the non- Muslim communities of the region. This 
dynamic system that continues to shape Nigeria’s geopolitics even to this day 
is deeply rooted in the enduring structures of Northern Nigeria’s fragmented 
society  going back to precolonial times. This po liti cal arrangement was predi-
cated on a problematic tributary system that depended on slave raiding and 
other forms of primitive extraction in the precolonial caliphate era. As Moses 
Ochonu deftly analyzed, this colonial arrangement was, in part, sustained 
by highly subjective British ethnographic studies that affirmed the claims of 
Hausa- Fulani Muslims as natu ral rulers of their “pagan” neighbors.  These Brit-
ish imperial studies  were replete with  imagined social, habitual, and physical 
attributes that rationalized the natu ral order of  things  under a superior Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim “race.”20
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In the Yoruba region, Peel has written convincingly about the transforma-
tive role of Yoruba cms missionaries and early converts—to articulate a pan- 
Yoruba ethno- national consciousness following the protracted social upheaval 
from the Yoruba wars of the nineteenth  century.21 This emergent ethno- 
national identity,  shaped profoundly by mission Chris tian ity by the end of the 
nineteenth  century, was a critical precursor for Yoruba sociocultural and po-
liti cal renewal  under colonial rule in southwestern Nigeria. As this pan- Yoruba 
consciousness emerged, the first generation of Yoruba- educated Christians 
embarked on a discourse of modern Christian civilization as a counternarrative 
to the prolonged turbulence that consumed much of the Yoruba region in the 
nineteenth  century.22 Derived from contested histories and mythologies,23 this 
complicated precolonial and colonial pro cess profoundly  shaped the meaning 
of power and identity for Yoruba communities within the wider context of 
modern Nigerian state- society formation.
Following decolonization  after World War II and the attainment of Ni-
gerian in de pen dence in 1960,  these religious structures  were essential to the 
mobilization of collective action by ethno- regional po liti cal elites in a rap-
idly shifting context. With a weak nation- state derived from the imposition 
of colonial rule, neopatrimonial regimes embraced patronage- clientage net-
works structured on communal relations as the framework for the distribution 
of scarce resources.24 Again, this encouraged the recasting of ethno- religious 
identity— along with other critical modes of communal identity. Amid po liti cal 
uncertainty, insecurity, and instability, Muslim and Christian structures consis-
tently retained prominence from decolonization in the 1950s to the country’s 
civil- democratic government at the turn of the twenty- first  century.
Focusing on more than two centuries of detailed historical analy sis, I 
 will show how religious forces— especially the dominant force of Islam and 
Chris tian ity— profoundly  shaped the formation of the modern Nigerian 
state and society since the turbulent nineteenth  century. The extensive social 
science scholarship on Nigeria surprisingly has ignored a methodological ap-
proach that focuses on the entangled histories of Islam and Chris tian ity as a 
pathway for analyzing the making of Nigeria. In this book, I seek to deeply 
analyze the significant impact of the history of Islam and Chris tian ity on the 
formation of the modern Nigerian state and society.
The book is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the impact 
of Islam and Chris tian ity on three major Nigerian regions where the two world 
religions consistently intersect to shape the evolution of modern Nigeria from 
the nineteenth  century to the twenty- first  century;  these three intersecting re-
gions are the Hausa- Fulani and Kanuri Muslim North (the region dominated 
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by the Sokoto Caliphate), the traditionally non- Muslim  Middle  Belt region 
(a religious and culturally distinct section of Britain’s Northern Nigerian Pro-
tectorate in con temporary central and northeastern Nigeria), and the Yoruba 
Muslim- Christian crossroads in the southwest region of Britain’s Southern 
Provinces. The second section provides detailed analyses of how the recur-
ring crisis of sharia (Islamic law) in postcolonial Nigeria essentially reflects 
the structural imbalance between emirate Northern Nigeria on the one hand, 
and Nigeria’s  Middle  Belt and Southern Regions on the other,  going back to 
the amalgamation of Britain’s Northern and Southern colonial provinces in 
1914. The fierce contestation between Northern Muslim rulers and Christian 
elites from other parts of the country over the imposition of expanded sharia 
in predominantly Northern Muslim states  were far from straightforward dis-
agreements between Muslims and Christians on  matters of religious beliefs; 
rather, they  were emblematic of deep structural imbalance that evolved with 
the formation of the modern Nigerian state  under colonial rule. The per sis tent 
call for expanded sharia by the Northern Muslim po liti cal class has consistently 
intensified this structural imbalance along ethno- religious and ethno- regional 
lines between the Muslim north and the rest of the country during the post-
colonial period.
Specifically, the book explores four major issues of importance to the critical 
roles of Muslim and Christian movements in the formation of the modern Ni-
gerian state and society: the role of Islamic reformism and mission Chris tian-
ity in the transformation of precolonial Nigerian communities in a turbulent 
nineteenth  century; Islam, Chris tian ity, and colonial rule in Nigeria’s North-
ern and Southern Provinces; Islam, Chris tian ity, and the po liti cal transforma-
tion of the Northern and  Middle  Belt regions during Nigeria’s decolonization 
pro cess; and Islam, Chris tian ity, and the crisis of the postcolonial Nigerian 
nation- state.
Chapter  1 proceeds on the understanding that the Sokoto Jihad in the 
Hausa region and the emergence of mission Chris tian ity from Atlantic Yoruba 
communities in the nineteenth  century  were pivotal in the transformation of 
the Nigerian region before the imposition of colonial rule at the turn of the 
twentieth  century. Specifically, the chapter analyzes the institutional and theo-
logical basis on which the Sokoto Caliphate was constructed in the nineteenth 
 century. In a similar vein, starting in Nigeria’s coastal southwest region, this 
chapter discusses how mission Chris tian ity set the stage for the social and po-
liti cal transformation of Southern and non- Muslim Northern Nigeria, providing 
a framework for social change in  these regions during the colonial period. This 
chapter is not a prelude to modern Nigerian history. It deeply examines how 
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Islam and Chris tian ity  were essential in framing social and po liti cal relations 
among Nigeria’s diverse communities in the critical de cades before the imposi-
tion of British colonial rule.
Chapter 2 analyzes the complex interactions between Hausa- Fulani Muslim 
rulers and British colonial rulers from 1903, when the Sokoto Caliphate and 
Kanem- Bornu Empire came  under British rule, to the 1950s, when British 
authorities started the decolonization pro cess in Nigeria. Using the case- study 
analytical approach, this chapter examines Hausa- Fulani emirate structures’ 
broad influence on colonial state formation in the Northern Nigerian Pro-
tectorate, and how the structures of this Northern Muslim confederacy  were 
woven into the colonial system of indirect rule. The po liti cal implications of 
the interactions among Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, non- Muslim communi-
ties, and British colonial policies are analyzed against the backdrop of evolving 
power configurations in the Northern Nigerian Protectorate—as  these  were ex-
pressed by Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and their Muslim subjects, Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim potentates and their non- Muslim “subordinates,” and Hausa- Fulani Mus-
lim “metropolitan” centers and “tributary” communities.
The outcomes of the interactions between mission Chris tian ity and colo-
nialism in diverse communities in Southern and Northern Nigeria are dissected 
in chapter  3. Although  Chris tian ity, unlike Islam in the Northern emirates, 
did not play a formal po liti cal role in colonial administration, the objectives 
of Christian missionary groups nevertheless advanced British interests, while 
paradoxically, challenging the hegemony of Hausa- Fulani emirate rulers in non- 
Muslim areas of the Northern Provinces, especially in the  Middle  Belt region. 
Christian missionaries and colonial administrators worked creatively to deploy 
complementary doctrines of Western training and enlightenment to advance co-
lonial imperatives. While local structures of society remained resilient— revealing 
the depth of indigenous cosmologies in vari ous communities— Christian mis-
sionary impact was far- reaching. Paradoxical relationships consistently  were re-
vealed in the everyday life of local  people: they  were played out in the objectives 
of colonial authorities and Christian missionaries, reflecting contending and 
competing forces between the temporal and the spiritual, between colonial 
state power and the power of Chris tian ity.25
The main focus of chapter  4 is the importance of Muslim and Christian 
structures in Nigeria’s decolonization pro cess. Analyzing that pro cess in the 
context of rapid po liti cal change  after World War II, I explore the critical role of 
Hausa- Fulani emirate structures in the regionalization of state power in the 
Northern Nigerian Protectorate. The prevailing Hausa- Fulani Muslim struc-
tures  were incorporated into hierarchies of power that sustained an emergent 
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modern po liti cal system during decolonization in the 1950s. The social trans-
formations of Southern Nigerian Provinces— and the  Middle  Belt region—by 
Christian missions intensified the imbalance between Muslim Northern 
Nigeria and the rest of the country during this time. Mission Chris tian ity was 
a decisive  factor in the Yoruba Muslim- Christian crossroads of the Southwest, 
transforming Yoruba ethno- national consciousness during the late colonial 
period, and it provided ideological and structural frameworks for a Chris-
tian identity in non- Muslim communities in the Northern Provinces. In the 
 Middle  Belt region and among non- Muslim minorities in Northern emirate 
society, overarching institutions and ideologies derived from emerging mission 
Chris tian ity— and subsequently in de pen dent African church movements and 
Pentecostal movements— provided a way for disparate ethnic groups to resist 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim domination in local, regional, and national politics, 
from decolonization on.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the nature of Nigeria’s Muslim and Christian 
movements during the strug gles by ethno- regional and ethno- religious elites 
for control of state power in the postcolonial period. The configurations of 
power at regional and national levels are analyzed in the context of the evolu-
tion of Nigeria’s ethno- regional, neopatrimonial po liti cal system through the 
policies of vari ous civilian and military governments— from the attainment of 
in de pen dence in 1960 to the outbreak of the sharia crisis that overwhelmed 
Nigeria during the Fourth Republic at the turn of the twenty- first  century. The 
chapter highlights several features of the relations between Nigeria’s problem-
atic nation- state and its deeply divided society, emphasizing how dynamic Mus-
lim and Christian movements repeatedly  were reconstructed, re imagined, and 
redeployed to complicate the contestation for state power by ethno- regional 
po liti cal classes, while seeking to respond to the day- to- day concerns of local 
communities in an environment of endemic po liti cal crisis. The major politico- 
religious conflicts of the postcolonial period, notably the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967–1970), the 1978 sharia debate, the controversy over Nigeria’s member-
ship in the Or ga ni za tion of Islamic Conference, and the ‘Yan tatsine riots in 
the 1980s, are analyzed in detail in this chapter.
A wave of new Pentecostal movements starting in the 1960s transformed 
the inner core of Chris tian ity in Nigeria, and the resulting changes are analyzed 
comprehensively in chapter  6. The significance of this huge religious move-
ment in Nigerian society is examined in the context of the deepening crisis 
of the postcolonial state, viewed through the prism of growing statism, neopat-
rimonialism, and neoliberalism in the age of globalization. Consequently, this 
Pentecostal revolution is analyzed in the context of the complex po liti cal, social, 
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and economic transformations that have engulfed Nigerian society throughout 
the postcolonial period.
Chapter 7 maps out the history of sharia since the colonial period, including 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim advocates’ imposition of expanded Islamic law in twelve 
predominantly Northern Muslim states at the turn of the twenty- first  century. 
I do not pretend to pres ent an objective analy sis of the major constitutional and 
po liti cal issues unleashed during the highly contentious strug gle over expanded 
sharia during Nigeria’s fourth attempt at demo cratic government (the Fourth 
Republic); instead, my analy sis suggests that Northern Muslim protagonists of 
expanded Islamic law  were, in some ways, effective at starting a discourse around 
sharia that reflected multiple religious and regional identities, even as the crisis of 
the state deepened and the structural fault lines between the Muslim North and 
the rest of the country widened. Conversely, the limitations of expanded sharia 
during this period of po liti cal turbulence reveal the complicated pro cess of the 
configuration of power in postcolonial Nigerian politics. Overall, this chapter 
underscores the paradoxical and contradictory role of expanded sharia in Nige-
ria’s religious and ethnically diverse society.
Chapter  8 analyzes the constitutional and po liti cal arguments that  were 
advanced and strategies deployed by religious and regional opponents of ex-
panded sharia (Southern,  Middle  Belt, and Northern- minority Christians). All 
told, religious, regional, and ethnic structures  were critical in shaping alliances 
to sustain the politics of sharia in the Fourth Republic; and this intense re-
sis tance to expanded sharia, especially from the intelligent sia of the predomi-
nantly Christian Southern and  Middle  Belt states, as well as from Northern 
Christian minorities, further deepened the structural imbalance between Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim society and other regions of Nigeria.
Chapter  9 underscores the severity of the constitutional and po liti cal cri-
sis that consumed Nigeria during the critical years of demo cratic transition 
at the beginning of the twenty- first  century, further exposing structural divi-
sions between the Northern Muslim hierarchy and the dominant Southern, 
 Middle  Belt, and Northern minority Christian elite. Diverse prob lems that 
profoundly affected religious and regional relations are evaluated, such as 
 factors that led to widespread support for expanded sharia in the Northern 
Muslim states;  bitter conflicts surrounding sharia in Nigerian politics since 
decolonization in the 1950s; and the extent to which the po liti cal crisis pre-
cipitated by the sharia crisis is embedded in Nigeria’s religious, regional, and 
ethnic configurations. Po liti cal, social, and economic  factors that ultimately 
undermined the sharia policies of the twelve Northern Muslim states are also 
examined in this chapter.
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 These critical issues with impor tant public policy implications prompt perti-
nent questions that are analyzed throughout this book. To what extent did the 
expanded sharia policies of the twelve Northern Muslim states pose serious 
constitutional challenges to the authority of the Nigerian federal government? 
What are the  causes and consequences of religious alliances between Nigeria’s 
ethno- regional po liti cal classes and their local constituencies? How might 
we assess the po liti cal roles of Muslim and Christian movements in Nigeria’s 
deeply divided society? What are the implications of enduring po liti cal and 
social roles of  these formidable religious movements for the legitimacy of the 
Nigerian nation- state? How have the complicated relations between Christian 
and Muslim groups  shaped governance and development in con temporary Ni-
gerian society? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the local and national 
conflict- resolution mechanisms used to address Nigeria’s recurring religious 
crises? In addition to their scholarly objectives, I hope that the analyses in this 
book  will provide some thoughtful reflection for  those interested in the impor-
tant public policy dimensions of the critical role of Christian- Muslim relations 
in the governance of Nigeria. Overall, this book attempts to address  these criti-
cal questions through a comprehensive analy sis of relations between state and 
society, and the po liti cal strug gles between Hausa- Fulani Muslim society and 
other regions in the country.
The conclusion brings the issues analyzed in the book together. The per-
sis tence of religion- based conflicts in Nigeria underscores an urgent need to 
devise  viable constitutional and po liti cal mechanisms to mitigate recurring re-
ligious vio lence in Nigeria’s Northern and  Middle  Belt communities. Fi nally, 
 whether through the dominance of Islam and Chris tian ity in local communities 
or in the resilience of indigenous religious beliefs, it is clear that religious struc-
tures have not only been remarkably adaptive to rapidly shifting social and po-
liti cal conditions in Nigerian society since the turbulent nineteenth  century 
but also, more importantly, have been central to the making of modern Nigeria.
The critical foundation in the making of modern Nigeria was constructed on 
the convergence of two monumental world religious movements that trans-
formed the Nigerian region, starting in the nineteenth  century.  These  were the 
celebrated Islamic reformist movement that established the Sokoto Caliph-
ate in the Hausa region of Northern Nigeria and a Christian evangelical mis-
sionary movement that gave impetus to the social transformation of coastal 
southwest Nigeria, beginning in the second half of the nineteenth  century. 
Although  shaped by regional and global forces,  these religious movements had 
enduring consequences for the diverse  peoples of the Nigerian region  because 
they  were also products of the internal dynamics among the local communities 
that would  later constitute the modern Nigerian state and society. While  these 
religious developments emerged from two distinct geocultural areas in the 
Nigerian region during the nineteenth  century, I contend that the pro cesses of 
their convergence  after the imposition of British colonial rule at the turn of the 
twentieth  century was essential in the making of modern Nigeria. Starting with 
a comprehensive analy sis of the ideologies and structures of the Sokoto Jihad, 
which transformed the Northern Nigerian region, and the Christian evangelical 
c h a p t er  o n e
is l a m  a n d 
c h r is t i a n  i t y  i n 
t h e  m a k i n g  o f 
mo d er n  n i ger i a
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movement, which precipitated the social transformation of Southern Nigeria, 
I argue that the scope and depth of  these historic movements provided the so-
cial and po liti cal platform on which modern Nigeria was constructed  after the 
imposition of colonial rule at the beginning of the twentieth  century. In terms 
of chronology, this pro cess began with the profound impact of the Muslim re-
formism of the Sokoto Jihad in the Hausa city- states of con temporary North-
ern Nigeria, culminating in the establishment of the historic Sokoto Caliphate 
at the beginning of the nineteenth  century.
The Rise of the Sokoto Caliphate
Many of the major city centers in  today’s Hausa region of Northern Nigeria 
 were derived from the traditional Hausa city- states that had evolved as po liti-
cal entities as early as 1000 ad: Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Gobir, Biram, Rano, and 
the principal city, Daura.  These major Hausa city- states  were linked to outlying 
towns of Zamfara, Kebbi, Yauri, Gwari, Nupe, Kororofa, and Yoruba through 
complex social, po liti cal, and economic networks.1 Drawing on a common 
language and social interactions over the centuries, “the term ‘Hausa,’ ‘Hau-
sawa’ and ‘Kasar Hausa,’ that defines con temporary Hausa ethno- religious con-
sciousness in modern Nigerian society,” Moses Ochonu notes, “is a concept that 
gained momentum with the monumental po liti cal and social transformations 
unleashed since the Sokoto Jihad” of the early nineteenth  century. Ochonu 
further asserts that prior to the Sokoto Jihad “the  peoples of the [Hausa] states, 
and ordinary Fulani mi grants who lived among them,  were likely to refer to the 
Hausa state citizens by their state of origin: ‘Katsinawa’ for  those from Katsina, 
‘Kanawa’ for  those from Kano, ‘Gobirawa’ for  those from Gobir and so on.”2 
This strong identification with the city- state defines the essence of a formidable 
politico- social system in the Hausa region before the imposition of the Sokoto 
Jihad in the early nineteenth  century.
At the apex of the political- social system in each Hausa city- state was the 
office of sarki, the sovereign authority on which the po liti cal, judicial, and mili-
tary powers of the Hausa states  were invested. The sarki was expected to be a 
shrewd ruler  adept at manipulating the strings of politics to satisfy competing 
interest in upper Hausa society.  Under the sovereign authority of the sarki was 
a class of aristocratic titleholders, known as the sarauta, who advised the sarki 
on a wide range of po liti cal and social  matters. Relations of state and society 
 were sustained largely through entrenched patron- client ties: consequently, in 
traditional Hausa society, the privileged class retained its legitimacy through 
patronage- clientage networks that  were based on personal control of public 
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office and management of economic resources.3 Hausa society was thus rigidly 
divided between the aristocratic class, the sarauta, and the masses of common-
ers, known as the talakawa.
Starting in the  fourteenth  century, Islamic influence steadily encroached 
on Hausa city- states through complex networks of commercial and social in-
teractions across the Sahel and the Maghreb. First came the Sudanese Mus-
lim diasporas that migrated southwestward to the Hausa region; over time, 
the clerics of  these Muslim populations converted local Hausa rulers to Islam 
through their teaching, preaching, and commercial activities.4 However, indig-
enous Hausa religious beliefs proved resilient to the transformative impact 
of Islam, especially among the talakawa. Nevertheless, Muslim administrative 
and judicial institutions steadily became prominent in many Hausa city- states. 
An impor tant indicator of the prominence of Islam in Hausa society was the 
rise by the early eigh teenth  century of the ulama (predominantly Fulani Mus-
lim clerics) in the courts of the Hausa sarki as advisers in local administration. 
As Islam gained greater prominence in Hausa society, ulamas became more 
influential in local communities; on the growing significance of ulamas in 
Hausa society, Mohammed Umar contends that  these Muslim clerics generally 
exhibited two distinct qualities: ulamas who  were active in state affairs served 
as judges, ministers, and scribes to Hausa rulers, reflecting the Maghilian tradi-
tion; conversely, many other ulamas, inspired by the Suwarian tradition, lim-
ited their activities to their clerical work and avoided direct involvement in 
state affairs.5 Significantly, the origins of the religious trends of the former, the 
Maghilian, was inspired by the singular contribution of the notable North Af-
rican cleric Muhammad al- Maghili in the late fifteenth  century.6
As the exponent of the famous Maghili School, Muhammad al- Maghili ar-
rived in Kano, the Hausa region’s most dominant city, in 1493 from the King-
dom of Tlemcen in modern- day Algeria, where he had fled the Reconquista. He 
preached against the syncretism that he found among Kano Muslims and cam-
paigned for Islamic reform and the establishment of sharia. Through his works, 
al- Maghili established the Kano School, which dominates Islamic thought in 
Northern Nigeria even to this day.7 Al- Maghili is credited with writing the first 
Muslim constitution for Kano, which was officially received by Mohammed 
Rumfa, Kano’s sarki (1463–1499), and thereafter consecrated as the famous 
manual on Islamic government in the Hausa region. In content and specifica-
tion, al- Maghili’s manual was precise in the definition of the role of Islam in 
local administration:8 in accordance with Islamic doctrine, he recommended a 
nine- member council of rulers; a trea sury with professional accountants; a sys-
tem of sharia courts run by a qadi and scribes; and provisions for public appeal 
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to the sarki’s court.9 Consequently, through al- Maghili’s influence, sharia was 
established as state law in Kano during the reign of Rumfa in the late fifteenth 
 century.10
With the growing influence of ulamas in state affairs, the relationship be-
tween sarkis and ulamas deteriorated by the late eigh teenth  century as the in-
fluence of Islamic reformism grew in the Sahel and Maghreb regions. With this 
growing influence of Islam, ulamas increasingly based Islamic thought on the 
sovereignty of Allah, contending that Hausa sarkis can only exercise legitimate 
po liti cal authority when they comply with strict dictates of Islamic law. In this 
context, Umar argues, “Islam limits po liti cal power by requiring its exercise 
in accordance with sharia rule of law. This limit gives the ulama, as experts of 
sharia law, considerable po liti cal clout to challenge the authority of a ruler by 
arguing that he loses his legitimacy if he fails to uphold the law of God.”11 With 
their growing politico- religious influence, derived from scriptural texts and re-
ligious injunctions, ulamas asserted their authority in Hausa society during this 
moment of regional Islamic reformation. Significantly, the Islamic reformist 
teaching of Usman dan Fodio, which led to the historic Sokoto Jihad in the 
early nineteenth  century, proved to be the most impor tant manifestation of 
this growing trend by the late 1700s.12 In addition to the critical theological 
role of the ulamas to the transformation of Hausa society, the huge success of 
the Sokoto Jihad can also be attributed to the rapidly shifting demographic 
conditions that  were transforming the social and religious environment in the 
Sahel by the eigh teenth  century. Indeed, just as the Sokoto Jihad was inspired 
by earlier Fulani- led West African jihads— notably Futa Bundu, Futa Toro, and 
Futa Jallon— between 1650 and 1750, it, in turn, would inspire several jihads 
in this vast region, including Masina, Seku Ahmadu, and Tukulor  later in the 
nineteenth  century. As the most far- reaching example of Fulani- led Muslim 
reformist movements, the Sokoto Jihad reflected a global trend of Islamic re-
formism that was pervasive in the Muslim world in the eigh teenth and nine-
teenth centuries.13
usman dan fodio and the sokoto jihad
Much has been written about the  family lineage of Usman dan Fodio, the 
Fulani ulama who spearheaded the Sokoto Jihad in the Hausa region from 1804 
to 1808. Fodio was born in Maratta in the Hausa city- state of Gobir in 1754, 
and like many from his Toronkawa Fulani clan,14 Fodio’s forebears had mi-
grated to Gobir from Futa Toro in modern- day Senegal. Young Fodio learned 
Islamic theology, philosophy, science, and Arabic, as well as the reformist doc-
trines that  were widespread in the Muslim world of the time from renowned 
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North African cleric Sheikh Jibril Ibn Umar. By age twenty, he started preach-
ing in Gobir and neighboring communities, drawing large crowds during his 
travels. During his teaching, Fodio challenged the religious syncretism that 
was widespread in Hausa society and denounced the abuse of power in the 
court of the sarki of Gobir, Yunfa Nafate. When tensions between Fodio and 
Yunfa reached their climax, Fodio and his followers retreated to Gudu, per-
forming the hijra, the ritual flight that preceded the formal declaration of a 
jihad, on February 12, 1804. In Gudu, with the support of his able lieutenants, 
his  brother Abdullahi and son Mohammed Bello, Usman dan Fodio launched 
a successful military assault against Yunfa’s army at Tabkin Kwaith. This vic-
tory announced the Sokoto Jihad, which transformed what became North-
ern Nigeria in the nineteenth  century.15 Michael Crowder notes that Fodio 
and his followers “justified their jihad against Yunfa and other Habe [Hausa] 
kings on the grounds that though they professed Islam, in mixing traditional 
practices with their observance of the true faith they  were juridically pagans 
against whom it was legitimate to rebel.”16 Beyond authorizing jihads against 
Hausa rulers— and eventually the Muslim rulers of Kanem- Bornu Empire to 
the northeast— Usman dan Fodio sanctioned military campaigns against the 
non- Muslim communities that  were scattered throughout the region, espe-
cially con temporary Northern Nigeria’s  Middle  Belt region. Thus Usman dan 
Fodio notes: “The waging of Holy war (al- jihad) is obligatory by assent . . .  and 
to make war upon the heathen king who  will not say ‘ There is no God but Allah’ 
is obligatory by assent and to take the government from him is obligatory by as-
sent.”17 Consequently, in keeping with its injunction for Muslim piety,18 Usman 
dan Fodio established his Islamic reformist teaching as the foundation for the 
Sokoto Jihad in the early 1800s.
Usman dan Fodio was educated in the well- known Islamic system passed 
down to the Hausa region from Timbuktu. He wrote many books, mostly re-
ligious texts and poems, in Arabic, Hausa, and Fufulde. His extensive written 
works also covered themes as varied as Islamic law and statecraft. Fodio’s impres-
sive scholarly and religious works— along with  those of his  brother, Abdullahi, 
and son, Mohammed Bello— provide critical insight into the ideological and 
institutional framework for the Sokoto Jihad as it swept through the Hausa re-
gion in the early nineteenth  century. In his Kitab al- Farq, written immediately 
 after the declaration of the jihad in 1804, Fodio contrasts the conditions in the 
Hausa sarauta system to the righ teous Muslim theocracy he envisioned. In his 
book Tanbih al- ikhwan ‘al ahwal al- Sudan (Concerning the Government of Our 
Country and the Neighboring Sudan), Fodio observes: “The government of this 
country is the government of its king without question. If the king is a Muslim 
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his land is Muslim; if he is an unbeliever, his land is of an unbeliever. In this 
circumstance, it is obligatory for anyone to leave it for another country.” In his 
indictment of Hausa sarkis, Fodio underscores the scriptural injunctions that 
insist that legitimate Muslim rulers must submit to the dictates of Allah: “As 
for the sultans, they are undoubtedly unbelievers, even though they may profess 
Islam,  because they practice polytheistic rituals and turn the  people away from 
the path of God and raise the flag of world kingdom above the banner of Islam. 
All this is unbelief according to the consensus of opinion.”19
Usman dan Fodio thus insisted on the imposition of Muslim theocracies 
in the Hausa city- states to eradicate “un- Islamic” practices common in the 
courts of Hausa sarkis, notably, the lack of consultation with ulamas in state 
affairs, the prevalence of exploitative taxes, and oppressive laws on talakawa 
commoners by officials of Hausa sarkis.20 Fodio identified five major founda-
tions of his new Muslim polity: po liti cal authority  shall be given only to  those 
who are willing to govern according to Islamic law; po liti cal rulers must govern 
with the consent of local communities; rulers must abandon harsh punish-
ments; justice in accordance with Islamic law is sacrosanct; and members of 
the ummah are called upon to do good deeds. On the structure of the Muslim 
state, Fodio identified specific functions for occupants of four principal offices 
in the ummah: the trustworthy vizier should be steadfast and compassionate 
 toward the  people; the judge must submit to Allah; the chief of police  shall 
obtain justice for the weak; the tax collector  shall discharge his duties in accor-
dance to sharia. In the declaration of his jihad, Fodio, imploring Allah’s name, 
called on “ every scholar and righ teous man . . .  in  these countries to assist me in 
building up the characteristics of the Muslims in their governments.”21
During the formative years of the Sokoto Caliphate, the three men who 
established the foundation of the new theocratic confederacy  were Usman 
dan Fodio; his  brother, Abdullahi; and his son and successor as leader of the 
Muslim faithful, Mohammed Bello. They articulated the moral authority of 
their politico- religious proj ect in accordance with a clearly defined vision of 
the ummah as espoused in the Qur’an and the hadith.22 According to Robert 
Hefner, in classical and modern times “movements of Islamic reform [such as 
the Sokoto Jihad] often involve the attempts of pious preachers to link their re-
ligious ambitions to some disadvantaged or aggrieved social class. Where such 
a linkage is created, movements of Islamic reform may extend their horizons 
beyond the aim of heightening piety  toward the goal of social and po liti cal 
transformation.”23 In this context, Fodio’s insistence on an ummah premised 
on justice for all resonated with Hausa talakawa commoners and disaffected 
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Fulani masses, who by the eigh teenth  century had become a major demo-
graphic group in the region.24
The subject of Islamic law was central to the works of Usman dan Fodio and 
featured prominently in the discourse of the Sokoto Jihad (Shifa’ al- Ghalil fi 
ma ashkala min Kalam Shakh Shuykhina). Consequently, Fodio drew enor-
mous inspiration from texts of the Bayan Wujub al- Hijra ala Ibad to filter his 
prescriptions for the governance of the ummah. He insisted that the just Mus-
lim ruler must be qualified to render in de pen dent judgments and execute his 
decisions; must provide guidance on all state affairs; and must draw a clear 
demarcation of authority among public officials, especially between the wa-
ziri (chief judge) and local judges. Rules regarding the  handling of war booty, 
the use of lands acquired through conquest, and the levying of taxes also  were 
stipulated in the works of Usman dan Fodio.25
Abdullahi dan Fodio and Mohammed Bello also contributed im mensely to 
the growth of Islamic thought, details of which are elaborated in the works 
of Islamic scholar Ibraheem Sulaiman.26 In Diya al- Imam, Abdullahi stresses 
personal integrity and Islamic piety as pivotal qualities for po liti cal leadership: 
the imam (emir) must perform his functions as the ruler for the sake of Allah; 
treat the common  people with compassion and leniency; and ensure that all 
state functions are clearly defined. Emphasis is placed on accountability; as 
such, all public officers must declare their assets, and if someone is found to 
have wealth above what he earns from his work, the ruler  shall confiscate and 
restore it to the trea sury.27 Indeed, Islam not only provided a widely respected 
 legal system, “it also provided a defense against encroachment by the Muslim 
Fulani. . . .  Thus, public observance of the five daily prayers became common. 
Total abstinence from alcoholic beverages, especially from  those associated 
with traditional religious practices  were enforced. Prestige within the emirate 
was clearly and closely associated with Islam.”28
The constitutional treatment of public office and division of powers re-
ceived elaborate treatment in Abdullahi’s Diya al- Tawil.  There, as Sulaiman 
explains, the Shura was vested in three interrelated powers of the consultative 
assembly, the ulama, and the community. The consultative body was a formal 
constitutional group responsible for the efficient operation of the state. It com-
prised mujtahids, scholars, military generals, and community leaders.29 Usman 
dan Fodio’s pillar of state sovereignty was the hisba, the police system charged 
with the responsibility of “commanding the good and prohibiting the bad.” 
In Abdullahi’s Diya ahl al- Ihtisab and Diya al- Iman, the institution of hisba, 
like the sharia from which it derives its authority, rests on the notion that local 
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 people must be properly educated about their responsibilities in a just Muslim 
society. In short, the hisba deals with the regulation of the market, the promo-
tion of justice, and the preservation of public morality.30
In the Usul al- Siyasa, Mohammed Bello, the first caliph of Sokoto, fo-
cused on issues of integrity and modesty in leadership. Thus the first princi ple 
of government excludes anyone who covets a po liti cal position; indeed, the 
imam (emir) must strive to select men of conscience, piety, and probity as 
advisers. Given the emphasis on accountability, it is logical that Bello would 
condemn sycophancy among po liti cal leaders; he warned specifically against 
gains achieved through double- dealing and trickery. Basic premises of the rule of 
law are set forth in al- Gayth al- Wabl. The application of sharia rests on three 
interrelated princi ples: all  people must be treated equally before the law; the law 
must follow its natu ral course without interference from the po liti cal elite; and 
the imam must not alter the law to suit narrow po liti cal interest.31 Significantly, 
Sulaiman’s analy sis of the works of the found ers of the Sokoto Caliphate fo-
cuses exclusively on the pathways to good governance in a righ teous Muslim 
state, suggesting a moral contrast between Usman dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliph-
ate and the modern Nigerian state.
 After only a few years of Fulani assault on the armies of Hausa rulers and 
non- Hausa communities in the region,32 Usman dan Fodio became the leader 
of the most populous geopo liti cal territory in nineteenth- century West Africa. 
He was succeeded on death (1817) by his son, Mohammed Bello, as the amir 
al mu ‘minin (commander of the Muslim faithful) and sultan (caliph) of the 
Sokoto Caliphate. The empire that succeeded the Sokoto Jihad was consoli-
dated during Bello’s reign from 1815 to 1837. Bello was charged with the control 
of the eastern emirates in the caliphate. His  uncle Abdullahi, emir of Gwandu, 
took charge of the western emirates of Nupe and Ilorin. Sections of Bauchi 
and Adamawa also  later came  under the control of the Sokoto Caliphate while 
Sokoto Jihadists unsuccessfully attempted to incorporate the Muslim- ruled 
Kanem- Bornu Empire into the caliphate. Caliph Bello had to repel opposition 
from other potentates, including his  brother Atiku, who  later succeeded him 
as sultan, and rebellion from dissidents such as Dan Tunku of Kano, an old 
ally of his  father. Thereafter, Bello emerged as a pragmatic empire builder. He 
consolidated the gains of the caliphate through a careful balance of religious 
doctrine and strategic po liti cal calculation, conceding authority to the emirs 
over the administration of their emirates and overlooking many precaliphate 
Hausa religious and social practices that his  father had decried.
Mohammed Bello was an astute ruler who possessed a keen eye for statecraft: 
he presided over a theocratic confederacy that unified the previously autonomous 
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Hausa city- states  under the politico- religious authority of the Sokoto Caliph-
ate. This endeavor included integrating Islamic and sarauta institutions, in-
corporating Fulani pastoralists into agrarian life within Hausa communities, 
establishing mosques, and encouraging the education of talakawa commoners 
and  women.33 The intellectual perspectives of his leadership included original 
discourses (Infakul Maisuri) on the theological and po liti cal visions on which 
the caliphate was built, including detailed narratives about the history of the 
jihad. Ochonu tells us that Bello’s Infakul Maisuri contains critical discussions 
on “epistolary efforts to place the Caliphate above Bornu in the hierarchy of 
Islamic piety.”34 The writing is the first treatise to articulate a Sokoto imperial 
hegemony over the non- Hausa Muslim areas of central and northeastern Nige-
ria (con temporary Nigeria’s  Middle  Belt region). Indeed, the Sokoto Caliphate 
was not only defined as the custodian of Muslim values, but was delineated as 
the locus of regional power.35
The early era of caliphate rule saw the establishment of Maliki law;36 in addi-
tion, the new rulers monopolized judicial, religious, and po liti cal leadership.37 
Alkali courts, emirs’ courts, and courts of appeals established during Usman dan 
Fodio’s time  were updated and incorporated.38 The sheer volume of Sokoto 
leaders’ writings on sharia indicates the prominence of Islamic law through-
out the caliphate;39 and Murray Last has pointed out that “any complainant 
could expect to see the Emir (or his local headman) personally any day  after 
the dawn prayer; [and]  people’s complaints served to feed into governmental 
intelligence.”40
How effective was the new po liti cal and  legal system in dispensing justice in 
the emirates that constituted the Sokoto Caliphate in its formative years? The 
dominant scholarship suggests that sharia was not firmly established in many 
of the communities that would constitute the Northern Nigerian Protectorate 
 after the British conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate and Kanem Bornu Empire 
in the early twentieth  century.41 Indeed, arbitrary rule did much more than 
erode the integrity of the po liti cal system; it also rendered the Sokoto Caliph-
ate insecure.42 Similar to their Hausa pre de ces sors, many of the Fulani Muslim 
rulers ignored Usman dan Fodio’s injunctions against hereditary leadership and 
the discredited Hausa system of taxation.43 Equally impor tant, with the many 
wars of conquest from the jihad, slavery was pervasive in the new emirates.44 
Not surprisingly, Fulani misrule created pockets of local re sis tance, military 
brigandage, and Mahdist agitations.45 But opposition among the disaffected 
sectors of Hausa society was weak,46 and protests  were easily contained and 
brutally suppressed. In effect, therefore, Fulani Muslim rulers  under the new 
po liti cal and religious dispensation  were largely despotic, failing to guarantee for 
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local communities the just ummah promised by Usman dan Fodio’s jihad. In 
the military execution of the jihad, Crowder insists, “the ranks of his [Usman 
dan Fodio’s] army  were swollen by the faithful as well as the usual band of 
adventurers that followed any Soudanese army. This curious admixture of 
religious fanat i cism and opportunism accounts for the charges of slaughter 
and plunder that accompanied most Fulani victories. The Shehu [Usman dan 
Fodio] was quick to condemn such actions on the part of his followers.”47
Additional features of local administration  under the Sokoto Caliphate that 
indicated misrule  were reflected in arbitrary taxation that Usman dan Fodio 
had denounced: for example, Fulani Muslim rulers reinstituted the arbitrary 
jangali taxes that Hausa rulers had imposed on the nomadic Fulani during 
the preexisting po liti cal order. Among diverse communal groups, the word 
jangali inscribed the ethnic meaning of the tax, for the word is derived from 
the expressions yan jangare and galla, which imply the transient existence of 
Fulani nomads. Before the Sokoto Caliphate, the jangali tax affirmed the dis-
tinction between nomadic Fulani and non- nomadic Hausa groups.  Under the 
Sokoto Caliphate, the jangali tax system was retained, but its utility was revised 
to reflect new interests and power dispositions. Instead of abolishing it, the 
new Fulani Muslim rulers reversed the concept of jangali to collect tax from 
non- Muslim (pagan) Fulani. Origins of the practice are associated with Emir 
Umoru Dellaji, the first Fulani emir of Katsina, who differentiated between 
Muslim Fulani and Fulani rehazawa or kitiju (pagans) by levying a tax called 
zakka (heretofore a Hausa tax) on Muslim Fulani. The jangali tax, then, took 
on the dual function of marking the religious and ethnic identity of non- Muslim 
Fulani outside the po liti cal echelon, while the zakka tax expanded its significance 
to include Islamic and ethnic connotations.48 Sokoto Jihadists had charged that 
jangali was an arbitrary tax imposed on the Fulani  under Hausa rulers. When Fu-
lani Muslim rulers  rose to power in the early nineteenth  century, they continued 
the exercise of this arbitrary power by imposing the tax on “pagan” Fulani herd-
ers.49 Thus, although the Sokoto Jihadists argued that the Hausa taxation system 
was oppressive  toward the Fulani and they swore to ensure a thorough reform 
of all extractive policies to humanize society, in fact the new Fulani Muslim rul-
ers ignored the rallying call for Islamic justice articulated in the Jihad of Usman 
dan Fodio.  Needless to say, taxes, tributes, and other forms of extraction  were 
symbols of official power and dictated the character of social relations.50 In-
deed,  under the Sokoto Caliphate, the new Fulani Muslim rulers deployed 
preexisting modes of coercion to enforce new po liti cal and social relations: for 
example, Fulani Muslim rulers used the old Hausa jakada system (feudal army) 
to dominate tributary communities, especially outside the confines of the new 
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Hausa- Fulani emirates. Ochonu notes the ideological framework on which 
this vast and diverse territory was constructed:
The Fulani Islamic reform jihad of 1804–08 superimposed a central po liti-
cal and religious authority on the fragmented Hausa states of pres ent- day 
Northwestern Nigeria and, through conquest and discourse, disciplined 
them into one politico- linguistic unit. More importantly, the jihad in-
scribed Islamic piety as one of the most impor tant markers of Hausa 
identity. . . .  [Thus] what the jihad did was to initiate the pro cess of 
homogenization and the construction of a po liti cally useful narrative of 
Hausa identity, a narrative which was underwritten by religious and cul-
tural associations.51
Nigeria’s first prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, wrote the novel 
Shaihu Umar (1966), in which the po liti cal and social effects of the Sokoto 
Caliphate system are creatively narrated. Specifically, it sought to reimagine a 
proper Muslim man,  family, and society  under Fulani Muslim rule. Set in late 
nineteenth- century emirate society, it portrays “the fin de siècle; the last days of 
a  century of turbulence, bloodshed, and slavery,” amid caliphate breakdown.52 
The plot revolves around three Hausa institutions: the Islamic court, slavery, 
and the tradition of itinerant Muslim preachers. Balewa portrays the court as 
corrupt and riddled with intrigue among Muslim clerics; societal ambivalence 
is revealed in how Muslim clerics condone slavery; although slavery is some-
times condemned as evil by puritanical Muslim clerics, power ful notables who 
actively engage in the practice are hardly denounced by ulamas; the system 
of itinerant preachers and Qur’anic education can embody Islamic piety. In 
short, Balewa’s novel depicts an emirate society at the turn of the twentieth 
 century that was far from the pious ummah Usman dan Fodio had envisioned 
in the early 1800s.
What ever the deficiencies of the Sokoto Caliphate, Fulani Muslim rulers 
brought the Hausa city- states  under their control, effectively asserting their 
dominance  under the compromise of Fulani and Hausa Muslim rulers. De-
fined and inspired by Usman dan Fodio’s Islamic reform, the Sokoto Jihad im-
posed a Muslim theocracy on the Hausa city- states. Fulani Muslim influence 
spread beyond the Hausa region, and as far away as Northern Yoruba com-
munities.53 By 1900, when the British declared their colonial control over the 
Sokoto Caliphate, the consequence of Usman dan Fodio’s Jihad was glaring: 
Islamic rule was entrenched in northwestern Nigeria; many con temporary 
northeastern Nigerian communities  were  under Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers; 
Fulani Muslim rule had been projected into con temporary central Nigerian 
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communities; Muslim influence had grown significantly in the Yoruba hinter-
land of Oyo and Oshun, as well as among Southern Yoruba subgroups around 
the Atlantic coast, especially Ijebu, Egba, and Lagos.54
The Yoruba Region: The Coming of Chris tian ity
At the time when Hausa- Fulani Muslim rule was transforming the commu-
nities that soon would constitute Britain’s Northern Nigerian Protectorate, 
mission Chris tian ity began to make inroads into the diverse communities that 
would become colonial Southern Nigeria by the late nineteenth  century.55 This 
pro cess had started in the early 1800s when several prominent western Chris-
tian evangelical socie ties began to explore opportunities for the establishment 
of missions in West Africa.56  These missionary socie ties received an enormous 
morale boost from the convergence of favorable internal and external forces 
by the 1820s.57 From the beginning, the remarkable work of the preeminent 
missionary society in West Africa, the Church Missionary Society (cms), was 
sustained by notable En glishmen such as William Wilberforce, the celebrated 
abolitionist; Charles Grant of the East India Com pany; Thomas Clarkson and 
Zachary Macaulay of the Sierra Leone Com pany; and Lord Teignmouth, a former 
governor- general of India.  These men had a mix of humanitarian and economic 
interests in Africa and India; they  were strongly united by the antislavery cam-
paign and mounted strong opposition against the  human calamity. They found 
a common missionary platform in the establishment of the Society for Mission 
to Africa and the East, soon to be known as the Church Missionary Society.58 
More importantly, cms missionary efforts in West Africa benefited signifi-
cantly from the enthusiasm of Thomas Fowell Buxton, a British Parliamentarian 
who was also the vice president of the cms. In his landmark book The African 
Slave Trade and Its Remedy, Buxton harbored boundless hope for the positive 
transformation of the African continent through the promotion of “legitimate” 
commerce and the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade. To achieve  these impor-
tant objectives, Buxton called on British authorities to encourage the exploration 
of the Niger River and establish treaties with West African rulers.59
Much of the Christian missionary work that set the foundation of the trans-
formation of the Nigerian region is thus inextricably linked to the history of 
the cms mission in West Africa. Henry Venn, son of the Reverend John Venn, 
a founder of the cms and its secretary- general from 1841 to 1872, contributed 
significantly to the policies that  shaped the objectives of this  great missionary 
society in the Nigerian region. Venn’s long ser vice as secretary- general encour-
aged local leadership of the new cms mission stations in West Africa.60 He 
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insisted on a mission that would be self- supporting and self- governing. Fol-
lowing Venn’s vision, significant resources  were invested in grooming Chris-
tian educated West Africans from British colonial Sierra Leone to lead local 
cms missions in the Nigerian region, starting in the mid- nineteenth  century.61 
Consequently, the cms began its missionary work in earnest in the West Af-
rican Atlantic coast of the Nigerian region in 1841  under the leadership of a 
German missionary, the Reverend Jacob Friederich Schon, and the Reverend 
Samuel Ajayi Crowther, a Yoruba repatriate from Freetown, Sierra Leone, who 
as a young boy had been liberated by British squadrons from a Portuguese slave 
ship off the coast of West Africa in 1821. From the onset, the mission forged a 
strong relationship with British colonial authorities in Lagos. This relationship 
was bolstered when the cms arranged a meeting for Reverend Crowther with 
the prime minister, the colonial secretary, Queen Victoria, and Prince Albert 
in London in 1850.62 Crowther subsequently was consecrated Anglican Bishop 
of the Diocese of the Niger Territories in 1864. He would serve as bishop  until 
1890, when the territory and other cms areas in the region  were consolidated 
into the Diocese of Western Equatorial Africa.
Initially, cms missionaries operating in the second half of the nineteenth 
 century could not directly draw on British power to support their efforts in 
the Nigerian region.63 Rather,  these pioneering missionaries worked with Eu ro-
pean merchants to secure the support of local rulers to establish mission stations 
in Yoruba and other Nigerian communities.64 As J. F. Ade Ajayi noted: “Traders 
and missionaries  were interdependent. The Christian missions made a con-
siderable impact on the trading situation. In turn, the expansion of Eu ro pean 
trade and po liti cal influence greatly facilitated the work of missionaries.”65 
Thus cms missionaries collaborated with Eu ro pean merchants to open up the 
Yoruba hinterland, the Niger- Benue confluence, and the Niger Delta region 
to Christian evangelism and Eu ro pean trade.66 However, by the 1850s cms 
missionaries established an effective partnership with colonial authorities sta-
tioned in Lagos. For example, the British government in Lagos supported three 
cms Niger expeditions from the 1840s to the 1850s.67 Indeed, with the support 
of Yoruba Sierra Leonean returnees, the cms Niger Mission opened the area 
around the River Niger to trade, leading George Taubman Goldie, leader of 
the Royal Niger Com pany, to amalgamate British companies and seek a royal 
charter for mono poly in 1886.
The convergence of  these regional and global developments in the second 
half of the nineteenth  century,68  shaped so profoundly by cms missionary 
work and British imperial interests,  were carried out against the backdrop of 
the intense military conflict among the rulers of Yoruba city- states for control 
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over resources and trade routes throughout much of the nineteenth  century. 
Indeed, the consequences of this protracted conflict among Yoruba city- states 
would have far- reaching implications for cms missionary work, ultimately 
shaping the direction and dimension of the social transformation of Yoruba 
communities since the turbulent nineteenth  century. It is to this military con-
flict with such impor tant implications for the work of the emergent Christian 
missions that we turn in the next session.
About the Yoruba Wars: A Detour
With the collapse of the dominant Yoruba city- state of Old Oyo in the early 
nineteenth  century, regional wars disrupted po liti cal relations in the Yoruba 
region for much of the  century.69 The historical lit er a ture is clear that the 
collapse of the Old Oyo Kingdom, for several centuries the hegemon in the 
region, and the southern expansion of the Fulani Jihad into the Oyo- Yoruba 
city- state of Ilorin in the early nineteenth  century unleashed protracted con-
flict among Yoruba city- states that was only brought to an end with the impo-
sition of British rule in the last de cade of the  century. The  human costs of the 
Yoruba wars are often mea sured in terms of the destruction of many Yoruba 
communities— indeed, Old Oyo Kingdom itself was destroyed and aban-
doned in the 1820s; large- scale  human displacement led to the mass migration 
of many Oyo- Yoruba communities pushing southward; adding to the trauma 
was the inevitable competition for space among the mix of  people pouring in 
waves southward, pushing other Yoruba subgroups, especially the Owu and 
Egba  peoples, farther south at the expense of the Egbado.70
 These major demographic shifts had several significant social and po liti-
cal consequences. First,  there was the epochal shift in the hierarchy of power 
among Yoruba states: the age- old Yoruba monarchical princi ple continued to 
be observed in theory, but in practice it was the age of warrior entrepreneurs 
who mobilized hundreds of fighting men and utilized slave  labor to produce 
palm oil for the Eu ro pean export trade in return for firearms. Second, instabil-
ity became the order of the day: the new centers of power, now dominated 
by warriors, continually rained fear among populations by challenging exist-
ing monarchies for the exercise of power.71 Third,  these disruptions produced 
new po liti cal experiments and alliances: for example, the displaced Egba and 
sections of the Owu regrouped in a new town, Abeokuta, about forty miles 
from the port city of Lagos. They welcomed missionaries hoping to use their 
influence with British colonial authorities and Eu ro pean merchants to build 
commercial and po liti cal power and outshine their closest rivals, the Ijebu; the 
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most successful of  these po liti cal experiments  were carried out by displaced 
Oyo warriors who established a new garrison town of Ibadan. They defeated 
the Ijaye, the only Oyo power to rival them, and built a novel chieftaincy system 
that consolidated the extensive power of Ibadan’s new military rulers. Ibadan 
rulers emerged to control much of Southern Oyo, Ife, Ijesha, Ekiti, and Akoko, 
where they competed with regional powers— Benin, Nupe, and Ilorin— for he-
gemony.72 Eventually, responding to Ibadan’s growing military threat, several 
Yoruba subgroups, the Ijesha, and Ekiti war chiefs formed a  grand alliance (the 
Ekitiparapo) with the Ife, Ijebu, and Egba to control a route in Eastern Yoruba-
land to the coast in Lagos for the supply of breech- loading  rifles.73
Thus as military conflicts consumed many Yoruba communities, warlords 
displaced elders as leaders of local communities, and wealth derived from war 
booty gained importance, destabilizing traditional modes of social hierarchy. 
With warfare among Yoruba city- states intensifying over control of economic 
resources and trade routes, captives from armed conflicts, displaced refugee pop-
ulations, domestic slaves, and other forms of unfree  labor disrupted preexisting 
demographic arrangements in many Yoruba communities.  These cataclysmic dis-
ruptions in one of West Africa’s major geocultural regions fueled the Atlantic 
slave trade through the port cities of Lagos and Porto Novo, even as the slave 
trade declined in the Amer i cas in the first half of the nineteenth  century. Sig-
nificantly, this coincided with the efforts of the British government, once the 
engine for the Atlantic slave trade in the previous  century, to undermine the 
trade at this new West African source. A direct outcome of the Yoruba wars, 
Yoruba returnees who had been liberated by the British Royal Navy off the 
West African coast and settled in Freetown, Sierra Leone, emerged as the most 
ironic story in this tragic saga. Several de cades  after their departure from their 
homelands,  these Yoruba returnees would play a critical role in the transforma-
tion of the Yoruba region from the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, when Britain 
consolidated its colonial control in the region.74
rebirth and evangelism
As  these Yoruba disruptions converged with global forces derived from Brit-
ish antislavery efforts against the slave trade, evangelizing efforts by the cms, 
Wesleyan Methodists, and Baptists expanded in the coastal city of Lagos and 
in Abeokuta to its immediate north. New opportunities opened for Christian 
missions and Eu ro pean commercial interests in the Yoruba hinterland. In addi-
tion to their religious and moral claims, Christian missionaries also had explic-
itly secular ideas about the virtues of commerce, ideas of vocational training, and 
economic development, contending that “civilization” was contingent on the 
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formation of a Western- oriented Christian elite that would spearhead the pro-
gressive transformation of Yoruba society. Alongside the turbulence of the Yo-
ruba wars, Yoruba returnees socialized in a pan- Yoruba consciousness in Sierra 
Leone emerged as agents of this modernization process in their homelands. 
As Christian missionary impact gained momentum by the late nineteenth 
 century in many Yoruba communities, Yoruba religious practices revealed a mix 
of indigenous and global religions, consisting of Yoruba adherence to a supreme 
god; cults dedicated to orisas (lesser deities); Islam; and Chris tian ity. However, 
Yoruba Sierra Leonean (Saro) Christian missionaries constructed the concept 
of a mono the istic Christian faith in contrast to the Muslim and “pagan” other, 
separating Christian religious practice from other aspects of life and positioning 
Chris tian ity as the religion of peace. This message would resonate among war- 
weary Yoruba communities.75
In the Yoruba region, the first major group of Christian missionaries 
charged with the responsibility of evangelizing the hinterland arrived through 
the auspices of the cms in Badagry in 1842, preceded  there by small groups of 
Yoruba returnees from Sierra Leone. Finding  little success in this unwelcoming 
coastal town, they moved to the new and vibrant city of Abeokuta, where local 
chiefs led by Sodeke welcomed them, hoping they would serve as intermediar-
ies on behalf of Abeokuta rulers with British authorities in Lagos to forestall 
the growing threat of the Dahomey Kingdom farther to the west. The success 
of  these pioneering cms missionaries— and successive missions, including the 
Wesleyan Methodist and the Baptist— led to the establishment of mission sta-
tions in Lagos, where Yoruba returnees from Sierra Leone, Brazil, and Cuba 
 were settling in large numbers by the 1850s.76
From this vibrant beginning, Christian missions expanded rapidly through-
out the Yoruba region. From bases in Abeokuta and Lagos, missionaries pushed 
inland, opening stations in major Yoruba towns such as Ibadan and Ijaye in 
1853, and subsequently in Ikorodu, Sagamu, and Igbesa. By the late nineteenth 
 century, missionaries, mostly Yoruba repatriates, became a regular feature in the 
Oyo- Yoruba towns of Oyo (New Oyo), Iseyin, Saki, Ogbomosho, and Awaye 
and in the western Yoruba towns of Ilaro, Ketu, Ibara, and Isaga. While po liti-
cal conditions limited their success in Ijebu- Ode, Ife, and Modakeke, a strong 
cms mission was established in Ode- Ondo. This mission eventually served 
as the headquarters for cms missionary work northward and eastward in Ife, 
Ijesha, and Ekiti, ultimately leading to the establishment of mission stations in 
Ife, Modakeke, Ado- Ekiti, Ijero, Aiyede, Akure, Ise, Owo, and Akoko, from the 
1870s to the end of the  century. In the eastern Yoruba hinterland of Ondo and 
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Ekiti, the arrival of Christian missionaries, most of them Yoruba Sierra Leon-
ean (Saro) returnees, meant a reprieve from de cades of Yoruba wars.77 Lamin 
Sanneh notes the social and economic impact of Saro returnees in the transfor-
mation of Yoruba communities in the second half of the nineteenth  century:
In the intervening years when government and mission  were still wary 
of any reckless scheme of territorial overreach, the re- captives [Saro] 
bought ships and traveled up and down the coast, demonstrating that 
expansion beyond Sierra Leone was  viable and logical development of 
the antislavery cause. . . .  Such advances in the personal circumstances 
of the settlers and re- captives produced the educated and successful in-
dividuals who could plan and direct the antislavery outreach to Nigeria 
and elsewhere. Preachers, pastors, schoolteachers, traders, and clerical 
personnel composed the ranks of this buoyant cadre of modernizing 
agents, with their skills supporting their mobile lifestyle.78
Saro returnees represented a significant component of the Yoruba cities of 
Lagos and Abeokuta in the second half of the nineteenth  century. E. A. Ayan-
dele estimates that in Lagos they numbered over five thousand, and about ten 
thousand in Abeokuta by the end of the  century.79 Indeed, Saro returnees had 
turned Abeokuta into a vibrant republic with modern administrative and in-
frastructural systems by the time the British consolidated their colonial rule in 
the early twentieth  century.80
missionary momentum: education  
and  human development
Concomitantly, cms mission stations grew in strides in Yoruba communities, 
reflecting the significance of elementary, secondary, and vocational education 
as a critical expression of progressive social transformation. By 1846, four years 
 after their arrival in Abeokuta, Reverends Crowther and Schon had founded a 
church and several schools. With the growing influence of the British authori-
ties in Lagos, the work of missionaries intensified, leading to a significant in-
crease in the number of schools in the city.81 As early as 1856, the cms alone 
had 256 elementary- level pupils in Lagos and 549 students in nine schools 
throughout the Yoruba region. And with the opening of the cms Grammar 
School in Lagos in 1859, the cms began instruction at the secondary school 
level. A de cade  later, the mission opened a girls’ secondary school, and in 1896, 
the cms had opened a teacher- training college, St. Andrews College, in Oyo. 
By 1930, three de cades  after the imposition of British colonial rule in Nigeria 
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and only four de cades  after the devastating Yoruba wars, the cms alone had 
a total of 567 elementary, secondary, and vocational schools with a total of 
34,140 students in Southern Nigeria.82
In Abeokuta,  under the leadership of Yoruba Sierra Leonean returnees, the 
Egba United Kingdom collaborated with the local government to establish el-
ementary and secondary schools in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.  These efforts resulted in the enrollment of about two thousand pupils 
in Egba schools by 1904, and the establishment of Nigeria’s first community 
secondary school, the Abeokuta Grammar School, five years  later.  After the 
conquest of the Ijebu by the British in 1892, the cms made quick inroads into 
the Ijebu region’s primary city, Ijebu- Ode, leading to the establishment of a 
vibrant Anglican Church movement by the early twentieth  century. This ef-
fort led to the establishment of a local secondary school, the Ijebu- Ode Gram-
mar School, in 1913. Similarly, in Ibadan, following the establishment of a cms 
mission by David Hinderer and Daniel Olubi in 1857, local Ibadan cms lead-
ers encouraged the mission to found a local community secondary school for 
boys, the Ibadan Grammar School, in 1913.  After several years of hard work, the 
local Ondo cms established a community secondary school, Ondo Boys High 
School, in 1919. A second secondary school in Ondo Province, Christ School, 
was created through the agitation of local cms church leaders in Ado- Ekiti in 
1933.83 Moreover, in the eastern district of Lagos in the early years of colonial 
rule, Yoruba cms missionary Thomas Ayegumbiyi describes the extent of local 
commitment to education:
Monday July 13 accompanied by Mr. Olubi, I attended a meeting of the 
parochial committee as a visitor. The chief topic for the discussion was 
the schoolmaster’s salary; it seems the fund was exhausted and  there 
was a difficulty to raise what was wanted even for the current quarter; 
the Bale [head chief ] of the town, a Mohammedan was invited into the 
room to have a say in the discussion and out of the interest he has in the 
education of the young of the town, readily promised to do all he could 
to get his co- religionists to lend a helping hand. I understand that he has 
since got them to promise 6 pounds annually  towards the fund.84
Several other Christian missions, notably the Southern Baptist Convention 
(USA), Wesleyan Methodist, and Catholic Missions, followed the lead of the 
cms, not only in the Yoruba region, but also in other Southern Nigerian regions, 
especially the Niger Delta and the southeast area of the Igbo  people. Inspired by 
evangelical movements from Western Eu rope and missionary work in India, the 
American Baptist Convention began to send missionaries abroad in the early 
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nineteenth  century. However, with growing divisions between contingents 
from Northern U.S. states, who opposed slavery, and their Southern counter-
parts, who condoned it, an intractable conflict led to the formation of the 
Southern (USA) Baptist Convention. This splinter group— the Southern Bap-
tist Convention— ultimately emerged as pioneering white American Baptist 
missionaries to southwestern Nigeria, starting in the mid- nineteenth  century. 
Thomas Jefferson Bowen pioneered the missionary efforts of the Southern 
Baptist Convention to the Yoruba region, initially settling in Ijaye in 1853 and 
ultimately encouraging the building of mission stations from Lagos on the coast 
through the Yoruba hinterland and on to the River Niger. His successors carried 
the work forward, establishing mission stations that eventually became promi-
nent centers of Southern Baptist Convention missionary work among Oyo and 
Oshun Yoruba subgroups, establishing pioneering Christian missions in major 
towns at the turn of the twentieth  century.85 The triumph of the Baptist mis-
sion in the Yoruba region by the early twentieth  century, despite the hard work 
of American missionaries, ultimately required the commitment of Yoruba pas-
tors and church leaders. Through the work of Yoruba pastors such as Reverends 
Moses Ladejo Stone, Mojola Agbebi, and Lajide Tubi in the First Baptist Church 
of Lagos, Ebenezer Baptist Church, and Araromi Baptist Church in Lagos in the 
late nineteenth  century, early Baptist missionary work led to the establishment 
of several schools in Lagos and Abeokuta.
Similarly, in many other Oyo and Oshun- Yoruba communities— and  later 
in Ekiti towns— the Southern Baptist Convention was particularly success-
ful  because of strong collaboration between American missionaries and local 
Baptist leaders from the late nineteenth  century to the end of colonial rule in 
the mid- twentieth  century.86 As challenging economic conditions forced new 
Oyo- Yoruba educated Baptists— especially Ogbomosho natives—to seek their 
fortune outside their hometown, they migrated not only to the major Yor uba 
cities of Lagos and Ibadan, but also settled far afield in Northern Nigeria, the 
Gold Coast, Dahomey, and Togoland. As they migrated to  these alien regions, 
they established Yoruba diaspora churches wherever they went.87 In Northern 
Nigerian cities such as Kaduna, Zaria, Kafanchan, Funtua, Minna, Bida, Katcha, 
and  others, Ogbomosho Baptist immigrants, taking advantage of new economic 
opportunities in the early de cades of colonial rule, became pastors, lay leaders, 
and active members of Baptist churches throughout the region. Indeed, Thomas 
Birch Freeman, a British- African Wesleyan missionary with experience among 
the Asante in the Gold Coast, accompanied by his wife and another West Afri-
can missionary, William DeGraft, had added to this momentum of rapid social 
transformation of Yoruba communities by the early 1840s. Freeman and his 
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associates had established a mission in Badagry and Abeokuta in 1842. Their 
work led to the establishment of some of the first elementary and secondary 
schools in Nigeria, including Methodist Boys’ High School, Lagos, founded 
in 1878, and a girls’ secondary school, Methodist Girls’ High School, Lagos, 
founded in 1879.  These churches and schools would serve as pioneering insti-
tutions for vibrant Methodist religious and educational institutions not only 
in the Yoruba hinterland, but throughout Southern and central Nigeria by the 
mid- twentieth  century.88
 Under the strong leadership of a French priest,  Father Pierre Bouche, the 
Catholic Society of African Missions, following the lead of Protestant mis-
sions, established its educational work in Lagos, as well as the Igbo towns of 
Onitsha and Ibuzo, with secondary school instruction at St. Gregory College 
in Lagos, and Christ the King College in Onitsha, as well as teacher- training col-
leges in Onitsha and Ibuzo, by the turn of the twentieth  century. In the specific 
case of Nigeria’s southeastern region, Magnus Bassey notes how the Holy Ghost 
 Fathers of the Catholic mission challenged the educational work of cms mis-
sionaries from the late nineteenth  century to the mid- twentieth  century:
The period between 1885 and 1932 witnessed intense missionary rivalry 
in southern Nigeria, occasioned by the entry of the Holy Ghost  Fathers 
of the Roman Catholic Mission into the missionary field in eastern Ni-
geria. In 1885 with the arrival of  Father Lutz as the Catholic Superior 
of the mission, the Holy Ghost  Fathers, who  were put in charge of the 
Lower Niger, started work. That same year  Father Lutz opened a mission 
at Onitsha on a piece of land donated by the Obi of Onitsha through 
the instrumentality of the Anglican Bishop Crowther. In 1900  Father 
Lejeune succeeded  Father Lutz as the Catholic Superior. Lejeune was 
one of the greatest advocates of the policy of evangelization through the 
schools. . . .  Lejeune further believed that good education would enable 
African students to earn a good living as well as exert their influence in 
society to the  favor of the Roman Catholic Church. . . .  When  Father 
Shanahan took over from  Father Lejeune he expressed a similar concern. 
 Under  Father ( later Bishop) Shanahan, the rcm spread its variety of reli-
gion and education to most parts of the Igbo, Ibibio, and Ogoja provinces 
east of the Niger.89
Starting with cms missions as early as the 1840s, ’50s, and ’60s, Christian 
missionaries of all denominations embraced the idea that missionary work re-
quired some investment in basic medical ser vices to address the needs of their 
mission stations and, whenever pos si ble, to meet the basic health needs of the 
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local community. Following the works of Bishop Crowther and other pioneer-
ing missionaries, Christian missionaries provided vaccination against smallpox 
and established medical dispensaries from the 1840s. Indeed, the genealogy 
of the modern Nigerian medical profession can be traced to the training of a 
handful of gifted Saro cms men who pioneered modern medicine in Nigeria.90 
Naturally, with the slow growth of the medical profession, cms missions estab-
lished health clinics to meet enormous health prob lems of local communities. 
Following the establishment of health clinics in the Yoruba hinterland, where 
Saro returnees had led mission stations by the late nineteenth  century, the cms 
expanded modest health care facilities to their new Southern and central Nige-
rian missions by the early twentieth  century. For example, several de cades  after 
Saro returnees pioneered the cms mission, Sybil  K. Batley, a cms mission-
ary, notes the enormous need for modern health care in Iyi- Enu Medical Mis-
sion: “The maternity department has increased markedly. Growing numbers 
of  women are attending for ante- natal advice, over 5,000 of  these attendees 
having been made through the Government Department.”91 Nevertheless, the 
daunting challenges confronting the cms missions’ health care initiatives—as 
well as other missionary health care programs— would persist late into the co-
lonial period.
The most significant impact of Christian missionary work in Southern Nige-
ria, however, would lie in the cultural implications of Western literary traditions, 
vigorously pushed by Saro missionaries in Yoruba communities, beginning with 
the arrival of the cms missions in the 1840s. Ajayi’s vivid analy sis of the signifi-
cance of the translation of the Bible to the Yoruba language by Crowther and 
his cms associates underscores this impor tant development not only in Yor-
uba society, but in vari ous Southern and central Nigerian communities by the 
turn of the twentieth  century. In this context, the translation of the Bible from 
En glish to Yoruba was not only essential to the propagation of Chris tian ity; it 
was also critical for the flowering of a literary tradition in Yoruba communi-
ties. Noting the significance of Crowther’s critical role in the translation of the 
Bible to the Yoruba language, Ajayi observes:
He published a few extracts in 1848; the Epistle to the Romans in 1850; 
Luke, Acts, James, and I and II Peter in 1851; Genesis and Matthew in 
1853; Exodus and the Psalms in 1854; Proverbs and Ecclesiastes in 1856 
and revisions of earlier text.  After 1857, he had to work with  others. 
Thomas King had collaborated with him on Matthew in 1853. In 1857–
62, they worked on the Epistles— Philippians, I and II Colossians, I and 
II Thessalonians, I and II Timothy, Titus, Philemon, Hebrews, John, 
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Jude, Revelations, thus completing the New Testament in 1861. . . .  
When  people remark casually on the literary quality of the Yoruba Bible 
and the foundation it has laid for developing the Yoruba language as a 
vehicle for education and communication, let us remember that it took 
hard work, scholarly study, and high literary skills. Wherever Crowther 
went, he collected vocabularies, probed histories, concepts and ideas.92
The literary pursuits necessitated by the translation of the Bible and other 
Christian theological documents to Yoruba— along with the establishment of 
schools— soon opened the door to a vibrant Nigerian printing industry by the 
early twentieth  century. Starting with the establishment of the headquarters 
of the cms Press in Lagos in 1913, the cms established bookshops in many 
Yoruba cities, notably Ibadan, Ijebu-Ode, Ile- Ife, Ilesha, Akure, Ondo, Owo, 
Ado- Ekiti, and Ikare. With Yoruba cms laymen as man ag ers,  these book-
stores encouraged the growth of literacy throughout Nigeria.93 And with 
the growth of literacy in  these Yoruba cities, print culture became a crucial 
medium of collective social action, shaping the meaning of identity in an 
increasingly diverse society. Adebanji Akintoye notes the implications of this 
print medium not just for literacy, but for the articulation of a Yoruba ethno- 
national identity:
The men of Yoruba origin employed in the Christian missions, and the 
growing number of literate  people in vari ous parts of the country  were 
attracted to the fascinating traditions of the past preserved in  every Yor-
uba community, and began to write about them, as well as about current 
happenings in Yorubaland. John Augustus Otunba Payne of Lagos be-
came the leading person among the early writers, with his Lagos and West 
African Almanac published annually from 1874. . . .  Writing on Yoruba his-
tory and institutions was to grow very richly during the last de cade of the 
nineteenth  century and to become even richer in the twentieth  century. The 
reduction of the language into writing during the nineteenth  century, and 
the emergence of a common Yoruba orthography, enabled some of the writ-
ers to produce their works in Yoruba language— and this was to become a 
very significant cultural development during the twentieth  century.94
Christian missionaries also facilitated the growth of modern apprenticeship 
in Nigeria. Yoruba returnee Christians from Sierra Leone, Brazil, and Cuba, 
with the support of missionary groups, brought to Nigeria their artisanal skills 
in bricklaying, masonry, carpentry, tailoring, watch repair, painting, and basic 
architecture.95 Indeed, with the establishment of the Yoruba cms mission in 
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the 1840s, cms secretary- general Henry Venn, critical of the orientation of 
Saro elite  toward literary education, stressed the importance of industrial train-
ing in the new mission: “In 1853, for example, he sent Mr. R. Paley, a young 
Cambridge gradu ate, to go and turn the Abeokuta Training Institution into a 
model self- supporting institution where learning  will be combined with indus-
trial  labor in the manner of the Basle missionaries in the Gold Coast. . . .  The 
institution or ga nized a system of apprenticeship, and trained a few carpenters, tai-
lors, printers, brick- makers, and masons.”96 The growth of artisans enabled the 
further development of apprenticeships through missionary schools. Within a 
short period of time, the products of missionary apprenticeship became a small 
but influential  middle class in Yoruba cities around the Atlantic coast, such as 
Lagos and Abeokuta. Many in this upwardly mobile class went into other busi-
nesses and had become successful by the time the Yoruba region came  under 
British colonial rule at the end of the  century.97
By the early twentieth  century, the strong partnership between Nigerian 
and Eu ro pean missionaries had  shaped the rapid growth of the Niger Diocese 
of the cms in southeastern Nigeria. In Nsukka, an impor tant cms stronghold 
in Igboland, for instance,  there  were about sixty established churches for local 
clergymen to manage. Clergymen and other church officials traveled  great dis-
tance to consolidate the successes of the cms mission stations in many South-
ern and central Nigerian communities.98
In this overview, I have underscored how the activities of local missionaries— 
especially Yoruba cms missionaries and Christian converts— gave impetus to 
the rapid pro cess of social change: Christian missionaries consistently  shaped 
social, po liti cal, and economic  factors to create the peculiar environment on 
which emergent Southern Nigerian communities  were built from the begin-
ning of the twentieth  century. British imperial interests also played critical 
roles in this transformative pro cess, creating local administrative institutions 
that coordinated the social transformation of Southern Nigeria.  These emerg-
ing Southern Nigerian communities  were fundamentally diff er ent from pat-
terns that  were being consolidated in the Hausa- Fulani Muslim confederacy 
north of the River Niger,99 analyzed above. The Nigerian colonial state—at 
least in Southern Nigeria, especially the Yoruba region— had started with the 
colonization of Lagos between 1851 and 1861 and the incorporation of Nige-
rian producers into global markets through the activities of the Royal Niger 
Com pany. But it was the ingenuity of Yoruba missionaries and new Christian 
converts that provided the essential social framework for the growth of  these 
po liti cal and economic developments by the early de cades of colonial rule.
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christian, ethno- national,  
and diasporan identities
It is essential to underscore the peculiarities of social change at this juncture 
and the characteristics of the purveyors of  these complex pro cesses of social 
transformation. In addition to the Saro returnees discussed above, the pro cess 
of mission Chris tian ity and migration was complicated by the arrival of an-
other impor tant returnee population, the Afro- Brazilians, during this era of 
Yoruba social transformation. Having been a casualty of the many disruptions 
among West African city- states, especially the Yoruba wars, Afro- Brazilian 
returnees began to arrive in Lagos in the second half of the nineteenth  century. 
Popularly known as the Aguda  because of their distinctive Catholic identity, 
Afro- Brazilians demonstrated strong connections to Luso- Brazilian culture 
and  were connected to the religious universe of the Yoruba Diaspora that domi-
nated the Bahian world they left  behind in Brazil.100 While elite Saros, through 
the educational institutions of the cms, dominated the modern professions— 
especially clergy, education, medicine, law, and civil service—by the beginning 
of the twentieth  century,101 Afro- Brazilians emerged as exceptional craftsmen 
and traders who took advantage of the dynamic conditions taking place in Lagos 
by the late 1800s.102 While some Afro- Brazilians became wealth merchants, en-
gaging in trade between Lagos and the Lusophone world, many became suc-
cessful as masons and carpenters.103
I have already highlighted the consequences of the collapse of the Old Oyo 
Empire that heralded the seven- decade- long “age of confusion” during the Yoruba 
wars. Mission Chris tian ity provided a new lens for looking at this turbulent 
Yoruba world. I have also discussed the emergence of new cultural identities: 
Saro missionaries combined evangelical Chris tian ity with Yoruba ethnic iden-
tity, and the intersection of historical space- time and evangelism produced 
new interpretations of Christian theology. The Catholicism of Afro- Brazilians 
enriched the throbbing social and cultural space, especially in the rapidly grow-
ing cities of Lagos and Abeokuta. Christian notions of sin and salvation domi-
nated debates among local clergies and their congregations. Debates on culture 
and religion reverberated throughout the Yoruba region’s emerging colonial 
society. The transformative impact of Christian missions in  these Yoruba com-
munities reflects David Chidester’s observation that “although Christian mis-
sionaries from Eu rope insisted that they  were bringing light into a region of 
darkness, their gospel of sin and salvation was experienced by Africans as a local 
prob lem of translation. . . .  African Christian communities engaged [the is-
sues] in an ongoing pro cess of intercultural translation, moving back and forth 
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between indigenous religious knowledge and the terms of Christian doctrine, 
practice, and authority.”104
In many ways Christian missions adapted to local social and po liti cal condi-
tions in southwestern Nigeria.105 In most Yoruba communities early Christian 
converts  were typically the poor, former slaves, or  those cut off from main-
stream local communities. The so- called age of confusion had produced  these 
marginal groups in large numbers, seeking empowerment  under the growing 
hegemony of British imperial power sustained by the new ideas of mission 
Chris tian ity and British commercial interests. To win converts, missionaries 
abandoned preaching for dialogue, connected the realms of heaven and earth, 
and emphasized Christ’s sacrifice to link Chris tian ity with indigenous cosmol-
ogy. This contrasts with Muslim conversion efforts, which had been making 
inroads into the Yoruba region since the early nineteenth  century.106 Muslim 
preachers from the Sokoto Caliphate had refused to translate the Qur’an or 
abandon Arabic terms. While Islam in the Yoruba region focused on its foreign 
origins, mission Chris tian ity was  shaped by the ideas of Yoruba Christian mis-
sionaries.  These missionaries articulated a Yoruba national consciousness,107 pro-
pelled by modern science and rationality. While they professed Western ideas of 
civilization derived from the missions, Yoruba returnee missionaries found cre-
ative ways to reconcile their Christian beliefs with local Yoruba traditions. Thus, 
as Femi Kolapo reflects, the Yoruba experience reveals that returnee missionaries
 were sojourning neighbors, fellow countrymen, traders in new im-
ported manufactures, and friends to white men with power ful gunboats. 
In addition, they had plenty of money to spend in the local economy 
and could redeem or buy off obstreperous or aging slaves. They  were 
equally involved in po liti cal situations that, willy- nilly, positioned them 
as friends or as foes in re spect of other settler groups. They constituted 
an economic and po liti cal group with corresponding obligations to the 
communities in which they  were established.108
Consequently, conversion to Chris tian ity gained momentum in Yoruba cities 
and towns by the late nineteenth  century. The end of the Yoruba wars and the 
imposition of the colonial state led to waves of conversion to Chris tian ity by 
the early twentieth  century. A sizable Christian population emerged, taking 
on mainline Catholic and Protestant denominations: Anglicans, Method-
ists, Baptists, and,  later, African in de pen dent and Pentecostal churches, which 
emphasized the spiritual force of prayer, individual connection to Christ, and 
vocal expression of Christian piety.
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Yoruba missionaries  were engaged in the tasks of reimagining an ethno- 
national identity, and it is said that the turn to Chris tian ity brought with it the 
birth of Yoruba nationalism starting in the early twentieth  century.109 Yoruba 
subgroups possess strong understanding of intersecting historical experiences 
as a  people, articulated in the emergent modernist proj ect of Yoruba mission 
Chris tian ity. An ethno- national discourse of shared Yoruba culture predicated 
on the power ful myths of common origin  were incubated during this trans-
formative moment of Yoruba history: the influential traditions centered on 
Ile- Ife as the cradle of Yoruba civilization and Oduduwa as the progenitor 
of the Yoruba  people; a common pantheon of Yoruba gods and spirits; inter-
connected po liti cal experiences; and universal belief in the common ancestry 
of Yoruba dynastic traditions. It is true that the Yorubas lived in their many 
city- states and villages as subethnic groups; notwithstanding, I concur with 
Akintoye that the enduring structures that sustained this modern ethno- 
national consciousness  were not simply contingent on the social realities of the 
times but, significantly, drew from the Yoruba  peoples’ tradition, religion, 
and customary ways.  Precisely for this reason, Akintoye concludes: “Common 
consciousness of the larger ethnic group ran through their lives, their politics, 
their rituals, and worship, their economic institutions and practices, and their 
total worldview.”110 The Yoruba wars of the nineteenth  century  were traumatic, 
though the experience also expanded Yoruba ethno- national consciousness. 
And Chris tian ity, the new religion that supplanted the “age of confusion,” did 
not erode Yoruba consciousness; it simply built on it.
This Yoruba encounter with mission Chris tian ity from the mid- nineteenth 
 century to the advent of colonial rule at the turn of the twentieth  century— along 
with other Southern Nigerian experiences— contrast sharply with the social 
and po liti cal consequences of the Muslim reformism of the Sokoto Jihad, im-
posed on the Hausa city- states and other groups in what soon became Britain’s 
Northern Nigerian Protectorate. The po liti cal and social destiny of  these vastly 
diff er ent regions,  shaped so profoundly by the Muslim reformism of the Sokoto 
Jihad and the Christian evangelization of the second half of the nineteenth 
 century,  were ultimately enclosed in Britain’s colonial territories of Northern 
and Southern Nigerian Protectorates in the first half of the twentieth  century.
In the vast Northern Nigerian emirates, where the Sokoto Jihad had profoundly 
altered relations of state and society in the nineteenth  century, Islam proved 
critical to the British colonial enterprise in local communities starting in the 
twentieth  century. As crucial structural and ideological frameworks on which 
colonial society was ultimately rationalized, Islamic structures  were decisive in 
the administration of the heterogeneous communities that  were incorporated 
into Britain’s newly established Northern Nigerian Protectorate.
The presence of the British in the Sokoto Caliphate, the epicenter of what 
would become colonial Northern Nigeria, began with the visits to Sokoto by 
Captain Hugh Clapperton, a Scottish explorer, who met Sultan Mohammed 
Bello in 1822 and 1825. This was followed by visits by two Cornish explorers, 
Richard Lander and his  brother John, in 1830 and by German explorer and 
scholar Heinrich Barth in 1852.1 The initial visits by  these Eu ro pean explor-
ers  were followed by the establishment in 1860 of a British consul in Lokoja, 
at the confluence of River Niger and River Benue. With the rapid growth of 
the Royal Niger Com pany, which was chartered in 1882, British authorities es-
tablished a foothold in two southern emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, Ilorin 
c h a p t er  t wo
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and Bida, before the conquest of the caliphate in 1903. Following the exten-
sion of constabularies from Ilorin and Bida emirates to some of their north-
ern neigbors in 1897, the West African Frontier Force,  under the command 
of Col o nel Frederick Lugard, formally proclaimed all communities within the 
Sokoto Caliphate and the old Kanem- Bornu Empire as the British Protectorate 
of Northern Nigeria on January 1, 1900. This culminated in the fall of Sokoto in 
1903. With the exception of Satiru and Hadejia uprisings in 1906, British rule en-
countered  little serious re sis tance from dissidents in emirate society in the early 
years of colonial rule.2 In the Sokoto Caliphate, as well as in most of Nigeria’s 
Southern Provinces, the administration of local communities was sustained 
by the now- famous system of indirect rule, imposed by Lugard, governor of 
Northern Nigerian Protectorate and  later governor- general of Nigeria,  after 
the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Provinces in 1914.3
Many scholars of British rule in Northern Nigeria agree that prevailing 
Hausa- Fulani emirate structures  were transformed into a more centralized 
administrative system  under the British system of indirect rule. This colonial 
system established the Northern Nigerian Protectorate as a distinct po liti cal 
unit in which Muslim and non- Muslim communities  were brought  under the 
control of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers within clearly defined administrative 
jurisdictions. Mohammad Umar notes the po liti cal implications of this admin-
istrative system for Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and the diverse communities 
that constituted the Northern Nigerian Protectorate following the imposition 
of colonial rule:
One reason for the seemingly smooth  running of colonial rule in North-
ern Nigeria was the British appropriation of the ancient sarauta- emirate 
po liti cal institutions to form the basis of British indirect rule. Between 
the imposition of colonialism in 1903 and the beginning of decoloni-
zation in 1945, the British transformed the sarauta- emirate system in 
vari ous ways. Beginning with territorial reorganization that got rid of 
absentee district heads in the 1900s, subsequent development of terri-
torial administration turned sarauta- emirates into colonial machinery 
of local government administration, while the introduction of techni-
cal departments (agriculture, health, works,  etc.) made sarauta- emirate 
institutions part of British colonial bureaucracy. Loyalty to the British 
took pre ce dence over all the sarauta- emirate po liti cal values, including 
Islamic values. But the British found much to admire in sarauta po liti-
cal institutions and values, preserving, strengthening, and modernizing 
them. An impor tant aspect of the colonial transformation of the sarauta- 
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emirate was its extension over ethnic minorities who had resisted Sokoto 
imposition of the system in the nineteenth  century.4
For  these expedient reasons, British authorities coopted Hausa- Fulani Mus-
lim rulers, largely influenced by the qadiriyya order,5 which dominated the 
politico- religious hierarchy in the region when the Sokoto Caliphate came 
 under British rule.6 Additionally, it was colonial rule that formalized Islamic 
law as a  legal system throughout the Northern Protectorate, and only with the 
colonial rulers’ arrival was Maliki inheritance law first enforced and slavery 
and concubinage banned in the region.7 Importantly, colonial administrators 
paid attention to contending interpretations of Islamic practices and then en-
trenched the power base of the dominant politico- religious ruling class. The 
response of British administrators to religion at this juncture was made dif-
ficult by the protean nature of Islam in a culturally heterogeneous region. In 
many cases, interpretations of Islam  were far from discrete ideas and categories; 
rather, prevailing po liti cal, religious, and social conditions encouraged varied 
interpretations of Islam, even among  those who claimed to share the same 
Muslim belief. Contested interpretations of Muslim authority required British 
administrators to invest considerable imagination in constructing doctrines to 
legitimate Islamic po liti cal authority.
Consequently, in order to control the diverse  people of the newly estab-
lished Northern Protectorate, British authorities did not simply embrace the 
existing po liti cal structures  under the leadership of the rulers of the Sokoto 
Caliphate; British administrators strengthened Fulani conquerors and im-
posed their po liti cal hegemony on the “subject”  peoples of the region.8 How-
ever, this expedient system of local administration was incongruous with the 
diverse religious, social, and po liti cal realities of the vast region. Moreover, by 
embracing caliphate rulers as ju nior partners, British colonial administrators 
consolidated the powers of the dominant Muslim rulers as legitimate tradi-
tional rulers, while marginalizing their competitors in local politics. Naturally, 
this policy strengthened the authority of the dominant qadiriyya order, while 
si mul ta neously jettisoning the leaders of other Sufi  orders.
Jonathan Reynolds’s conceptualization of “good” and “bad” Muslims pro-
vides a useful framework to explore how British authorities navigated this com-
plicated power structure among Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers. Reynolds holds 
that colonial construction of po liti cal authority in Northern Nigeria was  shaped 
by British preference for the dominant Muslim aristocracy in this region, 
especially in the early de cades of colonial rule. While British administrators 
claimed neutrality on local religious  matters, colonial officials embraced leaders 
of the major Sufi order they deemed “good” Muslims  because they legitimated 
the colonial order. The beneficiaries of this colonial policy  were leaders of the 
qadiriyya order that dominated the masu sarauta, the Hausa- Fulani emirate 
structure. As the qadiriyya consolidated their power base, competing Sufi 
 orders, such as the tijaniyya, sanusiyya, and mahdiyya,  were officially castigated 
as “bad” Muslims  because of their tendency to question colonial policies.9 In 
the case of the relationship between the qadiriyya and their main competitor, the 
tijaniyya,10 tensions would grow between the two groups in Kano, where the 
tijaniyya became more power ful in the 1930s and 1940s.11 Nevertheless, colonial 
authorities identified the qadiriyya as “good” Muslim rulers  because of their will-
ingness to embrace new colonial rules and reject religious doctrines British 
administrators considered “fanatical.”12 Captain G. Callow, the district officer in 
Adamawa, captures the affinity of British administrators for the qadiriyya:
The majority of the Muslims  here [Adamawa] follow the Khadariya [Qa-
diriyya] form of worship. It appears to be by far the most lenitive [sooth-
ing] sect . . .  and perfectly harmless to the state; I think it would be quite 
impossible to arouse followers of this sect to any fanat i cism; they take 
their religion much too easily, rather in fact like the average En glishman 
of  today [1926], who reserves his devotional exercises for Sundays—if it 
is too wet to play golf.13
Consequently, British authorities embraced the rulers of the emirates and the 
qadiriyya order to which most of them belonged, while gathering intelligence 
and employing repressive mea sures against leaders of movements they deemed 
subversive, especially Mahdism.14
Mahdism and Colonial Surveillance
It is understandable that British authorities, given the emphasis on local ad-
ministrative control,  were obsessed with the maintenance of order, and this 
comes through clearly in the intelligence reports and memoranda of G. J. Leth-
 em, an astute British administrator in the Northern Nigerian colonial ser vice. 
British authorities claimed that the Mahdist movement harbored “bad” Muslims 
who perpetuate anticolonial propaganda, and they devised strategies to monitor 
Mahdist activities throughout the Northern Nigerian Protectorate. Lethem’s 
detailed rec ords of Mahdist and other “fringe” Muslim movements also shed 
light on how vari ous Islamic doctrines  shaped the social and po liti cal landscape 
of the Northern Provinces in the early de cades of colonial rule.15
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Colonial authorities had good reasons to place Mahdists on their watch list, 
 because the movement’s ideology contained doctrines of impending anarchy 
that threatened colonial order. Mahdist clerics prophesied a period of po liti cal 
tumult that  will eventually lead to the end of all po liti cal hierarchies; with the ar-
rival of the Mahdi (the Direct One), this pro cess was predicted to lead to the end 
of the world in 1980 (1400). More importantly for British colonial rule, some 
Mahdist leaders insisted that the disruptions precipitated by Eu ro pean colonial 
rule would ultimately trigger this millenarian pro cess. Thus British administra-
tors contended that neo- Mahdism harbors seeds of vio lence, since many fol-
lowers of the Mahdi had fiercely resisted foreign rule in the Sudan in the late 
nineteenth  century.16
In the specific case of Bornu Province, the revival of this new trend of Mah-
dism among the Fulani was partly due to colonial administrative policy that 
transformed the preexisting po liti cal order. Some threatened local Muslim 
rulers capitalized on the po liti cal uncertainties of the earlier years of colonial 
rule to incite disaffected Muslim clerics against British colonial authorities 
and their local interlocutors. While some colonial administrators thought the 
Mahdist threats  were exaggerated, Lethem’s intelligence reports emphasized 
that some new colonial policies made Mahdist doctrine attractive to the masses 
of poor Muslims, especially marginalized Fulanis. In truth, the rise of Mahdist 
doctrine among the Fulani coincided with harsh colonial policies, especially the 
imposition of jangali taxes and other levies. Indeed, local Fulani clerics tailored 
Mahdist doctrine to the prevailing po liti cal context, even  going so far as to ap-
propriate the legacy of Usman dan Fodio as a manifestation of Mahdism.17
Mahdism had evolved into a movement of international significance when 
Muhammad Ahmad adapted its basic princi ples to form a radically enhanced 
religious strand, with the capacity for fierce military re sis tance against foreign 
incursion. Its main purpose was to fight imperial rule in his native Sudan in 
the late nineteenth  century;  later the movement would confront “enemies of 
Islam” in Ethiopia and Egypt.18 Thus the Mahdiyya state was created in the 
1880s to serve as the po liti cal base of the Mahdi movement; the entity never 
gained sovereign standing in international law, though it provided an orga ni-
zational platform for its adherents to confront British and Egyptian forces.19 
Ahmad’s success in creating a po liti cal community that challenged colonial 
rule, at least in the short term, meant that Mahdism was capable of providing 
an alternative vision for  those who saw British rule as anathema.20 Mahdism’s 
popularity across vari ous religious and social groups meant that it extended be-
yond the purview of localized po liti cal issues. When Ahmad proclaimed a jihad 
against the Egyptian and British governments following their attempt to arrest 
him, he gained a large number of recruits among the Baqqara and notable lead-
ers of the Rizeigat and Ta’aisha “tribes.”21 In addition to establishing itself in 
the Sahel, according to Lethem, Ahmad’s Mahdism gained influence in some 
areas that would constitute Northern Nigeria.  After Ahmad’s death, Abdullahi 
ibn Muhammad emerged as the new leader of the Mahdist state, and the strug-
gle continued unabated. He refused to cooperate with religious movements in 
neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia, which offered to join with the Mah-
dists against Eu ro pean powers.22 Instead, Muhammad led attacks on Ethiopia, 
Egypt, and Eritrea.
In the early twentieth  century, Abd Al Rahman emerged as the leader of 
the Mahdist movement, drawing on the broad support of his pre de ces sors.23 
British administrators traced the rise and fall of neo- Mahdism (or Abd Al Rah-
man’s Mahdism) in the second and third de cades of the twentieth  century to 
Northern Nigeria, keeping track of the movement’s prominence in the region. 
To do this, British intelligence officers in Northern Nigeria communicated 
with their counter parts in Sudan and Egypt, creating an expansive intelligence 
apparatus. Lethem’s memoranda connected the influence of Mahdism with the 
improvement of overland communication between East and West and the sub-
sequent circulation of newspapers, letters, and messengers. Lethem seemed to 
suggest that although the British and French both clamped down on Mahdism 
in their colonial territories, a lack of coordination of effort undermined the ef-
fectiveness of their policies.24
Lethem considered Abd Al Rahman an opportunistic rabble- rouser who 
manipulated information about colonial activities in order to rally local sup-
port and to enhance his po liti cal power. British administrators nevertheless 
enlisted his support during World War I to suppress movements sponsored 
by the Ottoman Empire for a jihad against British occupation. Abd Al Rahman 
traveled through the Nile Valley to spread a message of strategic support for the 
British through a more restrained interpretation of Islam, and as he did so, he also 
expanded his power, wealth, and popularity. His messengers, who  were meant 
to drum up support for Britain, collected zakat taxes for Abd Al Rahman and 
encouraged adherents to use the Mahdist prayer book. In the years following 
World War I, Abd Al  Rahman made similar calculated decisions, offering offi-
cial interpretation of Islam that enabled him to promote his power  under Brit-
ish colonial rule.25
Lethem’s papers reveal how religious interpretations  shaped po liti cal dy-
namics in the Northern Provinces in the early de cades of colonial rule. By the 
second de cade of colonial rule, Lugard, through the mechanisms of indirect 
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rule, had embraced Fulani Muslim interpretations that drew on the religious 
vision of Usman dan Fodio, squashing opposing religious movements in the 
region. Lugard had defeated vari ous Islamic potentates, such as the sultan of 
Sokoto, Muhammadu Attahira I, in the  Battle of Burmi in 1903. Remnants of 
radical opposition to British rule within the caliphate  were also suppressed: in 
1905–1906, Mahdist uprisings  were brutally crushed in Satiru by the combined 
forces of the British and the Sokoto Caliphate; indeed, the  whole town was 
destroyed, and two thousand Mahdist rebels and fugitive slaves  were killed.26 
Satiru was a Mahdist stronghold, and Satiruwa, the  people of Satiru, had to pay 
the  bitter price of rebellion  because their Mahdist ideology threatened the new 
order. British authorities and the Sokoto Caliphate found common ground to 
collaborate against Satiru  because both felt a deep sense of po liti cal insecurity. 
The British felt threatened  because its hold on power was tenuous, and Sokoto 
was rattled  because “revolutionary” Mahdism was a Hausa- based movement 
of “peasants, fugitive slaves, and radical clerics who  were hostile both to the 
indigenous authorities and the colonial regime.”27 Fear of a common  enemy 
therefore cemented the partnership between British authorities and caliphate 
rulers,28 though pockets of re sis tance continued to pose minor security threats 
to British rule  until the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Nigerian 
Protectorates in 1914.29
Frontal attack by the colonial authorities on fringe “Islamic radical” ele-
ments was mostly effective by the 1920s. For example, in 1924, the shehu of 
Bornu,  under the prompting of British administrators, identified sources of 
potential anti- British revolts, encouraged moderate interpretations of Islam, 
and arrested “carriers of seditious propaganda.” Furthermore, to combat what 
authorities considered “Islamic fanat i cism,” British colonial rulers prohibited 
pilgrimage to the Mahdi holy site in Aba in Sudan in 1923.30
Lethem’s work is relevant to this study not just  because his intelligence 
reports and memoranda underscored the relations between Islamic doctrine 
and British colonial rule, but more importantly  because he identified conflict 
triggers that presumably could threaten the colonial order. For example, Leth-
 em focused on the social and po liti cal interactions among “fringe” Muslim 
 orders such as the Nazaru and warned that the strict way in which the Nazaru 
tariqa structured the lives of its followers suggested a proclivity for religious 
intolerance. The Nazaru, Lethem observes, “despise other Muslims, refusing 
to eat, intermarry, drink, shake hands, or pray with them. . . .  They also would 
not eat meat prepared by other Muslims and they had to convert” their pro-
spective partners before marriage. Lethem’s account of religious “propaganda” 
in Bornu and other Northern Nigerian communities illustrates that religious 
interpretations could become freighted with po liti cal intent. He wanted colonial 
administrators and missionaries to work together to stem the strong opposition 
of some “fanatical” Islamic movements to Western institutions such as Chris-
tian schools and hospitals. He advised British colleagues to allay the fears of 
Muslim clerics about the dangers of Western cultural intrusion. A vast knowl-
edge about local cultures and of their precolonial relations in their setting was 
evident in Lethem’s memoranda, indicating that specific tariqas had differing 
attitudes  toward colonial powers. He noted that Fulani peasants preferred the 
British to other colonial powers, especially the French and Germans, who had 
been hostile to the Ouddai regime. The Sanussiyya fought against the British in 
World War I, but eventually embraced colonial rule by the 1920s. The tijaniyya 
placed enormous emphasis on loyalty and fairness; they thought the British 
colonial regime in the region could be trusted.31
Lethem’s proclivity for details seems self- evident: his memoranda are replete 
with detailed accounts of many personalities and activities that most colonial 
administrators in his position would have considered too marginal to the cen-
tral purpose of colonial intelligence. But Lethem deployed extensive analyti-
cal fervor to capture, for example, a religious leader in Bornu (1924) who was 
preaching the inevitability of an impending millenarian event— a condition 
that was supposedly linked to colonial domination. The imam was said to have 
attracted a large crowd and drew significant ovation when he chastised the co-
lonial government and called local Muslim supporters of the colonial adminis-
tration kufar, or unbelievers.
In similar fashion, Lethem’s memoranda reveals that po liti cal and religious 
crises in Sudan and Egypt had significant effects on po liti cal developments in 
Northern Nigeria. For example, in the notable case of Bornu he writes about 
vari ous messengers from the East who predicted the imminent arrival of 
Isa— the chosen one— who  will precipitate the millenarian event. His find-
ings about the crisis in Egypt drew from systematic analyses of po liti cal and 
religious events and included clear narratives of their consequences. His 
repeated attempts to decipher the  causes of religious riots in the Sudan in 
September 1924 are striking: he investigated a popu lar imam in Khartoum 
and his alleged role in inciting riots; commented extensively on the leader-
ship qualities of Ali Abd al Latif (the founder of the White Flag League); 
and examined the crisis in Gordon Memorial College, Sudan’s elite institu-
tion of higher learning. Importantly, Lethem reports that the Sudanese crisis 
might have influenced unrest in Northern Nigeria, especially Bornu. In all of 
this we can see that Lethem was acutely concerned about the under pinnings 
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of religion- based conflict and defined strategies to mitigate its worst conse-
quences.32 He demonstrated how the main contours of religious interpre-
tations could fuse with ethnic differences to explode violent crises. In this 
regard, Lethem insists that the new wave of Mahdism was linked to Fulani 
aspirations about the  future.33
With improvement in regional communication and infrastructure in the 
early twentieth  century, religious doctrines steadily spread throughout North-
ern Nigerian communities. Lethem was exasperated that better means of 
communication and travel  were facilitating the spread of Mahdism into parts 
of Northern Nigeria. He warned as follows: religion is a major instrument for 
mobilizing the “masses” in Northern Nigeria across cultural divisions; and Mah-
dism’s message is effective in arousing the “ignorant and credulous African Mo-
hammedan to fanat i cism and unrest.” But what seemed to disturb him most was 
that Mahdism had been used to unify some Fulani communities across the 
Sahel against colonialism.34
Native Administration and the Imposition of Islamic Law
Once the Sokoto Caliphate fell in 1903 to the military onslaught of Col o nel 
Lugard,35 what followed was the imposition of indirect rule on the diverse com-
munities that constituted Britain’s Northern Nigerian Protectorate, a region in 
1906 that had three hundred thousand square miles and 7 million  people,  under 
the control of just seventy- five British military officers.36 Lugard specifically 
picked Northern Nigeria for the implementation of his indirect rule system 
 because it was considered an ideal environment to test a decentralized admin-
istration, already practiced on a smaller scale in India and Uganda.37 Taxation 
was reformed within the bounds of Islamic doctrine, resulting in rapidly in-
creasing revenues. In a 1903 treaty, Lugard guaranteed Fulani rulers that British 
authorities would not interfere with the practice of Islam; he soon would renege 
on this promise.38 As Murray Last writes, the experience of subordination of 
emirate rulers to a Western (Christian) power must have been a disjuncture of 
enormous dimensions:
 Here the reader needs to go back briefly to mid- March 1903 and imagine 
the full shock of having Christian colonial rule suddenly imposed upon 
you, with the vast,  century- old Sokoto Caliphate defeated within the 
space of a few months. Dar al- Islam was no more; the legacy of Shaikh 
Uthman dan Fodio [Usman dan Fodio] and his son the Amir almu’minin 
Muhammad Bello come to naught. And it was Muslim Hausa troops 
 recruited in Kano,  under a few white Christian officers, using bigger and 
faster- firing guns more professionally than the Sokoto or Kano armies 
could muster, that did the damage.39
Doubtlessly, the region’s  legal systems  were modified to comply with Brit-
ish conception of law and justice.40 The Native Courts Proclamation Numbers 
4 and  5 gave British authorities broad powers of review over Islamic courts, 
which in princi ple subjugated sharia to colonial law; and special provisions de-
riving from it offered non- Muslims protection against the application of some 
aspects of sharia, and eliminated harsh punishment following convictions for 
murder, theft, and adultery.41 Proclamation Number 6 of 1900 (amended in 
1901) further regulated Islamic law and transformed alkali courts into formal 
native courts for indigenes while also establishing common- law courts for 
British subjects.42 Most controversial, however, was the establishment of what 
would become known as the Repugnancy Test,43 which dictated that punish-
ment found to be “repugnant to natu ral justice, equity, and good conscience”44 
would be instantly overturned— a sort of deus ex machina clause that ensured 
no British territory would enforce “unconscionable”  legal sentences.45 This in-
cluded punishments such as cutting off limbs, stoning, and crucifixion.46 All 
crimes punishable by death in sharia that  were treated as lesser crimes  under En-
glish common law  were reclassified to conform with common- law standards.47 
Moreover, sharia was subject to the authority of British administrators,48 which 
ensured that local application of laws did not conflict with written law promul-
gated by British administrators. The British conception of justice was also in-
fused into Islamic law and practices.49 For example, alkali courts  were compelled 
to accept police and medical reports as evidence, as well as the testimony of non- 
Muslims, despite strong objections from Muslim clerics based on Maliki law.50 
Some scholars have noted that British authorities gave Muslim jurists some au-
thority in civil litigation and reviewed only a small percentage of criminal cases 
for compatibility with repugnancy standards.51 Be that as it may, the main thrust 
of reform in the caliphate’s  legal system was definitive and deliberate.
The Native Courts Proclamation of 1906 further weakened sharia by broad-
ening En glish common- law courts and streamlining native courts from a four- 
tier system into a two- tier system.52 The Judicial Council was created to serve 
essentially as an Islamic court of appeal. In addition, Islamic law was denied 
recognition as a system deserving separate jurisdiction unto itself when it was 
merged with customary law during the unification of Nigeria’s Northern and 
Southern Provinces in 1914.53 The unification ordinance also dictated that cus-
tomary judicial sentencing could not break from the requirements of common- 
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law courts, particularly in criminal cases.54 Most importantly, it extended the 
Northern court system to the south, violating long- standing princi ples of sepa-
ration of jurisdiction between  these two very diff er ent regions.55 Reform con-
tinued with the 1922 Constitution,56 as further changes to the criminal and 
penal codes and the structure of the judicial system eroded the authority of 
Islamic law. Furthermore, the colonial government took a major step with the 
Native Courts Ordinance of 1933, which further weakened sharia by expand-
ing the power of common- law courts. High courts  were created57 and given 
jurisdiction over appeals from native courts (including sharia), an arrangement 
that lasted  until in de pen dence in 1960.
Despite the influence of common law on sharia, Islam grew steadily with 
the modernization that accompanied colonialism. This can be attributed to 
improved communications among local communities, increased security, better 
po liti cal organ ization of emirate society, more effective administrative control 
of non- Muslim regions by emirate rulers through the indirect rule system, and 
access to modern elementary school education.58 Most researchers say the 
last  factor was most significant  because improvements in education served to 
link diverse  peoples together, especially  those who relocated to the cities in 
search of work. Indeed, this rapid pro cess of social change was significantly 
encouraged by the arrival of the Lagos- Kano railway in 1912, bringing thou-
sands of Southern Christian mi grants who stimulated economic growth in 
the region. This heterogeneous mix of  people, consisting of Christian mi grants 
from the south and Hausa- Fulani Muslim settlers in non- Muslim sections of 
the Northern Nigerian Protectorate, as well as numerous non- Muslim “tribal” 
groups throughout the region,  were effectively brought  under the control of 
caliphate rulers within the indirect rule system. In the specific case of Zaria, 
Moses Ochonu underscores the subordination of non- Hausa Muslim  peoples 
to Hausa- Fulani Muslim rule  under the indirect rule system:
Through a long, convoluted pro cess, Zazzau [Zaria] emirate, a strategic 
frontier caliphate state, came to extend a loose po liti cal influence on the 
non- Muslim Southern Kaduna polities. In the early twentieth  century, 
the British accelerated this historical pro cess. They vested authority in 
Zazzau, its satellite emirates, and its officials and brought the southern 
Kaduna  peoples  under their sway. British imposition of Zazzau subcolo-
nial rule on the Southern Kaduna  peoples culminated in a complicated 
and volatile subcolonial administrative system comprised of Hausa- 
Fulani colonial chiefs, scribes, administrators, tax collectors, and other 
colonial operatives working for the British.59
A 1917 survey on the social diversity of Keffi and Nasarawa emirates by 
Resident Morgan further illustrates this complex mix of communities  under 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim rule. Christians of any ethnicity  were left uncounted, 
while nearly 20,000 Muslims  were tallied, 75  percent of whom  were Fulani and 
Hausa (with 584 Nupe Muslims). The survey found nearly three times as many 
“pagans,” totaling roughly 55,000 persons, split among Bassa, Gwari- Gangan, 
Yeskwa, Afo, Gwandara, Igbera, Gade, Agatu, Kinkera, Gwari Yamma, Koro 
Funtu, Koro, Gana, Toni, Kamberi, and Arago  peoples. In addition, the report 
ruminates on demographic shifts in earlier years, particularly the widespread 
migration by the “hill top villa gers of the pagan tribes” from their overcrowded 
and “unsanitary” sites to new villages in the open, level country, establishing 
new farms. However, far from chipping away at Hausa- Fulani Muslim power, 
the report shows that early British administrators consolidated Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim hegemony “with detached plea sure.”60 Consequently, the ethno- 
religious tension that dominated Nigeria’s  Middle  Belt and core Northern 
Muslim areas with significant non- Muslim communities (so- called pagans) 
by the period of decolonization in the 1950s was already apparent in the early 
colonial period. An extract from the 1907 annual report by Thomas Alvarez, a 
cms missionary to the cms secretary in London, is instructive:
Mr.  Low appears to have given the idea in  Eng land that the Society 
wished the Gwari work to be conducted through the medium of Hausa, 
i.e. that the Gwaris  were to be instructed in Hausa and that the scriptures 
 were not to be translated into Gwari. I cannot help feeling that Mr. Low 
is mistaken, or  there has been some misunderstanding of the members of 
the Gwari tribe. The Gwaris are the most numerous and compact pagan 
tribe in Northern Nigeria and to endeavor to reach them by means of the 
language of their inveterate enemies the Hausa- speaking raiders is to my 
mind ridicu lous. . . .  So I  shall be grateful if you assure Mr. Low that cms 
mean to take up the Gwari work seriously and encourage him to try and 
master the language.61
The influence of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers also was enhanced in native ad-
ministration and native courts throughout the Northern Protectorate. For ex-
ample, in 1931, in Kano Province, British administrators established a mixed 
court to provide  legal ser vices to non- Muslims  under the authority of the 
waziri (the Muslim chief judge), who held power of appeal. And in 1940, the 
Kano sabon gari— the areas of non- Hausa- Fulani native settlers— was placed 
 under the emir’s control for the first time since 1903.62
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The Limits of Indirect Rule
What was stipulated in the  legal reforms analyzed above was not always easily 
reflected in colonial administrative practice. Firsthand accounts of the imple-
mentation of local government policies by British administrators on the com-
plicated pro cess of colonial administration reveal the complexities of their rule 
in Northern Nigeria’s diverse communities. In this connection, the memoranda 
of long- serving administrators revealed how British officials attempted to re-
inforce the bond between religious, social, and po liti cal hierarchies of power 
in a region where such relations  were fluid  under the Sokoto Caliphate in the 
preceding precolonial era.
Commander  J.  H. Carrow (district officer and resident of Kano and So-
koto) provides a vivid illustration of the challenges to the implementation of 
colonial policy in a region where the balance between religious, social, and po-
liti cal power was far from clearly defined.  After British administrators  adopted 
indirect rule in Kano, they convinced the emir of Kano to reor ga nize the ju-
dicial, financial, and po liti cal structure  under his authority along the lines of 
what British administrators considered acceptable Islamic rules. In addition to 
reforms in the native courts and the tax system, British administrators intro-
duced fixed salaries for native administrators, including the emir. Significantly, 
to implement their reform, British authorities appealed to what they projected 
as Kano’s Muslim traditions.63
While the inhabitants of Sokoto Division  were loyal to the sultan of Sokoto 
as the Sarkin Musulumi (commander of the Muslim faithful),  those in Kano 
Division had conflicting allegiances, presumably  because of Kano internecine 
conflicts in earlier de cades and the colonial administrators’ initial application 
of direct rule in the region. The deposition of the waziri of Kano in 1909 is an 
example of the complicated nature of po liti cal allegiances in Kano Emirate. 
In 1908, British officials appointed Dan Rimi, a “slave” from the Warji “tribe,” 
as waziri. Before he was appointed, Rimi was a confidant of the emir and had 
served as a messenger to the resident. Once appointed waziri, Rimi separated 
himself from the authority of the emir, claiming that he was the “appointee of 
the white man.” Rimi soon had his own following and was eventually charged 
by the emir with contravening Kano’s “time- honored traditions.”  Because of 
growing instability in the division, the governor sacked Rimi in 1909 and re-
placed him with a Fulani, a loyal of the emir.64
The events surrounding this brief colonial saga in Kano illustrate the var-
ied dimensions of power relations in the Fulani emirates in  those years. Even 
though the Sokoto Caliphate had existed for a  century, internecine conflict 
remained a per sis tent prob lem between vari ous groups in Kano Emirate, 
 hampering the ability of the emir, district heads, village heads, chiefs, and vari-
ous Muslim clerics to effectively rule in their communities. In Kano Province, 
like many other emirates in the Northern Provinces, communal allegiances 
 were tangled with religious associations. Rimi’s ability to gather a significant 
following  under the banner of the “white man” suggests that power within the 
emirate was not a  simple, linear chain of command through the emirate structure. 
The governor’s response to the incident illustrates that colonial administrators 
sought to centralize the Muslim hierarchy  under the leadership of the emir. As 
he tried to stabilize the upper echelons of the caliphate, the governor relied on 
his understanding of ethnic conflict, appointing a Fulani, imposing ethnic and 
hierarchical differences that in fact  were not firmly in place when the British 
conquered the caliphate in 1903.
Resident C. L.  Temple’s 1909 annual report on Kano Province reveals the 
ambiguity between legitimacy and authority of Kano Emirate officials.  Temple 
notes that a local leader might often fail to follow the  orders of superior mem-
bers in the emirate. The subdistrict head of Damberta refused to collect the 
haraji tax even though he had been ordered to begin collection several months 
beforehand; he felt that he had the leeway to conduct his administrative re-
sponsibility as he pleased.  Temple also mentioned that three sarkis (Sarkin 
Kura, Sarkin Godia, and Sarkin Kabba) had embezzled funds from the jangali 
tax they had collected from Fulani “pagans.” The overt nature of the sarkis’ 
embezzlement of tax funds reveals that Muslim village heads  were not always 
 under the firm control of the emir. When British officers called the embezzle-
ment to the emir’s attention, he failed to see the seriousness of the charges, 
revealing the tendency of some Muslim rulers to ignore British policy.65
Despite  these under lying conditions, British policies on recruitment to 
po liti cal leadership positions in the Kano Emirate streamlined a tight- knit 
clique of potential rulers from the established Fulani hierarchy.  Temple’s 1909 
report further reveals that when leaders  were deposed for perceived opposi-
tion to British policies, their replacements often  were drawn from the emir’s 
court. When Chiroma Hamsa (one of the Madaki’s subdistrict head men) was 
deposed  after he “failed to fulfill his duties,” the emir, with the support of the 
resident, divided Hamsa’s jurisdiction into two parts. The first part was placed 
 under the leadership of Umaru, a son of Madaki Hassan; the younger  brother 
of Hamsa, Malam Aliu, was appointed as the leader of the second district.66
The actions of local community leaders reflected their pliant nature in the 
Kano emirate’s politico- religious hierarchy.  Temple’s report describes local 
 people applying to several local authorities for the adjudication of Islamic 
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law. In conjunction with a growing distrust in the Islamic courts, local  people 
 presented their cases to British district officers, suggesting some lack of confi-
dence in the Muslim order derived from the Sokoto Caliphate.67
The per sis tence of slavery added another impor tant layer to the structures 
of Muslim rule in local communities. Despite the outlawing of slavery in the 
Northern Protectorate by the British authorities,  Temple revealed that slavery 
remained widespread in Kano Province. Following the famine of 1907–1908, 
many slave  owners quietly transferred their slaves to more affluent slaveholders, 
and according to District Officer Dupigny, some Gongola “pagans” voluntarily 
“sold” themselves to wealthy slave  owners. The relationship between slaves and 
slaveholders provided another layer to the hierarchy of social relations in some 
of Kano Province’s communities, often lying beyond the control of the native 
authority system.
In the face of dynamic po liti cal conditions, British officials, with mixed suc-
cess, attempted to create an overarching colonial order across the Northern 
Provinces. They worked feverishly to modify the preexisting sociopo liti cal 
structure with a more effective local administrative system premised on what 
they considered legitimate Muslim traditions. In this vein, they insisted on spe-
cific Muslim “rules” that affirmed colonial administrative priorities in the levy-
ing of taxes and rents. For example,  Temple wrote that rents and taxes, based 
on “Islamic law,” would be collected within fixed time frames. The jangali tax 
was to be collected between July 1 and October 31, while the zakka and haraji 
was meant to be collected from November 30 to March 31.  Temple also stated 
that district and subdistrict heads had been informed that they would lose their 
positions if they did not turn in the requisite amount of taxes and rents by 
the stipulated dates. His report further revealed that  there was evidence of the 
tightening control that British administrators  were placing on local rulers: for 
example, as noted above, the district officer and the emir replaced Damberta; 
they deposed Sarkis Kura, Godia, and Kabbo for the embezzlement of jangali 
tax, and deposed Chiroma Hamsa for administrative irregularities.68
The tendency of the British to affirm Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers’ con-
servatism was best shown in the crucial area of colonial policy on education 
in the Northern Provinces. Carrow’s recollection in the 1960s of what stood 
for British education policy in Kano Province provides a vivid assessment of 
colonial policy in the region. Before World War I, British administrators had 
established a Western- type primary school for the  children of emirs, chiefs, and 
Muslim clerics, but  these local rulers instead sent their slaves to school. Further, 
local ambivalence for Western education also was apparent with the poor enroll-
ment of students in another primary school that colonial authorities established in 
a “pagan” area of Kano Division before the outbreak of World War II.  Carrow 
recalls that the re sis tance to Western education persisted  until the end of the 
war. Not surprisingly, when British authorities established a school for girls in 
1929, opposition from the Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers was stiff.  These rulers 
naturally believed that Western education would not give their  children the 
requisite religious and traditional training that emirate society required.69 In 
the early de cades of colonial rule, Islamic schooling remained the dominant 
form of education in the region. In 1913  there  were only 209 Northerners in 
British schools, but more than 140,000 students in 19,073 Islamic schools; the 
next year enrollment figures  were 527 (British government schools) and 218,615 
(Islamic schools) respectively, with only 1,682  in mission schools in the vast 
Northern Nigerian Provinces. Nevertheless, the marginalization of Western ed-
ucation before World War II led to the crisis that would consume Northern Ni-
geria for many de cades. In the short term, this crisis was evident in the inability 
of the colonial authorities to carry out basic administrative functions, including 
staffing the Kano medical dispensaries and administering native courts in the 
1920s and 1930s.70
As British administrators sought to close the gap between theory and prac-
tice in local administration, Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers  were content to 
use the evolving native authority system to legitimate their power and authority. 
 Tensions again  were apparent in Carrow’s account in Sokoto and Kano Prov-
inces. In 1932, the Resident of Sokoto sacked the sultan that was appointed in 
1924  after per sis tent fiscal “irregularities” and charges that he practiced “black 
magic.” The new sultan, with the waziri, regularly used religious practices to af-
firm colonial authority in the Sokoto Caliphate. Although the sultan’s religious 
practices  were not always clear to Carrow— who became Resident of Sokoto in 
1933— Carrow did think they advanced British colonial influence in the prov-
ince. For example, he recalled how the sultan and the waziri would take him to 
the tomb of Usman dan Fodio to pray for Carrow’s safe travel each time before 
traveling out of the province.71
Additionally, British administrators  were selective about prevailing in-
terpretations of Islam. They picked their  battles, as did their caliphate ju nior 
partners, and also disagreed on which  battles to pick. Although it was easier 
to administer Sokoto than Kano, Carrow was able to convince the religiously 
conservative emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero, to ban stoning for adultery. Even 
though  there was not a single account of stoning in Northern Nigeria, Car-
row felt a need to alter the law so as to state emphatically that Kano Division 
was in compliance with the British authorities’ repugnancy rule. Emir Bayero 
promptly agreed with Carrow’s request, since such a question was largely irrel-
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evant among the custodians of local state administration in the Kano Emirate. 
Furthermore, when renowned British colonial researcher Margery Perham at-
tempted to gain access to the main section of the chief alkali court in Kano in 
1930 and 1931, British administrators refused to overturn the objection of the 
chief alkali.72
Carrow recounts a moment of frustration while working with Emir Bayero 
of Kano in the early 1920s that illustrates the challenges experienced by colo-
nial administrators when they attempted to apply abstract theory of indirect 
rule to Northern Nigeria’s strong yet sometimes opaque religious environ-
ment. When a series of native administration construction proj ects began and 
a British engineer requested Western- trained workers, Carrow appointed two 
Northern Christians who had grown up in a mission school in Zaria, on the 
condition that they wear traditional Muslim attires and turbans so as not to of-
fend the sensibility of Muslim rulers. Although Carrow felt he had resolved a 
sensitive prob lem, he found to his “horror” that Emir Bayero had figured out that 
the two men  were in fact Northern Christians. In a private conversation, the emir 
told the Resident that he would rather have “a full- blooded Southerner” than 
an “apostolic Northerner” working on the proj ect.73
Carrow also believed that colonial administrators’ failure to create a more 
self- reliant native administration undermined the implementation of indi-
rect rule. He said that Kano was far from the modernizing city some British 
administrators tended to proj ect. Carrow thought real pro gress in the Northern 
Provinces could be achieved only when the native administration began taking 
responsibility for its own work instead of looking for direction from the district 
officer. He recalls returning to Kano as Resident in 1943 from Sokoto only to find 
the “old nonsense” he had left  behind a de cade before when he was district officer.
Implicit in the assessments of British administrators are tensions between 
colonial administrators who insisted on preserving the essence of the caliphate 
system and officers who believed by the 1920s that Northern Nigeria required 
a more efficient administrative system. No se nior colonial administrator in 
the 1920s exemplifies the tension between  these two critical positions better 
than Herbert Richmond Palmer, lieutenant governor of the Northern Prov-
inces from 1925 to 1930. To confront this prob lem, Palmer undercut the autoc-
racy of the Islamic aristocracy, while working hard to prop up the mystique of 
the emirs and members of their courts. In the case of Kano Province, Palmer 
attempted to modernize the emirate by limiting the power of the emir and 
his courts. Thus when the el derly and conservative emir died in 1925, Palmer 
seized the opportunity to push through substantial reforms that significantly 
altered the province’s po liti cal landscape. Along with other leading members of 
Kano native authority, Palmer urged the new emir to sign on to several reforms 
 before his inauguration. However, to protect the public image of the new emir, 
Palmer, during the emir’s installation in 1927, directed his assistants to create 
the impression that the emir was the towering po liti cal figure in the province 
from whom all authority flowed down to his subjects.74
In the Katagum Division of Bauchi Province in the 1920s colonial admin-
istrators sought to make local administration more efficient by reforming the 
native authority system, including Islamic law that had proven inefficient since 
the early twentieth  century. A careful reading of Assistant District Officer J. C. 
Guy’s touring diary reveals that the inefficiency British administrators attrib-
uted to emirs, district heads, and village heads was not always a  simple  matter 
of ineptitude, but was sometimes a result of the novel rules of administration 
that the British imposed in the district. Despite claims that colonial adminis-
trative policies  were derived from local Islamic traditions, a careful reading of 
Guy’s file reveals that Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers  were not always knowledge-
able about the rules inscribed as Islamic law on taxation. For example, the dif-
ficulty in implementing jangali tax ( cattle tax) in Katagum communities was 
a reflection of the imposition of uniform jangali tax practices on the diverse 
communities in the district. When local district heads and village heads recorded 
significant jangali tax deficits, Guy reprimanded them, threatened to cut their 
salaries, and persecuted them for criminal neglect. With regard to the applica-
tion of Islamic law to the reformed judicial system, Guy notes in his memo-
randum that it would be “useless to imagine or expect them [district heads and 
village heads] to be paragons of efficiency in Malinka Law.” Indeed, the degree 
to which Guy went to instruct local leaders on how to administer this colonial 
interpretation of Islamic law would indicate the extent of the novelty of  these 
rules in Katagum communities.75
The dynamics of local administration in the Northern Nigerian Provinces 
 were  shaped by power configurations of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and 
the complicated communal identities in local communities. Again, in Sokoto 
Province, the implication of this prob lem was apparent in the contradiction 
between colonial taxation and prevailing communal conditions in the earlier 
de cades of colonial rule. Although British administrators made some gains in 
implementing the new colonial policy, the elimination of some precolonial tax 
practices discouraged effective tax assessment and collection. Old gaisu taxes 
and other taxes between major and tributary communities persisted, compli-
cating the implementation of British policies. In addition, British administra-
tors failed to establish an effective strategy of tax collection among nomadic 
Fulani herders. And as emirs and their local agents reconciled themselves to 
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British colonial expectations in tax collection, many of  these leaders found 
their new positions at variance to  those of the local communities. This prob lem 
was manifested in the changing patterns of the use of jakadas76 for the collec-
tion of taxes. In contrast to their precolonial functions where they served mul-
tiple roles as intermediaries between Muslim rulers and local communities, emirs 
now employed the ser vices of the jakadas largely for tax collection. This reflected 
the patterns of violent appropriation of resources that occurred prior to colonial 
rule, exacerbating tension between Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and local com-
munities, especially  those designated as “traditional” tributary communities.77
The nature of local administration meant that local rulers and communities 
responded to the colonial government depending on their ethnic and reli-
gious identities within newly drawn colonial jurisdictions. In the Kuta Division 
of Niger Province, the way native authority subsumed hierarchical relations 
among diverse ethnic groups  under imposed administrative jurisdiction also 
complicated social relations that had been fluid during the precolonial period. 
Kuta Division, like most areas in the Northern Provinces, was religiously and 
culturally diverse. Some groups  were still functioning  under the precolonial 
tributary Kofa system, where local  people sought the patronage of the emir 
through his leading men, usually a member of the emir’s council.78
The British adoption of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rule also reified the ethnic 
and religious practices that the Fulani had established  after the conquest of 
the Hausa city- states, especially with regard to tax collection and assessment in 
the early twentieth  century. In Agaie- Lapai Division, British colonial reforms 
enhanced the status of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers as gatekeepers of the in-
direct rule system, cementing the marginalization of non- Hausa- Fulani local 
communities. This division— which included Lapai Emirate, an amalgamation 
of Guara, Gulu, Gupa, Edzu, and Sakka districts; Agaie Emirate; and Baro, a 
third- class township— contained many so- called pagans (Gana- Gana, Gupa-
chi  people, and Hausa and Gwari farmers), while Lapai was inhabited princi-
pally by ex- slaves of the ruling families. According to Assistant District Officer 
Matthews’s 1919 notes, emirs, district heads, and village heads only had limited 
success with this motley collection of religious and “tribal” groups. Many of 
 these groups evaded tax collection and the native administrative structure. But 
not all non- Hausa- Fulani Muslims resisted the new native authority. In Kuta 
Division, for example, some Gwari headmen manipulated the new indirect 
rule system  under the domination of the Hausa- Fulani Muslim aristocracy as 
a source of power and influence.79 Taxation and  legal practices before colo-
nization in Northern Nigeria  were im mensely complex, and they had strong 
ethnic, religious, po liti cal, and martial significance. Indeed, taxation and 
Muslim  legal practices  under the indirect rule system  were woven into prevail-
ing but  contingent networks of power and status. When British colonial rulers 
attempted to mold the indirect rule system into such interlocking religious, 
social, and po liti cal networks, they experienced mixed results.
This ambivalence between local leaders and their subjects was most pro-
foundly reflected in the po liti cal domination of the Hausa- Fulani Muslim ruler 
over the so- called pagan tribes in the Northern Provinces. As early as the late 
1920s, se nior colonial administrators in Kaduna and Lagos, drawing on exten-
sive intelligence reports and memoranda of district officers and residents from 
the Northern Provinces,  were well aware that communal and religious divisions 
posed major prob lems to local administration throughout the region. E. P. T. 
Crampton notes:
One of the prob lems that faced Lugard was the administration of the 
“pagans” of the North. The non- Muslim animistic  peoples  were usually 
referred to as “pagans,” but the word is less used now [1970s] as most 
of  these  people who are in contact with the outside world would claim 
to be Muslim or Christians.  There  were “pagans” in  every province, but 
especially in hilly, or thickly forested or remote areas. In some parts the 
conquest by the Fulani was virtually complete and the “pagans”  were 
subdued and living  under the control of their own petty village or hamlet 
heads  under the suzerainty of Fulani District Heads. In other parts the 
conquest was far from complete and the “pagan” was in continual rebel-
lion. In yet other parts, no real attempt had been made to subdue them 
and they  were in de pen dent. What Lugard did in  these diff er ent cases was 
to be of  great importance in their subsequent social and religious his-
tory. . . .  It can hardly be doubted that the practice of placing large num-
ber of “pagans”  under Fulani [Muslim] District Head and supporting the 
authority of  these by the powers of the Government when and where 
necessary led to the expansion of Islam.80
In Adamawa Province from 1905 to 1921, for example, the imposition of Hausa- 
Fulani Muslims as “natu ral” rulers of Yunguru “pagans” would lead to tragic 
consequences. When Yunguru re sis tance against Hausa- Fulani tax collectors 
led to the killing of the British- imposed Hausa ruler, his associate, and Hausa 
settlers, a British- led punitive force massacred Yunguru villa gers.81 And in 
Idoma in the lower Benue region of the Northern Protectorate, District Of-
ficer T. E. Letchworth recorded strong re sis tance of local  people to the Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim hierarchy, noting that a stranger to the area was “likely to have 
his head taken off,” especially if he was Hausa.82
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Sir Hugh Clifford, governor of Nigeria from 1919 to 1925, convinced about 
the serious prob lems ethnic and religious tensions posed to local administra-
tion, tried to introduce reforms that  were sensitive to religious and communal 
diversity, as well as the changing demographic transformation of the Northern 
Provinces. Such recognition of the region’s complicated demographic charac-
ter by Clifford was at variance with the orthodoxy of old- guard Lugardians in 
the Northern Nigerian colonial ser vice whom the governor distrusted. Clif-
ford was clear from the onset that religious and ethnic differences throughout 
the region had a significant bearing on the legitimacy of the native authority 
system. On examining the “pagan tribes” of the Bauchi Plain, the governor 
found that masses of local  people had opposed taxation  because of their age- 
old antagonism and animosity. To local “tribes” in the Bauchi Plains, British 
colonial taxation was seen as an offshoot of the slave raids of Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim rulers  after the Sokoto Jihad of the previous  century. Despite Brit-
ish administrators’ claims that a significant portion of taxes would be used to 
provide essential social ser vices in local communities, the leaders of the Plain 
“tribes” contended that the only difference between the extractive practices of 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers of the caliphate era and Britain’s colonial taxes lay 
in the irritating regularity with which British administrators insisted on the 
payment of taxes. To rectify this prob lem, Clifford called for the creation of 
new administrative units that would promote the aspirations of non- Hausa- 
Fulani communities. For Muslim immigrants of the Bauchi Plains, Clifford 
called for the establishment of a special judicial system composed of alkali 
courts to only adjudicate Muslim  legal  matters. With regard to the relation 
between Hausa- Fulani Muslims and numerous non- Hausa- Fulani Muslim 
groups in the Bauchi Plains, Clifford concluded:
The pagan tribes of the Bauchi Plateau succeeded in maintaining their 
in de pen dence and end up having succeeded in repelling successive 
Mohammedan invasions. The Plateau therefore is not and never has 
been Mohammedan country, and the Hausa and other Muslim set-
tlers, who have established themselves  there since our advent, have 
no more claim or right to exercise administrative authority over any 
part of it, or over any of its indigenous inhabitants, than has any other 
section of the immigrant community. Moreover, experience gained 
in other parts of the Mohammedan world has made me profoundly 
distrustful of the use which Muslims are accustomed to make of any 
power which they may seek  here over a primitive, non- Mohammedan 
 peoples.83
Clifford’s executive order signaled an impor tant break from Lugard’s policy 
of indirect rule, which vested the authority of the colonial administrative sys-
tem in Hausa- Fulani emirate rulers that emerged from the Sokoto Jihad. In 
Bauchi Province, the theory of indirect rule that had established its traditional 
claims on the hierarchy of culturally superior Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers 
over inferior “pagans” was flawed even at its conception. Yet it would be incor-
rect to suggest that Clifford’s declaration in the Bauchi Plains amounted to a 
 wholesale repudiation of the indirect rule system.
The implementation of British colonial policy thus varied greatly across the 
Northern Nigerian Provinces, resulting in protracted debates among colonial 
officials. For Clifford, local confidence in indirect rule required “order” and 
“justice,” and only  after gaining the confidence of local communities would co-
lonial taxation be justified, especially to  those who did not fall neatly  under 
the authority of the Sokoto Caliphate. Interestingly, the acting secretary  under 
Clifford, S. M. Grier, had a view that resembled Clifford’s, but his perception 
of “pagan” communities appears to differ. Like Clifford, Grier’s memoranda 
reflected the idea that  people in “pagan” communities lived  under moral and 
social conditions that  were inferior to  those of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers. 
But instead of characterizing the extraction of tax from “pagans” as coercive, 
Grier claimed that pagan communities did not expect or hope for any better 
condition. Where Clifford leaves open the possibility that “pagan” communi-
ties wanted but could not attain less coercive forms of taxation, Grier claims 
that “pagans” could not conceive of a diff er ent state. For Grier, then, indirect 
rule had more to do with compelling the “pagan tribes” to embrace a higher 
moral order and a superior form of life.84
The response of G. J. Lethem, as district officer of Dikwa District, to  these 
imperial discussions on the implementation of indirect rule is instructive 
 because it offers a way one British administrator interpreted the complexities 
of religious and communal identity in local communities  under his jurisdic-
tion. The files reveal that although certain practices on taxation  were discour-
aged by Clifford’s administration, Lethem felt compelled to allow them to 
continue in remote areas of Dikwa District. In response to Grier and Clifford, 
Lethem contended that effective adjudication of  legal codes had to take specific 
local conditions into account. Unlike his superiors in Lagos and Kaduna, Leth-
 em contends that  legal rules had significant social functions that continue to 
mediate social relations. Rather than intervene when he toured so- called pagan 
communities, Lethem claimed that he used the shehu’s name (the name of the 
Muslim ruler in the district), thereby aligning himself with prevailing networks 
of power. Lethem’s interpretation of colonial rule, then, recognized the role of 
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British collection of taxes, but also believed that preexisting practices did not 
need to be unduly altered by British colonial reforms.85
Assistant District Officer (and  later Resident of Bornu Province)  T.  E. 
Letchworth’s colonial files in Nasarawa Division further reveal the tension be-
tween the theory of indirect rule and the real ity of local administration among 
the diverse religious and ethnic groups that constituted Britain’s colonial 
provinces in Northern Nigeria. Like most ju nior colonial administrators in the 
Northern Provinces in the 1920s and ’30s, Letchworth was not naive about 
indirect rule’s limitations, although only close engagement with the realities 
“on the ground” gave him a fuller understanding of the extent of the social, po-
liti cal, and religious complexities in Nasarawa Emirate. In Nasarawa, multiple 
identities  were rooted in extensive religious and communal diversity,  under the 
tenuous rule of the emir, district heads, village heads, and Muslim clerics. Lu-
gardian indirect rule had brought  these diverse communal groupings  under a 
simplified system that obscured the intricate workings of the emirate’s po liti cal, 
religious, and social life. Moreover, the Lugardian system assumed a hierarchy of 
communities wherein Hausa- Fulani Muslim aristocrats governed as natu ral rulers 
over Hausa and Fulani Muslim talakawa and “pagan” tribes. However,  these reli-
gious and communal identities  were far more mutable than indirect rule’s  simple 
social stratification would like to admit. By imposing a simplified binary between 
Islamic aristocratic rulers and the masses of “pagans” in non- Muslim areas of the 
Northern Protectorate, British administrators not only consolidated the power of 
emirate rulers, but also accentuated a major politico- religious fault line between 
the Muslim emirates and communities that adhered to indigenous religious be-
liefs, many of whom would gradually come  under the influence of mission Chris-
tian ity by the late colonial period in the 1950s. Letchworth would  later recall a jar-
ring incident during one of his tours of rural communities  under his jurisdiction:
I had to do the Gade who  were mostly in Guada- Guada District I think it 
was, where three village areas overlap into the home district of the Nasar-
awa Emirate, which was  under a Fulani district head who subsequently 
became emir, and very early on it became an obvious fact they would 
have to be lumped into the new Gade District that was to be created for 
the Gade. . . .  But one illuminating  thing happened one day, I was  going 
to one of  these villages and we  were sitting on the sample  saddle of a 
range of hills. . . .  And I very distinctly heard him [Letchworth’s Hausa 
attendant] say, as the pagans  were trekking up the passing, Ga su shanun 
mu (translation:  there they go our  cattle). And I thought to myself, this 
was rather diff er ent from what we  were taught.86
In the  simple utterance of the Hausa attendant, Letchworth was immediately 
aware that the attendant’s words did not reflect a central assumption of indirect 
rule: that Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers  will treat “pagan” tribes as subjects, not, 
as the meta phor suggests, a means of profit. It is reasonable to assume from 
Letchworth’s statement that his Hausa Muslim attendant did not regard the 
“pagans” as subjects, at least not as British administrators would have assumed, 
but rather as a group that was fundamentally diff er ent from Hausa- Fulani 
Muslims, who  were deemed natu ral rulers of the Nasarawa Emirate. Ochonu’s 
conceptualization of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rule over non- Muslims in the 
 Middle  Belt is instructive in the rationalization of the indirect rule among the di-
verse  peoples of the Northern Nigerian Protectorate. He notes: “I traced the im-
perial activities of the defunct Sokoto Caliphates’ Hausa- Fulani Muslim agents 
[of British colonial rulers] in the  Middle  Belt as they morphed from conducting 
slave raids and exacting tributes in the mid- nineteenth  century . . .  to enforcing 
subcolonial preparatory rule  under the British in the twentieth  century.”87
While British authorities scaled back the more rigid form of the indirect 
rule system and installed discrete administrative units that recognized the re-
gion’s communal and religious diversity, the complicated local administrative 
system persisted throughout the Northern Protectorate even before the outbreak 
of World War II. For example, in Tangale District in Gombe Division, District 
Officer J. A. E. Morley’s rec ords of tax collection suggest that antagonistic rela-
tionships continued to characterize tax assessment and enforcement. The pace of 
tax collection varied significantly across the district. In some, tax was collected 
quickly. But in many  others, collection was a drawn- out affair that dragged on 
for many months. When census lines  were drawn, British officers knew the 
more affluent from the poorer areas and had a fair amount of knowledge about 
the seasonal variants that would affect communities’ abilities to pay, as well 
as when and where crops had done well or failed. It is unlikely, then, that the 
delays stemmed mainly from mistaken census lines. Instead, the rec ords suggest 
that the delays occurred  because leaders  either  were unwilling to vigorously 
enforce the collection of colonial taxes,  were simply unable to collect taxes, or 
embezzled funds collected from taxes.88
The proposed reorganization of Waja Native Authority in Gombe Division, 
based on a secret intelligence report by Assistant District Officer  D.  T.  M. 
Birks in September 1945, provides vivid insight into the fluid demography of 
the  people who  shaped the social landscape of Northern Nigeria. The appro-
priation, distortion, and manipulation of this history  under British colonial 
rule would continue to influence the pro cesses of decolonization  after World 
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War II. In this account, the creation of local colonial administrative structures 
reflected the narratives of the highly contentious communal conditions in the 
early twentieth  century, when British colonial rule was imposed, as well as the 
uncertainties of the early years of colonial rule that  were  shaped by indirect rule.
Birks’s confidential report suggests that colonial rule intensified the pro-
cess of politico- religious tensions in the area. In the Waja region of the Gombe 
emirate, indirect rule in the early twentieth  century solidified Fulani Muslim 
domination by formalizing the local administrative structure. In the Plains 
Waja area, the hegemony of two Fulani Muslim clans led to a growth in reli-
gious and po liti cal identity, shaping the framework for colonial local admin-
istration. According to Birks’s report, immediately  after the Fulani Jihad, two 
Fulani clans (Yola and Kukawa) settled in Kunde, near Gombe, an area adja-
cent to the Waja region.  Under the reign of Baba Yero, the Kunde Fulani raided 
several Plains Waja “tribes,” gained po liti cal control over them, and eventually 
achieved a fiefdom over the area. The Kunde Fulani used harsh tactics to sub-
ordinate  these Waja tribes, burning the resistant Gelengu tribe’s village to the 
ground. However, the Kunde Fulani  were unable to gain control over the Hill 
Waja  because their  horse men, although decisive in their subjugation of Plains 
Waja “tribes,”  were not effective on the steep hillside of Dogiri.
What followed from the uneven control of Fulani Muslim was a gradual 
hybridization of the vari ous groups, even as they retained consciously distinct 
identities. Fulani Muslim rulers in the Waja area more closely identified with 
the Waja when Emir Kwoiranga married a Waja girl, who became the  mother 
of a  later district head of the Waja, Musa Sarkin Yaki ( under British colonial 
rule). Many of the Plains Waja  adopted some notable Fulani religious and 
cultural practices, such as the Waja Tsafi festival called Giwiyendi (or Doki in 
Hausa). Although several of  these groups began to share cultural, religious, po-
liti cal, and lineage ties, they retained distinct identities that characterized a social 
hierarchy in the region. Despite  these ties, Plains Waja “tribes” still paid tributes 
and homage to their Fulani Muslim rulers, although Fulani control of the area 
was only a form of suzerainty.
In the case of the Hill Waja, when the British colonized the area in 1906 
 under the direction of Resident Howard, Birks’s intelligence report noted, 
Waja communities of Reme and Dogiri (what would become the Hill Waja) 
mounted strong re sis tance, but British forces ultimately subdued them. Before 
Howard’s departure from the area, he appointed Tukur Sarkin Yaki, a Fulani 
Muslim ruler from the Gombe royal court, as district head. Resident Howard’s 
actions effectively extended the power of the local Fulani Muslim rulers over 
the Hill Waja, as Sarkin Yaki’s appointment established the first Fulani headship 
over the Hill and Plains Waja. In 1908, the Waja District was incorporated into 
the Tangale- Waja in de pen dent districts, leading to the appointment of Musa 
Sarkin Yaki as district head  after the request of the  people in the area. Sarkin 
Musa was deposed by the British for “administrative incompetence” in 1926 
and was replaced by his son Kwoiranga II.
 After Kwoiranga’s death in 1936, the Waja  people resisted Fulani Muslim 
rule. In keeping with the trend to reform indirect rule, British administrators 
subdivided the district into smaller administrative units with in de pen dent 
leadership structures. In 1945, British colonial officers continued to recognize 
the autonomy of communities in the Waja region, enabling them to solidify their 
identities. Following Birks’s recommendation, British authorities divided the Waja 
Village head council into two, reflecting the communal differences between Hill 
and Plains Waja. Birks accumulated interviews with both colonial administrators 
and Waja elders so that he could piece together a representative (though still 
somewhat patchy) description of the vari ous Waja communities’ histories. A 
significant portion of his decision appears to be founded on the oral histories 
of vari ous Waja “tribes” that emphasized cultural, religious, social, and histori-
cal differences as a justification for their autonomy.89
The limitations of indirect rule  were also evident in many other divisions 
in the Northern Provinces. In the Katagum Division of Kano Province, many 
local communities resisted the policies of the native authority. In 1915, for exam-
ple, in his annual report to Resident  Temple, Assistant District Officer H. M. 
Brice- Smith reported widespread disorder in the division, including strong 
opposition against the authority of the emir, communal vio lence among Fu-
lani groups, and charges of duplicity against the emir in the implementation 
of colonial law. In the Chana Fika District, Sarkin Chana Jaju, a subordinate of 
the emir of Fika, rebelled against the emir’s authority and asserted his own au-
thority by marshaling disparate communities, including the Shadi, Fassakande, 
and Madigongo, against colonial authorities. Brice- Smith expressed dismay at 
the inability of the emir of Dambam to compel “Kerikeri pagans,” along with 
their allies, the Ngizimawa and Beddawa, to conform to colonial laws. Instead 
of confronting indirect rule’s serious structural prob lems, colonial authorities 
criminalized local re sis tance to colonial policy. Although Brice- Smith recog-
nized the conflict’s historical antecedent, describing “the slave raiding of the 
Fulani groups as an old habit,” the district officer, with the support of District 
Officer Elder from Bornu and District Officer Carlyle, as well as local rulers, 
mounted armed police opposition against the uprising.90
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The Consolidation of Hausa- Fulani Muslim Rule
As we have seen in previous cases, perspectives of the governor as the represen-
tative of the British crown and the chief executive in charge of colonial jurisdic-
tions often portend the general trend in administrative priorities throughout 
Britain’s Nigerian Provinces. Consequently, as governors changed with the 
times, so too did official perspectives on general statements of colonial ad-
ministration in Lagos and the regional headquarters. We recall that Lugard, 
as the high commissioner of the Northern Nigerian Protectorate from 1900 to 
1906, governor of the Northern Nigerian Protectorate from 1912 to 1913, and 
governor- general of Nigeria from 1913 to 1918, had firmly entrenched a rigid 
indirect rule system of local administration. In the intervening years between 
Lugard’s two tenures in Nigeria, when Sir William Wallace served as high com-
missioner of the Northern Nigerian Protectorate, and Henry Hesketh Bell as 
governor of the Northern Protectorate from 1909 to 1912, indirect rule was 
consistently affirmed as the governing princi ple in colonial Nigeria. Thus, dur-
ing the critical first two de cades of British rule, Lugard’s rigid conception of in-
direct rule dominated the nature and form of local administration in Northern 
Nigeria and beyond.
Hugh Clifford’s tenure as governor marked a slight shift in colonial admin-
istrative priorities in Nigeria. During his tenure as governor from 1919 to 1925, 
Clifford sought to encourage a more efficient method of local administration 
by exploring new strategies to expand the scope of the native authority system, 
especially in the Northern Provinces. We  will recall how Clifford expanded the 
concept of indirect rule so that the diverse communal groups, especially adher-
ents of indigenous religious beliefs, would have more control over their local 
affairs. When Clifford left, Graeme Thompson, governor of Nigeria from 1929 
to 1931, gave British officers considerable leeway to innovate as colonial admin-
istrators within their vari ous jurisdictions. This gave the lieutenant governor of 
the Northern Nigerian Provinces, Palmer, the ability to reassert a Northern- 
centered administrative system that further reified the authority of the Fulani 
emirs, district heads, village heads, and Muslim clerics in native authority struc-
tures. It would be left to Donald Cameron, governor of Nigeria from 1931 to 
1935, to implement a far- reaching reform of the indirect rule system of colonial 
administration.
In 1931, Cameron arrived fresh from ser vice in Tanganyika, becoming the 
new governor and commander in chief of Nigeria. Raised in the British empire- 
making tradition, Cameron was enmeshed in the colonial proj ect.91 Arriving 
at a time when the native authority system had proven inadequate to address 
Nigeria’s changing society, Cameron felt compelled to institute comprehensive 
reforms.92 He imposed austerity mea sures as a response to the  Great Depres-
sion and moved to improve security throughout colonial Nigeria. Cameron 
called for reform of the native authority system, especially in the Northern 
Provinces. James Harford, a district officer with many years of ser vice in North-
ern Nigeria, recalled Cameron’s “profound mistrust” of indirect rule, on which 
the Northern Nigerian native authority system was so firmly based. During 
this critical era before the outbreak of World War II, two competing visions of 
colonial rule created a “fundamental divergence” between the reform- minded 
Cameron and his subordinates in the Northern Nigerian colonial ser vice, who 
favored a slow pace of po liti cal evolution  under the leadership of Lieuten-
ant Governor  H.  R. Palmer.93 Cameron’s strident reforms thus drew the ire 
of Northern Nigeria’s colonial administrators, many of whom turned against 
Cameron for his perceived “vindictiveness and arrogance.”
Commander Carrow, who had served for more than two de cades as district 
officer and resident in Kano and Sokoto Provinces, recalled in the 1960s that 
 because of Cameron’s uncompromising style of administration, colonial pro g-
ress was restricted by infighting between British administrators in the Northern 
Provinces and British officers in Lagos, who  were generally loyal to Cameron. 
From Carrow’s perspective, Cameron and his supporters gave  little time to the 
practical considerations peculiar to this vast region and  were only concerned 
with abstract notions of colonial pro gress. By contrast, his subordinate with 
extensive experience in Northern Nigeria— Palmer— believed that ideas of co-
lonial pro gress should reflect the region’s peculiar religious, social, and po liti cal 
context, placing  these considerations over theories of colonial reforms.
Carrow cites two examples that illuminate the intense disagreement be-
tween Cameron and Palmer. The first open conflict occurred at a conference of 
chiefs in Kaduna, Northern Nigeria’s regional capital, in which Cameron was 
in a “very critical mood.” Carrow contends that Cameron’s “violent and rude 
attacks provoked a stupid and equally exaggerated defense from Palmer.” A sec-
ond moment of open disagreement occurred when the two men argued about 
 whether to unchain native administration prisoners. Cameron was staunchly 
against the practice, while Palmer felt such  matters should be left to the discre-
tion of Northern Nigerian native authorities. As conflict between  these two 
se nior officers intensified, Carrow observed that their subordinates often  were 
confused about acceptable colonial policy.94
At the national level, Cameron reinstituted the Supreme Court, weakened 
the native courts, abolished the residents’ provincial courts, created magistrate 
courts as appellate bodies, and established a high court staffed by professional 
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judges. The  legal hierarchy was thus reor ga nized into native courts, magistrate 
courts, the high court, and the Supreme Court. “The essential importance of 
the 1933 Cameron  legal ordinances,” Rene Larémont argues, “was that they re-
stored the authority of Muslim jurists in civil cases while still mitigating their 
authority in capital cases.”95 Notably, this development curtailed the role of 
British administrators in the day- to- day governance of the region, as described 
by Resident Letchworth of Bornu Province. Before Cameron’s reforms, the 
Resident’s duties had included providing leadership for school administra-
tion, provincial institutions, and the Native Authority Council; administering 
tax policy, bud gets, and public works proj ects; relaying the details of hom i-
cide cases to the Executive Council; and serving as registrar for marriages. As 
Cameron’s reforms consolidated the functions of native authorities, however, 
powers of British administrators such as  those held by the Resident  were trans-
ferred to a native administrative council.96 To provide requisite educational 
institution for local administrators, the government opened the Kano Law 
School on the model of Gordon College ( later the University of Khartoum).97 
With Arabic as the language of instruction and a curriculum designed to train 
elite Muslim jurists, the colonial administration attempted to reform the Is-
lamic  legal system.
Ironically, this crucial period of indirect rule undermined non- Muslim au-
tonomy in the Northern Nigerian Provinces. Overlapping colorations of reli-
gious, ethnic, and other communal forms of identities had evolved  under the 
aegis of a reformed indirect rule, starting during the governorship of Hugh 
Clifford. With Cameron’s reform came a formalization of the native admin-
istrative structures in the Northern Provinces and further sedimentation of 
emirate socie ties. Naturally, the growing influence of Hausa- Fulani Muslim 
rulers, precipitated by Cameron’s policy, was resisted by non- Muslim communi-
ties. In response, Muslim rulers attempted to fold such dissent into the po liti cal 
hierarchy, reasserting their hegemony as natu ral rulers of the region’s diverse 
 peoples. While divisions  were also evident in intra- Muslim relations in the re-
gion, the fault lines between Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and groups British 
authorities considered “pagan tribes” widened following the implementation 
of Cameron’s reform policy. As the gap grew wider, and proselytizing by Chris-
tian missions intensified in  these non- Muslim communities from the 1930s to 
the 1950s,98 the universal language of Chris tian ity steadily served as a power ful 
medium of politico- religious mobilization against Hausa- Fulani Muslim hege-
mony by the time of decolonization in the 1950s. This development established 
the foundation for major fault lines that would dominate the pro cesses of col-
lective po liti cal action in the Northern Provinces in the late colonial period, 
and ultimately in the postcolonial era, with its fissures of entrenched ethno- 
religious identity.
Institutional contestation was central to elite formation in this rapidly chang-
ing environment;  these efforts essentially amounted to the first deliberate policy 
that moved Nigeria  toward the regionalization of state power. As outlined above, 
 legal formalization required that colonial administrators devolve their authority 
to the dominant Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, yet it also required them to retain 
some control over the judicial system. Power thus flowed downward from the 
colonial authorities in Lagos (the national capital) and Kaduna (the Northern 
regional capital) to the power brokers of the Sokoto Caliphate; the reforms 
 were not transmitted upward from local communities to a Hausa- Fulani Mus-
lim aristocracy. They also set the stage for the consolidation of an ethno- regional 
power structure vested in the educationally advanced Southern Nigerian Christian 
elite and Northern Muslim rulers. By the end of World War II, religious and 
ethnic identities had been consolidated, reflecting the entrenched Hausa- Fulani 
identity embedded in the region’s long and complicated engagement with 
Islam and the impact of Christian missions on the non- Muslim areas of the 
Northern Protectorate. Though this pattern was complicated by mass migra-
tions of Southern Christians to the Northern Provinces and the migration of 
Hausa- Fulani Muslims to the  Middle  Belt region, Muslim and Christian identi-
ties assumed greater meaning in the region (the  Middle  Belt), especially during 
the decolonization pro cess.
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Once Christian missions entered non- Muslim areas in the Northern Nigerian 
Protectorate, what resulted was a complicated set of interethnic relations 
among the diverse communities in the region.  These relations developed spe-
cifically  because mission Chris tian ity successfully implanted a framework for 
disparate communal groups, erstwhile adherents of indigenous religions, to 
articulate defensive politico- religious doctrines and build unified re sis tance 
against Hausa- Fulani Muslim rule. Indeed, a lasting consequence of the impact 
of Christian missions on the masses of marginalized  people throughout the 
Northern Provinces would be its capacity to provide a medium of “religious 
renewal” and “newfound mobility for the po liti cal, economic, and social trans-
formations occurring  after the colonial takeover of the caliphate and the aboli-
tion of slavery.”1 Additionally, the caliphate’s grip on power was beginning to 
erode  because of colonial reform. Down in the Southwest, Chris tian ity contin-
ued to produce sharply diff er ent social and po liti cal outcomes among Yoruba 
communities, with vari ous missions expanding their base in major cities such 
as Ibadan, Abeokuta, Ijebu- Ode, and Lagos. As Yoruba traditions encountered 
this alien world religion, Christian doctrines and observances adapted to local 
c h a p t er  t h r ee
c h r is t i a n  i t y  a n d  t h e 
t r a n s f o r m at i o n  o f 
co l o n i a l  so u t h er n  a n d 
n o rt h er n  n i ger i a
cosmology, worldview, and custom. Indeed, this rapid growth of Christian 
missions would also transform indigenous religions and local traditions in 
other Southern Provinces in the Southeast and the delta regions as well as the 
non- Muslim areas of colonial Northern Nigeria.
Chris tian ity, Colonialism, and Social Mobility in Yoruba Society
John Peel argues in his groundbreaking book Religious Encounter and the Mak-
ing of the Yoruba that Yoruba conversion to Chris tian ity took place within 
the framework of a complicated, sometimes contradictory cultural dialogue 
between the Yoruba belief system and mission Chris tian ity. The methods by 
which the missionaries’ messages  were received brought together religious and 
social forces that  were anchored to essential structures of Yoruba indigenous 
beliefs. While Western Christian evangelical perspectives drew a distinction 
between the secular and religious, Yoruba Christian converts reconciled tem-
poral and transcendental forces, connecting the power of Chris tian ity to rap-
idly changing social conditions within a Yoruba frame of reference.2
Yoruba Christian converts understood the moral questions undergirding 
the rapidly changing world profoundly  shaped by British colonialism and mis-
sion Chris tian ity. Missionary teachings about personal integrity, the  family, 
and achieving material exactitude  were not novel ideas to Yoruba  people, since 
 these are well embedded in local traditions and customary ways.3 Ultimately, 
Chris tian ity flourished in Yoruba communities during the transformative mo-
ment of colonial rule  because it provided an impor tant means of navigating the 
increasingly complex social, po liti cal, and economic environment of modern 
Nigerian society at the turn of the twentieth  century.4 Indeed, in an earlier 
work Peel had argued that Aladura, the popu lar in de pen dent Yoruba Christian 
church movement, effectively adapted Yoruba religious beliefs to the modern-
izing proj ect of mission Chris tian ity.5
At another level, some earlier studies on mission Chris tian ity, modernity, 
and Yoruba traditions have looked at the transformation of Yoruba society by 
connecting the values of the new world religion to an evolving pro cess of so-
cial relations that  were expressed through changing marriage norms and  family 
structure. Kristin Mann’s impor tant book Marrying Well: Marriages, Status, 
and Social Change among the Educated Elite in Lagos is an exemplar among 
studies of this social pro cess during the colonial period.6 Mann explains that 
though Yoruba and neo- Victorian marriage practices among educated Yoruba 
Christians  were not always mutually exclusive,  there  were notable distinguish-
ing characteristics between  these two religious practices: the Yoruba practice of 
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polygamy ensured access to economic networks, while Christian marriage en-
sured elite status. In traditional Yoruba society, marriage often merged two lin-
eages to form corporate networks of power and status. But as educated Yoruba 
Christians  adopted Christian marriage, they acquired new social status derived 
from mission education, Christian civility, and elite networks that complicated 
the meaning of power in Yoruba society. While elite Christian marriages en-
hanced the economic power of men, in colonial society elite Christian  women 
became dependent on their husbands. In this complicated social context, neither 
traditional Yoruba marriage nor neo- Victorian Christian marriage guaranteed 
success, but both became a route to power and economic opportunity. Educated 
Yoruba Christians moved  toward Christian practices as a means of social ad-
vancement in a modernizing colonial system,7 but they continued to build on 
traditional Yoruba marriage practices to navigate lineage networks and social ties.
Bound to the layered social change caused by  these interactions between 
Christian and Yoruba marriage practices was the economic transformation 
that mission Chris tian ity and the colonial economy encouraged during this 
era. Sara Berry offers insightful examples of  these concurrent developments in 
her innovative book Cocoa, Custom, and Socio- Economic Change in Rural West-
ern Nigeria.8 In it she explains that, beyond the ongoing modernizing- elite ver-
sus reactionary- elder conflict, cocoa cultivation was tied to the mobilization 
of traditional social structures. Though the socially unmoored, such as former 
slaves and mi grant laborers, did take up production, the more impor tant 
 demographic groups  were  those who had access to Eu ro pean merchants and 
missionaries who  were spreading their knowledge of cocoa- farming techniques, 
particularly missionaries who connected cocoa cultivation to their Christian mes-
sage.9 In fact, breaking with established norms of religion often went hand in hand 
with quitting prevailing agricultural methods and switching to cocoa cultivation.
Michael Ajasin, the renowned Yoruba nationalist and first civilian governor 
of the Yoruba state of Ondo in postcolonial Nigeria, illustrates the impor tant 
intersection of mission Chris tian ity and export- oriented cocoa production 
at the center of his  family’s social transformation at the turn of the twentieth 
 century:
I got married to Comfort Babafunke Tenabe. Many years before we met 
each other and  later got married, providence had brought our  fathers 
into an impersonal contact. Pa Isaac Tenabe,  father of my wife, was born 
in Idoani about the year 1870. In 1892, the legendary Ogedengbe Agbo-
gungboro of Ilesha raided Idoani and took Pa Tenabe to Ilesha as one 
of his captives. While in captivity he was converted to Chris tian ity, a 
religion he began to introduce to Idoani and its districts when he re-
turned home on 13th November, 1892  after the overthrow of Ogedengbe 
and the abolition of the slave trade. He also brought with him the cocoa 
plant which he introduced into the area. With the bible in one hand and 
cocoa plant in the other, he travelled extensively in the area converting 
 people and introducing cocoa farming to them. At Owo, my  father be-
came one of his converts to both Chris tian ity and cocoa farming. . . .  My 
 father was converted to the Church Missionary Society (cms) other wise 
known as the Anglican Church denomination.10
However, the influence of modern agricultural systems derived from the Brit-
ish was limited, and the rapid rise in cocoa cultivation was not a  simple realiza-
tion of economic opportunity. In Ilesha and Ibadan, Berry contends that cocoa 
cultivation initially was a fallback option for the many unemployed soldiers 
who  were left over from the recently ended Yoruba wars. Thus, change within 
Yoruba society dictated the speed and patterns of the new practice of cocoa 
cultivation. The production of cocoa required large amounts of land and  labor, 
and cocoa trees took several years to mature, so successful cocoa cultivation 
relied not only on the landowner’s wealth but also on his ability to mobilize 
 labor and venture capital, usually through lineage ties. As many farmers sought 
to establish themselves in new Yoruba communities, landowners relied on un-
attached mi grants for  labor, creating an emerging landowner- tenant class re-
lationship. A system of land rentals emerged, and the cost of acquiring rights 
to land increased. In some ways, this eroded lineage relationships, as mi grants 
entered the traditional landowning system. In sum, the spread of cocoa farming 
was embedded in prevailing social relations that was transformed by mission 
Chris tian ity and colonialism, even as economic relationships  were broken and 
reconfigured in the emerging cultivation system.11
Chris tian ity, Colonial Rule, and Modernization:  
Reflections on Ibadan and Ijebu
The transformation of Yoruba communities that started in the mid- nineteenth 
 century was accelerated through a greater intensity of Christian missions  after 
the imposition of colonial rule in the early twentieth  century. Ibadan and 
Ijebu- Ode are two pivotal Yoruba cities in which this transformation induced 
by mission Chris tian ity was notable in the earlier de cades of colonial rule.12
In Ibadan, the first cms mission was established by a German- Swiss mis-
sionary, the Reverend David Hinderer, and his En glish wife, Anna Martin, 
72 Chapter 3
Chris tian ity and Transformation 73
who arrived in the city in May 1853. We are told in I. B. Akinyele’s rendition 
of local history, Iwe Itan Ibadan,13 that the relationship between the pioneer-
ing Christians and local  people was generally amicable. In fact, the mission’s 
first primary school was started in a  house given to Reverend Hinderer by the 
city’s ruler, Baale Oyesile Olugbode. Toyin Falola notes the steady growth of 
the cms mission in Ibadan during the formative years:
The mission  houses expanded slowly and additional converts  were made 
each year. By 1859, 135 converts had been baptized at Kudeti, and the 
first church was established in 1854. In 1868, a new church, St.  Peter’s 
was opened at Aremo and in the following year, St. James’ Church was 
opened at Ogunpa. In 1879,  there  were two mission schools, with about 
67 registered students. By 1899, the three churches had converts num-
bering 400  people, who  were concentrated in the neighborhoods of 
Kudeti, Alafara, Labiran, Oke Ofa, and Agodi. Whilst this was a small 
number, Chris tian ity was nevertheless beginning to make its impact in 
Ibadan. The few strong converts  were exclusive, preferring to interact with 
one another rather than with “pagans and Mohammedans.” The clergy 
became involved in politics, and their preaching and activities partly 
paved the way for further Eu ro pean penetration.14
By the turn of the  century, other Christian missions, led by Methodists, Bap-
tists, and Catholics, had emerged in vari ous sections of the city and neighbor-
ing towns, further encouraging the pace of social change.
In Ibadan, like most Yoruba communities, Christian missionary activities 
led to the advancement of Western education. Several de cades  after the Yoruba 
wars, mission elementary schools, along with the Baale School (named for the 
ruler), provided education for the  children of Christian commoners, since chiefs 
 were not inclined to avail themselves of this educational resource. The ambiva-
lence of chiefs about Western education is understandable,  because the overt 
proselytizing that accompanied missionary education undermined the indig-
enous religious traditions in which their traditional authority was based. Thus, 
anxiety over the destabilizing effects of Christian values on local traditions pre-
vailed in the earlier de cades of Chris tian ity in the city.15
The influence of Chris tian ity was further enhanced by the establishment 
of a cms community secondary school, the Ibadan Grammar School, in 1913. 
Education and many civic- oriented proj ects  were sustained by a small but in-
fluential Christian- educated elite during  those critical early de cades of colonial 
rule. By the 1930s, the expansion of missionary education had increased the 
influence of Western- educated Christians in local affairs, leading to friction 
between a younger generation of Christian elites and the old guards, largely 
consisting of traditional chiefs. Educated Christians used the training they had 
acquired from mission schools to gain access to new professional opportunities 
that the colonial system afforded and to advance the interests of their ancestral 
hometown within the colonial administrative system. Influential leaders of this 
emergent elite group consistently lobbied colonial administrators to incorpo-
rate educated Christians into the local administrative system.16
My emphasis so far on the significance of mission Chris tian ity should not 
be mistaken for an underestimation of the importance of Islam in the trans-
formation of Ibadan and other Yoruba communities.17 Indeed, Islam was a 
formidable force for change, though Chris tian ity had seized the initiative in 
constructing a pathway to modernity by the early twentieth  century. Be that as 
it may, the intersection of religious traditions was inevitable, given that Islam 
had engaged Yoruba communities since the early 1800s and was integral in 
transforming Ibadan during its emergence as a garrison town following the fall 
of the Old Oyo Empire. The incursion of Hausa- Fulani jihadists into Yoruba 
communities following the southward advance of the Sokoto Jihad is another 
significant historical  factor in this regard. With the conversion of Ibadan’s fa-
mous ruler, Are Latosisa, in the mid- nineteenth  century Islam grew in influ-
ence, especially among power ful chiefly lineages and wealthy traders. While 
Islam was embedded in the social structure of emirate society and deployed 
by British administrators to shape the colonial order in the Northern Prov-
inces, mission Chris tian ity,  because of its impact on local communities in the 
Southern Provinces, profoundly  shaped the direction of Ibadan. As social and 
po liti cal developments transformed spatial relations, and competition for scarce 
resources of the colonial state intensified, subethnic Yoruba and religious iden-
tities deepened in Ibadan  under colonial rule.18
A brief review of the Ijebu case also reveals the extent to which Yoruba com-
munities adapted the modernizing features of Chris tian ity to prevailing local 
conditions at the turn of the  century in the Yoruba region.19 Social relations 
and communal consciousness of Ijebu- Ode, the principal Ijebu city,  were dra-
matically transformed  because of the far- reaching social and po liti cal develop-
ments that accompanied the Imagbo War— the war that led to the conquest 
of the Ijebu by the British in 1892. Before their defeat, many Ijebu towns had 
remained largely isolated, insistently resisting direct missionary and Eu ro pean 
commercial encroachment into their communities in the second half of the 
nineteenth  century.20 But their isolation was to be shattered. The treaty be-
tween the British conquerors and Ijebu- Ode’s Oba, the Awujale, opened the 
door to British rule and to Christian missionary activities in the last de cade of 
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the nineteenth  century. Indeed,  because of the close proximity of Ijebu towns 
to Lagos on the coast and Abeokuta, about forty miles north, where Christian 
missionary influence had taken hold by the late 1800s, the social impact of mis-
sion Chris tian ity would be much quicker in Ijebu towns than in communities 
in the Yoruba hinterland that came  under British control at the turn of the 
twentieth  century.21 Mindful of  these radically new social and po liti cal condi-
tions, the enterprising Ijebu, who had retained control over trade routes be-
tween the Yoruba hinterland and the coast during the Yoruba wars, strategically 
embraced Christian missionaries, who held the key to modern development.22
At a crossroads, Ijebu Christian converts who had immigrated to Lagos 
before the Imagbo War collaborated with Christian missionaries to establish 
elementary and secondary schools in Ijebu towns. The profile of Christian edu-
cated elites, notably teachers, clerks, and clergy, increased  because of the grow-
ing importance of Western education; as the status of Christian educated elites 
 rose in Ijebu communities, their influence superseded  those of the custodians 
of the traditional order, notably local chiefs and heads of lineages. Indeed, by 
the early de cades of colonial rule, community pressure for Western education 
and modern development would stretch the resources of missionaries as Angli-
can and Methodist missions failed to meet the high demand for primary and 
secondary education in Ijebu communities. The strong desire to advance West-
ern education reached an impor tant milestone in 1913, when prominent Ijebu 
cms leaders established the first secondary school in Ijebuland, the Ijebu- Ode 
Grammar School.23
Before the outbreak of World War II, mission schools had significantly pro-
duced teachers, catechists, clerical workers, and traders, who in turn supported 
the objectives of the missions in local communities. Indeed, affiliation with 
Christian missions did not only guarantee membership in the local intelligent-
sia, but also ensured social mobility in an emergent Ijebu colonial society. Sig-
nificantly, by 1940, less than five de cades  after British conquest,  there  were 187 
mission schools in Ijebu communities; and by the Second World War, the Ijebu 
had become influential in commerce and in local administration in the Yoruba 
region.24
Although Chris tian ity and Western education spread rapidly in Ijebu 
communities, they did so unevenly and in some peculiar ways. Notably, cms 
schools had  little centralized supervision  after 1900, giving local cms lay lead-
ers considerable control over the direction of education in local communities. 
By contrast, Methodist schools  were tightly controlled and meticulously cared 
for by their missionary overseers. Before the government- backed education 
committee started its work in the 1920s, denominational competition between 
Christian missions  were prevalent in the earlier de cades of Christian mission-
ary work in Ijebu communities.25 As time passed, vari ous Christian missions 
would develop differently, interacting with Islam, Ijebu customary practices, 
and indigenous religious beliefs.26
This prevalence of Protestant Christian missions in Yoruba communities 
 under colonial rule was far from a straightforward embrace of progressive ideas 
committed to modern training and Western enlightenment. Indeed, some 
Eu ro pean missionaries continued to harbor misgivings about the pace and direc-
tion of change in Nigerian communities. What follows is an analy sis of such 
Eu ro pean missionary ambivalence in the form of a critical discussion of the let-
ters of an En glish cms missionary to his  mother during his ser vice in colonial 
Lagos.
Letters of a CMS En glish Missionary
Many Christian educated Yoruba elites  were committed to rapid development, 
and they pushed aggressively for the modernization of local communities,27 
despite the ambivalence of some Eu ro pean missionaries about the nature of 
social change in local communities in the earlier de cades of colonial rule. The 
detailed letters of an En glish cms missionary, the Rev. Canon R. A. Wright, 
to his  mother provide insight into the ambivalence of one Eu ro pean mission-
ary regarding the po liti cal and social conditions of Nigerian colonial society. The 
letters are also instructive  because they reveal the condescension that some 
Yoruba cms missionaries had attributed to their Eu ro pean counter parts; for 
example, by the end of the nineteenth  century, Saro missionaries, who gener-
ally favored literary education and professionalization, had clashed with Eu ro-
pean missionaries, who called for a slow pace of modernization and advocated 
vocational training for cms converts.28
Although Canon Wright’s letters  were written many de cades  after the ar-
rival of the cms in the mid- nineteenth  century, they nevertheless provide a 
personal insight into an impor tant aspect of imperial discourse in colonial 
Nigeria. Wright’s letters are decidedly paternalistic, even by the standards of 
the time (the late 1920s and early 1930s); they capture themes that  were per-
tinent to the imperial discourses of the times, such as popu lar religion, colo-
nial administration, racial repre sen ta tion, and modernity. British paternalism 
came through clearly in  these letters, and they vividly reveal the mentality of 
an imperial burden common among Western missionaries since the nineteenth 
 century. In a letter dated September 16, 1929, Rev. Canon Wright notes:
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A native Canon came in to see me about a wedding, the one I mentioned 
in my last letter. His name is Cole and he seemed a most intelligent per-
son. He had spent five months in  Eng land and knew Bishop Burroughs 
and had met Canon Storr. . . .  It is curious how even in an educated and 
good man like him  there is a sense of inferiority. He is conscious of being 
a subject race and clearly knew that he was talking to one of his rulers! It 
is an odd business living in another’s country as the military governors, 
thoroughly bad for one’s soul. But as the Emir of Kano told Mr. Tom-
linson if we  weren’t  here he would soon enclose the  whole of Nigeria in 
his empire, cartoon off the heads of  those he  didn’t like and enslave the 
rest! He apparently was quite friendly about it! A well- known native said 
the other day that if we left Nigeria he  will be on the same boat; so perhaps 
it is best as is.29
In a tour through the Southern and Northern Provinces in 1929, Wright pro-
vided in ter est ing insight into the administration of a key region in the Southern 
Provinces. In a letter describing his travel experience, he shares his impression 
of the city of Oyo, which at that time was the headquarters of Oyo Province 
 under the “rule” of the legendary Captain William  A. Ross, and Alaafin 
 Siyanbola Ladigbolu, Ross’s “supreme head” of this impor tant province in the 
Yoruba hinterland:30
The District Officer is a charming fellow. . . .  He sent me back to the rest 
 house  after tea, and on the way I passed his office. Six huge natives sitting 
on the ground suddenly got up and lay flat on their  faces while I went 
past! This sort of  thing is common up  there and a  little demoralizing. 
When Ross [Captain Ross, Resident of Oyo Province, 1914–1931] goes 
out  whole towns laid quite flat  until he signaled that they get up!  After 
breakfast to see the town of Oyo and the palace of the Alaafin who is 
a kind of combine Pope and Emperor ruling  under British protection. 
This city was made of mud but the Alaafin’s  house of concrete. He has a 
wonderful Daimler car. Then [I went] to see a special school for the sons 
of chiefs who  were cheery  little fellows. It’s a kind of boarding school and 
I believe a successful experiment . . .  not Christian but the native teacher 
is a Christian. . . .  The views  were perfectly wonderful and Ross on his job 
was most illuminating. I  don’t suppose, in his Province, that any Roman 
Emperor was ever so absolute. It is reported that when he was prospect-
ing for a site for his  house that he could not get through the Bush to the 
top. So he just said make a road to the top while I have my lunch. In that 
time thousands of natives  were set to work and some half mile of pass- 
able road produced by the time he had finished his coffee!31
In summing up his travel experiences, Wright harked back to the old mantra of 
the sacrifice of the custodian of the British imperial mission in colonial Africa. 
In his view, British empire making in Nigeria, as with other “inferior races” 
around the world for centuries, was an inevitable moral burden that ordinary 
subjects of the British Crown had to shoulder. For Canon Wright, it was a 
good  thing for British subjects to help save humanity; and on many occasions, 
he felt a sense of self- fulfillment when he encountered representatives of His 
Majesty’s Ser vice,
the kind of men who are ruling the Empire. They are with all their  little 
idiosyncrasies most amazing  people, full of life and often quite definitely 
religious, and embarrassingly anxious to talk about their par tic u lar prob-
lem in life. Men with families at home and desperately lonely, or a new 
child arriving, or thinking of getting married and wondering if they 
should, or some of the many prob lems which faced men in the outpost 
of empire. The cadets are just as good as I expected they would be when 
I first met them.32
From the above, it is evident that Wright is inclined to paint a romantic picture 
of colonial administrators as guardians of the British Empire’s civilizing im-
perative; and he associates  these men on imperial duty with a profound sense of 
responsibility and dedication to Pax Britannia. Although a missionary himself, 
Wright was suspicious of Eu ro pean missionaries he considered too close to the 
natives. Eu ro pean missionaries, in his view,  were susceptible to local manipula-
tion, unlike British administrators, who he thought demonstrated a healthy 
detachment from the everyday life of Africans. His assessments  were superficial 
and condescending, lacked context, and grossly simplified social realities. In 
contemptuous language, Wright observes:
I have been learning lately that  there is something about us which has 
“shaken” this land more than I realize which is a cause for both thankful-
ness and very real awe at the responsibility of it all. . . .  I  didn’t tell you 
yesterday that on arrival in Ibadan I looked around and noticed a chicken 
tied to the “bumper” at the back. I was just  going to ask the boy why 
he had put it  there thinking he had some theory about keeping it fresh, 
when it suddenly squawked! I was very angry.  These  people have no idea 
at all of kindness to animals.33
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Rev. Canon Wright believed that Eu ro pe ans are higher moral beings, and Afri-
cans of questionable moral standards. This perspective is evident in his conclu-
sions about the circumstances surrounding a “biracial” schoolboy’s parentage. The 
boy was a  family friend who attended the elite King’s College in Lagos. Wright 
recalled that he had invited the boy to tea: “Then tea at which I had two boys, 
friends of Bullen, who are now at King’s College. One is a half- caste, the son of 
a man, a very se nior official who married according to native law and custom in 
the days when Nigeria was a lonelier place than now. He was apparently a very 
good and faithful husband but the wife was a bad native  woman who ran away 
leaving him with the boy.”34
Against the backdrop of the  Great Depression, Wright does not shy away 
from expressing a strong opinion on the Port Harcourt  labor riots of 1929. In 
this November 12, 1929, letter, he is critical of the United African Com pany 
(uac) and poll tax, noting that
the root trou ble is a horrid trading combine called uac who having 
got the  whole of the trade of West Africa into their hands are depressing 
prices paid to the natives for such  things as palm kernels. This happens to 
coincide with a poll tax. The result is riots  etc. and the traders blame the 
government for the much damage that has been done. . . .  It is also partly 
due to the fact that taxes are collected by the natives themselves and their 
“ brothers”  don’t believe anything like the right amount gets to the govern-
ment. The African trusts no one but a white man. He knows too much 
about his  brother! It is rather in ter est ing to see the prob lems of Empire 
before one. We are  here by force of arms and levy taxes to run the country. 
If we go away the place reverts to barbarism— the Northern tribes  will 
sweep down and enslave every one. Then would follow the traders who as 
they did before would flood the place with gin and for a few drinks and 
gold watches buy up most of the land and  either force the peasant or make 
him work at their price. This is what happened before and made it neces-
sary for the government to defend the native. So we literally have to shoot 
the native for his own sake!35
Rev.  Canon Wright’s disdain for the cultures of the  peoples of Nigeria, and 
even the landscape,  were amplified in his travels to the southeastern section of 
the Southern Provinces and Northern Provinces. In an account reminiscent of 
information contained in the travelogues of Eu ro pean explorers and adven-
turers of the previous  century, Wright wrote in May 1930 from the Igbo city of 
Umuahia:
I am very glad to have done the trip. It has given me quite a new idea 
of every thing but in many ways it has been most disappointing. First 
the country itself is deadly dull. When it  isn’t tropical forest it is semi 
open desert of sand.  There is practically no color except in a few trees 
at this time of year which are sort of glorified red. Some of the  people 
wear pleasant clothes but nothing very startling. Generally they are some 
shade of blue or  else white. I met one tribe who literarily wore nothing 
at all and it  doesn’t worry them a bit  because they come into the town 
just as their more clothed brethren. They are a pagan race who live on the 
Plateau near Jos, and in spite of the intense cold and heat manage very 
well without any civilized covering.36
As with most Christian missionaries of the time, the dominant role of Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim rulers and the marginalization of the growing Christian minority 
communities in the Northern Provinces did not elude Canon Wright. On this 
impor tant issue, Wright reflected the general frustration of Christian mission-
aries about the rigidity of the Lugardian system of indirect rule, claiming that 
this system was grossly inadequate for the complex sociopo liti cal challenges 
confronting the Northern Provinces:
It struck me that our efforts to keep Northern Nigeria a medieval Mo-
hammedan state is not pos si ble forever and when the break comes  there 
 will be a row. . . .  The  whole question of missions and general Christian 
government up  there is a prob lem the magnitude of which simply cannot 
be understood by  people outside. . . .  It  will take a generation to bring 
them up into our ideas. They simply  don’t understand obvious  things 
like monogamy and truthfulness. Slavery to some extent still exists and 
no one sees any reason why it  shouldn’t.37
This critical review of Rev. Canon Wright’s letter to his  mother is not a compre-
hensive assessment of the attitude of Eu ro pean missionaries  toward the  peoples 
of colonial Nigeria. Rather, it exemplifies the condescension often associated 
with Eu ro pean missionaries within the wider context of the imperial discourse 
of the Eu ro pean civilizing mission in colonial Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.
The Rise of Charismatic Chris tian ity in the Southern Provinces
Following the social ferment in Nigerian communities in the early de cades of 
colonial rule, mission Chris tian ity witnessed its first major break from West-
ern Enlightenment thought,38 leading to a rescripting of Christian teachings 
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to local practices and charismatic traditions.39 Common assumptions about 
the origins of Nigerian “charismatism”40 often begin with the North Ameri-
can “fundamentalist” resurgence at the turn of the twentieth  century.41 How-
ever, Ogbu Kalu tells us that this perspective erroneously assumes that African 
Christian consciousness follows developments in the West, generally believed 
to be the “home” of Chris tian ity. For one, the gospel has strong historical con-
nections to African socie ties, spreading first through Egypt, North Africa, and 
Ethiopia within four centuries of Christ’s death, and  later to coastal ports and 
along the continent’s interior waterways in the age of Iberian conquest.42 In fact, 
the African charismatic revival and its North American counterpart emerged 
si mul ta neously, only  later converging to reflect similar characteristics.43
Following the waves of mission Chris tian ity at the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury, the charismatic movements that proliferated in Southern Nigerian com-
munities by the late colonial period reflected antistructural doctrines common 
among indigenous African cosmologies and worldviews.44 Thus, the proliferation 
of charismatic movements in colonial Southern Nigeria45 was reflected through 
the (British) Apostolic Church beginning in the late 1920s, the Assemblies of 
God in Igbo communities in the late 1930s, the Christian Council of Nige-
ria in 1930, the influential Scripture Union (su) in the 1950s,46 and the first 
indigenous Nigerian Pentecostal church, the Redeemed Christian Church of 
God (rccg), founded in 1952. Sorting through this web of charismatic move-
ments, Kalu identifies five distinct categories of fellowships, meeting houses, 
and churches: a priestly figure urging change in patterns of personal religious 
allegiance; a prophetic figure “endowed with healing powers and evangelistic 
ardor to quicken the pace of Christianization”; African in de pen dent churches 
(aics— also known as African- initiated churches) such as Aladura ( Those 
Who Pray); holiness groups representing the backbone of Pentecostal teach-
ing; and,  later, youthful puritan charismatism that led to the wave of Christian 
revivalist movements since the decolonization pro cess in the 1950s.47
Of  these, the aics are often characterized as distinctive in their teachings 
and doctrines, and scholars variously include or exclude them from Nigeria’s 
vibrant charismatic movement.48 Scholars who include aics in Nigeria’s char-
ismatic movement underscore similar historical origins, discourses, and social 
conditions between the aics and Pentecostal groups.49 However,  these claims 
of unity ignore the strong theological opposition of the leadership of Nigeria’s 
Pentecostal movement to the religious practices of the aics. Many Pentecostal 
leaders contend that aics’ religious practices violate tenets of the Christian 
covenant  because they venerate indigenous rituals and sacred objects.50 While 
such distinctions are crucial to theological classification,51 the influence of 
aics on Pentecostal groups in colonial Southern Nigeria is undeniably im mense; 
leaders of Nigeria’s early apostolic churches had strong connections to the Aladura 
movement in Yoruba communities (for a detailed analy sis, see chapter 6).52  These 
contending theological tensions among Southern Nigeria’s emerging charismatic 
church movements reflect the complexities of the region’s rapid social, economic, 
demographic, and po liti cal transformations that had been precipitated by 
the forces of late colonialism. This wave of religious fervor was not limited to the 
Southern Provinces; it also had an impact on non- Muslim communities in the 
Northern Provinces, in the context of the Lugardian policy of indirect rule.
Colonial Policy and Christian Missions in the Northern Provinces
Much of the Christian missionary work in key regions of the Northern Provinces 
at the turn of the twentieth  century was carried out by a new generation of Eu ro-
pean, North American, and Nigerian missionaries from both established and new 
missionary socie ties, such as the cms, the Sudan Interior Mission (sim), the 
Lutherans, the Irish Catholic  Brothers, and the French Catholic  Brothers.53 As 
Christian missionary expansion grew in the Northern Protectorate during the 
colonial period, cms missionary activities expanded from the Southern Prov-
inces into the Northern Provinces, especially to the non- Muslim  Middle  Belt 
and the non- Muslim areas of emirate society, encapsulating the three geopo liti-
cal territories in colonial Nigeria: the North, Southwest, and Southeast.
A new Northern Nigerian cms Diocese was established in the early co-
lonial years and went straight to work in Makurdi and Laffia, largely among 
Southern Christian mi grants, especially Igbo and Yoruba, who had settled 
in  those areas as traders and lower- level colonial functionaries starting in the 
early 1900s. More importantly, cms missionary activities, along with other 
 Christian missions,  were rapidly transforming the geopo liti cal framework in 
non- Muslim  Middle  Belt areas of the Northern Provinces, especially among 
the Tiv, Idoma, and other Benue Plateau  peoples. Focusing on the work of 
the sim in emirate communities of the Northern Protectorate, Shobana 
Shankar notes that “ after the British Colonial Office began to invest more re-
sources in welfare in the 1920s, missions  were allowed to play a greater role in 
education in many parts of Northern Nigeria. In the emirates, missions moved 
from urban Kano to suburban areas of Kano and other Muslim cities such as 
Sokoto and Katsina, where they founded leprosariums and other clinics in the 
1930s.”54 Furthermore, Lutheran missionaries, through a modern social ori-
entation derived from mission schools, made impor tant inroads in Adamawa 
Province by the outbreak of the Second World War, providing an ideological 
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framework against Hausa- Fulani Muslim rule.55 Indeed, some Southern Chris-
tian settlers in the emirates “developed radical new forms of evangelical culture 
in Muslim and ‘pagan’ villages, creating spheres of local autonomy over which 
mission, colonial, and native authorities had  little knowledge or supervision.”56
With contributions in critical areas of health care and education, colonial 
authorities initially saw the missions as key partners in the provision of essen-
tial social ser vices. But as cms, sim, Sudan United Mission (sum), and the 
Catholic  Brothers’ mission work thrived in the region, other missions (such 
as Methodist, Presbyterian Brethren, and the Christian Council of Nigeria) 
redoubled their efforts, and by the late 1920s, tensions between the dominant 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and Christian missionaries had become apparent. 
This strug gle between Chris tian ity and Islam in Northern communities has 
featured prominently in the region since the turn of the twentieth  century. 
The contest between the two world religions had deepened when the British 
introduced indirect rule in Northern Nigeria. In a strug gle that favored Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim rulers, British administrators curtailed the advance of Chris tian-
ity, especially in emirate communities. Nevertheless, many influential British 
missionaries called on colonial authorities to align their imperial interests with 
the objectives of the missions in emirate society.57
This perspective on Christian missionary work in predominantly Muslim 
areas in Africa had long been a prob lem in Eu ro pean missionary history in 
Africa, at least by the late nineteenth  century. In this context, the perspective 
of renowned French theologian Charles De Foucauld on the implications of 
French colonial rule for the propagation of Chris tian ity in the predominantly 
Muslim socie ties of the Maghreb is instructive:
My thought is that if the Muslims of our colonial empire in the north of 
Africa are not gradually,  gently,  little by  little, converted,  there  will be a 
major movement like that in Turkey. An intellectual elite  will form itself 
in the big towns trained in the French fashion, but French neither in 
mind nor heart, lacking all Muslim faith, but keeping the name of it to be 
able to influence the masses, who remain ignorant of us, alienated from 
us by their priests and by our contact with them, too often very unfit to 
create affection. In the long run the elite  will use Islam as a lever to raise 
the masses against us. The population is now 30 million; thanks to peace 
it  will double in 50 years. It  will have railways, all the plants of civiliza-
tion, and  will have been trained by us in the use of our arms. If we have 
not made Frenchmen of  these  peoples, they  will drive us out. The only 
way for them to become French is by becoming Christian.58
As is now well known, this “gentle,” “ little by  little” conversion called for by 
De Foucauld from Islam to Chris tian ity did not take place in Africa. Although 
the call for a steady conversion of North African Muslims advocated by De 
Foucauld would be considered overly optimistic even by the standards of the 
early 1900s, De Foucauld’s statement is useful for at least one impor tant rea-
son. A selective reading of his insightful intervention would suggest that this 
influential French missionary’s perspective adds foresight to late colonialism’s 
contradictory positions in the colonial world, in this instance, North Africa. In 
the case of Britain’s Northern Nigerian Provinces, Eu ro pean missionaries made 
similar calls for Christian evangelization in the region. However, Lugardian 
logic foreclosed Christian proselytizing in Muslim communities, only acced-
ing to missionary requests to evangelize among “pagan tribes.” Jeffrey Haynes 
observed that in the earlier years of colonial rule,  there  were consistent tensions 
between Eu ro pean missionaries who desired to proselytize in Muslim commu-
nities and British administrators who frustrated their efforts at  every turn.59 
Consequently, some missionaries in the Northern Provinces, including the fa-
mous En glish cms missionary physician and linguist Dr. Walter Samuel Miller, 
called on colonial authorities to permit Christian missionary work in Nigeria’s 
emirate society.60 Frank Salamone notes the rationale through which Eu ro pean 
missionaries challenged this policy premised on indirect rule: “Missionaries 
had their own opposing view of real ity. In that view, the Muslim Fulani  were 
not ‘natu ral rulers.’ . . .  Fulani  were seen as interlopers who had imposed their 
rule on the  people, enslaving them indiscriminately as they conquered.  Because 
they  were more likely than po liti cal officers to mingle among the talakawa and 
 because their work was restricted to non- Muslims, it is not surprising that mis-
sionaries, coming from strong anti- slavery movement oppose the official view 
of real ity.”61 In this context, Muslim rulers clashed with Christian missionaries, 
especially in non- Muslim communities of emirate society, where Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim rulers claimed po liti cal authority  going back to the establishment of 
the Sokoto Caliphate. Indeed, by the 1940s, Christian missionary activities 
had grown significantly in the  Middle  Belt region of the Northern Provinces 
through the expansion of mission schools, proving more than an irritant to 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers.62
The tension between colonial officials and Christian missionaries was 
brought into sharp focus by the opposition of British administrators to an anti- 
Muslim publication by British missionary Ethel Miller,  sister of Dr. Miller, in 
Kano in 1926. In an insightful account, Andrew Barnes explores how British 
administrators attempted to control Christian missionary rhe toric in emirate 
society  because of fears that missionary action would destabilize the colonial 
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administrative system. As the story goes, British administrators went to  great 
lengths to censor Ethel Miller’s controversial treatise The Truth about Moham-
med, which was in part an attack on Lugard’s pro- Islam position as espoused 
in his landmark book The Dual Mandate in Tropical Africa; and she reviewed 
critically the basis of Lieutenant Governor H. R. Palmer’s opposition to Chris-
tian missionary activities in the Northern Provinces.63
Even though Miller’s pamphlet was meant for Eu ro pean consumption, co-
lonial authorities denounced it as inflammatory and banned it, contending 
that it could arouse popu lar protest from Northern Muslims. Distribution 
of Miller’s pamphlets provided Palmer with an opportunity to move against 
growing missionary activism. He charged Miller with “violating Section 58 (2) 
of the Nigerian Criminal Code [which] made it unlawful to publish seditious 
writings.”64 However, fearing a backlash from influential British missionaries 
for what some saw as Palmer’s overreaction, Nigeria’s governor, Sir Graeme 
Thompson, overruled Palmer and reprimanded Miller, ordering her to desist 
from distributing her pamphlets.65 The rest is history, as they say. The Catholic 
 Brothers, an Irish Catholic missionary society, would emerge to carry out criti-
cal Christian missionary work in the  Middle  Belt region of Nigeria’s Northern 
Provinces during the colonial period.
The Catholic  Brothers in the Northern Provinces: A Case Study
Haynes has argued that compared to their Protestant counter parts, Catho-
lic missionaries  were more deeply engaged with the social conditions of local 
communities in colonial and postcolonial African socie ties.66 In the Northern 
Protectorate’s  Middle  Belt region, where Catholic missions had firmly estab-
lished themselves by the early 1950s, Eu ro pean missionaries evolved a strong 
partnership with influential local intermediaries. Consistent with Haynes’s 
perspective, colonial and missionary rec ords in many Northern Nigerian commu-
nities reveal that Christian missionaries in partnership with local elders played 
a critical role in developing local communities. In the 1930 annual report for 
Adamawa Province, Resident G. W. Webster recorded evidence of the crucial 
work by missionaries:
Proselytizing at pres ent takes a secondary place in the enhancement 
of the material welfare and health of the  people and it is prob ably this 
that has contributed greatly to the popularity and success of the mission 
among the Bura and Margi tribes. . . .  Their attitude to the administra-
tion is one of cordial cooperation and in no case has it been observed that 
any adherent of the mission has thereby failed to show proper obedience 
and loyalty to the District authorities.67
 These intimate relations between missionaries and local communities are viv-
idly presented in Barnes’s oral history proj ect, notably a comprehensive inter-
view with a pioneering leader of the Irish  brothers, the Rev. Maguire, before 
his retirement from missionary work in Nigeria in 1993. Barnes’s extensive 
interview with  Father Maguire is instructive for our purpose  here  because it 
captures the day- to- day activities of the Irish  brothers as missionaries in the 
Benue Plateau region during the crucial early years of the mission. Having gone 
through rapid social transformation during the interwar period as a colonial 
mining district, this  Middle  Belt region attracted mi grant workers from Nige-
ria’s Southern Provinces, including new Igbo Catholic converts, thus further 
complicating the ethnic and religious mix in the region.  Father Maguire’s retro-
spective is instructive, given the complex communal groups that the Catholic 
 brothers confronted:
When the sma [Society of African Missions] priests first came, they 
 were from Alsace, they  were French as well as Alsatian, and they  were 
experts in languages. They learned the language of the  people, which at 
that time was the Goemai  people down in Shendam. As time moved on 
a few years, they had to face the prob lem of education. And the non- 
Catholic mission bodies already have some schools, and it was per force 
that we had to get involved in schools that meant we had to learn the 
Hausa language,  because it was a type of lingua franca of the North at 
the time. So when we Irish came along the language that we learned was 
Hausa. Another reason too, was that to get involved in all the languages 
of the diff er ent tribes would be a bit much. For example, I started off in 
Kwande Parish down in the lowlands that are the Goemai  people. Then 
I was transferred to Tiv country. Then I was transferred to Kwa, Kafan-
chan, eventually up to Pankshin which would be in the Angas, then into 
Birom land  here in Jos.68
In the specific case of Plateau Province, where the Irish  Brothers initially 
worked,  Father Maguire recalled that mission work was a participatory pro-
cess in which the Catholic Diocese actively engaged Kabwir leaders to estab-
lish churches and rudimentary infrastructure in their local communities. As to 
providing and maintaining basic social ser vices, Maguire recalled that during 
the mission’s earlier years, catechists from local communities led the discussion 
about providing education and health care and other amenities that meant so 
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much to local  people. The Irish mission was not simply an institution for the 
propagation of the Catholic faith; more importantly, Catholicism provided a 
framework for the delivery of much- needed development.  Because of the im-
portance of education, local leaders often saw the arrival of missionaries as the 
prerequisite for establishing mission schools. Thus, for local  people a positive 
outcome of missionary intrusion into their local communities would be the es-
tablishment of mission schools. As the focal point of community development, 
they invested significant portions of their meager resources to constructing and 
maintaining  these schools.69
 Because major areas in Plateau Province in the 1940s  were removed from 
direct Hausa- Fulani Muslim control, Catholic missionaries had more space 
to influence native authorities. Unlike in neighboring provinces, where Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim rulers held sway, the Irish  Brothers’ work in  Middle  Belt commu-
nities brought many disparate ethnic groups together to articulate a unified idea 
of the common good in the region by the 1950s. With regard to the relationship 
between missionaries, community leaders, and British authorities, Maguire as-
serts that  these interactions  were mutually reinforcing:
Now, with regards to the Colonial Government at the time, the relationship 
in general was good. We got on all right together with no real difficulties. 
We had to obey the rules and regulations, the laws of the Government as 
regards the land, as regards buildings, as regards schools. In the main, the 
Colonial Government was very helpful. The schools  were an impor tant 
part of our lives, and in order to establish a school, we had to get the ap-
proval of the government. I  can’t recollect any time when we  didn’t get 
the approval for a school, and the Government was quite willing and 
helpful in this  matter.70
Local communities gained support from the Irish  Brothers to build churches, 
schools, and health clinics, and mission Chris tian ity helped forge a new sense of 
community among the diverse ethnic groups in the region. Moreover, local 
converts worked with missionaries to influence colonial policy.71 In addition, 
wealthy individuals mobilized essential resources for the overall advancement 
of their communities.  Father Maguire thought progressive leaders formed a 
healthy component for social change:
He would be a leader of the  people, a natu ral leader. He might be the one 
who suggested, look, I have heard from this Reverend  father in such a 
place that the  people in that community have a school  there. We need a 
school; what do you all think? He would have talked to his male friends, 
but possibly some  women would be involved as well. That’s how they 
would build the church. And his compound would be the place they 
would use for their meetings. . . .  [As the leader] the  people would look 
up to him, the  people would come to him with their trou bles, their dif-
ficulties, their worries . . .  and he brought many, many  people into the 
church  because of his leadership and  because of his own qualities.72
Consequently, during decolonization in the 1950s, primary and secondary 
school education took root in most non- Muslim communities in the Northern 
Provinces; the literacy rate was on an upward swing, and self- conscious leaders 
began to use their new Christian identity to unify non- Hausa- Fulani ele ments 
in the  Middle  Belt region of the Northern Provinces. Specifically, Chris tian ity 
provided much more than an opportunity to build a spiritual faith; it provided 
a framework in which vari ous ethnic groups would come together to articu-
late strategies to resist Hausa- Fulani Muslim hegemony. The United  Middle 
 Belt Movement emerged in part from the unifying forces of  these Christian 
missionary activities to articulate in much clearer terms the concept of the 
 Middle  Belt as a distinct geopo liti cal zone. Its major objective was to mobilize 
collective po liti cal action against the Hausa- Fulani emirate structure that had 
been reinforced by the British indirect rule system as the hegemon in Nigeria’s 
Northern Provinces.
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The constitutional conferences that  were convened from 1946 to 1959 to pre-
pare Nigeria for self- rule— and subsequently in de pen dence— during decolo-
nization focused principally on the structural imbalances between Nigeria’s 
Northern and Southern Provinces. As constitutional deliberations focused 
on this prob lem, representatives of the colonial government at the confer-
ences  were anxious to build  viable po liti cal institutions necessary for sustained 
governance among Nigeria’s three emerging regional government authorities 
(Eastern, Western, and Northern administrative regions). Within the three 
emergent regions, British colonial authorities also had to tailor  these constitu-
tional conferences to confront agitations from ethnic and religious minorities 
for po liti cal autonomy.1
As a central question in the governance of the Northern Region, Islamic 
law also came  under close scrutiny. Many emirs and Muslim clerics had consis-
tently expressed misgivings about the subordination of sharia to En glish com-
mon law2 and questioned the colonial policy that subjected Islamic law to the 
criminal code of common law.3 Thus, the 1951 Nigerian Constitution Confer-
ence ( later named  after Governor John Stuart Macpherson) charted new  legal 
c h a p t er  f o u r
t h e  p o li t i c s  o f  r eli gi o n 
i n  n o rt h er n  n i ger i a 
d u r i n g  d eco l o n i z at i o n
grounds to accommodate sharia. But the overall focus was to define the pro cess 
of self- rule. The Macpherson Constitution ultimately granted greater auton-
omy to the three regions vis- à- vis a weak federal center and recommended the 
establishment of a professional civil ser vice. This constitutional reform would 
set the stage for Nigeria’s first experiment with constitutional democracy 
(1951–1966).4 Following the 1951 Constitution,5 two successive constitutions 
in 1954 and 19606 provided for the implementation of regional autonomy, fed-
eralism, and revenue allocation. More relevant to our immediate concern, the 
growing fear among non- Muslims in the Northern Region about marginaliza-
tion never received adequate constitutional treatment— Hausa- Fulani Muslim 
rulers’ domination of politics in the region continued apace and without miti-
gation by the federal center on behalf of religious and ethnic minorities.7
It was also apparent during the constitutional deliberations that the North-
ern Region faced stiff developmental challenge  because of the lack of indigenous 
Western- educated personnel to manage the bureaucracy that was needed to 
anchor a modern regional government. The magnitude of the prob lem comes 
through in Governor Macpherson’s assessment that the Northern Region had 
started on the road to Western education at least five de cades  behind its South-
ern counter parts. The cause of the prob lem was straightforward enough: in 
seeking to contain the spread of Chris tian ity in the Northern Provinces  under 
colonial rule, Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, in alliance with British administra-
tors, had stiffly rejected not only Christian proselytizing but also its sociocultural 
under pinnings of Western education. To address this shortfall in professional 
manpower, Western- educated Christian Southerners  were recruited to serve as 
civil servants, teachers, health officers, and technical experts in the Northern 
Region following the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protector-
ates in 1914. But this mea sure soon generated Northern Muslim resentment. 
With a growing sense of micronationalism in the form of a northernization 
strategy, the region’s dominant po liti cal party, the Northern  Peoples Congress 
(npc), formulated policies to boost the training of Northerners for profes-
sional office in the region.8 Thus, when the npc took control of the regional gov-
ernment in 1951, it established a “fighting fund” to train promising Northerners 
in the modern professions, especially as  lawyers, engineers, accountants, health 
workers, and so on.9 But as is well known, the wheel of reform grinds slowly: at-
tempts to raise the Northern Region’s  human resource capabilities would require 
considerable time and patience.
The scale of the prob lem regarding shortfalls in trained manpower was mag-
nified when the government of the Northern Region tried to establish a fully 
functioning modern  legal system. First, while the Eastern and Western Regions 
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by the 1950s already possessed a large pool of indigenous  lawyers trained in the 
En glish common- law tradition, the Northern Region had only a handful to serve 
a population of more than 20 million  people. Indeed, by the early 1950s, all of 
the Northern magistrate courts  were staffed by one En glish judge stationed in the 
region’s capital city, Kaduna. It was customary to transfer cases to adjacent jurisdic-
tions in the Western and Eastern Regions,10 and reports suggest that the admin-
istrative logistics must have bordered on crisis.11 In the short term, British judges, 
magistrates, barristers, and solicitors  were appointed to serve in the region’s  legal 
institutions, including the ministry of justice, high courts, and magistrate courts.12
Po liti cal Leadership and Decolonization
It is widely accepted from the onset of the decolonization pro cess that the mo-
mentum of po liti cal change in the Northern Provinces was profoundly  shaped 
by the towering leadership of the charismatic potentate of the Sokoto Caliph-
ate, Ahmadu Bello, the sardauna of Sokoto, a  great- great- grand son of Usman 
dan Fodio.13 The sardauna’s popu lar appeal was based not only on his charisma 
but also on his place in the Sokoto Caliphate aristocracy. As a cousin of the 
sultan of Sokoto and a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio, the sardauna 
drew on his religious legitimacy to stake his claim for po liti cal leadership. With 
the exception of “ Middle  Belt radicals,” as some British administrators labeled 
the leaders of the less compromising  Middle  Belt Christians, the sardauna’s 
pedigree in the caliphate ensured his widespread popularity throughout the 
Northern Region. Consequently, he worked to ameliorate intra- Muslim con-
flict by paying his re spects at the tombs of both qadiri and tijani leaders,14 and 
he tried to assure leaders of Christian minority groups that they have an impor-
tant role to play in the administration of an emergent Northern Region.15 Call-
ing Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the npc deputy leader and soon- to- be– prime 
minister of Nigeria, his “able lieutenant,” the sardauna felt that the rough- and- 
tumble of national politics in Lagos was below his stature, and left  others to 
carry out what the Times of London referred to as work not fit for “a Muslim 
nobleman out of another  century.” This sense of his own destiny would only 
increase when he became premier of the Northern Region in 1954. His ability 
to draw support from a large spectrum of Northern public opinion lent cred-
ibility to any agreement to which he was party. Indeed, it was inconceivable 
to successfully implement constitutional reforms in the Hausa- Fulani emirates 
without the active engagement of the caliphate aristocracy  under the leader-
ship of someone with the sardauna’s stature. With regard to the sardauna, 
Ahmadu Bello, Governor Macpherson notes:
His  great advantage from the beginning  until almost the end was that he 
was not only a leader of the North but he was a leader who could claim the 
following of prob ably almost all shades of opinion in the Northern Region, 
apart from a few urban or  Middle  Belt revolutionaries. It would have 
been quite impossible to introduce into the conservative, traditional 
Muslim North anything approaching the demo cratic system which we 
did in 1951 and 1954  unless it had been accepted and fathered and worked 
by a member of the Fulani ruling caste. . . .  The Premier was a descendant 
of Usman dan Fodio; he was a cousin of the Sultan; he was a big man in 
his own right. If any form of change or demo cratic pro gress  were to be 
introduced, then he was the man to do it. The chiefs would follow him 
and the nas [native authorities] would follow him. So far as the  Middle 
 Belt was concerned, the pagans and the Christianized Northerners  were 
prob ably in awe but at least they accepted him.16
The sardauna’s influence was projected well beyond the borders of Nigeria, as 
he began to travel in the late 1950s to predominantly Muslim African states 
such as Niger, Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tuni-
sia. And as his influence grew in  these African states, Ahmadu Bello sought 
diplomatic connections to the wider Muslim world, notably Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirate, and 
Jordan. The sardauna built mosques at home and positioned himself as the 
leader of Nigerian Muslims.17 While connecting Hausa- Fulani identity to his 
Islamization strategy, the sardauna also built a working relationship with lead-
ers of Christian minorities in the Northern Region, especially in  Middle  Belt 
communities. Though they harbored resentment against the politico- religious 
doctrine from which he drew his legitimacy, non- Muslims in the region grudg-
ingly accepted his leadership.18 In his autobiography, Bello notes his historic 
mission in Nigerian po liti cal history:
I have never sought the po liti cal limelight or a leading position. . . .  
But I could not avoid the obligation of my birth and destiny. My 
 great- great- grand father built an Empire in the Western Sudan. It has fallen 
to my lot to play a not inconsiderable part in building a new nation. My 
ancestor was chosen to lead the Holy War which set up his Empire. I have 
been chosen by a  free electorate to help build a modern State. . . .  This, 
then, is the story of my life.19
Equally significant was the position of the Northern Region’s main opposi-
tion party, the Northern Ele ments  Peoples Union (nepu). It consisted of a 
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small group of emirate progressives led by Aminu Kano, who during decolo-
nization argued for a power ful central government, in contrast to the npc’s 
preference for a federal arrangement based on stronger regions vis- à- vis a weak 
federal center. Thus, while the npc was committed to a po liti cal proj ect legiti-
mated by the Northern Muslim aristocracy, Aminu Kano’s nepu combined 
egalitarian doctrines in Islam with socialist thought to advocate for social im-
provements for the talakawa, the masses of Hausa commoners. Aminu Kano 
possessed strong Islamic credentials drawn from his training in Islamic law 
and fluency in Arabic.20 Having worked on  women’s rights and the promo-
tion of egalitarian policies, Aminu Kano was keenly aware of Usman dan Fodio’s 
strong legacy on Islamic doctrines of social justice. His nepu colleague, Isa Wali, 
blamed Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers for collusion with British authorities and al-
leged misrule by the sarakuna, the Hausa- Fulani Muslim aristocracy.21 Drawing 
its religious patronage from the populist tijaniyya order—in opposition to the 
qadiriyya order that dominated the npc’s Sokoto Caliphate base— nepu lead-
ers denounced emirate structures as a feudal system that had betrayed the Islamic 
piety of Usman dan Fodio’s jihad.22 In the long term, nepu’s impact on po liti cal 
reform was negligible  because of its limited constituency in emirate society and 
the strong opposition of British authorities to its call for radical change.23
To be sure, both npc and nepu shared cultural ties at the initial stages of 
their formation to Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa, the dominant regional sociopo-
liti cal organ ization that had emerged in the early years of decolonization. But 
it was the npc that emerged as the official Northern party  because of its deep 
roots in the Sokoto Caliphate. Using its extensive socioreligious networks 
in emirate society to leverage British authorities, the npc consolidated the 
structure of class dominance derived from the caliphate.24 This emergent Hausa- 
Fulani power structure of emirs and politicians embraced both “traditional” and 
“modern” ele ments of governance. As C. S. Whitaker notes in his magisterial 
book The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 
1946–1966, po liti cal development during decolonization was not a linear pro cess 
from a “traditional” Islamic aristocracy to a more “modern” pattern of consti-
tutional government. Rather, it came out of a dialectical pro cess combining 
“traditional” and “modern” attributes and drawing its legitimacy from the tra-
ditions of the Sokoto Caliphate.25
The contending perspectives of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and their 
Southern Christian counter parts about Nigeria’s po liti cal  future took center 
stage during the 1953 London Constitution Conference that ultimately led 
to the 1954 Constitution. According to British administrator A. E. T. Ben-
son,26 participants from Southern areas  were animated during the constitutional 
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 deliberations, while Northern delegates “appeared dour and out of their 
depths.” Led by the deputy npc leader, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who  later 
became Nigeria’s prime minister, the Northern del e ga tion argued for a loose 
federation with a weak federal center and called for a slower pace  toward in de-
pen dence so that their region could develop on its own terms. In the spirit of 
developmental catch-up, Northern delegates supported the colonial govern-
ment’s gradual approach to in de pen dence.27
The divergent perspectives of the Southern delegates at the conference in 
part reflected the fundamentally diff er ent experience they had obtained in mis-
sion schools and Western postsecondary institutions,  going back to the turn of 
the twentieth  century. For example, Obafemi Awolowo, a product of Christian 
mission schools from the Ijebu town of Ikenne and a London- trained  lawyer, 
led the Action Group (ag), the dominant party in the Western Region, to 
the 1953 London Conference. Western Region delegates at the conference28 
called for Nigeria’s in de pen dence from Britain and insisted on a strong federal 
system that would ensure autonomy for Nigeria’s ethnic groups. Awolowo had 
earlier argued that any  viable constitution for an emergent Nigerian state must 
underscore the country’s ethnic diversity. He contended that the  peoples of 
Nigeria  were naturally divided by the River Niger and River Benue into three 
main areas— the North, West, and East— and further subdivided into ten 
ethno- national groups: Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Tiv, Nupe, Igbo, Ibibio/Efik, 
Ijaw, Yoruba, and Edo. The differences between the three major ethno- national 
groups (Hausa- Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo), Awolowo insisted,  were as  great as 
that between the German, French, and British.29 Reminiscing on the brief his-
tory of constitutional changes since the imposition of colonial rule, Awolowo 
chastised colonial officials, especially  those in the Northern Colonial Ser vice, 
for promoting the interest of the Hausa- Fulani Muslim aristocracy at the ex-
pense of the Christian- educated elite from the Western and Eastern Regions.30 
In all, Awolowo called for a clearer definition of the jurisdiction of regional and 
federal governments, the withdrawal of British administrators from regional 
and central governments, and the elimination of a numerical princi ple that 
gave greater advantage to the Northern Region in the distribution of resources 
in Nigeria’s evolving federal system.
The National Council of Nigeria Citizens (ncnc), the party that controlled 
the Eastern Region Government, was dominated by the Igbo elite and led by 
the renowned nationalist Nnamdi Azikiwe. Like the ag, the ncnc struck a 
po liti cal pose against the npc’s conservatism; ncnc supported the ag’s stand 
on immediate self- rule. Reacting against what it considered the negative im-
pact of the npc’s northernization policy on Southerners, especially Igbo settlers 
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in Northern cities, the ncnc pressured the Supreme Court in Lagos for a  legal 
ruling that would protect Southern immigrants in the Northern Region.31
In the end, the Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions got some aspects 
of their po liti cal preferences consolidated in the 1954 Constitution, though 
it was the Northern Region that had more to celebrate: the 1954 Nigerian 
Constitution accepted the national bicameral legislature, which satisfied the 
interests of the po liti cal parties in the Eastern and Western Regions, though 
the Constitution also devolved substantial judicial powers to the regional gov-
ernments, in accordance with Hausa- Fulani Muslim interests.32 Ultimately, the 
Northern po liti cal establishment was sustained by the npc, the party of the 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, while nepu, the United  Middle  Belt Congress 
(umbc— the party of Christian minorities from the  Middle  Belt), and an-
other newly formed regional party, the Bornu Youth Movement (representing 
the interest of Kanuri Muslims in the Northeast), mounted opposition against 
the dominant npc.33 In practical terms, Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers emerged the 
most successful among the three regional power centers in the constitutional 
deliberations. Representing the interest of the Sokoto Caliphate, the npc so-
lidified its control over the Northern Region’s social structure; for example, 
68   percent of Northern Regional parliamentarians  were from the Sokoto 
Caliphate royalty and nobility, while only a small percentage represented reli-
gious and ethnic minority groups.34
The npc Regional Government also reformed its relationship with the na-
tive authorities,35 further reinforcing the powers of the masu sarauta in several 
impor tant ways: the reformed native authority structures  were brought  under 
the firm control of emirs and district heads, who also dominated the Regional 
Houses of Assembly and Chiefs; new set of local government laws gave the npc 
Regional Government even greater control over the appointment of native au-
thority officials, and the Regional Government gave the emirate- dominated 
native authorities more power over religious and ethnic minorities.36 Lastly, the 
npc regional authorities retained statutory control over the na system.37 As the 
prominent Northern Nigerian Catholic theologian Rev.  Dr.  Matthew Kukah 
observed, “Royal blood, the Hausa language, and the Muslim religion” remained 
the criteria for npc po liti cal leadership during the period of decolonization.38
Decolonization and the Resurgence of Religious Identity
The process of decolonization was po liti cally significant, not only  because it 
produced rapid constitutional transformation but also  because it encouraged 
significant changes among both Muslim and Christian groups in Nigeria’s 
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Northern Provinces. This was expressed in the intra- Muslim tensions among 
the dominant Sufi tariqas, the qadiriyya and the tijaniyya. According to John 
Paden, the Sufi  orders  were critical to defining the character of politics in the 
city of Kano, the region’s preeminent city. Although the qadiriyya originally 
(in the early nineteenth  century) was associated with the Sokoto Caliphate, 
the movement gained significant popularity  because of its connection to Na-
siru Kabara of Kano in the twentieth  century. Kabara linked West African 
forms of qadiriyya with some North African branches, such as the shaziliyya 
(with its two sub- branches, arosiyya and salamiyya); over time, local trends in 
emirate Northern Nigerian society would predominate over North African 
traditions.39
However, from the mid-1900s, the competing Sufi order, the tijaniyya, rap-
idly grew in prominence in many Northern communities and soon became the 
dominant tariqa in Kano. This growth was precipitated by the work of Ibra-
him Niass, a Wolof sheikh from Kaolack, Senegal, who had arrived in Kano 
during World War II and introduced a “reformed” version of tijaniyya that 
emphasized group prayers. Initially, this reformed tijaniyya doctrine appealed 
to the Hausa section of the city, mainly traders and crafts workers;  later, with 
the installation of Muhammad Sanusi, a tijaniyya devotee, as emir of Kano in 
1954, reformed tijaniyya spread throughout the emirate and across many urban 
centers of Northern Nigeria. Reformed tijaniyya embraced modern methods 
of communication, effectively using radio, print media, and the Hausa language 
to propagate its doctrines among its long- distance Hausa adherents, who traded 
between their homes in Kano through tariqa guest  houses (zawiyas) through-
out West Africa. With this rapid growth of the tijaniyya  after World War II, in-
trareligious tensions developed between the region’s two dominant Sufi  orders 
in the 1950s.
Although Qur’anic imperatives discourage conflict between  these two domi-
nant Northern Nigerian tariqas, Bryan Sharwood- Smith, governor of Northern 
Nigeria’s secret memorandum to the governor- general in Lagos, vividly explains 
the  factors that led to conflict between the two regional tariqas in the 1950s. 
According to Sharwood- Smith, lingering tension erupted into a theological 
conflict by the early 1950s, when some prominent tijanis began praying with 
their hands crossed over their chests, which previously had been viewed as an 
expression of Mahdism. As previously discussed, Mahdism was a tariqa that 
had been associated with militancy against duly constituted authority.40 In the 
early years of colonial rule, its millenarian doctrine understandably resonated 
among the masses of the poor, who  were likely to follow the self- proclaimed 
Mahdi and help usher in a righ teous Islamic order.41
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Clashes between  these tariqas came to a head in 1956, as some “radical” ti-
janis crossed the line by openly questioning the qadiris’ commitment to Islam. 
This claim that qadiris  were not true Muslims was an expression of contempt 
for an established Islamic school of thought, denying the unity of Islam. When 
vio lence broke out between the two tariqas, British authorities intervened, 
striking a balance between the leaders of the two Sufi  orders while marginal-
izing Mahdists, seen as a militant Muslim sect that threatened the stability of 
emirate society.42
Meanwhile, Christian missions  were working diligently to advance their com-
mon cause in evangelization, especially in the  Middle  Belt region and among 
non- Muslim minority groups in emirate society. In par tic u lar, the Catholic 
Church achieved remarkable advance  under the leadership of Dr. David Mat-
thew, the auxiliary Catholic bishop of Westminster who had been appointed 
Apostle Delegate of British East and West Africa territories in 1946, giving 
him supervisory authority over Catholic churches in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and 
the Gold Coast. Matthew used his good relations with British administrators 
to draw the Catholic Church closer to the colonial state. Although local mis-
sionaries  were ambivalent about Matthew’s style of administration, they appreci-
ated his contribution to the growth of Catholic missionary work in Nigeria and 
admired his influence among British administrators. Matthew’s vigorous leader-
ship led to the establishment of the prefecture in the Northern city of Yola (in 
Adamawa) in 1950, and ecclesiastical jurisdictions  were created throughout the 
Northern Region. Eventually new prefectures  were established in the Northern 
Muslim heartlands of Sokoto, Katsina, and Bornu provinces. The colonial state 
was a major beneficiary of this Christian missionary proj ect  because the new 
missions provided critical social ser vices for local communities. The Adamawa 
Native Authority, for instance, depended mainly on the Franciscan  Sisters of 
the Catholic Church for health care and vari ous other social ser vices. Although 
colonial administrators sought broadly to control missionary activity, in the 
main  there was interdependence between church and state to promote devel-
opment in the  region.43
Intra- Christian relations also improved, particularly in the Eastern Region, 
where the Catholic Church was most dominant.  After several de cades of frosty 
relations over theological and ministerial differences, cms and Catholic mis-
sionaries in the Eastern Region built bridges that would have an established 
role in the new nation. cms Anglican bishop Cecil Patterson and Catholic 
archbishop Charles Heerey met regularly to discuss  matters of common inter-
est, especially in the impor tant areas of education and health care. In due 
course, the cms strengthened its grip in Tiv, Idoma, and other  Middle  Belt 
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regions, and other Southern Christian missionary groups began to open mis-
sions in the  Middle  Belt and in the non- Muslim areas inside the emirates. But 
this development soon would generate a po liti cal reaction from the Northern 
Muslim seat of power: Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers mounted strong opposi-
tion against the northward push by the Catholics, cms, Methodists, Presbyte-
rian Brethren, and the Christian Council of Nigeria. Eventually, as part of the 
northernization policy that was taking root, and in the interests of stability, 
British administrators worked collaboratively with the npc regional govern-
ment to curtail missionary work in the North.44
Restrictive official policies did not dampen the enthusiasm of  these Prot-
estant and Catholic missions. In fact, leading Christian missions worked even 
harder to spread the word;  these missionary efforts encouraged national and 
international partnerships among educators, theologians, and technical ex-
perts to promote education, health care, and agriculture. Support came in the 
form of personnel and financial investments from  Eng land, Canada, Australia, 
and the United States. Moreover, with a new generation of Nigerians now lead-
ing the church, cms work reflected the changing condition of the times. Many 
of  these new- breed cms ministers had attended leading Anglican colleges of the-
ology in  Eng land, such as St. Aidan’s College, Birkenhead, London College of 
Divinity, and St. Augustine College in Canterbury, in the de cade immediately 
 after World War II. Indeed, a new generation of outstanding Nigerian cms 
clergymen  were sponsored for advanced studies in theology and education in 
 Eng land and Canada and at the recently established Nigerian universities.45 
cms missionary activities had shifted even more from the earlier emphasis on 
pastoral work to general  human development. In collaboration with Method-
ist and Presbyterian missions, the cms established two theological training 
colleges in Ibadan and Umuahia. This collaborative effort provided the three 
Protestant missions with a wider pool of talented clergy, better equipped to 
respond to the demands of a rapidly changing society.46
The Northern Muslim hierarchy would not be outdone; the npc tight-
ened its grip over emirate society, creating greater cooperation among vari ous 
tariqas by the late 1950s, as decolonization was winding down. In par tic u lar, 
the sardauna raised funds from Arab countries to launch what came to be 
known as the Muslim “conversion campaign” to expand the influence of Islam. 
As  these dynamic religious forces exposed the tension within the Northern 
Region— and between the Northern Region and the rest of the country— they 
also revealed contradictions between Islamic law and En glish common law in 
the Northern Region during this period of po liti cal transition.
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Islamic Law in Northern Nigeria: Contending Issues
British colonial authorities convened three major conferences (1953, 1956, 
and 1959) to emphasize the necessity of  legal reform in Britain’s African colo-
nies during decolonization. While the first was held at Makerere College in 
Uganda— East Africa’s leading institution of higher learning— the second was 
held in Jos, Nigeria’s principal  Middle  Belt city. The 1953 and 1956 conferences 
confirmed the challenges of reconciling “native” law (including Islamic) and 
En glish common law in Britain’s increasingly complex colonies. In princi ple, 
 these two conferences sought to develop a  viable  legal framework to respond 
to the pressing demands of Britain’s African colonies.
Convened by the secretary of state for the colonies in London in 1959, the 
final conference on the  future of law in Britain’s African colonies was chaired 
by the eminent En glish jurist Lord Alfred Thompson Denning. Conference 
participants explored the interactions between customary, Islamic, and En-
glish law and discussed ways to reduce tensions among the vari ous  legal sys-
tems at the eve of in de pen dence. Significantly, this historic conference and the 
previous  legal conferences  were central to the intense debate over the tension 
between sharia and En glish common law, particularly in Northern Nigeria. 
While Lord Denning and his colleagues  were optimistic about the  future, the 
developments of the last several de cades reveal the enormous challenges of rec-
onciling Islamic, native, and common law in modern Nigerian state and soci-
ety. Lord Denning noted:
One group of pieces is founded on the costumes of the African  Peoples, 
which vary from territory to territory, and from tribe to tribe. Another 
group of pieces is founded on the law of Islam, with all its many schools 
and sects. Yet another group is founded on the En glish common law. An-
other on the Roman- Dutch law, another on Indian statutes and so forth. 
If the  peoples of Africa are to emerge into a  great civilization, then  these 
discordant pieces must all be sorted out and fitted together into a single 
 whole. The result is bound to be a patch work, but we should remember 
that a patch work quilt of many colors can be just as ser viceable as one 
of a single color, and is often more to be admired  because of the effort 
needed to make it.47
The laws that  were in force in Britain’s African colonial territories north of 
the Zambezi can be broadly divided into two sections: general law and specific 
law. Applied in default of other provisions to  every person within colonial ju-
risdictions, general law had been based on En glish common law. It can be further 
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divided into four parts: the received law of  Eng land as it was understood at a 
par tic u lar date (for example, January 1, 1900, the formal date of British rule, in 
the case of Nigeria); common- law doctrines of equity, the statutes of general 
application in force in  Eng land on that date ( January 1, 1900); modifications 
of the colonial legislature; and modifications by act of the imperial parliament, 
or by an order in Council.  These laws, of course,  were expected to go through 
significant modifications once in de pen dence was obtained by the colony.48
Specific law, on the other hand, includes the bodies of laws applied as ex-
ceptions or additions to the general law in a defined class of cases.  These laws 
include customary (or native) laws within specified jurisdictions, and religious 
laws (for example, Islamic law in Northern Nigeria). The most impor tant ex-
pression of specific law was what was generally known in colonial parlance as 
“African customary law,” which consisted of a variety of laws that address the 
 legal concern of diverse communities. Since the vast majority of local inhabit-
ants  were subjected to customary or native law, most cases in colonial courts 
 were governed by specific law. During colonial rule, however, the consequences 
of rapidly changing social conditions meant that customary law was ultimately 
a mélange of rules from “indigenous” customary practices, En glish common 
law, and Islamic law (where applicable, such as Northern Nigeria).49
During decolonization, Northern Nigeria was British colonial Africa’s ulti-
mate test case for  these discussions at the intersections of customary, Islamic, and 
En glish common laws. Despite a de cade of constitutional reform in Nigeria, and 
although Islamic law had been applied more extensively in Northern Nigeria than 
anywhere in the world except Af ghan i stan and the Arabian Peninsula, Islamic law 
was still subsumed  under native law in the region.50 To many British adminis-
trators in the Northern Nigerian Colonial Ser vice, the institutional design that 
had evolved  under Lugardian indirect rule was “genius,”  because it allowed for 
varied application (the so- called sliding scale) that reflected contending socio-
religious conditions. In princi ple, Islamic law was applied strictly in Muslim 
areas, non- Islamic customary laws ruled in largely non- Muslim areas, and an 
amalgam of Islamic and customary law was enforced where the population was a 
combination of Muslim and non- Muslims. For instance, in the Jarawa Court, 
a non- Muslim Native Authority court in Bauchi Province, “Muslim members” 
 were allowed to advise on Islamic law in cases involving only Muslims while 
taking into account local custom within the Native Authority jurisdiction.51 
Moreover, the maintenance of the Repugnancy Clause, reaffirmed in 1956, con-
tributed to this malleability by setting an upper bound on the applicability of 
Islamic law.52 Thus, institutional flexibility allowed courts to adjust the law to 
social conditions and work out decisions often agreeable to most parties.53
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However, this flexible application of the law also was problematic, especially 
to Hausa- Fulani Muslim clerics, who found it objectionable to mix Islamic 
codes developed in the Arabian Peninsula, Eu rope, and North Africa with local 
customary practices that  were presumably indigenous to “tribal” Nigerian com-
munities.54 Moreover, as Islamic scholar A. A. Oba would  later argue, customary 
law is (by definition) determined by cultural practices, whereas Islamic law is a 
universal code that determines cultural practices.55 In addition to Muslim objec-
tions to this classification, the  legal variation within jurisdictions that resulted 
from such flexibility created disparities in access to justice among communities. 
Most problematic, this varied application lacked an “established framework for 
distinguishing customary law from non- legal customary practice.”56
With rapid social change by the period of decolonization in the 1950s, it 
had become difficult for both British administrators and native court judges 
to distinguish between legally enforceable normative rules of be hav ior, drawn 
from widespread local usage, and legally unenforceable social, moral, and re-
ligious obligations that simply reflected customary practice. This ambiguity 
became pronounced just as the value of customary practice increased, as local 
 people guarded “tradition” more closely than before. The “sliding scale” in-
stead depended on judges to interpret evolving social conditions outside the 
legislative context; rather than letting such change work its way up through 
the administrative system, with the law interpreted according to recognized 
societal norms, this task was left to individual judges. This made institutional 
adjustment to societal change an uneven pro cess, as  there was  little real possibil-
ity to enact  legal recognition of such evolving conditions. Furthermore, this re-
bounded back on changing social identities; the fact that the  legal system could 
not apply a uniform code intensified varied identities throughout Nigeria’s co-
lonial provinces. Ironically, then, as this  legal system reflected ambiguous social 
relations, it also solidified contending communal identities. In short, social up-
heaval in the late colonial period moved too quickly for the ad hoc customary 
law to  handle; society and the  legal system governing it  were transforming at 
diff er ent speeds.57
This system was grossly inadequate for pressing social and po liti cal conditions 
in the Northern Region during the critical period of decolonization. Conse-
quently, as the pressure for  legal reforms grew, regional authorities introduced 
the Native Court Law of 1956. This reform separated Islamic law from custom-
ary law, institutionalizing sharia courts alongside non- Islamic native courts.58 
Moreover, the new law established the first Muslim Court of Appeal.59 In real-
ity, though,  these changes amounted to half- measures. Islamic courts still fell 
 under the broad category of customary law, considered prima facie applicable to 
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Africans “in the vast majority of cases.” The Muslim Court of Appeal was also 
circumscribed, with jurisdiction over appeals from native courts on  matters per-
taining to personal law. It was not a “standing” court; instead judges convened 
on an ad hoc basis. Far weaker than its En glish common- law counterpart (the 
High Court), the Muslim Court of Appeal looked more like a patchwork solu-
tion to Northern Nigeria’s long- term  legal prob lem.60 Also, while the dreaded 
repugnancy clause remained in force,61 the law allowed non- Muslims in the 
Northern Region to opt out of Islamic law.62 In sum, this reform recognized 
the real distinction between Native and Islamic law, but also reified it along a 
Muslim/non- Muslim axis, ending the “sliding scale” of judicial interpretation 
of social context. This essentially froze social change from a juridical perspec-
tive,63 cementing religious division in the Northern Region.
This change created numerous  legal challenges in the following impor tant 
ways. First, the distinction between Islamic courts and native courts, heavi ly 
influenced by the interests and perspectives of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, 
was murky at best. The Islamic courts  were less flexible, insisting on doctrinal 
interpretations of Islamic law, and the native courts also rested on Islamic law 
as a  matter of administrative guidance.64 According to British officers, within a 
few years it was evident that the average Northern Muslim drew  little distinc-
tion between Islamic and customary law. But the Northern Region contrasted 
sharply with the Western Region (the southwestern region of the Yoruba 
 people), which also had a significant Muslim population: the former was two- 
thirds Muslim, with predominantly Islamic law, while in the latter, although 
about half of its population was Muslim, Yoruba native law and customs 
formed the basis of local  legal codes. This disparity resulted from the arrival of 
Islam in Southern Nigeria during a period of Eu ro pean imperial influence, creat-
ing a liberal conception of mono the istic religion, while the Northern Region, 
as discussed in previous chapters, had experienced centuries of Islamization that 
was consolidated by the success of the Sokoto Jihad.
Second, customary law policies of previous de cades  were, by the period of 
decolonization, largely inadequate  because of complex social conditions, es-
pecially  labor migration, which complicated colonial  legal designations such 
as “Muslims,” “indigenes,” and “settlers.” The  labor migration, especially the 
movement of Southern Christians as mi grant workers to the Northern Region, 
meant that many Nigerians now fell within the problematic jurisdictions of 
Islamic, customary, or En glish common law that hardly captured their identi-
ties.65 Furthermore, not only had overlapping identities become increasingly 
salient along religious and ethnic lines in the Northern Region; the impact 
of Christian missionary work had also increasingly transformed the meaning 
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of “indigenous custom,” especially in the  Middle  Belt region and among non- 
Muslim minority groups in the emirates. The crude distinction of common 
law, customary law, and Islamic law was far removed from the complex real-
ity of intersecting ethno- religious identities most local  people encountered in 
everyday life. This rigid imposition of  legal categories on dynamic social con-
ditions in local communities was deleterious to the carriage of justice in the 
reified Northern Region Native Court Law of 1956. This complexity is best 
reflected in the way elite Northern Muslims utilized Islamic law and common 
law: they tended to opt out of Islamic law to facilitate commerce, but personal 
 matters, such as inheritance issues,  were exclusively deci ded by Islamic courts. 
The courts thus became not only an arena for the interpretation of chang-
ing social identities, but also a vehicle for the manipulating of  these shifting 
identities.66
This shortcoming was particularly pronounced in civil law issues such as 
marriage and inheritance, as well as disputes over land tenure. In  matters of 
succession, for instance, customary law held that a plurality of heirs would di-
vide the inheritance, whereas En glish common law split estates according to 
a  legal document. This difference seemed largely unbridgeable,67 yet rapid in-
tegration of the two categories necessitated a compromise. The result was the 
same fusion before the reform: a poorly defined trichotomy of areas of custom-
ary (including Islamic) law tempered by En glish common- law influence. De 
jure fusion, in this sense, became a de facto failure of reform. In land- tenure 
cases, En glish common law holds property to the individual citizen, whereas 
indigenous practice (as formulated  under native law) recognized communal 
owner ship. Traditionally, local power brokers could not dispose of such land 
without the consensus of members of the relevant corporate— often  family or 
kinship— groups. As economic migration picked up, however, En glish laws of 
transfer came to bear on customary practice. Across Nigeria, Western standards 
of individual owner ship  were borrowed and built into local practice, particu-
larly in coastal areas with long- standing Eu ro pean connections. This fusion is 
most pronounced in cities that evolved almost exclusively from mi grants, such 
as Jos, Kaduna, and Port Harcourt, lacking strong preexisting local traditions 
and thus indigenous authorities to adjudicate land- tenure  matters on a native- 
court basis. In some cases, colonial planners removed such urban areas from 
the jurisdiction of customary land tenure altogether, designating them “extra- 
customary centers,” leaving only personal  matters  under customary law. Thus, 
in some of the heterogeneous and highly mobile cities of the  Middle  Belt, with 
weak centralized customary practices and growing foreign economic interests, 
coherent land laws  were rarely found.68
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A third prob lem was that the Native Court Law of 1956 failed to resolve the 
tensions of  running parallel  legal systems— which is what had motivated the re-
form in the first place. The differences between the courts remained vast from 
a  legal perspective. In capital cases, for instance, the ability to enter evidence to 
support the defense of provocation can bear heavi ly on an outcome: Islamic law 
does not recognize such evidence, but En glish common law does. As a result, 
justice was determined by the par tic u lar agencies trying the case instead of the 
circumstances of the crime itself. Norman Anderson offered an example of a 
man allegedly provoked to murder who was arrested by the emir’s officers, 
tried, convicted, and executed, even though he just as easily could have been 
apprehended by the Nigerian Police and tried  under En glish common law, 
potentially with a much diff er ent outcome.69 The 1956 reforms thus failed to 
resolve such issues, and  there appears to be  little indication that the new sys-
tem worked any better. While power was further regionalized, debate simply 
shifted to the disparity in authorities of the  legal systems: instead of lamenting 
the absence of a sharia appellate court, Northern Muslim clerics now lamented 
its weakness in comparison to common law. The per sis tence of  these  legal con-
tradictions during self- rule in the mid-1950s would require a greater review of 
sharia in the Northern Region as Nigeria approached in de pen dence in 1960.
Constructing Islamic Law in the Northern Region
The  legal and constitutional foundations on which governance in the North-
ern Region would be based during self- rule  were further explored in the late 
1950s, with in de pen dence fast approaching. The pressure for reform was ini-
tially precipitated when a judicial committee called on the Northern Regional 
Government to review the defense of provocation in hom i cide cases  under 
Islamic law.70 This was paired with recommendations of the Willink Commis-
sion, a high- profile commission of inquiry established by the British authori-
ties to investigate the rights of ethnic and religious minority groups in Nigeria’s 
three regions. Significantly, the Willink Commission recommended that the 
Northern Regional Government exempt non- Muslims from the jurisdiction of 
Islamic law  under the native authority system.71 The commission also recom-
mended that the powers of Islamic law and native law should be restricted to 
personal  matters in Northern Nigeria.72 Predictably, prominent Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim rulers opposed the recommendation. More importantly, with growing 
queries on the role of sharia in  legal administration, the npc regional govern-
ment established a fact- finding committee to investigate this enduring prob-
lem in state affairs. Governing about 20 million  people, two- thirds of them 
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Muslim, the npc government, with the guidance of the out going Northern 
colonial ser vice, sent representatives to explore recent  legal reform in Libya, 
Sudan, and Pakistan, all newly in de pen dent Muslim countries with consider-
able non- Muslim minorities.73 On their return in 1958, the delegates further 
deliberated and submitted a report that once again kicked off debate over re-
forming the  legal institutions of Northern Nigeria.
In addition to the challenge of reforming the Northern Region’s  legal sys-
tem,  there was a growing strain between the colonial administrators and the 
Northern Muslim leadership  because of the rising sense of self- confidence 
among the npc hierarchy. Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers had gained significant 
exposure from the initial exercise of semi- autonomous regional rule; most had 
traveled abroad, gained diplomatic experience, implemented public policy, and 
made decisions that sometimes clashed with British policy. Seeing the British 
in their natu ral habitat at Whitehall also gave the Hausa- Fulani elite perspec-
tive on how governance was inevitably anchored in social context, a discovery 
they leveraged to their benefit. More importantly, this development tran spired 
with the sardauna’s push to bring emirs to heel, effectively bringing the emirate 
structure  under the authority of the npc government. Thus, emirs and chiefs 
had to comply with ministerial decrees in 1957 and 1959 as their judgments 
became subject to appeal of the regional government.74 Fi nally, even  those 
changes that state officials agreed on would require review by the Regional Ex-
ecutive Council, the House of Assembly, and the House of Chiefs, all  under 
the control of the npc regional government.75 This assertion in the authority 
of the npc regional government provided the context for a far- reaching review 
of the region’s judiciary system.
The npc regional government judicial review committee was chaired by 
Syed Abu Rannat, chief justice of Sudan; other members of the committee 
included the chairman of the Pakistan Law Reform Committee and former jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Mohammed Sharif; the waziri of Bornu, 
Shettima Kashim; the chief alkali of Bida, Mallam Inusa; a former minister of 
the Northern Region, Peter Achimugu; and Professor Norman Anderson of 
London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies. The commissioner 
for native courts in the attorney general’s office, S. S. Richardson, was appointed 
secretary of the Reform Committee.76 Professor Anderson summed up what 
was at stake for the Northern Muslim po liti cal elite:
 After in de pen dence they would need to attract foreign capital, so they 
must have a  legal and judicial system which would give confidence to 
foreigners. They would wish to be members of the United Nations 
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 Or ga ni za tion, so they must expect awkward questions and put them-
selves in a position to give satisfactory answers. They must have a  legal 
and judicial system of training which would enable them to administer 
 these systems themselves.77
Although the committee’s proposal invested more powers in a regional 
Sharia Court of Appeal, it still subjected native courts (including Islamic 
courts) to the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code  under the author-
ity of common- law courts. However, to accommodate the new powers invested 
in the Sharia Court of Appeal, the committee recommended substantial re-
form of the procedure governing the Penal Code.
Not surprisingly, the committee’s proposals  were announced to immedi-
ate criticism. Most strident was the opposition to reform the Penal Code, de-
spite claims of judicial indiscretion and abuse.78 Some British officials, especially 
common- law judges and many Hausa- Fulani Muslim clerics, disagreed with the 
proposals; the former engaged in a drawn- out argument over new procedural 
provisions and the bureaucratic burden of implementing them.79 This dissent 
from British administrators stemmed from the fact that the proposals sought to 
strike a compromise between common and Islamic codes. In  doing so, the com-
mittee  adopted the Sudanese procedure, itself based on the Pakistani approach, 
which was, in turn, a derivative of Indian innovations on colonial  legal proce-
dure. Unlike the British system, where police take statements, interview witnesses 
and suspects, charge whom they suspect, bring the accused before the court, and 
leave him or her to the Crown’s prosecution, the Indian system saw the magis-
trate  doing the inquisitorial work. No statements  were made before the police, 
nor did they prepare the charges. Instead, the magistrate took the statements, 
certified them, directed the police investigation, framed the charges, charged 
the accused, and then  either tried the case or sent it to another magistrate. Such 
a system appalled British jurists, who revered their procedural code as much 
as Muslim clerics did their own.80
To resolve this objection, a final meeting was called at the Kaduna residence 
of the chief justice of Northern Nigeria, Sir Algernon Brown. Among the 
attendees  were Regional High Court Judge Henry Skinner, S. S. Richardson, 
Chief Registrar Smith, Attorney General Hedley Marshall, and Marshall’s 
draftsman, Imanus Nunan.  Here, Brown criticized the procedural law as “novel, 
eccentric, and disagreeable,” referring to it as a “reactionary and unwarranted 
deviation” from the time- tested British system.81  After the meeting, he broke 
protocol and sent a missive to the colonial office protesting the change, refer-
ring to Richardson and Marshall (both officers in Northern Nigerian colonial 
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ser vice) as “Prus sian and unyielding.”82 Thereafter, he continued to solicit sup-
port from colonial officers, even contacting the inspector general of police in 
Lagos. Attorney General Marshall pushed back, reminding Brown that he had 
been bound by similar procedure during his previous tenure as a high court 
judge in Singapore. At any rate, the Colonial Office supported the proposed 
reform. Minor concessions  were made to appease Brown and like- minded 
En glish common- law jurists, but the reforms moved ahead largely as planned. 
Marshall  later recalled:
The Muslim countries to which the earlier del e ga tion had been sent had 
come to terms with their Muslim law in a way which had enabled them 
to keep pace with the modern world and in which, of course, Northern 
Nigeria had up to then been unable to do. . . .  What I can say, however, 
is that the carry ing out of the proposals of the Panel of jurists involved a 
tremendous overhaul in the  legal and penal structures of the North and 
involved a considerable amount of legislation.83
Opposition of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, on the other hand, mostly came 
from a perception that the new Penal Code weakened sharia.84 Northern Mus-
lim clerics felt that the Penal Code was an intrusion into age- old moral codes 
of emirate society: “The sharia (a divine law) had become subjugated to what 
they believed was mere  human law.”85 In crippling Islamic law, sharia advocate 
Auwalu Yadudu  later reflected, “the Minorities Commission and the Abu Ran-
nat Panel  were in effect used as a smokescreen by the departing colonial admin-
istration to give local legislative legitimacy to a decision which had long been 
officially entertained.”86 Protesting the new Penal Code’s specific provisions 
 were more conservative emirs such as emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi. For such 
critics in Northern Muslim royalty and aristocracy, the main sticking point was 
that sharia in criminal cases was subjected to the appellate authority of En glish 
common law.
A second major concern was a specific  matter of Islamic  legal doctrine ex-
pressively championed by the emir of Kano: the provocation defense in a hom-
i cide case. An intensely religious man described by Marshall as “medieval with 
his superstitions,” the emir was seen as “almost the Henry VII or Louis XI of 
the Muslim hierarchy,” and thus harbor a deep revulsion to any reform that 
would weaken sharia.87 British authorities thought they could convince him 
by mobilizing authoritative Muslim scholars who could overcome his obsti-
nacy. Marshall thus got the sardauna to persuade the emir of Kano to meet 
with Chief Justice Rannat and the  grand mufti of Sudan, who  were in Kaduna 
for a cele bration of Northern Nigerian self- government. The parties met at the 
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Council Chamber in Nasarawa, with Isa Kaita representing the sardauna and 
the emir appearing very “sulky.” The  grand mufti brought out a book of Hanafi 
law to convince the emir that the proposals  were in line with the Islamic prac-
tice of punishing hom i cide according to the circumstances of the case. He and 
Chief Justice Rannat both had been tutors of the emir, and  were thus able to 
persuade him, as Marshall had hoped. With Emir Sanusi’s approval, the Penal 
Code was all but settled.88
The panel’s other recommendations for reform  were broadly accepted. 
Widespread support for the proposals in large part stemmed from the fact that 
they  were derived from the (substantially Maliki- based)  legal systems of the 
three consulted countries. Thus, the sultan of Sokoto and other emirate rulers 
 were supportive throughout, only dissenting with the removal of Islamic courts 
from the native authority jurisdiction, which they argued would undermine 
the authority of the Hausa- Fulani Muslim hierarchy.89
Another recommendation approved by the panel was Richardson’s nomina-
tion as commissioner of native courts in the attorney general’s office. Responsible 
for supervising courts, preparing its rules, and checking its rec ords, he actively 
participated in formulating policy and drafting legislation.90 In his negotiations 
with cautious Northern Muslim clerics, his “cheery, friendly way, his knowl-
edge of Hausa and Arabic, [and] his personal friendship” with many emirate 
rulers helped to win their support. Even hardliners  were converted to Richard-
son’s side. Fi nally, the proposals  were helped by the fact that eminent foreign Mus-
lim jurists authored them.91 Rannat and Sudan’s  grand mufti met with vari ous 
public opinion leaders in the region, particularly emirs and Muslim jurists, to 
convince them about the merits of the reform. As with the case of the emir of 
Kano’s opposition to the Penal Code, their influence was decisive.
 After such support had been corralled, the legislative package was intro-
duced to the Northern Regional Legislature. It consisted of seven parts: the 
much- debated Penal Code; the far- reaching Native Court Amendment Law; 
the High Court Amendment Law, which would constitute a Native Court 
of Appeal division run by the chief justice, the  grand qadi of the Northern 
Region, and other impor tant Islamic judges; the new Magistrate Courts Law; 
the District Court Law; the Sharia Court of Appeal Law, which established 
a venue for appeals from Islamic native courts on civil cases; and the Court of 
 Resolution Law, based on the Sudanese Court of Jurisdiction, which resolved 
jurisdictional issues arising from conflict among the high court and the sharia 
courts. Attached to this raft of bills was a Supplementary Evidence Amend-
ment Law, which stipulated that the native courts would be guided— but not 
bound—by the Codes and Evidence Act.92 Without such a provision, it is likely 
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that many native- court decisions would have failed the repugnancy test on ap-
peal, as procedural violations  were rampant. Despite such leniency, the reform 
was still a major change, as this was the first time that native courts would be 
subject to the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.93
The judicial system thus was or ga nized into three parallel ladders: Islamic, 
native, and common law. The Muslim Court of Appeal had been eliminated 
only four years  after its constitution and replaced with the much stronger 
Sharia Court of Appeal.94 Oba writes:
 There are only two major differences between the Moslem Court of Ap-
peal and the Sharia Court of Appeal. The first is that appeals no longer lie 
to the High Court from the court. The decisions of the Sharia Court of 
Appeal are final. The second is that the Sharia Court of Appeal now has a 
standing membership consisting of a  Grand Qadi and Qadis specifically 
appointed to man the court. . . .  The High Court retained jurisdiction 
over appeals from Native courts in Islamic law  matters other than Islamic 
personal law.95
In other words, the Sharia Court of Appeal had no original jurisdiction, but 
full appellate power over lower and provincial courts. It had four justices and 
was considered duly constituted when three of them sat.96 Moreover, when 
an appeal from a native court relating to Islamic law went to the High Court, 
common- law judges would be aided by a qadi. The Penal Code was passed in 
1959 with the backing of religious leaders, despite minor difficulty in the House 
of Assembly;  after much debate but  little opposition, the rest of the bills passed 
the legislature in 1960. The entire program went into force  later that year.
Implementation would prove a predictably daunting task. Despite ear lier 
agreeing to back the reforms, the emir of Kano “did all he could to sabotage the 
[new] system”97 when the laws came into force.  There also  were logistical prob-
lems, as seven hundred native (mostly Islamic) courts handled 95  percent of the 
region’s system of justice. Given the Northern Region’s social complexity and 
general illiteracy, translating the law into local languages substantially compli-
cated  matters. Similarly, five thousand new staff members had to be hired and 
all existing jurists retrained. As a result of such difficulties, the regional govern-
ment set the target for full implementation for the mid-1960s. To help meet 
this goal, it opened a law school at the Institute of Administration in Zaria 
with the aim of retraining alkalis, native court presidents, and other se nior  legal 
officials, as well as stepping up its program to train jurists abroad.98 Fi nally, 
the reform policy needed support from local communities. To win such sup-
port, the regional government began public education campaigns, including an 
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adult literacy program, attempting to popu lar ize the new  legal system through 
print, radio, and  later tele vi sion media. Such efforts  were particularly necessary 
for the legitimacy of the new high and magistrate courts, as local  people con-
sidered both of  those courts “English”— that is, distant, corrupt, and represent-
ing foreign interests. As  these courts  were about to come  under the jurisdiction 
of the Northern Region Government, the panel in charge of implementation 
undertook a public- relations campaign that included educating the public 
about its functions. Officials also encouraged En glish common- law justices to 
learn the Hausa language, the lingua franca of the Northern Region.99 Such 
mea sures completed the reform proj ect.
This was the status of the  legal system in the predominantly Muslim North-
ern Region when in de pen dence arrived in October 1960. In the years imme-
diately  after the Second World War, British authorities collaborated with the 
po liti cal elite of the three major regions to address the deep structural imbal-
ance between the Northern Region and the Southern Regions (the Eastern 
and Western Regions). However, despite their best attempts, British reform 
policies achieved  little to ameliorate the deep division between the North and 
the South. Indeed, with regard to the  legal reforms of the 1950s, British reform-
ers soon recognized the steep challenge ahead. By the time of in de pen dence, 
British officials openly confronted the dearth of trained professional staff to 
run the Northern Region’s courts and government offices; in 1960,  there  were 
only four barristers for the entire Northern Region and no new crop of  legal 
minds on the immediate horizon. To resolve this serious shortage, the Institute 
of Administration, Zaria, partnered with several British  legal institutions such 
as the Council of  Legal Education and the Masters of the Benches of Lincoln’s 
Inn and the  Middle  Temple, to prepare promising Northern Nigerian candidates 
to take the En glish bar examination. Initially the program was committed to 
preparing fifteen candidates annually, anticipating a “steady flow of competent, 
homegrown  lawyers, judges, magistrates,” and other jurists to replace expatriates 
and former colonial officers.100 Such programs indicate the extent to which 
British reforms had failed to achieve the “balance” administrators had wished 
for. Moreover, the British system of indirect rule and reform policies during 
decolonization solidified ethno- regional identities that exacerbated the struc-
tural disparity between the Northern and the Southern Regions. As the region-
alization of state power intensified, British administrators— especially  those in 
the Northern Civil Service— further reified the authority of emirate structures, 
delegitimating indigenous religions and cultural practices while extending the 
powers of the dominant ethno- religious potentates in the region.
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To underscore a central issue in this chapter, Western- oriented Southern 
elites from the Eastern and Western Regions, dominated by products of Chris-
tian missions, insisted on in de pen dence and pushed for a power ful central 
government to challenge the Northern Region’s superior population. They at-
tempted to control the  legal- bureaucratic agencies of the federal government 
and called for a developmental agenda to transform the country.101 To a large 
extent, Hausa- Fulani Muslim elites  were able to stem this tide of change and 
preserve their formal regional autonomy  because of British policy preferences, 
and the remarkable coherence of the masu sarauta. Emirate leaders consistently 
drew from their religious legitimacy to gain po liti cal and  legal authority, dic-
tating the shape, content, and direction of the Northern Region administra-
tion and its role in the broader Nigerian state proj ect.
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The challenges posed by ethno- religious identities to Nigeria’s emergent post-
colonial state was immediately evident  after the 1959 federal election that 
ushered in in de pen dence in October 1960.  After the elections, officials of the 
United  Middle  Belt Congress (umbc)1— the party that represented  Middle 
 Belt ethno- religious interests in the elections— alleged that the dominant 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim party, the npc (Northern  Peoples Congress), used 
state power to sanction and intimidate their supporters throughout the re-
gion. In Tiv communities, a umbc stronghold in the  Middle  Belt, umbc of-
ficials claimed that npc- controlled native authorities used repressive mea sures 
to oppress their supporters. In Laffia, another umbc stronghold in the region, 
umbc officials claimed that npc- controlled native authorities levied punitive 
taxes on their supporters, imprisoned them illegally, and deprived them access to 
employment.2
 These well- founded charges of fragrant abuse of power3 reflect tensions be-
tween Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and increasingly assertive ethno- religious 
minority groups in the  Middle  Belt since the onset of decolonization in the 
c h a p t er  fi v e
r eli gi o n  a n d  t h e 
p ostco l o n i a l  stat e
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early 1950s.  These recurring conflicts, in part, can be traced to the rapid con-
version of so- called tribal pagans in the Northern Nigerian Protectorate to 
Chris tian ity and the waves of migration of Southern Christians to the region 
during the colonial period. As Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers reasserted control 
over  these communities through the npc- controlled regional government dur-
ing decolonization,  these ethno- religious groups formed new po liti cal organ-
izations to assert their autonomy by the early 1950s. As the tensions between 
Hausa- Fulani Muslims and non- Muslim minorities intensified in the years im-
mediately  after in de pen dence, npc leaders further utilized state patronage to 
coopt some opposition leaders, and deployed repressive mea sures to intimidate 
 those they considered recalcitrant.4 Thus, during Nigeria’s first demo cratic gov-
ernment from 1960 to 1966 (the First Republic) intersecting religious, ethnic, 
and regional identities intensified to spark communal conflicts in  Middle  Belt 
communities.
In other parts of the country, ethno- regional and communal power brokers 
mobilized collective po liti cal action by speaking to narrow sectarian aspira-
tions. Adele Afigbo argues that the prevailing ethno- regional and communal 
tensions during decolonization— especially ethnic, religious, regional, and 
subethnic— degenerated into major po liti cal confrontations during the First 
Republic.5 As competition for state patronage and power dominated po liti cal 
alliances among the dominant regional- based parties, overlapping and inter-
secting divisions shifted back and forth between entrenched regional and local 
fault lines, complicating religious, ethnic, and subethnic tensions everywhere. 
In the Northern Region,  these conflicts  were not limited to ethno- religious 
rivalries between Hausa- Fulani Muslims and Christian minorities; they also 
reflected prevailing intrareligious competition among Sufi  orders immediately 
 after in de pen dence.
As with earlier intra- Muslim conflicts in the 1950s, the schism grew in the 
context of the exponential growth of the reformed tijaniyya order in many 
Northern Muslim communities (see chapter 4). In reaction to the growing in-
fluence of Ibrahim Niass’s reformed tijaniyya, the sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu 
Bello (the premier of the Northern Region), founded the Usmaniyya move-
ment (named in honor of his  great- great- grand father, Usman dan Fodio) in 
1963 to check the erosion to his leadership in the Sokoto Caliphate. To reassert 
the authority of the caliphate among Hausa- Fulani Muslims at a time when the 
masu sarauta’s legitimacy was questioned by tijaniyya leaders, Bello linked the 
npc’s mission to the political- religious proj ect of his forebears in Hausa states 
in the nineteenth  century. Abdulkader Tayob notes:
Bello had tried to unite the Muslim of Nigeria  under a sufi order, called 
Uthmaniyyah [Usmaniyya], to recall the jihadist leader of the nine-
teenth  century. This par tic u lar order would unite Muslims in a nation- 
state  under the symbol of a historical figure associated with the area. The 
par tic u lar construction of a national Sufi order would be reminiscent 
of constructing a nation in historical and symbolic terms. At the same 
time, Uthmaniyyah aimed to diminish the po liti cal and social roles of 
the older Qadiriyyah and Tijaniyyah  orders.6
Indeed, to consolidate his control over Northern Muslims, Bello flew Usman 
dan Fodio’s war banner at rallies, made frequent visits to the Shehu’s tomb and 
presented himself as the extension of Usman dan Fodio, Abdulahi, his  brother, 
and Muhammad Bello, his son in the Hausa- Fulani Muslim hierarchy. By the 
early 1960s, posters of Bello  were even showing a direct link to the Prophet 
Muhammad, through his connection to Usman dan Fodio.7 Starting in 1963, 
Bello and his supporters embarked on “conversion campaigns” to Islam that was 
characterized as modern- day extensions of the Sokoto Jihad into the  Middle 
 Belt and non- Muslim areas of emirate society.8 Illustrating the wider geopo-
liti cal implications of the sardauna’s conversion campaigns, Iheanyi Enwerem 
observes:
Bello’s specific target for the final unification of the North was to convert 
the “pagan” enclaves in the region to Islam. He was determined to sway 
them away from the Christian missionaries. This move was understand-
able, principally  because the enclaves  were not only the major sources of 
Christian growth in the North, but could also become the seedbed of a 
po liti cal threat to Islamic interest in the region if the trend  were allowed 
to continue. Besides, Christian missionaries had erroneously resigned 
themselves to the belief that  these “pagan” enclaves  were the reserved 
domain for their missionary enterprise.9
In response, umbc leaders mounted stiff re sis tance to the sardauna’s Islamiza-
tion policy, considered an assault on  Middle  Belt communities.10
The sardauna also convened the Council of Mallams, an advisory group of 
se nior Muslim clerics appointed by and accountable to him as regional pre-
mier. When Niass, the tijaniyya leader, refused to curtail his “confrontational” 
teachings, the council instigated a theological debate on whether a contentious 
 reformed tijaniyya practice that entailed the crossing of arms (kablu)—as op -
posed to the “arms at ease” (sadlu)— practice was an acceptable (sunna) method 
of prayer.11 Although the council endorsed Niass’s teaching as sunna, a gesture 
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of goodwill to encourage Niass to concede ground to the sardauna, Niass’s 
followers still questioned Bello’s authority. As relations between tijaniyya ad-
herents and npc supporters deteriorated, riots, erroneously believed to be the 
handi work of Niass’s followers, broke out in Argungu in Sokoto Province. Ul-
timately, in 1965, the Council of Mallams deci ded to ban imams from leading 
prayers with arms crossed. As kablu was a reformed tijani practice, the sudden 
change of course was a deliberate plan to delegitimate Niass among the masses 
of Northern Muslims, attempting to cut off his challenge to the npc and its 
masu sarauta base. Furthermore, as Niass forged an alliance with the North-
ern Ele ments Progressive Union (nepu), the emirate’s main opposition to the 
npc, Niass’s tijaniyya challenge to the masu sarauta took on a more decidedly 
po liti cal dimension.12
Nevertheless, the sardauna reworked ijma “to characterize not the agree-
ment of the ulama on a par tic u lar  legal  matter, but rather to symbolize the con-
sensus of the Islamic polity and its legitimated leadership.”13 As the putative 
modern- day embodiment of the Sokoto Jihad, the sardauna and npc loyalists 
dismissed their major opponent in emirate society, nepu, as kafir (infidel) de-
spite the strong Islamic traditions of nepu leader Aminu Kano.14 nepu coun-
tered that the npc had betrayed the vision of Usman dan Fodio by collaborating 
with corrupt British rulers. With regard to Islamic legitimacy, Abubakar Gumi, 
the dynamic Muslim cleric, provided a theological reply to npc opponents. 
 After meeting the sardauna during the 1955 hajj, Gumi became his adviser on 
Islamic affairs, and was appointed deputy  grand qadi, and  later  grand qadi of the 
Northern Region. With Gumi’s help, the sardauna founded the Jama’atu Nasril 
Islam (Society for the Victory of Islam, or jni) in 1964 to promote unity among 
Northern Nigerian Muslims. Following the jni’s inaugural meeting— chaired 
by the waziri, Junaidu of Sokoto, and attended by the sultan of Sokoto and 
representatives from each province of the Northern Region— the organ ization 
built its headquarters and Islamiyya school in Kaduna, the regional capital.15
Following the assassination of the sardauna in 1966 in a failed military coup, 
and the dissolution of the Northern Region in 1967, the jni was coopted by 
other prominent emirate rulers.  After the Nigerian- Biafra Civil War (1967–
1970), the organ ization came  under the influence of Ibrahim Dasuki, a power-
ful Sokoto potentate who became the sultan of Sokoto in 1988.16 To expand its 
base, the jni called for Muslim unity throughout Nigeria and formed alliances 
with international Muslim groups, especially  those related to education and 
development. For instance, with the help of the Kuwaiti Sabbah  family, the jni 
established the first Muslim post- secondary school in Northern Nigeria, Sheikh 
Sabbah College in Kaduna.17 As Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers strengthened the 
connection between Muslim piety and Northern identity, the masu sarauta fur-
ther projected Northern Muslim power into Nigeria’s contentious national 
politics.
Military Rule, Religion, and National Politics
However, the main threat to the npc’s Hausa- Fulani Muslim hegemony 
emerged  after the January 1966 assassination of the sardauna— and Prime 
Minister Balewa—in a failed coup carried out by predominantly ju nior Igbo 
(Christian) officers from the Southeast. Following the crisis that engulfed 
Nigeria  after the coup, the succeeding regime of Major General Aguiyi- Ironsi 
(an Igbo Christian) relied on traditional rulers, especially Northern emirs on 
whom the impact of the coup was most devastating, to help restore stability. 
During Ironsi’s short tenure as head of the national government ( January 16, 
1966– July  19, 1966), prominent traditional rulers, especially Northern 
emirs,  were called upon to bridge the gulf between competing regional interests 
and the new military regime. Having dismissed regional politicians, Ironsi em-
braced the emirs as the embodiment of Northern interests.18 The failure of his 
policy reveals the limit of the military regime’s neotraditional strategy as a  viable 
response to Nigeria’s po liti cal crisis—as British administrators had learned sev-
eral de cades previously.
 After assuming control of the federal government, Ironsi appointed military 
governors in the three regions, along with a fourth region, the Mid- West Re-
gion, which had been carved out of the Western Region during the ag crisis 
from 1962 to 1966:19 Lieutenant Col o nel Odumegwu Ojukwu, son of a promi-
nent Igbo businessman, to the Eastern Region; Major Hassan Katsina, son of 
the emir of Katsina, to the Northern Region; Lieutenant Col o nel F. Adekunle 
Fajuyi to the Western Region; and Major David Ejoor to the Mid- Western Re-
gion. Brigadier Babafemi Ogundipe, the highest- ranking Yoruba army officer, 
became chief of staff of Supreme Headquarters; and a thirty- three- year- old 
Christian, Lieutenant Col o nel Yakubu Gowon, an Angas, from the  Middle 
 Belt was appointed chief of army staff.20
Initially, the new regime enjoyed the goodwill of most Nigerians. Even 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim elites, who had lost their two foremost leaders in the 
January coup, the sardauna and Prime Minister Balewa, cooperated with the 
regime despite the seemingly sectarian nature of the coup. This endorsement 
was short- lived, however, as Ironsi failed to assuage Northern Muslim anxiety. 
As far as Hausa- Fulani Muslim leaders  were concerned, Ironsi’s first transgression 
was his failure to bring the leaders of the coup to justice, despite the decision of 
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the Supreme Military Council to proceed with their trial in May 1966. When 
May rolled around, Ironsi postponed the trial in defi nitely. To Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim elites, this confirmed their suspicion that the January coup was a sec-
tarian Igbo (Southern Christian) conspiracy to dominate the Muslim North. 
In addition, critics claimed that Ironsi surrounded himself with a clique of Igbo 
advisers, contending that the Federal Military Government (fmg) was domi-
nated by Igbo allies of the military ruler.
It was Decree No. 34 that proved to be Ironsi’s fatal miscalculation.21 The 
decree dissolved Nigeria’s federal structure and established a unitary system 
of government. Dissolution of the structure that was established during the 
constitutional conferences of decolonization forced Northern emirs, as new 
regional intermediaries, onto the center stage of national politics. This was the 
first and only time since its inception that Nigeria was governed as a unitary 
state, and the first time the masu sarauta had no formal po liti cal structure to 
articulate its agenda. In addition, two de cades of hard- fought  battles to win 
regional autonomy, which had been the legacy of the beloved and martyred 
sardauna, was wiped off the map with a stroke of the pen. More immediately, 
the Hausa- Fulani Muslim po liti cal class feared that the abolition of Nigeria’s 
federal structure would expose their region to takeover by the more education-
ally advanced Southern Region. In a  matter of days, the decree sparked waves 
of vio lence in several Northern cities.22 As riots intensified, mutinous Muslim 
mobs turned their rage against vulnerable Southern Christian settlers, espe-
cially Igbos, in the Northern Provinces.23 Afraid for their lives, many Southern 
Christian settlers— including many Igbo Christians— fled the North for the 
Eastern, Western, and Mid- Western Provinces.
Federal military authorities responded to the vio lence against Igbo settlers 
by seeking help from Northern emirs. Having denounced regional politicians, 
Ironsi embraced Hausa- Fulani emirs as communicators of his policies to emir-
ate society. He instructed the four military governors to discuss impor tant state 
policies with traditional rulers in their respective provinces. The most critical of 
 these dialogues  were  those held between the military governor of the Northern 
Provinces, Major Katsina, and Northern emirs.24 The emirs, in turn, discharged 
their role as intermediaries with  great confidence. For example, in June,  after 
many private deliberations with Katsina, the sultan of Sokoto, Sir Abubakar III, 
submitted a bold memorandum to Ironsi, demanding the repeal of Decree 34.25
With growing Northern discontent, Ironsi convened a national conference 
of traditional rulers in Ibadan on July 28–29, 1966, to find solutions to the 
country’s po liti cal crisis. Twenty- four prominent traditional rulers represented 
the provinces at the meeting, and  were charged with finding  viable solutions to 
Nigeria’s crisis. As fate would have it, Ironsi could only attend the first day of 
the conference;  after a state dinner in his honor, Ironsi and his host, Governor 
Fajuyi (the Western Region’s military governor)  were assassinated— just two 
months  after issuing Decree 34. The bloody countercoup, led by Northern of-
ficers, also claimed the lives of many other Igbo officers.
The countercoup catapulted Chief of Army Staff Gowon to power, and 
moved the country in yet another direction. As the national crisis deepened, 
Gowon abandoned Ironsi’s strategy of working through emirs and traditional 
rulers. More importantly, Gowon, a  Middle  Belt Christian with strong cultural 
connection to the Hausa- Fulani Muslim elite emerged as a bridge to  Middle 
 Belt minorities who  were influential in the Nigerian officer corp.26 For Gowon, 
the looming crisis required a more comprehensive approach, integrating the 
efforts of a broad- based co ali tion of regional power brokers. The affairs of state 
now revolved around alliances among military administrators loyal to Gowon, 
se nior federal civil servants, and prominent regional politicians— now recog-
nized as essential spokesmen of major ethno- regional groups. Gowon appointed 
prominent politicians from the failed First Republic as commissioners in his 
Federal Executive Council and as heads of federal statutory corporations. He 
encouraged their participation as regional “leaders of thought” in vari ous 
federal peace initiatives.27 Recognizing the central place of regionalism in the 
crisis, Gowon released Awolowo, the preeminent Yoruba po liti cal leader, from 
Calabar Prison in August 1966. In 1963, Awolowo had been convicted of trea-
sonable felony against the federal government during the ag crisis of the pre-
ceding demo cratic era.28  After his release from prison, Awolowo was chosen by 
Yoruba obas and elders to lead the Yoruba regional del e ga tion to the critical 
“leaders of thought” conferences, created by the fmg to recommend solutions 
to the crisis that ultimately led to the Nigerian- Biafra Civil War. For strategic 
reasons, Gowon also appointed Awolowo as federal commissioner for finance 
and vice chairman of the Federal Executive Council in 1967.
Significantly, Gowon reinstated the preexisting federal structure and di-
vided the Northern, Eastern, Western, and Mid- Western Regions into twelve 
states. This military decision led to the creation of new states, including some 
that reflected the long- term agitations of ethnic minorities for autonomy in 
the Eastern and Northern Regions. From the Eastern Region, where the Igbo 
 people  were the dominant ethnic group, the fmg carved out three states: 
East Central, South Eastern, and Rivers. The Northern Region was divided 
into North Central, North Eastern, North Western, Kano, Benue- Plateau, and 
Kwara States. Significantly, the last two of  these gave— for the first time since 
colonial rule— ethnic and religious minorities in the  Middle  Belt and northern 
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Yoruba areas their own states.29 This decision prompted emirate elites to re-
evaluate their perceived eroding power and unite around a strategy that would 
establish a new partnership with the po liti cal class of  these new states. At least 
from a formal- legal perspective, the dream of Islamization, Northernization, 
and “Hausanization” suffered serious reversal  after the creation of the states.
At a national convention to find solutions to Nigeria’s po liti cal crisis shortly 
 after Gowon’s ascent to power, Hausa- Fulani Muslim leaders initially pushed 
for secession before switching course and advocating a strong central govern-
ment with new states, Benue- Plateau ( Middle  Belt region) and Kwara (north-
ern fringe of the Yoruba region). Mobilizing the support of the Council of 
Mallams and the jni, the Northern Muslim elite closed ranks, asserting their 
position as the defenders of Islam and Northern interests.30 By the time of the 
outbreak of the civil war in early 1967, old npc stalwarts had established a 
good working relationship with leaders of the National Christian Association 
(nca) in the  Middle  Belt and Northern minority communities. The Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim elite’s rapprochement with  Middle  Belt Christians initially 
worked  because of Gowon’s strategy31 of building a united front against the 
Biafra (predominantly Igbo) secessionist agenda and sustaining the federation 
with the support of the po liti cal classes of the core Northern emirate,  Middle 
 Belt, Yoruba region, and ethnic minorities in the defunct Eastern Region. How-
ever, once the nca was drawn into the Northern alliance, ethnic fissures soon 
emerged among  these Christian minority groups, effectively undermining a uni-
fied Christian co ali tion. Indeed, Hausa- Fulani Muslim power brokers  were able 
to fend off simultaneous challenges from Southerners and Northern Christians 
at once, meanwhile quashing internal dissent and unifying their base.32
As former colonial governor, Macpherson  later would recall during the 
Nigerian- Biafra Civil War, this united front from Northern Muslim rulers in 
the midst of the Biafran secession also contributed to the regionalization and 
militarization of Nigeria. Recounting his “friends” killed during the Nigerian 
crisis in the 1960s, Macpherson agreed with the sentiment of Igbo leaders that 
Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Biafra leader and former military governor of the 
Eastern Provinces, embodied the apprehension of core Igbo constituency im-
mediately  after the countercoup against the Ironsi regime. Drawing on his cor-
respondence with Igbo leaders during the crisis, Macpherson observed during 
the civil war that Igbos could only participate in a federation that would ensure 
their protection, especially  after the systematic mob attacks on Igbo settlers in 
Northern communities.33
In the long term, the absence of vibrant Igbo settlers in Northern cities 
would have impor tant implications for religion and society in Northern states 
for many years to come. With the departure of Igbo settlers, mainline mis-
sions, especially Catholic churches, redoubled their missionary work among 
indigenous non- Muslim communities in Northern and  Middle  Belt states. In 
the case of the Catholic Church, the missions embraced a strategy to “north-
ernize” church doctrines, tailored missionary work to the unique demographic 
conditions of the region, and more effectively engage the social conditions of 
non- Muslims in  Middle  Belt and Northern states.34 Enwerem notes the new 
trajectory in Catholic missionary work in Northern states immediately  after 
the civil war:
The Catholic Church in Northern Nigeria announced its growth, so to 
speak, in 1970 with the ordination of ten priests. Many more soon fol-
lowed, to the extent that by 1979 the region could boast of about eighty- six 
indigenous priests, within Tivland alone, the historic center for anti- 
Muslim re sis tance in the North, leading with forty priests.  Women  were 
not found wanting in responding to the call to a religious vocation. In view 
of this, it became necessary to found the indigenous religious communities 
of nuns, like the Congregation of Our Lady of Fatima in Jos, the  Sisters of 
the Nativity in Makurdi, and the Dominican  Sisters of Saint Catherine 
of Siena in Sokoto. With the exception of Maiduguri and Yola, all the ten 
Dioceses in the former North are headed by indigenous bishops. In 1991, 
Kano became a mini- diocese— a step  towards becoming a diocese.35
Conversely, the consequences of the civil war encouraged another moment 
of Hausa- Fulani Muslim ascendancy. The devastating consequences of the war 
and the consolidation of military rule centered on a Hausa- speaking officer 
corps would help cement the po liti cal influence of the masu sarauta in the 
1970s and 1980s. This resurgence of Northern Muslim elite in national politics 
generated strong, but divided opposition from the Southern states, the  Middle 
 Belt, and Northern minority Christians, with serious implications for sharia as 
the country embarked on constitutional reforms for a demo cratic government 
in the 1970s.
Concomitantly, Northern Muslim assertiveness encouraged Southern and 
 Middle  Belt Christians to forge alliances across denominational, ethnic, and re-
gional lines. Indeed, Gowon’s postwar policy of reconstruction encouraged 
mainline Catholic and Protestant denominations to coordinate their response 
to the devastation in Eastern states. For example, the Christian Council 
of  Nigeria— a group of Protestant churches— collaborated with Catholic 
churches to establish the first national ecumenical proj ect in 1971. This led to 
the establishment of two impor tant initiatives: the National Institute of Moral 
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and Religious Education and the Christian Health Association of Nigeria; the 
latter organ ization coordinated the distribution of international medical relief 
to war- torn southeastern communities immediately  after the war.36
This new ecumenicalism notwithstanding, mainline Christian denomina-
tions remained cautious in their newfound relations  until the formation of Ni-
geria’s preeminent national Christian organ ization, the Christian Association 
of Nigeria (can), in 1976. While many  factors encouraged its formation, most 
analysts agree that the consolidation of Northern Muslim interest was the cata-
lyst for its establishment.37 With a strong focus on the Northern Muslim power 
structure, the po liti cal theater for can’s activities was in the non- Muslim areas 
in the old Northern Region, where the Sokoto Caliphate had consolidated its 
power base  under the indirect rule system, and Christian missions had made 
significant inroads since the colonial period.
Sharia Debate and Transition to Democracy
The years immediately  after the civil war  were expected to be a time of national 
reconstruction and reconciliation, but wound up being a period when con-
tending po liti cal and religious groups reasserted themselves within the frame-
work of Nigeria’s prevailing ethno- regional structure. As the Gowon regime 
embarked on post– civil war reconstruction, Muslim activists, through vari-
ous national Muslim organ izations, especially the recently formed Nigerian 
Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (nscia), reasserted Muslim interest in 
national affairs.38  These agitations opened up a space for discussions on sharia 
in the Nigerian  legal system. With the overthrow of the Gowon administration 
in 1975, religion gained greater influence in national politics. Gowon’s succes-
sor, General Murtala Mohammed, a devout Muslim from Kano, openly em-
braced a public role for Islam in state affairs during his short period as head of 
state ( July 30, 1975– February 13, 1976). Following Southern Christians’ outcry 
against Mohammed’s attempt to establish a federal Sharia Court of Appeal, 
the fmg backtracked to create a unified Customary Court of Appeal in 1975.39
It was in the wider context of agitation for post– civil war po liti cal and  legal 
reforms that the fmg in 1975 created a committee to draft a constitution that 
would herald Nigeria’s transition to democracy. This deliberation led to the 
1979 Nigerian Constitution, and encouraged an animated debate on the role 
of sharia in Nigerian po liti cal and  legal affairs.40 This debate, which brought 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim elite into direct conflict with the po liti cal class of other 
regions of the country, once again exposed Nigeria’s deep religious and regional 
fault lines. Consequently, sharia emerged as a critical medium for the articulation 
of Hausa- Fulani Muslim interests during the transition to a demo cratic govern-
ment in the mid-1970s.
As the conflict between pro- sharia (largely Northern Muslims) and anti- 
sharia (Southern,  Middle  Belt, and Northern- minority Christians) factions 
intensified during the constitutional debates, a power ful national Muslim co-
ali tion emerged to petition for a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal (fsca) that 
would have jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases. Pro- fsca Con-
stituent Assembly members insisted that since religious injunctions requires 
that the conduct of Muslims must be regulated by Islamic law, the new Nige-
rian constitution must grant sharia courts authority to adjudicate on all  legal 
 matters that affect Nigerian Muslims.41 But when it became apparent that pro- 
sharia delegates would not achieve their objective in the Constituent Assem-
bly, they elected to boycott assembly deliberations. Eventually, a compromise 
by the Constitution Drafting Committee’s judiciary subcommittee established 
Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal in Northern states, with limited au-
thority in civil and criminal cases.42 Ardent anti- sharia activists contended that 
the subcommittee’s compromise would infringe on the constitutional rights 
of religious minorities in Northern states and would undermine the secular-
ity of the Nigerian nation- state. Despite this limited constitutional victory 
by Hausa- Fulani Muslim elites, the Northern pro- sharia alliance was largely a 
marriage of con ve nience, bringing together emirate elites of diff er ent ideologi-
cal persuasions and po liti cal interests. For example, Islamic reformist clerics, 
notably Abubakar Gumi,  were by the mid-1970s challenging the masu sarauta’s 
legitimacy, claiming that the Hausa- Fulani Muslim aristocracy was a compo-
nent of a corrupt Nigerian oligarchy.43
State Crisis and Religious Vio lence
Po liti cal parties in Nigeria’s second demo cratic government, the Second Re-
public (1979–1983), had their roots in the po liti cal alignments formed during 
decolonization. Aware of the deep divisions among the major regions, and 
hoping to undermine alternative centers of power, the Ironsi, Gowon, and 
Mohammed/Obasanjo44 military regimes had all curtailed partisan po liti cal 
activities during the period of military rule, from 1966 to 1979. In the Northern 
states, preexisting po liti cal associations provided an orga nizational node for 
the construction of parties in 1978, when the Mohammed/Obasanjo regime 
lifted the ban on party politics. Most prominent of  these was the National 
Movement, precursor to the National Party of Nigeria (npn), which  later won 
the presidential elections of 1979 and 1983. Although the npn  later embraced 
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a diverse co ali tion of ju nior partners, notably Yoruba, Igbo, and Edo politi-
cians, as well as ethnic minorities from the Niger Delta and Cross River areas,45 
the party had its foundation in the Northern  Peoples Congress— the former 
Hausa- Fulani party of the preceding civilian government  under the leadership 
of the late sardauna of Sokoto.46
Despite this national alliance, the npn was firmly anchored to the masu 
sarauta. Significantly, the party was formed when emirs and other Northern 
Muslim dignitaries assembled in Sokoto, the headquarters of the caliphate, to 
celebrate the fortieth anniversary of Sir Abubakar III as the sultan of Sokoto 
and Sarkin Musulmi (leader of Northern Nigerian Muslim).47 Furthermore, 
prominent caliphate titleholders, such as Ibrahim Dasuki, Baraden ( later sul-
tan) of Sokoto, and Shehu Malami, Sarkin Sudan of Wurno (a major titleholder 
in the Sokoto Caliphate) played impor tant roles in the critical months before 
the 1979 elections. The Makaman Bida, one of the caliphate’s most influential 
traditional chiefs and trusted adviser of the late sardauna served as the  grand 
patron of the party in its formative years.48 Once in control of state affairs, npn 
governors and officials emphasized the emirs’ role in the preservation of po liti-
cal stability and the maintenance of law and order.49
Similar to the initial era of demo cratic governance when a progressive popu-
list party, Northern Ele ments  Peoples Union (nepu), opposed the npc, the 
party of the masu sarauta, the  People’s Redemption Party (prp) emerged to 
draw its legitimacy from nepu’s progressive traditions; the prp campaigned 
against the entrenched power base of the masu sarauta, now articulated  under 
the po liti cal machine of the emergent npn. Although the prp was the brain-
child of po liti cal newcomers, notably Abubakar Rimi, Balarabe Musa, and Bala 
Usman, former nepu leader Aminu Kano  later was elected party leader.
From the Yoruba states of Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, and Ondo, as well as Kwara 
State and Bendel State (essentially the old Mid- Western State),50 prominent 
Yoruba politicians and obas (traditional monarch of Yoruba city- states) ral-
lied the support of the defunct Action Group (ag) loyalists  under the lead-
ership of Awolowo, now elevated to the distinguished title of the Asiwaju of 
Yorubaland (leader of the Yoruba  people) by leading obas. This group became 
known as the Committee of Friends. This committee led to the formation of a 
Yoruba- centered party in 1979—in collaboration with old Edo, Itsekiri, Ishan, 
and other Mid- West allies— the Unity Party of Nigeria.
In the Southwest and Southeast, respectively, the “Progressives” of Lagos 
and the old Eastern Region formed an alliance that drew its support from the 
proscribed ncnc co ali tion of the old Eastern, Western, and Mid- Western Re-
gions. The Lagos and Eastern Progressives merged in May 1978 to form the 
Committee for National Unity and Pro gress. This co ali tion  later became the 
Southern wing of the Nigerian  Peoples Party (npp).51 Like the National Move-
ment and the Committee of Friends,  these organ izations combined the expe-
rience of an older generation of party leaders with the aspirations of a new 
cohort of influential power brokers. Despite the objection of a formidable 
Northern ally, Kanuri po liti cal stalwart Waziri Ibrahim, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the 
former ncnc leader and renowned nationalist,  later became the npp leader 
and its presidential candidate in 1979.52 Ibrahim went on to form a breakaway 
party, the  Great Nigerian  Peoples Party, which dominated electoral politics 
in his Bornu stronghold. Consequently, prevailing ethno- regional (and in the 
case of the Northern states, ethno- religious) alliances provided the framework 
on which  these major po liti cal parties  were subsequently based during Nigeria’s 
second demo cratic government.
Given this context, the election that followed the new constitution saw 
voting primarily along ethno- regional lines. Dominated by the Northern states, 
the npn succeeded in attracting a winning co ali tion through the support of 
ju nior allies in the South, especially in the East, Rivers, and Cross Rivers States. 
Shehu Shagari, the Turaki of Sokoto, a prominent Hausa- Fulani Muslim title-
holder, was elected president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In addition, the 
npn succeeded in securing control over the federal legislature.
With the ascendancy of the npn in national and regional politics, Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim power was anchored to the sardauna’s northernization and Is-
lamization vision of the previous demo cratic era. This incited strong re sis tance 
from Christian activists, especially in Southern and  Middle  Belt states, as well 
as among Christian minorities in Northern states. As Christians accused the 
npn of advancing Northern Muslim interests, ethno- religious and regional 
divisions grew wider.53 And as Southern,  Middle  Belt, and Northern Chris-
tians trumpeted their opposition against what many considered the mono poly 
of state power by a Northern Muslim oligarchy,54 npn emirate po liti cal elites 
pushed back, insisting on establishing a Sharia Court of Appeal that would 
have full  legal authority in civil and criminal cases in Northern Muslim society, 
further amplifying Christian anxiety.
The growing ethno- religious and regional tensions brought vio lence.55 Start-
ing in 1980, a wave of religious vio lence by fringe Islamic movements ravaged 
several Northern communities. Although the origins of  these violent conflicts 
are not always easy to discern, this enduring religious vio lence tended to reflect 
several impor tant  factors. First, it reflected the deepening religious and ethnic 
divisions in Northern and  Middle  Belt states; second, it showed the growing 
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alienation of the masses of Northern Muslims with the neopatrimonialism of 
the custodians of the Nigerian state; and fi nally, it revealed the widening gulf 
among factions of Hausa- Fulani groups over claims of leadership of Northern 
Muslims.  These  factors exacerbated prevailing fissures between Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim rulers and Northern Christian “indigenes”; Hausa- Fulani Muslim in-
digenes, and Southern Christian “settlers”; Hausa- Fulani elite and Southern 
Christian intelligent sia; and Hausa- Fulani Muslim elite and Northern Muslim 
radical groups.56 With all of  these religious crises  going on, the moral authority 
of the holders of state power was seriously compromised, severely undermining 
Nigeria’s fragile demo cratic pro cess.57 Compounded by deepening economic 
crisis from statism and the declining price of petroleum, the Shagari admin-
istration’s growing neopatrimonialism exacerbated ethno- regional and ethno- 
religious tension among Nigeria’s diverse groups.58 In addition,  these religious 
conflicts reflect deeper structural crisis endemic to the Nigerian state and soci-
ety. The tenuousness of Shagari’s npn government was revealed when a mili-
tary coup brought the Second Republic to an end on New Year’s Eve of 1983.
The first major religious conflict with national implications started in the 
 early 1980s with a radical Muslim sect known as ‘Yan tatsine (Hausa for, 
roughly, “ those who damn”). ‘Yan tatsine (Maitasine) deployed Islamic doctrine 
and Hausa traditions of protest to gain popu lar support among marginalized 
Hausa talakawa in Northern cities. While many analysts emphasized the 
fanat i cism of ‘Yan tatsine, Paul Lubeck perceptively traces the gardawa— 
the Qu’ranic students who  were foot soldiers of the sect— back to the era of the 
Sokoto Caliphate in the 1800s. As Nigerian society experienced rapid social 
transformation, Lubeck contends, “semi- industrial capitalism” further under-
mined the gardawa in major Hausa urban areas such as Kano, especially in the 
dry season. Before the petroleum boom of the 1970s, the gardawa had been 
steadily integrated into the  labor market in Northern cities. Huge growth in oil 
wealth (from $1 billion in 1970 to almost $23 billion in 1980) intensified social 
in equality among an emergent commercial- bureaucratic class and the masses of 
Hausa talakawa, as semi- industrial production stagnated. With this economic 
transformation, the “laboring poor” was effectively marginalized from the main-
stream economy, especially in Northern Nigeria’s principal city, Kano.59
It was in the context of  these tensions in 1980, that ‘Yan tatsine’s opposition 
to state authorities exploded into twelve days of violent riots in Kano City that 
had national reverberations.60 With inadequate response from state authorities, 
the riot claimed many lives and destroyed property worth millions of naira. 
In 1981, another religious protest initiated by ‘Yan tatsine discontent in Kano 
ended in a major confrontation between two Muslim sects that reportedly re-
sulted in the death of several thousands. In Maiduguri in Bornu State, 400 
 people  were killed in 1982. Two years  later, in Jimeta in Yola State, 763  people 
 were killed. And in Gombe State, more than 100  people  were killed in 1985.61 
When Pope John Paul II visited Nigeria in 1982, growing tensions between 
Christians and Muslims  rose to a boiling point, leading to widespread unrest, 
including the burning of eight churches in Kano by mobs of Muslim youth.62
With Muslim and Christian identities further shaping bound aries of 
po liti cal mobilization by the late 1980s and 1990s, religious conflicts became 
outright confrontations, complicated by a mix of po liti cal, social, and demo-
graphic conditions, especially in an environment where the legitimacy of the 
holders of state power was very much in doubt. The trigger for  these violent con-
frontations tended to be in the perceived encroachment of a religious minority— 
“non- indigenes”—on the “ancestral” space of a dominant ethno- religious group. 
In this context, Chris tian ity and Islam had emerged as an impor tant framework 
for the articulation of local interests connected to the distributive resources of 
the state. This trend intensified the wave of religious conflicts in the emirate states 
and the predominantly Christian  Middle  Belt states.63 Significantly, this trend 
has effectively posed a serious threat to peaceful coexistence among Christians 
and Muslims in Northern and  Middle  Belt states, especially since the 1980s.64
In other Northern cities, religious riots  were triggered by several unfortu-
nate incidents in the 1980s and the 1990s, notably, a case of an alleged inflam-
matory speech by a Christian preacher who had recently converted from Islam 
in Kaduna State; a Muslim protest in Kano in 1982 over the construction of a 
church near a mosque, which reportedly led to the death of forty- four Chris-
tians; and a visit by German evangelist Richard Bonnke in 1991, dubbed a “cru-
sade,” which resulted in two days of mayhem that led to the death of more than 
two hundred  people, most of them Christians. In addition,  there  were reports 
of a meeting at the Central Mosque of the Ahmadu Bello University campus 
that called for the “destruction of Chris tian ity in Zaria” and led to riots in the 
university that spilled into local communities, resulting in the destruction of 
churches, mosques, and the homes of many Christians; and in Kano City, in 
May 1995, a confrontation between two alleged Hausa thieves and Igbo shop 
 owners led to religious attacks by irate Muslim youths in the Sabon Gari (set-
tler) quarters, resulting in the death of many Christians.65 Significantly,  these 
waves of religious crisis  were widespread during the military regimes of three 
Hausa- speaking Muslims  after the demise of Nigeria’s Second Republic, namely 
the military administrations of Generals Buhari, Babangida, and Abacha.
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Muslim- Christian Relations: Conflict and  
Compromise  under Military Rule
The brief military regime of Major- General Mohammadu Buhari ( January 
1984 to August 1985) further firmed up the power base of the Northern 
Muslim po liti cal class. Following the massive corruption of the ousted civil- 
democratic government, Buhari’s regime projected stern and dictatorial poli-
cies that restricted civil liberties and confronted many professional and civic 
organ izations (including the Nigerian Bar Association, Nigerian Medical As-
sociation, Nigerian  Labor Congress, and Nigerian University Students Union). 
However, the regime embraced Hausa- Fulani emirs to harness local support in 
Northern states. A Hausa- Fulani “Brahmin” from Katsina, Buhari regularly 
consulted the sultan of Sokoto, Sir Abubakar III, on critical state affairs. Bu-
hari also instructed his state military governors, especially  those in charge of 
Northern states, to embrace emirs as an “informal second tier of authority.”66 
Nevertheless, Buhari’s brief rule witnessed prompt military response to sporadic 
religious vio lence by Muslim militants in Northern states. For example, the 
Buhari regime moved against religious riots carried out by ‘Yan tatsine militants, 
allegedly with support from Niger, Chad, and Cameroon nationals in Kano in 
1984— and intermittent riots in Yola from 1984 to 1985, killing more than one 
thousand  people. State authorities blamed this wave of religious disturbances 
on demographic pressure from illegal immigrants. As Nigeria’s economic crisis 
deepened and with growing discontent over the restriction of civil liberties, an-
other Hausa- speaking Muslim general, Ibrahim Babangida, ousted Buhari in a 
palace coup in August 1985.
 Under Babangida’s regime, Nigeria’s Christian- Muslim conflicts took cen-
ter stage over the country’s controversial membership in the Or ga ni za tion 
of  Islamic Conference (oic,  later Or ga ni za tion of Islamic Cooperation) in 
1986.67 Christian leaders claimed that the regime made the decision to join the 
oic without consulting the Nigerian public. Nigeria’s power ful Catholic bish-
ops, expressing concern over the nation’s unity and the rights of Christian mi-
norities in predominantly Northern Muslim states, noted that the oic charter 
undermined the essential tenet of Nigeria’s plural and secular state.68 Earlier 
in the year, at a national conference on Babangida’s oic policy, a prominent 
Catholic leader, Monsignor Hypolite Adigwe, had argued in a well- circulated 
conference paper that Babangida’s policy would embolden the Northern pro- 
sharia movement.69 As the oic controversy expanded, Adigwe’s paper was 
published as a pamphlet titled Nigeria Joins the Or ga ni za tion of Islamic Confer-
ence, O.I.C.: The Implications for Nigeria.70 Adigwe notes:
The ratification of our membership of the oic amounts to amending our 
constitution automatically. It is at variance with Section 10 of our Con-
stitution which declares Nigeria a secular state. Both are mutually exclu-
sive. The oic is  there to foster Islamic religion in all its dimensions— 
economic, po liti cal, cultural, scientific,  etc. and  every activity has to be in 
accordance with Islamic law. Our money  will therefore be used in spread-
ing Islam, building Islamic schools, universities, and mosques, and maybe 
fighting a jihad.71
Responding to the strong opposition of Christians throughout the country, 
General Babangida convened a Consultative Committee of leading Christian 
and Muslim leaders, including Archbishop A. O. Okogie, Catholic archbishop 
of Nigeria; Bishop J. A. Adetiloye, Anglican bishop of Nigeria; and Ibrahim 
Dasuki, secretary-general of the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs—to ex-
plore how Nigeria’s national interest might “be affected by the recent change 
from observer status to full membership within the oic.”72 Significantly,  under 
the chairmanship of a Northern Christian military officer, Lieutenant Col o nel 
John Shagaya (a regime loyalist), the committee was noticeably diff er ent in its 
makeup from the del e ga tion of Northern Muslim notables that had formally 
presented Nigeria’s application for oic membership at the organ ization’s an-
nual meeting in Fez, Morocco, earlier in 1986.73 Not surprisingly, the report of 
the Consultative Committee was vague and perfunctory:
We note that the assurance given by the Federal Military Government 
that our full membership of the oic does not in any way imply Nigeria 
has become or  will become an Islamic state has addressed the undoubted 
reservations expressed by sections of the country. We also note that  these 
reservations can only be cleared with time and  after further consultation. 
Furthermore, we agree that the peace and stability of our multi- religious 
nation and the secular character of Nigeria must be preserved.74
The following year, when Muslim mobs attacked churches in several North-
ern cities, Catholic bishops called on federal and state authorities to carry out 
a thorough investigation to bring  those responsible to justice. At the annual 
Catholic Bishops’ conference in Awka in 1987, the bishops again queried Nige-
ria’s oic membership.
However, as Christian- Muslim tensions intensified, some Catholic leaders 
also encouraged peaceful dialogue with their Muslim counter parts, drawing 
on doctrines from the Second Vatican  under Pope Paul IV from 1962 to 1965. 
Significantly, in a high- profile meeting  later in 1987, Catholic bishops, in collabo-
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ration with the Association of Episcopal Churches, in a communiqué titled 
“Chris tian ity and Islam in Dialogue,” identified common grounds between 
the two world religions; they called on Muslim leaders to reject discriminatory 
practices against Christians, including classifying non- Muslims as infidels and 
imposing heavy penalties on Christian converts from Islam, and on Muslim 
 women who marry Christians.
No Christian leader exemplified this spirit of peaceful dialogue with Nige-
ria’s Muslim leadership during this period more than Cardinal Francis Arinze, 
a former archbishop of Onitsha and president of the Pontifical Council for 
Inter- religious Dialogue. He  later became a prominent cardinal bishop in the 
Vatican. As one of Africa’s foremost Catholic priests, Cardinal Arinze, an eth-
nic Igbo, had gained fame for his humanitarian work in the defunct Republic 
of Biafra during the civil war. Having arrived at the Vatican only a year be-
fore the oic crisis, Cardinal Arinze had acquired extensive experience with 
Christian- Muslim conflicts in Nigeria. As Nigeria’s religious crisis intensified 
in the 1980s, Cardinal Arinze called for reconciliation and understanding 
between Christians and Muslims. For example, in a notable keynote address in 
1988, he provided impor tant historical and global contexts to Nigeria’s enduring 
Christian- Muslim conflict. Cardinal Arinze contended that while Chris tian-
ity has existed for twenty centuries and Islam for fourteen, their relations had 
been characterized by tension and conflict. However, since the Second Vatican, 
impor tant theological steps had been taken to establish an environment of rec-
onciliation between Catholics and Muslims. Calling for constructive dialogue, 
Cardinal Arinze argued that religious conflicts are often related to po liti cal and 
economic  factors, compounded by historical memories of wars and vio lence. 
Drawing on the Second Vatican’s call for peaceful coexistence,75 he pleaded the 
imperative of accommodation and reconciliation among Nigerian Christians 
and Muslims.
Cardinal Arinze was, however, realistic about the limitations of interreli-
gious dialogue in Nigeria’s deeply divided society. He felt that Nigerian Catho-
lic leaders should nevertheless find inspiration from the doctrine espoused in 
Vatican II and the works of Pope Paul IV— and subsequently Pope John Paul II. 
In the Declaration on Religious Freedom, Cardinal Arinze notes that Vatican II 
speaks of the right of  every  human being to follow his or her conscience in re-
ligious  matters. It sought to underscore shared beliefs among vari ous religions 
and the need for understanding and collaboration. Cardinal Arinze noted that 
Pope Paul received the ulema of Saudi Arabia in 1974. For his part, Pope John 
Paul II engaged  people of vari ous religions, especially Muslims, receiving Mus-
lim representatives and giving addresses on interreligious dialogue around the 
world. Cardinal Arinze called on Nigeria’s Catholic leaders to draw on the in-
spirational leadership of Paul IV and John Paul II.76
In keeping with Cardinal Arinze’s passionate call for interreligious dialogue, 
some Nigerian Catholic priests encouraged constructive dialogue between 
Catholics and Muslims. In this regard, the work of a renowned Igbo Catholic 
theologian, the Rev. Dr. Stan Anih, is worthy of note. In his popu lar pamphlet 
The Cathedral and the Mosque Can Co-exist in Nigeria, Reverend Anih con-
tends: “We believe that by a healthy dialogue between Christians and Mos-
lems a new religious sensitivity, called ecumenism . . .  can give Nigeria peace 
and unity  because dialogue is an eternal action.”77 Reflecting on the fallout of 
Nigeria’s religious crisis in the 1980s, Anih called on  people of all faiths, espe-
cially Christians, to “listen” and “dialogue” carefully and work with Muslims 
to achieve a common good. He insisted that this new ecumenism must lie in 
reconciliation, the ac cep tance of pluralism, and “bracketing” all destructive as-
pects of culture to achieve unity in diversity.  After all, “the basic doctrine of all 
theologies is the sameness of divinity in all men [and  women].”78
Some mainstream Muslim organ izations attempted to encourage construc-
tive dialogue between Muslim and Christian groups. For example, the Council 
of Ulama tried to corral diverse Islamic interests into a peace movement, but its 
ties to the “radical” Muslim Student Society hindered the organ ization’s claims 
as a reliable broker of peaceful dialogue with Christian groups.79 Other peace 
efforts initiated by federal and state authorities took the form of seminars, 
workshops, and conferences to foster religious dialogue between Christians 
and Muslims.80 In 1987, the Babangida administration convened the National 
Council for Religious Affairs (ncra) as a statutory body to promote peaceful 
coexistence. This body, however, enjoyed  little success. In practice, the commit-
tee consisted of leaders of the nscia and can. When the latter alleged bias 
from federal authorities  toward Northern Muslims and stopped participating 
in the body’s deliberations, the committee became obsolescent.81
Despite the peace initiatives, the divide between Christian and Muslim 
groups grew wider as the oic controversy raged on with  great intensity. Mus-
lim leaders, most of them from emirate society, defended Babangida’s decision 
to join the oic, arguing that Nigeria is a majority Muslim country and thus 
should deepen its relationship with Muslim countries.82 Muslim rebuttals to 
oic critics further contended that the organ ization merely sought parity with 
Christian organ izations; for example, Muslim activists argued that belonging 
to the oic was no diff er ent from having diplomatic relations with the Vatican, 
as many countries did, including Nigeria.83 However, the oic’s stated objectives 
revealed a major contradiction for a country with Nigeria’s religious history: as 
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noted by a former oic secretary- general, the organ ization’s main objectives are 
“to propagate Islam and acquaint the rest of the world with Islam, its issues and 
aspirations . . .  [and affirm that] Islam is the only path which can lead [Mus-
lims] to strength, dignity, prosperity, and a better  future. It is the pledge and 
guarantee of the authenticity of the Ummah, safeguarding it from the tyranni-
cal onrush of materialism.”84
Christian leaders, for their part, argued that since oic membership held the 
force of international treaty, Nigeria, like other oic members, now would be 
duty- bound to provide financial resources to defend Islamic holy places, sup-
port Palestinian liberation movements, and promote global Islamic solidarity. 
In the end, the oic affair and resultant controversy only hardened religious 
identities, especially as they reflected entrenched Hausa- Fulani Muslim power 
structures, Northern Christian minority re sis tance, and Southern Christian 
intelligent sia insistence on Nigerian state secularity.85
Embedded in the oic conflict and contemporaneous national debate  were 
the questions of how and by whom “Islam” and “secularity”  were defined in a 
country where the vestiges of Western governance  were steeped in Christian 
influences. The saga thus exposed a fundamental contradiction in the discourse 
of the Nigerian state and society over the meaning of religion in Nigeria’s pur-
ported secular state. In his keynote address at the annual conference of the 
Nigerian Association for the Study of Religions in 1991, the eloquent Yoruba 
secretary- general of the nscia, Lateef Adegbite, argued that Nigerian Mus-
lims who confront this contradiction fall into the following stark categories:
state supremacists (who seek to place the state above all other social insti-
tutions including Islam); atheists and secularists (who claim that Nigeria 
is a secular state, which Muslims argue against  because Islam forbids de-
nying the presence of God); modernists (who undermine religion and 
[would like] to do away with it); rival religious groups (who feel threat-
ened by Islam and want to harass Muslim leadership and drown Islamic 
voices); spoilers within (a  house divided within itself, giving Islam a bad 
image); and media misrepre sen ta tion (local and international media 
aimed at distorting [the image of ] Islam).86
While such specific religious dictates reflect strong conviction, they reify major 
ethno- religious fault lines in Nigeria’s contentious politics.
During this period, another major bout of religious vio lence exploded on 
the national scene in Kafanchan, in Kaduna State, in March 1987,  later spinning 
off to other parts of the state and several Northern communities. This wave of 
Christian- Muslim confrontations would mark the peak of the religious vio lence 
in Northern and  Middle  Belt states in the turbulent 1980s. Kafanchan, head-
quarters of the Jema local government, is located about three hundred kilo-
meters south of the city of Kaduna. With a population of about eighty thou-
sand, Kafanchan consists largely of Christian indigenous ethnic groups— the 
Jaba, Kagoma, Ninzom, Ayyu, Gwantu, Numana, and Godo- godo—as well 
as Hausa- Fulani Muslim “settlers.” In this specific case, under lying Christian- 
Muslim tension turned into open attacks on churches when a recent Christian 
convert from Islam, Abubakar Bako, allegedly blasphemed against Islam at a 
Christian students’ organ ization meeting at the city’s College of Education.87
 After a week of destruction, the Kaduna State military government con-
vened a panel chaired by State Commissioner for Justice Hansen Donli to in-
vestigate the riots and to make recommendations to the state authorities. The 
Donli Panel noted: “From many submissions made, it was quite obvious that 
certain highly placed individuals and organ izations, had in the past been in 
the habit of  either making unguarded utterances or publishing provocative and 
sensitive materials in the media, capable of causing tension in the country.”88 
However, the panel failed to secure the confidence of both Christian and Mus-
lim groups. can claimed that the panel did  little to address the plight of ag-
grieved Christians and kowtowed to power ful Muslim interests.89 Representing 
Muslims’ interests, the Council of Ulama called for Islamic solidarity, argued that 
the state governor should have done more to protect Muslims, and requested the 
release of Muslims detained in police custody. A Committee of Concerned Citi-
zens claimed that the economic and social deprivation of the masses of Hausa- 
Fulani Muslims was the root cause of the vio lence, but Christian groups, the 
Kaduna State government, and the federal government dismissed the commit-
tee’s claims. Eventually, the fmg (Federal Military Government) convened a 
judicial tribunal chaired by Justice Karibi- Whyte to try all  those detained in the 
religious riots. In the end,  little was done to provide  either justice or reconcili-
ation. Reflecting on  these tragic riots many years  later, the Rev. Dr. Matthew 
Hassan Kukah— a renowned Catholic theologian and  later Catholic bishop of 
Sokoto— concluded that the crisis further consolidated the power base of the 
Northern Muslim elite.90
Sporadic religious vio lence continued in some Northern communities in 
the late 1980s as the Hausa- Fulani Muslim elite asserted its power base dur-
ing the Babangida regime’s transition to demo cratic government.  Toward this 
end, Hausa- Fulani elites created the Northern Elders’ Committee, consisting 
of emirs, politicians, businessmen, and se nior administrators, to exert influence 
over the fmg. In the context of  these efforts, internecine  battles continued 
between Muslims and Christians, especially in Kaduna State, with its large 
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indigenous Christian population. More widespread communal conflicts  were 
reported during the 1987 local government elections. Christian leaders in Ka-
duna State and other Northern states with substantial Christian populations 
alleged that Muslims retained a stranglehold on state affairs, as exemplified 
by the oic crisis, Nigeria’s involvement in the Islamic Development Bank, 
and the unrelenting push for expanded sharia in Northern states.91 Northern 
Christian leaders called for comprehensive reforms to ensure secularity and 
national unity, and for a prohibition against Nigerian membership in interna-
tional religious organ izations.92
During this period of intense religious conflict, intra- Muslim relations in 
the Northern states also suffered as reformists, particularly Abubakar Gumi 
(see chapter 4),  rose to prominence. Gumi had been educated in elite Islamic 
schools; he came to know Hausa- Fulani Muslim notables such as Tafawa 
Balewa, Aminu Kano, Ibrahim Dasuki, and Shehu Shagari in his youth.93  After 
attending Kano Law School, he briefly worked with the sardauna and as a scribe 
for the chief alkali, thereafter taking up a teaching position at his old school in 
the early 1950s. In 1955, Gumi was made imam of the sardauna’s hajj group, and 
 later, in 1957, he oversaw the pilgrimage of Nigerians to the hajj. As discussed 
earlier,  these notable accomplishments won him the appointment as deputy 
 grand qadi of the Northern Region just before in de pen dence, and in 1962 he 
was promoted to  grand qadi. Gumi and the sardauna collaborated to found 
the jni ( Jama ‘atu Nasril Islam) and established many Islamic schools in the 
Northern Region.  After the sardauna’s assassination, however, Gumi embraced 
a new Islamic reformism and questioned the authority of the masu sarauta. 
In the early 1970s, he criticized Gowon’s military regime; this move won him 
support from populist ele ments in emirate states. In 1975 General Murtala Mo-
hammed appointed Gumi  grand mufti. Three years  later, Gumi gave his blessing 
to a new movement, Jama’t Izalat al Bid’a Wa Iqamat as Sunna, or Izala. Seeking 
to both revive and reform Nigerian Islam, Izala leaders preached a return to 
orthodoxy and decried Sufi thought as deviating from holy texts. He reserved 
the strongest criticism for the tijaniyya  because of the association of the qadiri-
yya with Sokoto jihadists, whom he revered. Despite Sufism’s long history— 
arising from twelfth- and thirteenth- century mysticism, with qadiriyya coming 
first and the tijaniyya arriving during the eigh teenth  century— Gumi claimed 
that such Sufi  orders “are inconsistent with true Islam.”94 According to him, 
Sufis teach withdrawal from this world, practice mystical rites, canonize certain 
rulers, recognize saints, and or ga nize the ummah into hierarchical, competing 
structures, all of which are unauthorized innovations to the Qur’an and the 
Prophetic tradition.95
Nevertheless, Izala gained prominence among relatively well- educated 
professionals in the public and private sectors, especially in the cosmopolitan 
cities of Kaduna and Jos. With a focus on religious orthodoxy, Izala empha-
sized strict interpretations of religious texts, especially the Qur’an and hadith, 
along with the widespread availability of classical texts in Hausa language.96 
Reflecting in his autobiography on the establishment of Izala, Gumi frames 
the organ ization as a regrettable necessity, given the corruption of some emirs 
who had broken from Sokoto’s piety: “They had brought back to life all the 
corrupt practices against which Sheikh dan Fodio went to war with the for-
mer Hausa rulers. They had become kings with big palaces full of servants and 
courtiers, and required other  people to bow down before them. They kept 
concubines and did not  really fear God’s anger.”97  Later, Gumi defends his 
Izala movement on grounds similar to  those propagated by Usman dan Fodio 
and his followers during the Sokoto Jihad: “Certainly, one could draw a lot of 
parallels between the rise of some con temporary mass ele ments, like the Izala 
Movement, and the forces that overthrew the Hausa kings during the Jihad in 
1804.”98 Indeed, it was from the tradition of the Sokoto Jihad that Izala estab-
lished its moral authority to inscribe sharia into the Nigerian politico- religious 
proj ect.99
Thus, Izala institutionalized criticism of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and 
lambasted preachers who claimed to have direct connection to the Prophet. 
Within months, such activity had sparked a full- fledged crisis among North-
ern Muslims; attempts at reconciliation failed in 1979 and again in 1983, the 
second time despite President Shagari’s personal intervention. Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim youths flocked to its teachings despite the emirate establishments’ am-
bivalence  toward the movement. Tensions, already fraught,  were heightened 
when Saudi Arabia gave the prestigious King Faisal Award to Gumi in 1987 
for his ser vice to Islam. Nigerian Christians  were against the award  because it 
underscored the influence of Saudi Arabia in Nigerian politics; in addition, 
some emirs frowned at it  because it elevated Gumi’s brand of Islamic ortho-
doxy among Nigerian Muslims. Nevertheless, “intra- Sufi and Sufi– Yan Izala 
differences mounted” by the late 1980s,100 resulting in the formation of Jundul-
lahi (Soldiers of God) and the Fityan al- Islam (Muslim Youth or Heroes/Youth 
of Islam) by qadiriyya and tijaniyya, respectively. Despite  these  counters, mem-
bers of Izala  were widely seen as forward- thinking Muslims  because they ad-
vocated female education and denounced entrenched traditional practices 
considered un- Islamic, such as customary bride prices. Despite Gumi’s death 
in 1992, and eroding Izala membership, the movement remains influential 
among Northern Muslims.101
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A Long Transition to Democracy
At the height of such po liti cal uncertainty in 1985 Babangida announced his 
transition program to a constitutional demo cratic government. Although the 
program was  later subverted by Babangida himself,102 the issues that domi-
nated the discussion from military rule to a demo cratic government neverthe-
less provides a good illustration of Nigerian public discourse for almost four 
de cades. The regime’s contentious politics of demo cratic transition exposed 
the growing politicization of the Nigerian military by the late 1980s, revealing 
a clique of se nior military officers’ domination of the extractive agencies of 
the state.
Immediately  after seizing power in 1985, Babangida appointed a Po liti cal 
Bureau to recommend a suitable demo cratic system for Nigeria. At its inau-
guration in January 1986, Babangida called on the panel to identify the prob-
lems that had led to previous failures of Nigerian civilian governments and 
to propose effective po liti cal response to sustain a demo cratic system in the 
long term.103 Unlike the 1976 Constitution Drafting Committee, this was a 
fact- finding commission, responsible for appraising Nigeria’s governance insti-
tutions and proposing  viable solutions. Although many Nigerian civic groups 
 were growing wary of military- sponsored transition programs, emirate elites ac-
tively participated in the Po liti cal Bureau discussions. Dominated by proscribed 
npn party bosses from the Second Republic, Northern Muslim elite formed 
a po liti cal organ ization called the Committee of Elders to lobby the Po liti cal 
Bureau. The po liti cal class of Southern states (notably from the Igbo, Ibibio, 
Efik, Ijaw, and Yoruba communities) also lobbied the bureau. In one landmark 
gathering in early 1987, an organ ization called the Eastern Solidarity Group, 
consisting of politicians and traditional rulers from the Eastern states of Anam-
bra, Imo, Rivers, and Cross Rivers, resolved to “advance eastern interests.”104 
In the West, Yoruba politicians and obas started an ethnic association called 
the Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba (Yoruba Progressive Or ga ni za tion) to position the 
Yorubas for the next demo cratic government.105
The Babangida regime, in any case, rejected the Po liti cal Bureau’s main rec-
ommendation: the establishment of a social demo cratic/socialist republic. 
This decision left the regime with no other option but to embrace the existing 
po liti cal arrangement. This further hardened Nigeria’s neopatrimonial po liti-
cal structure, rationalized by dominant ethno- regional power relations. As the 
resultant crisis of po liti cal legitimacy intensified, the Nigerian po liti cal pro-
cess was aggravated by a dramatic economic downturn brought on by falling 
oil prices, a staggering foreign debt burden, and shortages of foreign exchange. 
This intensified existing disequilibria— between classes, between regions, and 
between community- based structures and the Nigerian state.106
Complicated by the economic crisis of the 1980s, religious identity in the 
Babangida years thus reflected intersections of ethnic, regional, and class in-
terests. Babangida’s initial policy of dialogue was steadily replaced by manip-
ulative and repressive mea sures to ward off growing discontent.107 This only 
alienated restless professional and civic organ izations. As the regime restricted 
the po liti cal space and civil liberties of the urban citizenry, its policies  were 
complicated by the failure of its economic liberalization program. It was clear 
by the late 1980s that it would be difficult to reconcile a structural adjustment 
program, imposed with the blessing of the International Monetary Fund, with 
the regime’s faltering demo cratic transition program.108
Nonetheless, economic prob lems worsened, causing cutbacks in already 
dwindling social ser vices, resulting in more unrest by early 1988. Small- scale, 
localized events, such as mobs of Muslim youths attacking churches, became 
frequent,109 and religious intolerance continued into the early 1990s. The sul-
tan of Sokoto, Sir Abubakar III, died in 1988, ending a fifty- year reign, and 
disputes over his succession caused riots that killed ten  people before the ap-
pointment of Ibrahim Dasuki as sultan.
As the Babangida regime planned, the Constituent Assembly met in 1989 
to review a new constitution. Christian activists argued that the  legal system 
was now tilted  toward advocates of expanded sharia in civil and criminal cases. 
Sharia advocates, on the other hand,  were adamant that the opposite was the 
case and that Nigeria needed a federal sharia appeal court system, for which 
they had unsuccessfully fought in the previous de cade. In language foreshad-
owing the sharia crisis that would overwhelm the country at the beginning of 
the twenty- first  century, sharia advocates in the Constituent Assembly argued 
that in order to make justice equitable, Nigerian Muslims should have the con-
stitutional right to be governed by sharia in civil and criminal cases. With the 
growing polarization between pro- sharia and anti- sharia factions, Babangida 
removed federal Islamic law from the Assembly’s terms of reference.110 Fi nally, 
while the Constituent Assembly increased the jurisdiction of sharia courts of 
appeal at the state level, it still limited  these courts’ powers to civil cases among 
Muslims. This constitution, which came to bear Babangida’s name, was made 
into law but never enacted.111
Significantly, 1990 witnessed a failed coup by ju nior officers, mostly of 
 Middle  Belt and Northern Christian minority origin, that further deepened 
religious tensions, alongside the growing delegitimation of the Babangida re-
gime. Sporadic religious riots in Bauchi continued from 1990 to 1991, reportedly 
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killing two hundred  people, and similar outbreaks in Katsina took forty lives. In 
1991, Islamists clashed with the military in several Northern communities, while 
anti- Christian riots occurred in Kano.112 Meanwhile, the Federal Military 
Government conducted a census that led to allegations of widespread census 
inflations across the federation.113 In early 1992, ethno- religious conflict broke 
out in Kaduna and Taraba States, the latter a Tiv- Jukun conflict that lasted 
through the following two years.  Later in 1993, the Babangida regime’s transi-
tion program fi nally brought about a presidential election. A Yoruba Muslim 
from Ogun State, Moshood Abiola, won the presidency on the Social Demo-
cratic Party ticket. It was declared the freest election in Nigerian history, yet 
Babangida annulled the result, a move widely attributed to the fact that it 
would have shifted regional control over federal government from the Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim North to the South. Strong opposition against the military re-
gime forced Babangida to step down.  After a brief interim civilian government 
led by Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba ally of Babangida, former Chief of Army 
Staff Sani Abacha staged a coup in November 1993, keeping power in the hands 
of Hausa- speaking Muslim officers.
The next five years  were characterized by a level of state brutality unknown 
in postcolonial Nigerian history. Po liti cal dissidents and prodemocracy activ-
ists, including former military head of state Olusegun Obasanjo,  were jailed on 
trumped-up charges of sedition for opposing the regime. And in 1995, Abacha 
executed Ogoni (Niger Delta Region)  human rights activist Ken Saro Wiwa 
and his compatriots, amid global outrage.114 In March 1996, Abacha took the 
unpre ce dented step of deposing Dasuki as sultan of Sokoto and replaced him 
with the more conservative Muhammadu Maccido, initially preferred by the 
Sokoto kingmakers.115 Moreover, Abacha imprisoned the radical Muslim cleric 
Ibrahim Zakzaky in September 1996. Zakzaky’s followers clashed with state se-
curity forces in Zaria in late 1996, and again in February 1997, when they tried 
to capture the Kano Central Mosque.116 By this time, it was evident that the 
relationship between the Abacha regime and the Northern Muslim elite was 
significantly strained  because the regime’s excessive repression had shattered 
the equilibrium between the Northern Muslim po liti cal class and the po liti cal 
classes of other geopo liti cal zones in the country, effectively undermining the 
strategic po liti cal advantage of the emirate po liti cal class.
Abacha died suddenly in 1998, amid speculation of foul play, and the de-
fense chief of staff, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, another Northern Mus-
lim, became interim head of state. He immediately announced a transition to 
civilian rule. As prodemocracy activists insisted that the interim regime re spect 
the outcome of the June 12, 1994, presidential election, President- elect Abiola 
died suddenly only a month  after Abacha, and the Abubakar administration in-
troduced another transition to demo cratic government program. The interim 
government reinstated po liti cal freedoms, released po liti cal dissidents— including 
Obasanjo, Zakzaky, and Dasuki— from prison. Fi nally, a Constitutional Draft-
ing Committee was instated.
This committee’s final proposal for a new constitution was based on the 
1995 Abacha draft constitution, which had curtailed sharia.117 Unlike the 1979 
Constitution, this draft constitution came from a peculiar environment. It was 
formulated during the period when emirate power was declining and the mili-
tary’s image was being shattered. Nonetheless, elections  were held, and former 
military head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian, was elected 
president on the ticket of the  People’s Demo cratic Party (PDP)— and Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic was born.118
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Pentecostalism formed the most impor tant religious movement that swept 
through Nigeria’s Southern and  Middle  Belt states starting in the 1980s. It 
evolved from mission Chris tian ity and African- initiated churches in the wake 
of the po liti cal ferment of the 1950s, grew exponentially during the national 
upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s, and further expanded  because of the con-
sequences of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s. Jacob Olupona, a leading 
scholar of Chris tian ity in Nigeria, argues persuasively that despite its deep reli-
gious roots, Pentecostalism is essentially a manifestation of and response to the 
complexities of modern transformations in the country:
Pentecostalism is a phenomenon inseparable from modernity and should 
be seen as complementing the increasingly cosmopolitan character of 
business, ideas, and  people. Studies in Pentecostalism should not only 
consider the issues of origin— that is, where and when Pentecostalism 
began— but also should address the influence of the movement on indi-
viduals and society.1
c h a p t er  s i x
r eli gi o us  r ev i va l 
a n d  t h e  stat e :  t h e  r is e 
o f  p en t ecosta lism
In his book Nigerian Pentecostalism, theologian Nimi Wariboko makes 
the critical connection between Pentecostalism and the material conditions 
of local  people, arguing that the “Pentecostal epistemic” reveals a dialectical 
pro cess between transcendence and temporal, sacred and profane, local and 
global, engaging major themes that are emblematic of Nigeria’s rapidly chang-
ing society.2 As the crisis of the Nigerian state deepened by the 1980s, mass 
conversion to Pentecostal churches from mainline Catholic and Protestant 
churches, as well as African- initiated churches, centered on material and spiritual 
empowerment. Consequently, Pentecostalism, despite its evocative piety, pro-
vides a pragmatic and moral response to the crisis of statism and neoliberalism.3 
Wariboko provides a compelling analy sis of contending Pentecostal doctrines, 
distinguishing between vari ous traditions including Holiness and Prosperity 
and showing how this remarkable religious movement transformed Nigerian 
public life, especially since the attainment of in de pen dence in 1960.4 Further-
more, the renowned scholar of African Pentecostalism Ogbu Kalu argued that 
many social science— especially sociological— approaches to the study of 
Nigerian Pentecostalism are limited in their analytical perspective  because they 
fail to seriously engage the religious experience of adherents of Nigeria’s Pen-
tecostal movement. He called for a greater engagement with religious beliefs 
and traditions.5 Concomitantly, Ruth Marshall focused on the explic itly reli-
gious manner in which Nigerian Pentecostals interpret po liti cal developments 
and the manner in which they express their po liti cal opinions and activities.6 
Lamin Sanneh contends that one of the major issues facing new African Chris-
tian movements such as Nigerian Pentecostal movements lies in the inability 
of the secular state to effectively engage the religious questions that are central 
to the everyday lives of local  people.7 In this context, Pentecostalism provides 
an impor tant medium for the articulation of religious, social, po liti cal, and 
economic conditions that shape local  people’s aspirations in con temporary Ni-
gerian society. Consequently, Simeon Ilesanmi perceptively observed that Nige-
ria’s Pentecostal movement reflects a complicated religious, social, and po liti cal 
pro cess that is integral to the making of modern Nigerian society. He notes that 
Nigerian Pentecostalism “does not constitute an homogenous movement, but 
is rather the sum of a number of succeeding waves, each of which draws upon 
and transforms that which has gone before.”8 As the crisis of the Nigerian state 
intensified in the 1980s, Pentecostal Chris tian ity did not only fill the gap left 
 behind by the state, but also provided a power ful critique of the state’s cus-
todians. In its engagement with the wider Nigerian state and society, this 
movement has complicated the structural imbalance between Christians and 
Muslims in the three major Nigerian geopo liti cal regions that feature signifi-
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cantly in this study: the core North (the Hausa- Fulani region), the South-
west (the Yoruba region), and the  Middle  Belt.
Holiness Pentecostals in Historical Perspective
Nigeria’s Holiness Pentecostal movement grew significantly in the context of 
the challenges confronting Nigerian society following in de pen dence in 1960.9 
Its followership grew exponentially during the Nigerian- Biafra Civil War 
(1967–1970)  because the fluid theological structure of Pentecostal movements 
freely adapted to the disruptions precipitated by the war.10 Equally significant 
was the fact that in the Igbo- speaking areas of southeastern Nigeria, the epicen-
ter of the civil war, local  people moved  toward syncretistic prayer  houses that 
combined Chris tian ity with indigenous cosmology. In addition, the influence 
of mainline Protestant and Catholic churches eroded in southeastern Nigeria 
 because many major Western countries, especially Britain, supported the Nige-
rian Federal Government’s opposition to Biafra’s insistence on secession from 
the country. More importantly, the war severely disrupted missionary work in 
Biafra- controlled areas and undermined the integrity of some established mis-
sionary institutions in Northern, Western, and Mid- Western states. In a con-
text of national crisis, it is not difficult to see how and why indigenous religious 
beliefs would interact with forms of charismatism, creating new “social control 
models” in a moment of  great uncertainty and insecurity.11 Consequently, 
the crisis precipitated by the civil war encouraged the growth of “antistructural” 
Christian movements that had been a feature of Nigerian Pentecostalism, espe-
cially during the upheaval of the late colonial period.12
With the crisis of the 1980s and  1990s (see chapter  5), the deliverance 
doctrines of Pentecostalism gained momentum, attracting millions of disillu-
sioned Nigerian Christians.13 As Pentecostal leaders denounced the po liti cal 
alliances that had produced the insecurities of this period, their membership 
moved further away from prevailing social networks to form distinct moral 
communities. In many instances, religious practices transformed social orien-
tation. Engaging innovative methods of responding to the material and spiri-
tual needs of their growing adherents, Holiness churches contested the public 
space as the exclusive domain of secularism.14 While materialism remained a 
function of everyday life, it was repackaged into specific Christian rules: pros-
perity flowed from personal moral integrity and not the economy of  favors, 
and rewards come in both this life and the next. Leaders of mainline Christian 
denominations who had been preaching “pro gress” since the colonial era  were 
“disarmed”  because of their connection to the discredited po liti cal and social 
order.15 Thus, leaders of Holiness groups denounced the old churches for their 
“traditionalism, the sustenance of the heritage from the missionary ancestors, 
[and] encrusted patriarchy.”16 In response, mainline church leaders responded 
rigidly to this moral challenge, imposing new codes of discipline within their 
ranks. Indeed, in many cases, mainline church leaders treated the younger gen-
eration who  were attracted to the revivalist message of Pentecostalism as rebel-
lious upstarts and in some cases expelled them from their churches.
A younger generation of charismatic clerics led the movement’s remarkable 
growth and creative energy. Po liti cal in de pen dence in the early 1960s had seen 
thousands of young Nigerians in higher education, and with four new univer-
sities established between 1960 and 1962, university enrollment grew signifi-
cantly in the years immediately  after in de pen dence, particularly in Southern 
areas.17 Many young  people who had grown up with connections to African 
in de pen dent churches (aics) such as the Aladura Church, with its syncretistic 
rituals,  were attracted to the revivalist theology of the Pentecostal movement.18 
But despite this attempt to distance themselves from aics, Olupona percep-
tively observes that “Pentecostal practices surreptitiously reflect traditional 
forms of African religious spirituality, including speaking in tongues, posses-
sion by the Holy Ghost, and an emphasis on the proximate, this world sal-
vation, as evidenced by a focus on materiality, prosperity, and pragmatism.”19 
Indeed, several notable Pentecostal churches traced their roots to aics: for 
instance, in 1969 prominent Pentecostal church leaders such as Stephen Oka-
for, Raphael Okafor, and Arthur Orizu left Aladura churches to form the Hour 
of Freedom Evangelical Association, which grew rapidly in Igbo communities 
 after the civil war.20 Similarly, when a schism appeared in Christ Ascension 
Church, Mike Okonkwo, another prominent Pentecostal leader, led a group 
of “young rebels” and founded a Pentecostal church, the True Redeemed Evan-
gelical Mission; in 1986 Okonkwo became the president of Nigeria’s power ful 
Pentecostal national umbrella organ ization, the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nige-
ria (pfn).21 More importantly, a network of evangelical students’ organ izations 
in Southern and  Middle  Belt states expanded the scope of the three dominant 
Christian spiritual associations in Nigerian universities— the Student Chris-
tian Movement (scm), the Scripture Union (su), and the Christian Union 
(cu)—in the first de cade  after in de pen dence in 1960.
The scm had come to prominence in the 1940s, with returning Nigerian 
gradu ates from British universities, including Igbo statesman Sir Francis Akanu 
Ibiam and Yoruba leader Theo philus Ejiwumi; the latter had mentored many 
of the first generation of Christian students at the University of Ibadan. From 
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the early 1960s, scm branches  were formed at the newly established University 
of Nigeria campus in Enugu and the University of Zaria ( later Ahmadu Bello 
University). Indeed, as the only interdenominational Christian student organ-
ization in Nigerian universities, the scm had established vibrant branches in 
the newly established Universities of Ife, Lagos, and at the Nsukka campus of 
the University of Nigeria by the mid-1960s.22
By contrast, the su, established in  Eng land in 1867, arrived in Nigeria in 
1884 as a nondenominational evangelical movement. It almost dis appeared in 
Nigeria during the Second World War, and was revived by the evangelical fer-
vor of several British teachers in the 1950s. Nigerian university students seized 
the helm of the su resurgence by the early years of in de pen dence, and the 
movement grew significantly in the country’s institutions of higher learning 
and secondary schools. In the 1970s the movement shifted focus to its Pilgrims’ 
groups, established a vibrant youth evangelism program, and published a vast 
lit er a ture to propagate the faith among Nigeria’s growing educated class.23
Similarly, the cu has its roots in Nigeria’s colonial past. It began in 1910, 
having broken away from the scm “for being spiritually and ethically tepid.”24 
In the early years of in de pen dence, the cu grew in popularity, spreading at the 
University of Ibadan; the University College Hospital, Ibadan; the University 
of Lagos; and the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. By the late 1970s, cu had 
established the Christian Students’ Social Movement of Nigeria, seeking to 
“enlighten [young] Christians on the possibility of their influence in national 
life.”25 With support from faculty mentors as chaplains, dedicated cu students 
actively recruited new members. In January 1970, the Tuesday Group, a cu- 
affiliated Pentecostal prayer network at the University of Ibadan, formed the 
World Action Team for Christ, spreading its message of intense Bible study, 
strict moral rectitude, and baptism in the Holy Spirit. In addition to forming 
the Calvary Ministries—an evangelical arm extending into Northern states— 
the group or ga nized numerous retreats to deepen the faith among its members 
and spread its message throughout the country.26
An inadvertent tool for the evangelization of the Holiness movement 
among educated young Nigerians arrived in the form of the National Youth 
Ser vice Corps (nysc), a one- year mandatory program for national integration 
imposed by the Gowon regime in 1973. As evangelical nysc recruits arrived at 
their postings in vari ous regions of the country, they formed national evangeli-
cal organ izations such as the Fellowship of Christian Students, New Life for 
All, and the Nigerian Fellowship of Evangelical Students. By the mid-1970s, 
nysc evangelical members had established ten ministries in the Northern 
and  Middle  Belt cities of Jos, Kaduna, Kano, and Zaria, further projecting a 
Southern Christian consciousness into Northern and  Middle  Belt states. In the 
words of Kalu:
Initially,  these fellowships served as the ministerial formation sites. . . .  
The young  people walked on foot along the railway line from one town 
to the other preaching, sleeping in open classrooms, without money, and 
dependent on the hospitality of strangers. They trusted that God would 
miraculously meet their needs. The millennialist beliefs added urgency 
to their evangelism and inspired one and all to be agents of God’s work 
in  these end- times.27
Significantly,  these student movements served as a catalyst for the charismatic 
churches that proliferated during the economic and po liti cal crisis of the 1980s 
and 1990s in many urban Nigerian areas.
Matthews Ojo provides an insightful analy sis28 of a prominent Holiness 
church, the Deeper Christian Life Ministry (also known as Deeper Life Bible 
Church or Deeper Life), that traversed the Nigerian social landscape from the 
transformative years of the 1960s to the period of state decline in the 1990s. 
The founder of the Deeper Life Christian Ministry, William Folorunso Ku-
muyi, from Ogun State in the Yoruba Southwest, had been a member of vari ous 
Anglican and Aladura congregations before converting to the Apostolic Faith 
Church in 1964. As a mathe matics student at the University of Ibadan, Kumuyi 
was an active member of the cu and the su. Following his graduation with 
honors in 1967, he earned a postgraduate diploma in education at the University 
of Lagos. It was from Kumuyi’s Bible study group  there that the Deeper Life 
Church movement emerged in 1973. Within two years, the group had become 
large enough to rent worship spaces and offices from the Redeemed Chris-
tian Church of God (rccg), by that time a well- known Pentecostal church. 
Deeper Life began holding retreats across Southern Nigeria and by 1980 was 
active in some Northern states. While distancing itself from the earlier charis-
matic movement, Deeper Life grew tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s. No 
longer a small evangelical network, Deeper Life transitioned into a full- fledged 
church by establishing a full- time staff, regular Sunday ser vices, and formal orga-
nizational structure by the early 1980s.29 Insisting on its unique evangelical Chris-
tian identity, Deeper Life members embraced strict moral codes that  shaped 
their corporate identity, distinguishing them from the plethora of Pentecostal 
churches that dominated the religious landscape in the 1980s and the 1990s.
The case of the rccg, Nigeria’s most prominent Pentecostal church movement 
by the early 1990s, provides another compelling illustration of the  far- reaching 
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impact of Holiness Pentecostalism in Nigerian society. Although Pastor Josiah 
Akindayomi had broken from aic Cherubim and Seraphim in 1952 to found 
the rccg, it was not  until the early 1980s, just as Deeper Life gained promi-
nence, that the movement expanded beyond its Yoruba base. In the 1960s 
and  1970s, rccg members  were sometimes looked down upon, identified 
with the perceived “fanat i cism” of the su, and pitied for their general poverty, 
a product of their doctrinal asceticism. The rccg’s transformation from a 
regional to a national and even global church came  after the appointment of 
Pastor Enoch Adejare Adeboye, a former University of Lagos mathematician 
and confidant of Pastor Akindayomi, as general overseer in 1981.  Under Pastor 
Adeboye’s leadership, the rccg embraced the strategy of earlier evangelical 
movements at university campuses and established a monthly prayer group, the 
Holy Ghost Camp. Embracing this general shift from fellowship- based Bible 
study to institutionalization through evangelism, the rccg emerged as the 
largest Pentecostal church in Africa by the early 2000s. With its headquarters 
at the popu lar Lagos- Ibadan Expressway, the rccg had, by the turn of the mil-
lennium, established about two thousand parishes in Nigeria, and had parishes 
in many African, Eu ro pean, North Amer i ca, and Ca rib bean countries.30
The rccg’s statement of faith reveals a strong embrace of fundamental-
ist Christian doctrines drawn from the Old and New Testaments.31 rccg doc-
trines are defined in church manuals it publishes periodically. One such manual 
lays out the responsibilities of lay members to the church and defines steadfast 
adherence to church rules.32 Church members are implored to fervently pray for 
their leaders and church missionaries. rccg members are required to generously 
give from their financial resources and professional expertise to the church.33 
Such codes of conduct are binding on church staff members, too: a similar rccg 
manual spells out qualifications for them, ranging from being born again to at-
tributes needed for spiritual holiness. Staff members are charged with vari ous 
activities central to the mission of the movement, such as submission to duly 
constituted authorities, personal hygiene, appropriate dressing, and commit-
ment to Christian fellowship.34 We now turn to an analy sis of the Prosperity 
movement, the second type of Pentecostal church that has dominated the 
Nigerian Pentecostal movement since the 1980s.
The Rise of Prosperity Pentecostalism
Just as Holiness Pentecostal churches  were growing in prominence, the mid-
1980s brought another major development: a new trend among evangelicals 
that  later would be known as the Prosperity Pentecostal church movement. 
Significantly influenced by the charismatic style of postwar American evangeli-
cal churches, this movement harbored notable theological differences with the 
older Holiness movement, reflecting impor tant distinction on the conception 
of the relationship between the believer and the world around him or her. In 
notable cases, Prosperity theology connects spiritual excellence and moral up-
rightness to the believer’s material well- being. As the Word comes from a God 
of abundance, to be worthy of it one must give abundantly. To win converts 
to the movement, Prosperity churches sell goods and ser vices, offer retreats, 
and market their message against the backdrop of neoliberalism.35 Similar to 
their Holiness forebears, the ranks of Prosperity followers  were predominantly 
young and relatively well educated. Unlike the earlier revival movements, how-
ever, Prosperity churches emerged from the onset with strong institutional 
frameworks. Furthermore, while mainstream churches and, to some extent, 
Holiness churches appear rigid, Prosperity churches freely adapt to Nigeria’s 
changing conditions.
One of the first Prosperity churches was Benson Idahosa’s Church of God 
Mission in Benin City, Edo State’s major city. This was followed by Patrick 
Ngozi Anwuzia of Zoe Ministry International in Lagos and Tunde Joda’s 
Christ Chapel, the last of which emerged on the national scene in 1985 and 
inspired the foundation of the House hold of God Fellowship led by Kris 
Okotie and Powerline Bible Church. Other prominent Prosperity pastors in-
clude George Adewale Adegboye of the Ever Increasing Word Ministries (also 
known as Rhema Chapel, founded in 1987), and Alex Adegboye of World 
Alive Ministries, founded in 1993.36
Midsize churches of a tempered message, mediating Holiness and Prosperity 
strains, also sprang up in the turbulent 1990s.37  These churches include Bishop 
Mike Okonkwo’s Redeemed Evangelical Mission, Francis Wale Oke’s Sword of 
the Spirit Ministries in Ibadan, and Tunde Bakare’s Latter Rain Assembly in 
Lagos. Among the most successful of this hybrid type are megachurches such 
as Overcomers Assembly in Lagos and Bishop David Oyedepo’s Living Faith 
Church Worldwide,38 also widely known as Winners Chapel International. Liv-
ing Faith’s transformative religious and social roles has consistently responded 
to the pressing needs of local communities at a time of  great uncertainty follow-
ing the enduring economic crisis posed by neoliberal reforms since the 1980s. 
This power ful megachurch provides critical social ser vices in education and 
health care, as well as support for building business enterprises.39 Taking off in 
1986  after the start of the Word of Faith Bible Institute, Winners’ Chapel is a 
formidable religious and social force. The movement’s student groups are active 
at over sixty university campuses throughout Africa. Bishop Oyedepo followed 
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his initial success with the World Mission Agency and African Gospel Invasion 
Program that sent evangelical aid to many African countries. Winners’ Chapel 
has collaborated with the Gilead Medical Center to provide medical resources 
to local  people.40 Thus, articulated in clearly defined educational and humani-
tarian commissions, Bishop Oyedepo’s Living Faith Church has responded 
to Nigeria and several other African countries’ educational, health care, and 
social welfare crises with comprehensive and efficient ser vices in education, 
health care clinics, and many humanitarian proj ects. The church’s educational 
institutions include two private universities, Covenant and Landmark, each of 
which has a comprehensive curriculum in the arts, humanities, sciences, social 
sciences, business, agriculture, engineering, and technology; a group of leading 
secondary schools, known as the Faith Academies, that spread across Nigeria 
and several African countries; and fifty- seven excellent elementary schools in 
Nigerian communities and several major African cities, notably Dar esalam, 
Tanzania, and Mombasa,  Kenya.41
Moreover, from the onset, Living Faith Church Worldwide has actively 
provided humanitarian assistance to communities ravaged by war and natu-
ral disaster, such as Rwanda and Liberia, as well as humanitarian assistance to 
the Nigerian Red Cross and impoverished communities in Koma Hills in Ad-
amawa State.42 To underscore the significance of the church’s educational and 
humanitarian mandate, Bishop Oyedepo in retrospect observes:
Years ago, I caught a caption on one of my trips to the United States 
which to me was a fundamental philosophy  behind the greatness of 
the American nation. It reads “Amer i ca the home of the  free, land of the 
brave.” Truly only the brave ever become  great. It is bravery that begets 
greatness. It is not just a dreamers world anymore. It is the darers world. 
It is bravery that moves men [and  women] to think the unthinkable, dare 
the undareable and move the immovable.43
Rosalind Hackett further provides an insightful case study of the Mountain 
of Fire and Miracles Ministries (mfm), a deliverance church within the arc of 
the Prosperity gospel movement. Founded by molecular ge ne ticist Dr. D. K. 
Olukoya, this church boasted one hundred thousand worshippers at its Sun-
day ser vice by the beginning of 2000, and millions more members throughout 
the world. Hackett interrogates Pastor Olukoya’s deliverance doctrine, arguing 
that it focuses attention on bad foundations, wastage of life, links to evil, and 
even  family curses. To cure  these spiritual ailments, Pastor Olukoya recom-
mends “high- voltage prayer,” specific intonations that invoke Jesus’s name to 
save the afflicted from their “contamination” and ward off evil spirits. Such 
teachings describe the danger of everyday life in militaristic terms, empowering 
the afflicted to fight their own  battles. Dark forces aligning against Christ and 
mfm are fought with continual prayer, tithing to the church, and numerous 
testimonials.44
Since holding onto their vast wealth is impor tant to church leaders, Pros-
perity churches tend to have centralized administrative structures that rely 
on  family members and trusted associates to oversee the management of their 
enormous resources.45  There is the concern, however, that while Nigeria’s Pros-
perity theology can inspire believers to transform their lives, they also focus 
excessively on material conditions. Nevertheless, Prosperity churches are re-
markable actors in con temporary society and have served as critical engines for 
development since the economic downturn of the 1980s and 1990s.46
In sum, Holiness and Prosperity forms of Pentecostalism have thrived in 
the context of state crisis, especially in the aftermath of the civil war in the 
late 1960s and neoliberalism, starting in the 1980s. The dynamism of Nige-
ria’s Pentecostal revolution, with its intersecting social and po liti cal currents, 
is connected to changing local conditions. As a new generation of Christians 
responded to a turbulent era in Nigerian society since in de pen dence, Pentecostal 
churches provided institutional framework to engage the uncertainties of Ni-
geria’s complicated social and po liti cal conditions.
Constructing a Pentecostal Public Sphere
As the globalization of markets and media systems intensified in the 1990s, 
the ability of Nigerian authorities to shape moral and po liti cal discourses in 
local communities further eroded, giving Pentecostal movements ample room 
to extend their influence in national and transnational contexts. With access 
to resources derived from global networks, leaders of Pentecostal churches are 
less dependent on the custodians of the Nigerian state, allowing their members 
space to take charge of their social conditions.47 Nigeria’s Pentecostal move-
ment has been at the center of shaping the country’s public sphere in the global 
era, and it is well integrated with global popu lar culture, media, institutions, 
and technology. For example, popu lar American culture, notably African 
American expressive culture, has  shaped how Nigerian evangelical churches 
disseminate their messages in both Nigerian- based churches and Nigerian dias-
pora branches that have sprung up in many British and US metropolitan areas 
since the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s.48 As Ebenezer Obadare notes, 
the growing influence of  these external agents in shaping the style and doctrines 
of Nigeria’s evangelical churches is indeed a reflection of “the  weakening of the 
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state and its institutions, [which translates] into freer access by foreign religious 
groups and personalities to their local counter parts. . . .  The major external players 
in this re spect have mostly come from the United States, the global influence of 
whose charismatic televangelists has become an academic staple.”49
This trend was particularly expressed through Nigeria’s media networks, 
starting in the 1980s. With regard to tele vi sion and audio media, Pentecostal 
churches  were not the first to use  these critical media to evangelize; however, 
they pioneered their use as medium of mass proselytizing by exploiting vast 
industrial networks around the production, distribution, and consumption of 
gospel cassettes, videos, and cds.50 Reflecting on some of  these developments, 
Kalu notes three  factors that encouraged Pentecostal churches to use media to 
shape Nigerian public discourse:51 the liberalization of the Nigerian state radio 
since the 1970s; the growth of tele vi sion in Nigerian cities in the 1980s; and 
the influence of American televangelists on Nigerian Pentecostal pastors in the 
1980s.52
The evolution of popu lar  music and the global diffusion of musical genres 
exemplify  these trends. Mainline Protestant and Catholic missionaries had 
long suppressed local musical trends  because of their customary expression, but 
by the 1960s the “vernacularization” of  music, liturgy, and media progressed 
together. Evangelical movement in the earlier years of Holiness Pentecostal-
ism used popu lar musical trends to increase spirituality while avoiding the 
materialism of Nigerian society. Embracing popu lar musical genres initially 
took some adjustment for many Nigerian Pentecostal churches. For example, 
dances viewed as sensual  were replaced with Pentecostal- friendly variants such 
as the “holy shuffle.” Similarly, where original lyr ics praised indigenous deities, 
evangelical musicians replaced them with instrumentals or tunes extolling the 
deliverance of Christ and the glory of God. This reshaping of popu lar musical 
trends to fit the message of local evangelism, helped by the general liberaliza-
tion that dominated the early 1990s, threw the field open for entrepreneurs to 
capitalize on changing religious structures. The  music industry became both a 
product and an agent of the Pentecostal revolution.53
Pentecostal churches’ increasing use of the media since the 1980s was fur-
ther reflected in the globalization of tele vi sion, the explosion of the Nigerian 
film industry, and access to the Internet. For instance, in the 1990s Pastor Ashi-
molowo’s Kingsway International Church Center had programs broadcast in 
twenty- one Eu ro pean countries, while God Digital (formerly the Christian 
Channel Eu rope) hosts the God Channel, the Revival Channel, the Worship 
Channel, and  others reaching across Western Eu rope and into many African 
states. Similarly, a Pentecostal film industry developed into a range of subgenres, 
including religion- based dramatic forms, secular movies with heavy religious 
overtones, religious  music videos, documentaries, and sermons. All  these initia-
tives  were designed to promote Pentecostal ministries’ mission in an entertain-
ing way. Mount Zion Faith Ministries International paved the way from Ile- Ife, 
when it made the first Nigerian Christian motion picture in 1994 and led the 
Nigerian Pentecostal film industry. Fi nally, Pentecostal churches’ websites have 
created forums where members can interact with one another and have served 
as tools for proselytizing. Though their effectiveness has been questioned— 
some observers note that sustained strategies of proselytizing still depend on the 
personal interaction that is at the core of the Pentecostal witnessing tradition— 
these social- media efforts are invaluable in expanding the scope of Pentecostal 
church groups.54 Nevertheless, the modernist implications of the Pentecos-
tal church movement cannot be overstated, as eloquently noted by Ilesanmi:
Its media- savvy pastors- cum- superstars regularly fill airwaves with their 
preaching and gospel  music, and creating a new publishing niche for 
their tracts and manuals on self- improvement. Youthful congregations 
fill modern airconditioned tabernacles and chapels for all- night ser vices. 
They come in search of the latest blessing and to participate in Christian-
ized popu lar culture.55
Just as the new generation of evangelicals transformed the internal core of 
Pentecostal churches, so too have they altered  these churches’ relationships 
with the broader Nigerian public, especially since the late 1980s, when some 
leading Pentecostal ministers pushed for greater involvement of their move-
ment in national politics. As Nigerian politics became more contentious in 
the 1980s and 1990s, socioreligious structures  were politicized, and evangeli-
cal leaders began injecting their influence into the public sphere.56 Idahosa, 
the leader of the Church of God Mission, was one such power broker in Edo 
State; and in 1992, the Rev. Peter Obadan, a prominent Pentecostal minister, 
was elected deputy governor in Edo State. The link between Pentecostalism 
(church) and the state (politics) was expressed in dramatic fashion in a state-
ment attributed to Pastor Adeboye, rccg’s general overseer: the statement 
was widely publicized as prophesy of impending doom for Nigeria’s military 
despot and the arrival of a new dawn in June 1998. General Abacha, the North-
ern Muslim military ruler, died suddenly, and military rule came to an end  after 
Adeboye’s prophesy; a presidential election (1999) ushered a civilian govern-
ment into power, and Olusegun Obasanjo, a self- proclaimed Born- Again from 
the Yoruba region, became Nigeria’s civilian leader.57
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More impor tant was the meteoric rise of the Pentecostal Fellowship of 
Nigeria (pfn)— the movement’s national umbrella organ ization—in national 
politics.58 By the time of its first biennial meeting in 1991, the organ ization 
had more than seven hundred registered affiliated member churches in Lagos 
State alone.59 Within a de cade of its existence, pfn had stamped its imprint 
on Nigeria’s public landscape with an active national president, an efficient sec-
retariat in Abuja, Nigeria’s federal capital, and many branches in each state of 
the federation. The pfn frequently hosts high- profile events to discuss  matters 
of pressing national significance. Furthermore, pfn is a constituent member 
of the larger Christian Association of Nigeria (can). In comparison to can, 
pfn possesses stronger institutional cohesion and has a more affirmative voice 
in national debates.
Despite the tendency to cooperate on  matters of mutual interests, especially 
on issues of po liti cal significance, major Pentecostal groups continue to func-
tion as autonomous entities with distinct religious and po liti cal agendas. Wari-
boko, himself an ordained rccg pastor, notes a clear distinction between his 
church (rccg), Deeper Life, and Winners’ Chapel.60 This tendency for Pente-
costal groups to pursue distinct agendas can be attributed to their in de pen dent 
evolution since the 1960s.61 Thus Allan Anderson, in broader African context, 
notes, “Pentecostalisms are more impor tant than Pentecostalism: the local dy-
namics of change and interpretation are more impor tant than any overarching 
unity among diff er ent groups.”62
With a focus on a theology that stresses rebirth and the  free- forming spirit 
of the Pentecost, “Pentecostalism seeks to transform the  mental and material 
cultures of communities and challenges extant religious structures as it seeks to 
transform the religious landscape.”63 In this context, Pentecostal churches have 
created a distance between themselves and aics  because of the latter’s expres-
sive reflection of indigenous religious practice. Furthermore, mainline church 
members, according to Kalu, are dismissed “as benchwarmers who have lost the 
power of the gospel that was very real in the early Jesus movement.”64 To be sure, 
Pentecostal churches inscribe charismatism within a par tic u lar evangelical tra-
dition, but their emphasis on “history in the pres ent” leads to antagonism with 
mainline Chris tian ity.65 As Kalu notes, “Just as Augustine, Luther and Calvin 
variously taught, experience of the charismata exists outside established dispen-
sation, and thus spiritual rebirth necessitates new medium and methods of re-
ceiving it.”66 With  these  factors preventing a broad Pentecostal alliance, growth 
continued through the 1990s— but further splintering of the movement took 
place.67 As Pentecostal churches grew in response to the destabilizing effects of 
neoliberalism in the 1990s, older Holiness churches questioned the perceived 
excesses of the Prosperity gospel and the proliferation of theologies that make 
prophetic claims and emphasize a pervasive demonic world.68
However, Pentecostal churches, irrespective of theological orientation, 
have posed impor tant critiques of societal norms. On  matters of gender, for 
example, Pentecostalism’s fluid structure and doctrines provide ample space for 
empowerment and innovation. With the entrenched power of a male hierarchy 
in mainline Protestant and Catholic churches, mainline churches had largely 
left  women ambivalent, keeping even elite  women away from the leadership of 
their churches. In the Pentecostal movement, however, some notable female 
pastors, such as Archbishop Dorcas Siyanbola Olaniyi and Dr. Stella Ajisebute 
of Agbala Daniel Church and  Water from the Rock Church in Ile- Ife, have 
played impor tant roles in the movement since the 1980s. Both leaders are well 
educated, with doctorates in microbiology, and both have been eloquent voices 
for leadership roles for  women in the Pentecostal movement.69
Fi nally, the exponential growth of Pentecostal churches has occurred 
alongside the resurgence of Islamic reformist movements, notably Izala (see 
chapter  5), since the 1980s. Inevitably, this has led to major confrontations, 
especially in non- Muslim areas of Northern states and in the  Middle  Belt,70 
where competition for converts had historically complicated social relations 
and rapidly changing demographic conditions have intensified communal ten-
sions between predominantly Christian “indigenes” and Hausa- Fulani Mus-
lim “settlers.” With a movement away from the purification of the interior of 
the Christian community to conversion of local communities,71 a network of 
groups known as the Northern Christian Association had intensified evangeli-
zation in  Middle  Belt and Northern non- Muslim minority communities start-
ing in the 1970s.72 Ultimately, this fervor of Pentecostal evangelism came up 
against the strong missionary impulse of Northern Muslim reformists who uti-
lize the media, technology, and other methods to propagate the Muslim faith. 
For example, although Northern Muslim reformists had debated  whether it 
was halal to read the Qur’an on the radio well into the 1960s, by the 1980s 
they had built a significant tele vi sion and radio presence—as well as a film in-
dustry in Kano (Kannywood)—to counteract the expansion of the Pentecos-
tal movement in  Middle  Belt states and in Northern states with substantial 
Christian populations, such as Kaduna and Niger States.73 Indeed, even in the 
Yoruba states where it is widely believed that Christians and Muslims have his-
torically forged common grounds of peaceful coexistence, Obadare has argued 
that Islamic reformism has taken on the strong proselytizing fervor often as-
sociated with Pentecostal churches. This trend, he contends, is beginning to 
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erode the vaulted tradition of religious accommodation and tolerance in the 
region. Obadare concludes: “We see a revitalized Islam forging a response to a 
surging and increasingly hegemonic Pentecostalism. This revitalization, which 
ostensibly involves the incorporation of the demonstrably successful aspects 
of Pentecostal prayer is, nevertheless, not simply mimetic. . . .  What we in fact 
see at play is a dynamic reformulation of Muslim identity, against (1) the exter-
nal pressure exerted by Pentecostalism, and (2) internal prompts which more 
closely echo a historical cycle of decay and renewal.”74
Pentecostal and Islamic reformist movements thus embody similar methods 
of propagating their faiths, despite their drastically diff er ent religious doctrines 
and perspectives on politics. Indeed, as previously discussed, following the tur-
bulent de cades  after in de pen dence a new generation raised in the po liti cal cul-
ture of postcolonial Nigerian society has placed their faith in the competing 
visions of  these two religious movements.75 Extolling the reformist doctrines of 
 these two movements to restructure the moral order of con temporary Nigerian 
society, Ruth Marshall insightfully argues:
While initially concerned with the revitalization or restoration of their 
respective religious traditions, and largely inspired by the intensification 
of transnational relations, both movements arise from within the same 
social classes, are products of post- colonial educational institutions, 
and seek to create moral and po liti cal renewal and order from the chaos 
of the oil- boom years through religious revival. Their competing proj-
ects  were bound to clash, and constant provocation from both sides has 
meant that the bid for converts and for po liti cal repre sen ta tion has taken 
increasingly violent forms.76
Thus, although  these two movements are diff er ent in many re spects, they are 
both inspired by a “quest for justice” and the transformation of society.77 Con-
ceived in the vortex of rapidly shifting demographic and ethno- religious con-
ditions, the recurring conflict between Muslims and Christians in  Middle  Belt 
and Northern states resonates in the structural tensions between the mission 
of Pentecostal and Northern Islamic reformist movements. Elaborating fur-
ther on the consequences of  these developments in Northern and  Middle  Belt 
states, Paul Lubeck notes:
What, then, had changed in the  Middle  Belt since Ahmadu Bello elimi-
nated sharia criminal law in the compromise of 1960 (see chapter 4) in 
order to mollify Northern Christians? The answer lies in the politicization 
of religious identities among Christians and Muslims and, specifically, the 
rising orga nizational power of can and the militancy of an evangelical 
and Pentecostal Chris tian ity fueled by global networks. In 1970, “Pen-
tecostals and charismatics combined represented less than 5% of Afri-
cans,” but by 2006 Pentecostals alone represented 12% about 107 million 
[quoted from Pew Forum 2006a]. In Nigeria, where Pentecostal growth 
is rapid and their voice increasingly assertive, they represented 18% of the 
population and 48% of all Protestants, roughly equal to Nigerian Catho-
lics and Anglicans combined.78
Nevertheless, as Pentecostal and Northern Muslim reformist movements con-
front each other, adherents of the latter seek to reconstitute the juridical state 
around their perception of a proper Islamic society (see chapters 7, 8, 9), while 
followers of the former  favor radically restructuring the world around them 
into a pious Christian community. In the context of Nigeria’s  Middle  Belt and 
Northern states, where Islam and Chris tian ity are particularly integral to the 
rationalization of state power, the prevailing reformist ideologies of Pentecostal 
and Northern Islamic reformist movements has intensified the contradiction 
of the postcolonial nation- state. As the Pentecostal movement has transformed 
Nigerian society alongside the destabilizing effects of neoliberal reforms since 
the 1980s, this remarkable religious movement has had profound implications 
for the dialectical relations between national and transnational forces in the 
global era.
Pentecostalism: Transnational and Global Networks
Religious movements have always been impor tant media for the articulation 
of African and black identity in African diaspora history, especially across the 
 great waterways of the Atlantic world. As essential structure of society among 
African- descended populations in the Atlantic world, religion has not only 
engaged the quotidian issues confronting local communities, but has also re-
sponded to the vicissitudes of life among African diasporic  peoples over the 
centuries.79  Shaped by its own unique conditions, this trend persisted in the 
global era following the crisis of the state in many African countries in the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s. In the context of globalism, trends in Nigerian transnational 
experience  were to be found in migration flows of vari ous types and intensities, 
characterized by links between homeland and diaspora, reflecting complex 
pro cesses of movements of  people, ideas, cultures, and religions.80 With regard 
to the intersection between Pentecostal Chris tian ity and transnationalism in 
the context of neoliberalism, Olupona notes:
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Theories of transnationalism and globalization are essential to under-
standing how movement of  people and ideas across borders shape Chris-
tian ity in Africa. Former paradigms of assimilation, secularization, and 
the loss of identity are no longer sufficient to explain the complex web 
of geographic, cultural, and personal connections that bind  people and 
places. In an age of technological advancement where  people often have 
ready access and movement across global space, immigrants can maintain 
ties with their homelands and participate in vari ous global networks of 
 people and institutions.81
It would be useful to set the context for Nigeria’s transnational Pentecostal 
networks by outlining the major features of globalization, especially as they 
affect a fragile African state such as Nigeria in the context of the economic 
and po liti cal crisis of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. David Held and Anthony 
McGrew explain that globalization is “a pro cess in which events, decisions, and 
activities in one part of the world can come to have significant consequences 
for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe.”82 They 
perceptively define globalization as a pro cess “which embodies a transforma-
tion of the spatial organ ization of social relations and transactions [that can 
be] assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity, and impact, gener-
ating transcontinental or interregional networks of activity.”83 Focusing par-
tic u lar attention on the religious dimensions of this global and transnational 
pro cess, Ilesanmi contends that globalization’s major thesis “is that the world 
is undergoing an irresistible mutation, tending  towards shrinkage and interde-
pendence, in which the media, economy, religions, migration are playing active 
and mutually reinforcing roles.”84
With the growing contradictions of global capital by the 1970s, economic 
globalization led to the privatization of public ser vices, the search for cheap 
 labor, crisis of too much accumulation and too  little consumption, and the col-
lapse of space and time by the early 1990s.85 This volatile global economic con-
dition has complicated Nigeria’s entrenched neopatrimonial po liti cal system, 
exposing the fragility of the country’s economic, po liti cal, and social institu-
tions. In an environment of economic and po liti cal crisis, this development 
triggered new transnational networks,  shaped by the migration of millions of 
skilled and unskilled Nigerian workers to vari ous parts of the world starting in 
the mid-1980s. As we  shall soon observe, Nigeria’s Pentecostal churches would 
play impor tant roles in the transnational pro cess that resulted from  these eco-
nomic and po liti cal disruptions.
Responding to the economic crisis that goes back to the 1980s, Nigeria’s 
skilled workers sought out new destinations in the United Kingdom and in 
other English- speaking Western countries, especially the United States and 
Canada, as well as in South Africa, Botswana, and Gulf states.  These Nigerian 
professionals  were largely products of the Christian missionary educational 
institutions of Southern and central Nigeria that traces its origins to the turn 
of the twentieth  century (see chapters  1 and 2). While  these skilled Nigerian 
professionals have brought in vast financial remittances to their Nigerian home-
land, bridging government shortfalls in the provision of essential goods and ser-
vices, the overall cost of their migration has been a massive net loss of  human 
capital for the developmental imperatives of the Nigerian state.86 Thus, this mi-
gration of trained professionals has led to a serious brain drain and daunting 
challenges in Nigerian society.
Indeed, this pro cess had its structural foundation in the thousands of South-
ern and central Nigerian Christians who had left in large numbers to pursue 
higher education in American, British, and Canadian universities since the late 
1960s. Most had been supported by scholarships made pos si ble via Nigeria’s 
petro- dollar of the 1970s and early 1980s. From the beginning, the objective of 
this higher- education enterprise was  simple enough: obtain university educa-
tion in Western countries and return to professional  careers guaranteed by the 
Nigerian state. However, with a drastic decline in petroleum revenue, a grow-
ing debt burden, and a deepening economic crisis in the 1980s, returning to 
Nigeria became a less attractive option for many of  these young Nigerians and 
their families. With the imposition of structural- adjustment policies in the late 
1980s, another wave of Nigerian professionals migrated to the United King-
dom, United States, and Canada in the 1990s, bringing with them branches of 
Pentecostal churches from their Nigerian homeland.
Over the years,  these churches became critical public spaces for collective so-
cial action for Nigerian mi grant populations during this period of uncertainty.87 
Nigerian Pentecostal churches have responded effectively to the religious and 
social need of  these energetic Nigerian professionals and have provided a frame-
work for them to negotiate alien social environments in many British, United 
States, and Canadian metropolitan areas.88 Consequently, transnational Nige-
rian Pentecostal churches are popu lar  because they provide distinctive social 
networks for their adherents to explore economic opportunities and social mo-
bility.89 Itinerant Pentecostal evangelists travel widely to spread their message 
to Nigeria’s immigrant congregations abroad. Conversely, financial resources 
flow from  these immigrant congregations to support Pentecostal churches in 
the homeland. Indeed, many Nigerian Pentecostal evangelists are courted by 
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Christian organ izations in Western countries to fill the gap in pastoral person-
nel, bolster Christian missionary work, and help sustain church membership in 
Western countries. This is indeed a moment of notable historical irony: African 
evangelists are moving to the West as carriers of the Christian faith. Olupona 
labels this pro cess the “reverse missions” of African Christian evangelizing to 
secular Western countries in the age of globalization.90 Olupona’s conceptual-
ization of “reverse missions” further shows how Pentecostal doctrines transcend 
the narrow communal bound aries that had previously been the case for other 
charismatic churches, such as the aics.91 Thus, many Nigerian immigrant Pen-
tecostal churches proj ect a cosmopolitan image, appropriate to the ethos of 
transnational corporate bodies.92 For example, Pentecostal immigrant groups 
such as the All Nations International Development Agency became impor tant 
sources of humanitarian support in Nigeria in the early 2000s.93
From the above, it is clear that Nigeria’s Pentecostal movements have navi-
gated complicated transnational pathways94 in the course of their evangelizing 
mission. As major actors in Nigerian politics and society, religious forces are 
embedded in the structures that transformed modern Nigeria. The complex 
social and po liti cal manifestations of  these religious forces would assume a cen-
tral role in the Nigerian state and society during the Olusegun Obasanjo civil-
ian administration, when twelve Northern state governments imposed sharia 
as the state religion. The implications, actions, interactions, and constitutional 
dimensions of expanded sharia are extensively analyzed in the rest of the book.
Ahmed Sani, the governor of Nigeria’s Northern Zamfara State, was fresh in 
office (October 1999) when he generated major po liti cal stirrings in Nigerian 
politics by signing two items of legislation into law: the first established new 
lower sharia courts and the second changed the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court 
of Appeal. Associated with this, Sani enacted into law a Penal Code that was 
integrated into sharia in January 2000. Several weeks  later, the Zamfara State’s 
government transferred the administration of sharia courts from the state chief 
justice to the  grand qadi, who by this very official act was empowered to preside 
over a transformed Sharia Court of Appeal.  These executive actions enjoyed 
overwhelming endorsement from the state legislature, and for the first time 
in Nigeria’s postcolonial history, sharia courts gained authority over civil and 
criminal cases in a state located in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In his an-
nouncement declaring the arrival of expanded sharia to the State House of As-
sembly, Sani insisted that this historic development established a new dawn 
not only for Zamfara State but for all Nigerian Muslims, affirming emirate 
Nigeria’s reformist tradition  going back to the Sokoto Caliphate.1 To consolidate 
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the policy, Sani enlisted the support of emirs and ulamas.2 However, Paul Lu-
beck tells us that Zamfara did not draw direct moral authority from the Sokoto 
Jihad, nor did the policy initially have the rousing endorsement of the Hausa- 
Fulani po liti cal class:
Zamfara was a renegade community, for its rulers had rejected the iconic 
Islamic eighteenth- century [and nineteenth- century] reform movement 
of Usman dan Fodio. For a number of reasons, “playing the sharia card,” 
according to informed observers whom I interviewed, was a radical de-
parture from the long- standing preferences of more established northern 
politicians, who specialize in constructing multi- ethnic co ali tions to 
hold federal po liti cal power and control the distribution of petro- rents.3
Three months  after Zamfara’s announcement, the governor of another 
Northern state, Niger, announced that he, too, would sign into law a bill for ex-
panded sharia.4 Over the next two years, nine more Northern state governors 
followed suit: Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Jigawa, Yobe, Bornu, Bauchi, Kebbi, 
and Gombe. In addition, the governor of Kaduna State signed a more limited 
version of expanded sharia. Among Northern majority- Muslim states, only 
the Adamawa and Nasarawa governments did not embrace expanded sharia. 
Again, Lubeck provides a perspective on the conditions of extreme uncertainty 
that made the expansion of sharia so attractive to the masses of Northern Ni-
gerian Muslims:
 There is no doubt that for the youths participating in the Muslim sphere 
in the eighties, the spectacular failure of Nigerian oligarchic rule con-
firmed what their cultural nationalist and anti- imperialist instincts told 
them was true. For  these cohorts, the obvious failure of Western- imposed 
institutions to meet their material and spiritual needs confirmed that they 
should recommit themselves to tajdid [renewal] in order to implement 
sharia as an alternative path to realizing Muslim self- determination.5
 These complicated questions with their implications for the configuration of 
state power throughout the country necessitates a discussion of the context in 
which Islamic law was vigorously contested at the beginning of Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic in 1999.  These contestations over the meaning of sharia among con-
tending ethno- religious and ethno- regional po liti cal classes and the constitu-
encies they claim to represent in Nigeria’s troubled nation- state also warrant 
a careful analy sis of the  legal and po liti cal implications of sharia reforms for 
Nigerian citizens, especially since the attainment of in de pen dence in 1960.
 Legal and Po liti cal Contexts
We  will recall that Muslim and customary laws have been supplanted by com-
mon law since the imposition of colonial rule at the beginning of the twenti-
eth  century. Islamic scholar Syed Khalid Rashid contends that over time this 
colonial policy not only undermined sharia’s legitimacy  under colonial rule, 
but also established the framework for the marginalization of Islamic law in 
the postcolonial era.6 Additionally, vari ous military regimes had used the area 
court system to further supplant Islamic law in Northern communities. Fi nally, 
we  will also recall that the draft ers of the 1979 Constitution had overcome the 
pressures from the Hausa- Fulani po liti cal class to establish federal and state 
sharia courts of appeal during Nigeria’s second transition to civil- democratic 
government.7 By the 1990s, opposition to the area court system had gained 
momentum, especially among Northern Muslim leaders. Detractors of the area 
court system charged that  these courts lacked due pro cess.8 The area courts’ bu-
reaucracies  were said to suffer from a host of administrative prob lems: by many 
accounts the courts  were notoriously corrupt, with no systematic rec ords of 
court decisions. Furthermore, relations between Islamic judges and Western- 
trained  legal experts  were often strained. The former considered the latter 
ignorant of local custom and overly bureaucratic, while the latter considered 
the former uninformed about basic  legal princi ples. Many cases in  these courts 
 were deci ded ex parte (with only one party pres ent), usually not in exigent cir-
cumstances. In many cases, judges used oaths to decide the case when a full 
trial was necessary.9 Often, in Northern states, judges  were Muslim clerics even 
though the courts administered many cases that did not possess any religious 
components. Beyond  these structural prob lems, the area courts  were poorly 
staffed— most of the  legal assistants and court clerks  were untrained.10 Never-
theless,  these courts adjudicated most of the cases involving Nigeria’s poor, an 
arrangement perceived as legitimate  because their authority was considered to 
reflect local custom and tradition. In short, informality made the area courts 
more accessible but also impeded justice and due pro cess.
With such grossly inefficient administration of the area courts— and the 
Islamic and customary courts— out spoken sharia advocates seized on the demo-
cratic opening that followed military rule to press their case for  legal reform. To 
most Northern Muslim critics of the prevailing system, however, the more press-
ing concerns went beyond the failures of the area courts; they complained that 
Islamic law needed greater repre sen ta tion within Nigeria’s judiciary system. Is-
lamic scholar Abdulmumini Adebayo Oba, for example, captures this sentiment 
when he called for the professionalization of Islamic courts and questioned the 
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constitutional requirements that insist on Maliki madhab (school of thought) 
law as essential qualification for sharia judges. He demanded greater repre sen-
ta tion of sharia experts in the Nigerian judiciary and insisted on the separation 
of sharia from customary law to meet the religious needs of Muslims, including 
 those from Southern and  Middle  Belt states. Similarly, Rashid suggested that 
sharia should be paramount in civil  matters and that its appeals pro cess should 
be specific to Islamic law.11
Particularly contentious  were the sharia courts of appeal, first established by 
British colonial authorities as the Muslim Court of Appeal during the reforms 
of the decolonization pro cess in the 1950s. Although they  were superior courts 
of rec ord, they hardly engaged the Constitution and  were widely ignored by  legal 
professionals trained  under the common- law system. Other Muslim scholars pro-
posed an overhaul of the Judicial Ser vice Commission to reflect equality among 
competing  legal systems.12 For most reformers, autonomy and parity among the 
three  legal systems was essential for any efficient and just  legal reform.13
In failing to increase the scope of Islamic or customary law, the 1999 Con-
stitution did  little to address  these prob lems. Indeed, as with previous consti-
tutions, the Nigerian  legal system remained decidedly  under the authority of 
the common- law courts. New courts that  were established at Nigeria’s Federal 
Capital Territory in Abuja also affirmed the authority of the common- law 
courts. At the national level, a federal high court has broad jurisdiction on 
 matters pertaining to the federation or between par tic u lar states. Appeals from 
this court or any of the superior state courts go to the Federal Court of Ap-
peal, as do decisions from constitutional tribunals and any ad hoc commissions 
established by acts of the National Assembly. Fi nally, in addition to its role as 
the ultimate appellate bench, the Supreme Court is granted original jurisdic-
tion on all cases pertaining to the existence of  legal rights and any further remit 
bestowed by acts of the National Assembly (not including criminal  matters).
As is evident from this system, Islamic and customary laws  were highly 
circumscribed. Not only are the customary and sharia courts of appeal lim-
ited to personal law; they also can be appealed to the Federal Court of Ap-
peal and ultimately the Supreme Court, which are both based on common law. 
Equally relevant to ensuing contestations, all common- law justices are required 
to have specific  legal training and must be accredited, but judges of Islamic 
law only need “a recognized qualification in Islamic law from an institution 
acceptable to the National Judiciary Council.”14 The long- contested issue of 
En glish provisions being superior to  those of sharia was thus firmly upheld in 
the 1999 Constitution, which creates a regulatory system anchored in com-
mon law. Consequently, when the Northern Muslim po liti cal class and Islamic 
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clerics  insisted on expanded sharia in the early years of the Fourth Republic, 
that posed a thorny constitutional prob lem. With Nigeria’s entrenched ethno- 
religious structure, the insistence on expanded sharia exposed the contradic-
tions between Islamic law and Nigeria’s Western- derived Constitution. The 
analyses that follow  will further underscore specific aspects of the constitu-
tional challenges posed by expanded sharia to the Nigerian state in the early 
years of the Fourth Republic.
islamic law and common law
In the Northern Provinces during the colonial era, Oba identifies two phases 
of the evolution of Islamic law that contributed to the erosion of sharia in post-
colonial Nigerian society. First, in the early years of colonial rule, he contends 
that British authorities embraced Islamic law as a necessity but limited its scope 
by classifying it as customary, steadily allowing common law to dominate its 
authority.15 With the growing presence of Southern Christian immigrants and 
foreign immigrants (Eu ro pean and Lebanese) in the Northern Provinces by 
the 1930s,16 common law rapidly gained supremacy over Islamic law. During 
this period, Islamic courts  were also subjected to the oversight of British ad-
ministrators. Most contentious was the restriction of sharia’s jurisdiction to 
personal law.17 Firmly established by the period of decolonization, the Repug-
nancy Clause established by British administrators in the early years of colonial 
rule was reviled by conservative Muslim clerics and emirs as the hallmark of 
colonial intrusion.18
Conceived during decolonization and the early de cades of in de pen dence, 
the second phase effectively witnessed the formal subjugation of Islamic and 
customary law to the jurisdiction of common- law courts,19 reflecting a pro-
fusion of cases where common, customary, and Islamic law conflicted with 
each other as well as with competing  legal interpretations. Islamic law was in-
creasingly flexible, despite claims of its divine origin by Muslim clerics, while 
customary law was so ill- defined that it could be shoehorned into competing 
juridical systems. With the exception of conflicts between Islamic law and 
common law in criminal cases, Islamic law often was adaptive to local conditions 
on personal cases where it retained jurisdiction. Consequently, as Nigerian soci-
ety evolved in the postcolonial era, the three  legal systems converged, diverged, 
and overlapped in vari ous ways. By the time of the 1990s demo cratic transition, 
local  people  were choosing their preferred bench based on their identification 
with a par tic u lar religious or cultural group, and to many, the country appeared 
headed  toward a mixed  legal system.20 Emerging from this  legal blend, how-
ever, was a perception by a vocal voice in the Northern Muslim po liti cal class of 
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an unjustifiable preference for common law in Nigeria’s  legal system.  These ad-
vocates of sharia contend that common law is not normatively neutral  because 
it is derived from Christian traditions.21
secularism, multireligiosity, and state religion
A second cause of conflict revolved around Nigeria’s multireligious identity 
versus the constitutional princi ple of secularism, which prohibits state religion. 
While the former calls for a state structure that embraces a diversity of faiths, the 
latter asserts a complete absence of religious influence in state affairs. Christian 
opponents of sharia have long complained about sharia’s endorsement of state 
religion, though they resisted attempts to strip state funding for churches and 
Christian schools.22 By the time the sharia crisis exploded on the national scene 
in 1999, sharia advocates had latched onto the distinction, extending their ar-
gument for sharia from federal and state governments’ undeniable support for 
Nigeria’s two world religions. For example, at a Kwara State College of Islamic 
Studies seminar, sharia advocates concluded that religious and civil liberties do 
not come from man and thus cannot be bound by  human law; as all rights are 
divinely granted, they can only be divinely governed. As Adegbite observes, 
“To the Muslims, the notion [of secularism] is anti- God, and we reject it totally 
and irrevocably. We are wholly committed to the sovereignty of Allah to whom 
we submit without reservation. That is Islam.”23 Or as Gumi had argued a de-
cade before, in his autobiography:
The roots of our instability lie deep in the concept of secularism, which 
eats away at the very cords which should bind us together as a nation. By 
divorcing our government from God we are at once encouraging selfish-
ness and unfounded ambitions. The current system does not acknowl-
edge God, which is why we lack direction. . . .  Secularism, therefore, as 
the policy of operating government outside God’s control, is alien to 
civilized  human existence. We cannot expect to succeed in our affairs 
without abiding by the wishes of God, in spirit and in form.24
Furthermore, advocates of sharia felt it hypocritical for Christian oppo-
nents of Islamic law to claim that the Nigerian Constitution should be based 
on unassailable secularity. To  these sharia advocates, the Nigerian state has 
never been secular, having its foundation in common law that is derived from 
Christian traditions.25 Their insistence on expanded Islamic law would simply 
bring sharia on equal footing with common law, as both have religious moor-
ings that need to be balanced for Nigerian jurisprudence to be acceptable to 
Muslims. Thus, sharia activists contended that since historically the government 
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had favored Christian traditions and institutions (for example, through the 
Christian origins of common law and by subsidizing Christian missionary 
schools), the sharia policies of the twelve Northern states simply rectify the 
imbalance of many de cades.26 As a result of this history, Southern,  Middle  Belt, 
and Northern- minority Christians consistently have enjoyed significant advan-
tages in Nigerian constitutional evolution, from which they proj ect the myth 
of Western secularism that blocks Muslim religious and social aspirations.27 In 
short, advocates of expanded sharia presented secularism as Western- derived, in 
direct conflict with Islam, and at its core fundamentally a po liti cal theology.28
The claims of sharia advocates seemed substantially bolstered in the numer-
ous provisions of the Constitution providing for a Sharia Court of Appeal.29 
If it  were simply the religious nature of sharia that was unconstitutional, sharia 
advocates argued, then how could the same document concede so much au-
thority to Islamic law within the jurisdiction of the state governments? They 
further contend that the mere provision against state religion30 did not guaran-
tee secularity, or the absence of religion in government.31 On this, Adegbite ar-
gued that expanded sharia did not amount to declaring a state religion  because 
secular courts still existed in Northern sharia states.32
Nevertheless, opponents of sharia underscored the importance of secularity 
in the constitution, insisting the new laws  violated section 10 of the 1999 Consti-
tution. Harnischfeger provides the typical refrain: “Muslims’ call for autonomy 
flies in the face of Nigeria’s moderately secular tradition. . . .  The Constitution 
does not allow elevating any religion to a state religion. Yet this princi ple is 
 violated when governors in the North use state authority to Islamize public 
life.”33 This position flowed in part from the oic debacle of the 1980s and the 
conflict over  whether joining an Islamic organ ization, such as the Islamic Bank, 
amounted to declaring a state religion, as well as the 1978 and 1989 Constituent 
Assembly debates wherein pro- sharia advocates purportedly refused to differ-
entiate between secularism as godlessness and secularism as religious neutral-
ity.34 Furthermore, many detractors of sharia argued that state resources would 
be directed to enforcing a religious code, which amounted to funding Islam.35 
Sharia proponents countered that  these critics ignored the fact that the state 
was already heavi ly subsidizing and funding religious institutions, especially 
schools, pilgrimages, and other interests.36
Constitutional scholars, judges, and politicians in the end relied on specific 
circumstances to decide constitutional meaning.37 Both “secular” and “reli-
gious” states are not the  simple products of vari ous stages of modernization; 
rather, they are stages in ongoing pro cesses of state formation, overlapping 
with  people’s aspirations and strug gles.38 According to Islamic scholar Sanusi 
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Lamido Sanusi (who was installed as emir of Kano in 2014), the concept of jus-
tice that is held by progressive Muslims has been connected to Western schol-
arship since the Enlightenment, and the interpretations conferred on Islam 
represent a hermeneutical pro cess of finding meanings in the Qur’an and the 
hadith.39
states’ rights
The third constitutional issue involves the question of  whether state govern-
ments have the powers to create, modify, and abolish courts in their spheres of 
influence. When Mamuda Aliyu Shinkafi, deputy governor of Zamfara State, 
defended sharia’s legality, he noted that “any law that is enacted by the House of 
Assembly is constitutional.”40 While this is at best a curious constitutional pro-
nouncement, more common was the narrower claim that, as Adegbite argued, 
states have the right to control their laws and their courts.41 Importantly, Northern 
states retained the Sharia Court of Appeal and extended its jurisdiction. Exercised 
through  these reforms, expanded sharia appeared to have exceeded constitutional 
guarantee by claiming authority over criminal cases.42
Southern,  Middle  Belt, and Northern- minority anti- sharia analysts found 
room to contest  these changes by the Northern sharia states. Distinguished  lawyers 
Rotimi Williams and Ben Nwabueze contended that Islamic and customary- law 
provisions in the Constitution are subject to the federal Penal Code, making a 
statewide shift to sharia illegal. Nwabueze further argued that, by the rules of 
statutory construction (the Constitution was written  after the Penal Code), 
the application of a uniform federal Penal Code is necessary.43 Nevertheless, 
constitutional scholars such as E. Essien argued that changes by the Northern 
states  were in line with provisions of the Constitution: only an amendment to 
the Constitution can take away from the jurisdiction of a state’s Sharia Court of 
Appeal, but any state can legislate to add to its original jurisdiction. More prob-
lematic, however, was the  legal limbo in which high courts’ jurisdiction was 
left hanging with the new role of expanded sharia in civil and criminal cases.44
written law
Islamic law is essentially derived from the holy texts in Arabic about the life 
and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. According to doctrine,  these texts 
should not be translated from Arabic into any other language. Despite defend-
ing sharia’s constitutionality, Justice Bello (former chief justice of the supreme 
court) had noted that the challenges of translating Islamic law from Arabic 
pose a serious prob lem for the constitutional requirement to codify Nigerian 
criminal laws.45 On this mea sure, opponents of expanded sharia argued that 
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Islamic law is not compatible with chapter IV, section 36 (12) of the Constitu-
tion, which states that “a person  shall not be convicted of a criminal offense 
 unless that offense is defined and the penalty therefore is prescribed in a writ-
ten law,” and in this subsection, a written law refers to an act of the National 
Assembly or a law of a state, any subsidiary legislation, or instrument  under the 
provisions of a law.46 Many sharia activists rejected this argument  because, as 
they see it, sharia has endured over a thousand years of textual interpretation 
and scholarly debates.47
freedom of religion
The relevant constitutional provision on freedom of religion is found in chap-
ter IV, section  38 (1) of the Constitution: “ Every person  shall be entitled to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, including freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom ( either alone or in community with  others, and 
in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his or her religion or belief 
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”48 Many sharia activists read this 
provision to mean that the constitution gave Muslims access to all that Islam 
entails, including the requirement that Muslims be governed by sharia; in this 
reading, section 38 validates the constitutionality of expanded Islamic law. The 
speaker of the Plateau State House of Assembly, while denying that his state 
would implement Islamic law, argued that the “core Muslim North” had a right 
to sharia inherent in its Muslim identity.49
Along the same lines,50 anti- sharia analysts argue that just as the Consti-
tution grants freedom of religion, it also ensures freedom from religion, pro-
tecting citizens from state- sanctioned expanded sharia.51 Defense  lawyers in 
Kaduna and Niger states would make this case on behalf of their non- Muslim 
clients who  were being prosecuted  under sharia.52 Advocates for sharia have 
argued that religious orthodoxy necessitated sharia, but legislators had made 
alterations to the law that seemingly  violated their faith, making the new leg-
islation no more “holy” than the previous. For instance, in many states, the 
sharia Penal Code was not written de novo but, rather, adapted from the old 
Northern Nigerian Code, itself a colonial compromise.53
civil and  human rights
Particularly objectionable to opponents of expanded sharia was the concern 
that the twelve Northern states’ expanded Islamic law abrogated constitution-
ally guaranteed civil and  human rights of Nigerian citizens.  These critics con-
tend that the Northern states’ sharia courts, in contrast to prevailing practices 
in common- law courts, contravene established norms of justice and lacked 
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 procedural standards. Consequently, they conclude that expanded Islamic laws 
are in violation of constitutional provisions protective of citizens’ rights and 
due  process.54
Anti- sharia analyst Simeon Nwobi’s argument encapsulates the sentiments 
of most of  these critics. He identifies three areas where strict application of 
sharia in criminal and civil cases contravened the civil and  human rights guaran-
teed by the Nigerian Constitution. First, sharia’s prohibition of commercial ac-
tivities on products deemed haram (forbidden), such as alcohol, abrogates the 
constitutional rights of citizens to participate freely in the country’s national 
economy.55 Second, Nwobi claims that expanded sharia restricted Nigerians 
from moving freely within the country  because it limits the social activities of 
 people  under its jurisdiction.56 Fi nally, Nwobi judges that sharia prohibits con-
version from Islam to any other religion, contradicting the Constitution.57 The 
ban on “apostasy,” while formally absent from the letter of Islamic law in most 
of the twelve Northern states, would be considered an essential rule once ex-
panded sharia was instituted.58 Anti- sharia advocates Masih and Salam further 
argued that preaching Chris tian ity (and other religions) would be outlawed 
 under sharia, which violates the “freedom to manifest and propagate [any] re-
ligion or belief in worship, teaching, practice, and observance,” as would ex-
panded sharia’s abrogation of Christian education, a right guaranteed by the 
Constitution.59 With  these queries, less Islamic law was required for sharia to 
be constitutionally acceptable.60
What ever the limits of the Fourth Republic’s judicial framework, it was 
clear that Islamic reformers’ wishes  were not integrated into the prevailing 
Nigerian  legal system. It was in this context that prominent Hausa- Fulani poli-
ticians and Muslim clerics pushed for reforms within their respective states. 
This led to expanded sharia policies instituted by the twelve Northern states.61 
To understand the impact of  these reform policies in the Northern states, it is 
necessary to situate the push for sharia in Islamic thought and the construction 
of the Northern Nigerian ummah.
Islamic Thought and the Ummah
The extent to which Islamic thought impacted the sharia crisis is reflected in 
interpretations of scriptural texts and the variety of doctrines that have  shaped 
Northern Nigerian Muslim identity over several centuries. Although religious 
clerics are not granted any special authority  under Islamic doctrine, they are 
entrusted with interpreting  legal texts through case studies, a practice known as 
fiqh.62 Fiqh was codified by Imam al- Shafi’i in the eighth and ninth centuries.63 
The Northern Ummah and the Fourth Republic 167
This “science of Islamic law” is divided into usul (the methodology of law, its 
sources, and scope) and furu (the study of substantive branches of law).64 Fiqh 
is applied to the corpus of Islamic jurisprudential texts, and divided among 
primary and secondary sources. The first primary source is the Qur’an; it is 
composed of the text itself (with 114 surah, or chapters),  legal commentary on 
the Qur’an (referred to as tafsir, carried out only by  those who have attained 
advanced knowledge of the Qur’an), and the sunnah (documentation of the 
life of the Prophet, transmitted orally  until Caliph Umar Ibn al- Aziz instructed 
scholars to write it down). As it varies in reliability, the sunnah is further split 
into Sahih (if the sources are trustworthy) and Da’if (if not), with accordingly 
diff er ent  legal weight applied. The second primary source is the hadith, the 
rec ord of the Prophet’s and his companions’ sayings and actions.65 Secondary 
sources are essentially composed of  legal interpretations, known as ra’i if by 
an individual and ijma if made by consensus— with the latter weighted more 
heavi ly. Other secondary sources include istishab, or  legal presumption, such 
as of innocence or lawfulness of  those activities not expressly forbidden. More 
controversial secondary sources are public interest (Malikis refer to this as 
al- Masalih Mursalah); earlier religious law from recognized prophets such as 
Moses and Jesus (Shar min Qblana); acts of Madinah  people, since they lived 
with the Prophet (Amal Ahl al- Madinah); and local customs (urf ).66 Should 
this body of  legal doctrine fail the scholar, fiqh dictates that he makes a qiyas, an 
analogical deduction based on available evidence for a  legal prob lem to which 
no solution can be found in the texts.67 Decisions must always follow five con-
cerns: belief, moralities, devotions, transactions, and punishments. All acts are 
classified into one of five categories: obligatory, recommended, indifferent, pro-
hibited, or distasteful.68
Islamic jurisprudence is informally divided between a divine half and a 
 human half, the latter of which can change over time.69 Thus, claims that Is-
lamic law is universal and unchanging do not contradict assertions that it can 
be adapted to local circumstances. In this re spect, the princi ple that shapes 
sharia is similar to that of common law, for which ( until recently) divine law 
ruled and positive ( human) law supplemented a  legal baseline derived from 
Chris tian ity. The major distinction between Islamic law and common law lies 
in the fact that the latter has sucked up its divine component.70 However, this 
balance leaves room for disagreement over interpretation of the corpus, partly 
arising from differences in scholars’ intellects,  legal abilities, and readings of 
linguistic derivations.71 As a  whole, sharia forms a uniform, all- encompassing 
 legal system: “Law, religious ethics, and morality form an integral part of the 
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same normative pro cess,”72 therefore Islamic law is a necessary component of 
Islamic society.
Islamic law cases proceed with the pre sen ta tion of the relevant parties in 
the case, followed by the oath, the pre sen ta tion of the witnesses (if the accused 
denies the charges, witnesses are brought in and cross- examined), and eventu-
ally the rendition of judgment.73 Depending on the case, two males, a male and 
two females, or two females are needed for witness testimony to prove guilt. Each 
must be of a certain “quality” with re spect to gender, adherence to Islam, and 
age. With regard to judgment, specific sentences are not always provided for; 
instead sharia relies on judicial discretion.74 Appeals are heard by the justice from 
the original decision, as opposed to the Western practice of a second judge (or 
panel of judges) reviewing the case.75 The most serious criminal acts are classi-
fied as hudud offenses, of which  there are eight: zina (adultery), qadhf (slan-
der), sariqa (theft), hirabah (armed robbery), shurb al- khamr (consumption 
of alcohol), jinayat (hom i cide), riddah (apostasy and blasphemy), and baghye 
(rebellion). All have fixed penalties, and all but the last two  were implemented 
in Northern Nigeria following the imposition of expanded sharia.76
Among contending Northern Nigerian Muslim groups, the reformism that 
 shaped the agitation for sharia came out of the Izala movement. Providing the 
movement’s dominant theological perspective since the 1980s, Izala had mo-
bilized a new generation of Northern Muslims to articulate new Islamic  legal 
tradition that challenged Nigeria’s constitutional and po liti cal reform. Conse-
quently, Lubeck argues that Nigeria’s sharia movement was
driven by a new generation of Islamic reformers who while drawing upon 
eclectic sources, are largely inspired by neo- Salafi  legal models and dis-
courses originating in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. The latter should 
be distinguished from the Salafi reformers of the nineteenth  century, 
like Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Rida. Neo- Salafi doctrines privilege 
the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, re spect the companions of the 
Prophet, and reject subsequent innovations such as Sufism and Muslim 
modernist reasoning (ijtihad ) for the public good (maslahah). While 
neo- Salafi reasoning relies heavi ly on Hanbali doctrines, it is impor tant 
to emphasize that when scriptural  legal movements travel through global 
networks and are applied by reformers living in large, complex socie ties, 
like  those of Northern Nigeria, they become intermingled with each 
other. Therefore, while sharia reform was empowered by neo- Salafis, 
Nigeria’s  legal system remained largely Maliki  because the existing sharia 
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judges adjudicating personal and  family law  were trained in the Maliki, 
not the Hanbali tradition.77
With such a well- defined jurisprudential tradition, the expanded sharia 
codes introduced by Nigeria’s Northern state governments in 1999 and 2000 
followed a fairly uniform format. Kaduna State’s Penal Code provides a stan-
dard example of such reform. The new code acknowledges that only Muslims 
(and non- Muslims who consent) are subject to Islamic law, extending its juris-
diction to  those who commit a sharia offense outside Kaduna when they reen-
ter the state. Years are counted by both Islamic and Gregorian calendars, oaths 
must be in Allah’s name, and several Arabic terms are defined. A list of pos si-
ble punishments, such as caning and amputation, are outlined. With regard 
to doctrine, punishments are divided into four categories: hudud, diyya, qisas, 
and ta’zir. As would be expected from expanded sharia, corporal punishment 
and judicial discretion are elevated, while probation and fines are less  common 
and degrees of punishment are less graduated.78 In addition to this textual 
grounding, the philosophical disposition of Muslim clerics tied jurisprudence 
to the word of Allah. This barred any expedient revision of Islamic law, much 
less its replacement with an alien common- law jurisprudence.
To Muslim reformers,  these changes  were essential. The adoption of ex-
panded sharia, one advocate of Islamic law claims, was “the essential founda-
tion of the just Islamic society . . .  one that follows the revelations and words 
of God.”79 When the Bauchi State government announced its expanded sharia 
policy, the governor reasoned that the decision was taken simply in fidelity to 
Islam.80 A typical editorial of the Northern- centered New Nigerian reiterated 
that the law governing Muslims “cannot be adapted, altered, or dropped capri-
ciously but must be followed absolutely.”81 It followed that any contradiction 
within the constitution that restricted access to expanded sharia on civil and 
criminal cases for Northern Muslims was prima facie invalid.
Similarly, as Murray Last argues, ideas inherent to emirate society have 
always pushed Muslim leaders to advocate for sharia in local communities. 
 Because Islam is as much a civilization as a religion, it experienced vari ous trans-
formations as it spread across Sudanic Africa over many centuries. Since the 
imposition of colonial rule, its doctrines have acted as a buffer against Western 
conceptions of modernity and other global intrusions.82 Moreover, “the sense 
of closure,” Last argues, “is central to Islamic culture. Not only is the interior 
of a  house strictly private . . .  so too, in a sense, is the territory of the jama’a 
[Muslim faithful]. Not for nothing is the land of the Muslim ummah [Muslim 
polity] called dar al- Islam, the ‘house’ of Islam.” The push to expand Islamic 
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law in 1999 and 2000 represented “a way of keeping ‘strangers’ in their place, 
reminding them that [a community such as] Kano is not theirs and reasserting 
the right of Muslim dominance in a Muslim city.”83 Thus, sharia is an attempt 
to reestablish the dar al- Islam and assert Northern Nigeria’s membership in a 
global Muslim community. In Last’s words:
Shari‘a and hisba are proof to the wider ummah that “we Muslims” in 
Northern Nigeria are serious members of the ummah; that “we” are not 
to be pigeon- holed by foreigners simply as “Nigerians” and associated 
with doubtful dealings. It proves, too, that “we” are not aligned with the 
USA against “our” Muslim  brothers and  sisters in Iraq, Iran, or indeed 
Af ghan i stan. But while I argue that we should interpret hisba and the 
shari‘a as aspects of this reaffirmation of a Muslim citizenship, I would 
argue also that it is not about cancelling Nigerian citizenship; it is just an 
attempt to develop and articulate a second nationality.84
He adds, “Putting  things right in the Jama’a  will lead Allah to aid the Jama’a 
significantly, albeit in His own time. Calling the Jama’a to order is thus a seri-
ous po liti cal act.” Muslims from emirate society cite as an example of Allah’s aid 
the end of Christian colonial rule in 1960 and the removal of vari ous corrupt 
postcolonial regimes.85 From the start, the imposition of expanded sharia was 
a reassertion of Northern Muslim identity; sharia thus became the unifying re-
gional framework for the enunciation of a vision that connected the noble past 
articulated in the Sokoto Jihad with the  future of a Northern Muslim commu-
nity. Consequently, Brandon Kendhammer contends,
As elites and ordinary citizens argued about what it meant to be a Muslim 
in a demo cratic society and about how Islamic injunctions might shape state 
policy, a discourse emerged connecting sharia implementation to broader, 
pan- Nigerian ways of talking about democracy. This discourse drew on 
symbols and images from Northern Nigeria’s Muslim past, but also rep-
resented new and evolving co ali tions of religious and po liti cal interests.86
 These critical issues  were vividly reflected in a landmark national confer-
ence on sharia sponsored by jni in February 2000 and presided over by 
distinguished Nigerians, including Justice Mohammed Bello, former chief 
justice of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; a renowned academic, Professor 
Abubakar Mustapha, vice chancellor of the University of Maiduguri; and the 
Rev. Dr. Matthew Hassan Kukah, a prominent Northern Nigerian theologian 
and  later Catholic bishop of Sokoto.87 Offering incisive interventions in his 
keynote address, Justice Bello traced the course of Islamic law in Northern 
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Nigeria through two centuries and identified distinct stages of its evolution in 
the region following Usman dan Fodio’s jihad in the early nineteenth  century: 
the formation of the Sokoto Caliphate involved an expansive emirate system 
governed by Islamic law that lasted through the better part of the nineteenth 
 century; Islamic law endured the imposition of the early colonial administra-
tive system in the Northern Nigerian Protectorate. Thus, as the colonial system 
evolved, emirate rulers— emirs, alkalis, and ulamas— served both as agents of 
the British authorities and as embodiments of prevailing Islamic  legal order. 
While acknowledging that the modern  legal system eroded Islamic law, Justice 
Bello insisted that “with the exception of  matters within the exclusive juris-
dictions of Federal and State High Courts, [Northern Nigeria’s] mode and 
conduct of life has always been governed by sharia.”88
Given his reputation as Northern Nigeria’s preeminent common- law 
 jurist, many pro- sharia activists con ve niently interpreted Justice Bello’s nuanced 
endorsement of Islamic law as an unqualified support for sharia in Northern 
communities.89 In regional newspapers, sharia advocates insist that Islamic law 
has long governed the public life of Northern Muslims. Expressing a popu lar 
Northern pro- sharia perspective, the emir of Ilorin, Alhaji Sulu Gambari, in 
the northern Yoruba region, on the southern fringe of the Caliphate, thought 
it unreasonable for “Christians to demand secularity in a region [the Hausa- 
Fulani emirate] long ruled by Islamic law.”90 While pledging support for 
Obasanjo’s federal government, Northern ulamas noted that sharia “has been 
in existence in Nigeria, regulating the lives of Muslims in vari ous states of the 
country for centuries.”91 One prominent pro- sharia commentator described the 
Northern states’ insistence on expanded sharia as the modern manifestation 
of the Sokoto Jihad, and a critical step in defining the essence of the North-
ern Nigerian ummah.92 Even high- ranking federal government officials from 
Northern states in the Obasanjo administration, though generally ambivalent 
on expanded sharia, supported their Northern Muslim compatriots. For exam-
ple, in a bbc interview, Nigerian foreign minister Sule Lamido, an influential 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim, defended the sharia policies of the Northern states.93
For Muslim proponents of sharia, this restoration of the ummah required 
the reframing of expanded sharia to challenge the erosion of Islamic law since 
decolonization. At in de pen dence, the final “reconciliation” of Islamic law 
and common law had come in the Penal Code, which was embraced by the 
sardauna’s npc regional government,  under the tutelage of out going British 
colonial officers. This public support for Islamic law not only challenges this 
alien legacy, but also situates Northern states in their proper place as legitimate 
Muslim communities.
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The Ummah and the Common Good
In addition to articulating sharia as the essence of the ummah, power ful advo-
cates of expanded sharia also packaged their support for sharia as the quest for 
the common good in emirate society. Ludwig observes that many Northern 
Muslim proponents of sharia defended the application of expanded Islamic law 
on the grounds that “the new laws have been enacted by demo cratically elected 
executive and legislative officials responding to the unquestionable desire of the 
vast majority of their constituents.”94 Governor Ahmed Sani of Zamfara State, 
a champion of expanded sharia, provides a good illustration of this line of argu-
ment. For Sani the demo cratic pro cess was premised on implementing sharia 
 because he had based his gubernatorial campaign on Islamic law. As opposition 
mounted against Zamfara’s sharia policy, Sani replied: “When I was campaign-
ing for this office, wherever I [went], I always start[ed] with ‘Allahu Akbar’ 
(Allah is the greatest) to show my commitment to the Islamic faith. . . .  As part 
of my programme for the state, I promised the introduction of sharia.”95 Sani 
told us additionally that sharia is essential for the organ ization of a just Islamic 
society, and would serve as an effective response to the corruption that West-
ern conception of modernization had imposed on Zamfara communities.96 He 
was backed by the state’s chief justice of the Sharia Court of Appeal and by the 
Speaker of the State House of Assembly;  these officials  were convinced that 
sharia represents the Zamfara  people’s mandate.97
In an editorial in the New Nigerian, Bello Alkali, a prominent pro- sharia 
commentator, argued that the Zamfara State governor and legislators  were 
popularly elected and that their sharia policy was a reflection of democracy, 
not an abrogation of it. In addition, he insisted that “the overwhelming popu-
lation of Zamfara State had told [Governor Sani] they want sharia to govern 
their lives if the Almighty makes him the Governor.”98 In summation, Alkali 
argued that sharia would help reverse the moral and social crises endemic in 
Zamfara’s society; contrary to the position of Northern, Southern, and  Middle 
 Belt Christians, sharia, he contends, is in keeping with constitutional provi-
sions on freedom of religion and state’s rights. Another New Nigerian editorial 
opined that expanded sharia would affirm the right of Muslims to be governed 
by Islamic law, as dictated by the Qur’an, sunnah, and hadith. The editorial 
outlined the functions of qualified judges and called for the establishment of a 
police force to enforce the new Islamic law.99
The sharia- as- justification- for- democracy argument  later was used by advo-
cates of Islamic law in Bauchi State100 to turn the Katsina State government’s 
position  toward sharia,101 and in Kano to declare that if non- Muslims (only 
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2   percent of the population  there)  were against sharia, they should leave the 
state.102 In Katsina State, Governor Umaru Yar ‘adua, a confidant of President 
Obasanjo among pdp governors and  later president of the federal republic, 
who earlier had been ambivalent about expanded sharia, reversed himself when 
he was confronted with sharia’s popularity in his state.103 In Kaduna State, with 
its substantial Christian population, the government established a statewide 
public opinion campaign,104 which eventually led to sharia’s enactment.105 
From the perspective of pro- sharia scholar Ibrahim Ado- Kurawa, Southern 
“secularists” and Christians  were conspiring to crush the demo cratic aspira-
tions of Northern Muslims.106 Lateef Adegbite, the Yoruba secretary- general 
of the nscia, declared that since Northern Muslims had spoken through the 
demo cratic pro cess, any opposition to sharia could only be seen as an attack on 
the popu lar  will.107 Consequently, for pro- sharia activists, Southern,  Middle 
 Belt, and Northern Christians’ fierce opposition to sharia signifies intolerance 
and is antithetical to the demo cratic  will.108
Supporters of the expanded sharia policies of the Northern states also ar-
gued that Islamic law represents a societal necessity. Beyond a straightforward 
binary of  legal and illegal, sharia, they think, provides the only just  legal sys-
tem for mediating relations among Muslims. Many prominent emirate clerics 
had argued since decolonization in the 1950s that sharia’s elimination from the 
Penal Code spelled the death knell of Usman dan Fodio’s vision for the Sokoto 
Caliphate.109 For its supporters, the extension of sharia beyond  family cases thus 
represented a homogenizing force, eliminating the sectarianism that had plagued 
Northern communities since in de pen dence.110 Furthermore, since the Constitu-
tion does not provide for social and economic rights, one prominent pro- sharia 
commentator pointed out that sharia’s zakat tax levy on the wealthy would help 
reduce emirate society’s grinding poverty.111 Indeed, Lubeck observes that
the poor members of the popu lar classes rallied around sharia  because 
they hoped that the zakat tax on the affluent (2.5  percent of liable asset) 
would result in the re distribution of wealth. . . .  In Kano, for example, 
approximately a million  people turned out to celebrate the passing of 
sharia in 2000. The advantage of sharia, advocates argued, was that judg-
ment would be swift, access improved, and citizen participation increased 
 because Muslims already spoke the same language of sharia and understood 
its princi ples of justice, which was not true of Nigerian common law.112
Another pro- sharia commentator, Yakubu Yahaya Ibrahim, argued that ex-
panded sharia would resolve the corruption inherent in the financial require-
ments of common law.113 Of par tic u lar relevance to sharia is its critical role 
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in the Penal Code,114 where its proponents contend that the new expanded 
Islamic law  will effectively check society’s countless social ills.115
As riots between Muslims and Christians over the implementation of sharia 
 later engulfed some Northern communities, pro- sharia commentators con-
ve niently argued that the orgy of vio lence was evidence that the Penal Code 
should be reflected in Northern states’ sharia laws.116 Responding to detractors 
who criticized the harsh penalties in Islamic law, Governor Sani noted, “Sharia 
[is] always aimed at deterring  human beings from committing crimes rather 
than executing punishment.”117 Praising Zamfara State’s policy, Bello Adamu 
Sakkwato, a sharia advocate, agreed with the governor: “Justice, fair dealings, 
economic development, peace, and tranquility in all ramifications  will ensue 
in the state.”118 Bashir Sambo, a renowned emirate judge, continued the opti-
mistic viewpoint that sharia can solve all of Nigeria’s prob lems,119 echoing the 
observation in the 1980s of Ibrahim K. R. Sulaiman, a prominent Northern 
Muslim  legal analyst, that sharia is the bastion of morality against the corrup-
tion inherent in common law.120
With the popularity of Sani’s sharia initiative in many Northern states, 
prominent regional personalities from all walks of life and of diverse ideologi-
cal perspectives showed their support for sharia. Barrister Abdullahi Jalo, a 
prominent regional attorney, called on Governor Habu Hashidu of Gombe 
State to follow Zamfara’s example and introduce sharia in order to rid “the state 
of crime, prostitution, and other vices”;121 a leading emirate potentate Adamu 
Shanono, Baraden Abakpa commended Governor Sani’s foresight and courage, 
claiming that this policy would reverse the social decay that was endemic in 
emirate society.122
Tied to this argument was the belief that sharia is inherently just and is built 
upon extensive textual and case law for the protection of minority rights. The 
National Concord, founded by Moshood Abiola as a pro- npn newspaper dur-
ing the Second Republic, editorialized that true sharia would lead to religious 
tolerance,123 while an opinion piece in the New Nigerian said that sharia in 
Kaduna State would, in fact, protect the religious beliefs of the state’s substan-
tial Christian population.124 Indeed, Sani personally assured Christians in his 
state that their freedom of worship would be protected  under sharia.125 Again, 
Adegbite wrote that if properly administered, sharia would deter crime, foster 
public order, and promote social justice.126 Many pro- sharia letters to the edi-
tor of the New Nigerian  were confident that sharia would reverse the Western 
values that have corrupted the morality of emirate society.127 In the run-up to the 
implementation of the new Islamic laws, the Speakers of the Houses of Assem-
bly of Northern states met to coordinate prohibitions on alcohol, prostitution, 
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and gambling across their respective states.128 When sharia came, many declared 
preemptively: “Peace and moral improvement had arrived.”129 Northern states 
immediately passed strict anti- vice mea sures such as the Zamfara State law that 
banned non- Muslim cultural resources, including videos, foreign films, and ad-
vertisements, all considered to have negative impact on Muslim youths.130
As pro- sharia commentators contended that expanded sharia is the pana-
cea to the social prob lems in Northern communities, they also argued that 
the sharia revolution would encourage a re nais sance in Islamic culture. This, 
they contend, would not only provide an effective response to the corrupting 
influence of Christian and secular education in Northern communities, but 
would also reverse the educational disparity between Northern and Southern 
states. Ado- Kurawa argued that Islamic education gave the Sokoto Caliphate 
its power, but colonial authorities elevated secular education and, even worse, 
missionary schooling in Northern communities.131 Proponents of expanded 
sharia said the educational requirement inherent in the implementation of Is-
lamic law would provide culturally relevant education for talakawa commoners 
and  women.
 These thoughts in part illustrate the context in which pro- sharia commen-
tators  imagined the significance of a revitalized sharia movement in the edu-
cational transformation of Northern states.132 Indeed, the acerbic reaction of 
sharia’s opponents to the reforms, its proponents contended, was simply an 
episode in secularist ignorance, particularly among anti- sharia Muslims, indi-
cating the extent to which widespread educational reform was needed.133 Most 
prominent was a campaign to establish an Islamic university as a center for ad-
vanced Islamic studies in Katsina.134 So strong was the extent of local support 
in Katsina State that Katsina civil servants agreed to donate 5  percent of their 
annual salaries to fund its construction.135
With heavy emphasis on lionizing the precolonial Sokoto Caliphate, Brit-
ish colonial authorities, the previous allies of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers,  were 
now denounced by sharia advocates as the destroyers of Islamic piety and the 
cause of Northern states’ turn to the immorality seen in the West.136 The return 
of Islamic law, which British colonialism destroyed would thus represent the 
revival of a noble Islamic heritage.137 To sharia proponents, Western vice was 
the cause of social chaos and economic crisis.138
Sharia advocates also  were aware that they needed to provide effective re-
sponse to the strong Southern Christian opposition to sharia mounted through 
the power ful Lagos- Ibadan news media outlets, especially in the months  after 
the launching of comprehensive sharia policies by Northern state governments. 
As a Yoruba, Lateef Adegbite, the nscia secretary- general, was well posi-
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tioned to respond to the scathing attacks on sharia policies of the Northern 
states by the Southern intelligent sia. Interestingly, Adegbite emerged as one 
of the most articulate defenders of Northern sharia states, challenging the as-
sault of Southern Christians against sharia.139 In Zamfara State, where Sani 
particularly drew the rage of Southern Christians, Adegbite countered that the 
state’s sharia policy was not only in keeping with the Constitution, but also 
would address the crisis of law and order.140 Furthermore, in an opinion piece, 
Northern Muslim commentator Abdul Gaffar lashed out against Southern 
journalists— especially Yoruba journalists— for what he considered their bias 
against Muslims.141
Indeed, to confront what many Hausa- Fulani Muslim elites have long con-
sidered Southern and  Middle  Belt Christian propaganda against Islam, now 
manifested in the vitriolic campaign against sharia, the chairman of the Coun-
cil of Ulama called on Muslims everywhere to defend their religion against its 
enemies. Similarly, at the announcement of his state’s sharia policy, Kano State’s 
governor called for a massive turnout for its inauguration— demonstrating to 
the country that sharia had widespread appeal among Northern Muslims.142
However, this overwhelming Northern Muslim support for expanded 
sharia was hardly a blind allegiance to the Hausa- Fulani po liti cal class. The 
erosion of the moral authority of the emirate po liti cal elite, especially  under 
unpopular military regimes led by Northern generals, had left the masses of 
Northern Muslims disaffected with the Sokoto Caliphate’s power structures.143 
Hausa- Fulani politicians and their emirs and Islamic clerics allies are good at 
preaching sharia, critics argued, but are an essential component of a national 
neopatrimonial system that can only be eradicated through fidelity to true 
Muslim values.144 Moreover, while noting sharia’s constitutionality, a group of 
“progressive” Northern Muslim analysts saw the mass campaign for expanded 
sharia as a distraction from the po liti cal and economic failings of the Nigerian 
po liti cal class.145
Northern Muslim Co ali tion for Expanded Sharia
Despite the ambivalence of a small minority of Northern Muslims for ex-
panded sharia, the sharia movement clearly had popu lar appeal among most 
Northern Muslims.146 Sharia also had the support of notable figures in emir-
ate society’s small but influential group of radical intellectuals who had  shaped 
the progressive traditions of populist socialist parties, notably nepu (North-
ern Ele ments Progressive Union) and the prp ( People’s Redemption Party), 
since decolonization. For a movement that Southern modernists generally 
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saw as atavistic, the sharia movement, at least initially, succeeded in unifying 
Northern Muslim public opinion of diverse ideological orientations around 
a common ethno- religious— Hausa- Fulani- Northern- Muslim— identity.147 
 These disparate groups coalesced around a revived Northern  People’s Congress 
(npc) in March 2000. Led by the sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Muhammadu Mac-
cido, the revived npc morphed into a renewed Arewa (Hausa for “Northern”) 
Consultative Forum (acf), a po liti cal association of emirate leaders (with a 
minority of ju nior partners from nonemirate Northern communities) com-
mitted to asserting Northern interests. In fact, the initial success of this pan- 
Northern acf was not unconnected to Northern perception of a visceral 
Southern and  Middle  Belt Christian opposition to the sharia movement. This 
was particularly apparent in the Southern Christian- dominated national press 
corps. Thus, a Northern “manifesto” declared that the “pastime” of Southern 
Christians was “to ridicule, vilify and scandalize Islam and sharia.”148 Added 
to this was Northern Muslim leaders’ feeling that despite their strong support 
for Obasanjo in the 1999 presidential election, an administration led by a self- 
proclaimed Yoruba born- again Christian failed to confer on Northern Muslims 
the recognition commensurate to their support for him.149 In this context, the 
acf unified Northern Muslims  behind sharia and argued that Hausa- Fulani 
Muslims have a moral obligation to defend the Northern state governments’ 
sharia policies against their Southern and  Middle  Belt Christian adversaries. 
The influence of this intersecting Northern Muslim identity  will be seen in the 
evolution of the debate discussed below.
The major challenge before older- generation acf leaders was to bring into 
the Northern Muslim fold disaffected Muslim youths, who had become in-
creasingly restless since the po liti cal and economic crisis of the 1980s.150 Con-
fronted by an uncertain  future, this younger generation of Northern Muslims 
had been attracted to Islamic reformist movements (especially neo- Salafi move-
ments) such as Izala. Thus, the strong Southern and  Middle  Belt Christian op-
position to sharia further radicalized educated Northern Muslim youths in the 
Arewa  Peoples Congress, the de facto militant wing of the acf  under Briga-
dier General Sagir Mohammed. The group’s militancy grew out of allegations 
of the “silence of the so- called elders over the massive massacre of Northerners 
in [the Yoruba cities of ] Lagos and Ibadan. . . .  The younger generation is losing 
confidence in the leadership of the older generation.”151
Nevertheless, the environment created by  these militant Hausa- Fulani Mus-
lim youth movements gave greater coherence to the sharia riots that engulfed 
many Northern cities during the early years of the Fourth Republic. In 
 Kaduna State, where the sharia riots  were particularly violent, Northern Mus-
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lim youths blocked some one hundred thousand Christian demonstrators against 
sharia, whose “other wise peaceful protest” they “literally lit on fire.”152 When 
Southern and  Middle  Belt Christian students fled their Northern university cam-
puses during the Kaduna riots in February 2000, their properties  were looted by 
Muslim mobs.153 Also, Hausa- Fulani Muslim youths targeted the Christian 
deputy governor, Stephen Shekari, for his earlier  handling of the sharia riots 
as acting governor.154 At a minor level, the sharia crisis spilled over into a few 
Yoruba communities, betraying the low- level rumblings of Yoruba Muslim ac-
tivists against the decidedly anti- sharia opposition of Yoruba Christians. For 
example, months  after the Kaduna sharia riots, Ijebu and Lagos (Yoruba) Mus-
lim youths attacked Christians in their local communities.155 Less violent but 
equally vociferous was the National Committee of Muslim Youth, which or ga-
nized a rally titled “Iwo [an Oyo- Yoruba city] Land for Islam,” which tried to 
instigate religious conflict in the city.156 To be sure, riots incited by Christian 
youths also  were reported in Northern, Southern, and  Middle  Belt communi-
ties during this period of religious and po liti cal turbulence.
Another crucial constituency was to be found among emirs and Muslim 
clerics, who  were promptly co- opted into the newly established sharia courts. 
In exchange for the emirs’ support for state policies, se nior state officials re-
warded them with state patronage.157 For instance, Zamfara State’s governor 
identified emirs and traditional chiefs as the first vector for the implementa-
tion of the government’s sharia policy.158
Sharia advocates also drew inspiration from international supporters by link-
ing Northern Nigeria’s sharia reforms to a global history of Islamic law dating 
back centuries.  These reformers justified the  legal changes by pointing to global 
jurisprudential pre ce dents. Thus, “the experiences of countries which practiced 
forms of sharia such as Sudan and Saudi Arabia  were taken into account” in 
drafting legislation in the Northern states.159 One editorial in the National Con-
cord traced sharia from Prophet Muhammad, through early Islamic states in the 
 Middle East, to precolonial Nigeria.160 Partly as a result of widespread concerns 
that the extension of sharia into criminal cases would undermine the civil rights 
of religious minorities, sharia proponents drew on Algeria as a successful case 
of protections afforded to non- Muslims.161 Ado- Kurawa, meanwhile, framed 
the reform effort as part of a global Islamist resurgence, comparing it to the 
Ira nian Revolution of 1979. He called for a pan- Islamic movement to break  free 
of Western domination, insisting on Muslims’ triumphant victory and moral 
superiority.162 Similarly, situating Nigeria in the Muslim world, another leading 
Muslim commentator, Syed Khalid Rashid, argues that Islamization is pro gress 
and Nigerians should abandon their irrational tendency to imitate the West. 
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Many pro- sharia intellectuals concur, noting that Western- oriented Nigerian 
Christians consistently associate Islam with backwardness. Many Northern 
Muslim commentators contend that Islam is  under attack throughout the world 
and that Nigerian Muslims should seek solidarity in po liti cal linkages with fel-
low Muslims around the world. As John Paden notes, major Nigerian Muslim 
constituencies have international ties  going back many  centuries:
Hausa- Fulani rulers are linked to Sudanic Africa; Sufi movements are 
strongly transnational (tijani are tied to Morocco and Senegal, qadiri to 
the Maghreb and Iraq); anti- innovation legalists are allied with Saudi 
Arabia; intellectual reformers have global educational contacts; anti- 
establishment syncretistic network with local groups in Niger, Chad and 
Cameroon; the Muslim Brotherhoods have supporters in Iran; and even 
urban youth and mi grants have access to foreign radio.163
Consequently, the Zamfara State government made overtures to the 
broader Islamic world, and several Muslim countries pledged to train Zam-
fara’s Islamic judges and provide resources for the state’s sharia institutions.164 
Other Northern states also sought and received diff er ent forms of support 
from the Arab world. Several Northern Islamic judges received training in 
Saudi Arabia, while Iran, Libya, Mauritania, and Sudan lobbied the Nigerian 
federal government to promote sharia.165 Such efforts  were helped by the for-
malization of Nigeria’s place in the global ummah through its membership in 
the oic,  going back to the 1980s.  Running parallel was a less effective attempt 
by sharia activists to define Nigeria’s anti- sharia movement as an extension of 
the West’s assault on Islam.166  After allegations of Christian- instigated vio lence 
in January 2000, Kwara State Muslims charged that weapons used during the 
riots  were imported from groups seeking to destabilize Nigeria.167 Such state-
ments appear to have been intended to isolate the non- Muslim opponents of 
expanded sharia in Northern and  Middle  Belt states from international back-
ers, especially from Western countries, a tactic that largely failed.
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The early years of the Nigerian Fourth Republic  were marked by systemic con-
flict between the twelve Northern sharia states and Christian groups, primarily 
from Southern and  Middle  Belt states. The conflicts  were episodic and unpre-
ce dented in the extents of bloodletting, even by Nigeria’s tragic standards of 
religious vio lence. The crisis did encourage some introspection on the part of 
se nior federal government officials, religious leaders, and po liti cal elites from 
all regions of the country. But on the  whole, collective efforts at reconciliation 
 were less than far- reaching; peace initiatives  were severely compromised by dis-
trust among contending ethno- religious blocs in the country.
The Case against Sharia: Christian and Nationalist Critiques
Anthony Olubunmi Okogie, the Catholic archbishop and national president 
of the Christian Association of Nigeria (can), was at the forefront of national 
debates against the imposition of expanded sharia in the Northern states.1 
Archbishop Okogie and many Christian leaders argued essentially that the 
Northern states’ sharia policies  were serious threats to the rights of Christian 
c h a p t er  ei gh t
e x pa n d ed  s h a r i a : 
r e s is ta n c e ,  v i o  len c e , 
a n d  r eco n c i li at i o n
minorities in Northern Muslim states and that sharia would destroy Nigeria’s 
fragile demo cratic transition, undermine its precarious federal structure, reify 
ethno- religious identities, and derail the country’s developmental agenda. 
Archbishop Okogie was particularly concerned about the danger of a Muslim 
versus non- Muslim binary in Northern states, as he expressed it: “Any such law 
[sharia]  will stand as a parallel law to the Constitution and therefore, is un-
acceptable. If Christians and other religions practiced in the country decide 
to have their own judicial systems, how many systems of laws  will be in this 
one country?”2 Okogie’s views  were further elaborated in a five- part newspaper 
series on sharia’s implications by his successor as can president, Dr. Sunday 
Mbang, primate of the Methodist Church of Nigeria.3 Mbang, Okogie, and 
many Christian leaders embarked on a national campaign to neutralize what 
they considered a dangerous po liti cal development.
Southern intellectuals also wrote extensively to register their fears about 
sharia. In fiery newspaper editorials, pamphlets, and conference papers, their 
viewpoints underlined that pro- sharia initiatives threaten the Constitution.4 
For example, Rotimi Williams, a  legal luminary and Yoruba Christian who had 
chaired the 1979 Constitution Drafting Committee, argued that a “radical 
sharia movement” would impose an unbridgeable constitutional fault line be-
tween the Northern states and other states in the country, as well as between 
common law and sharia. He endorsed the thinking among  human rights groups 
that the imposition of expanded sharia  will fundamentally alter the prevailing 
concept of civil rights and civil liberties in Nigeria.5 Olu Onagoruwa, a Yo-
ruba Christian who was once Nigeria’s federal minister of justice and attorney 
general, argued that the Nigerian Constitution trumps any other  legal code.6 
Particularly problematic for Christian- educated elites was the idea of equality 
between common law and sharia as competing  legal systems. As an editorial 
in the Lagos- based national newspaper the Weekend Concord put it: “Nigerian 
common law was created by Christians and was also imposed upon the Muslim 
community. But  there is a difference: common law can change and adapt to the 
needs of the time. Sharia does not change since it is believed to be the word 
of Allah.”7 The irony was not lost on many other Christian critics of expanded 
sharia that the constitutional provisions that granted the Northern Muslim 
states the right to legislate on  matters of jurisprudence was derived from com-
mon law that now would be prohibited  under expanded sharia.8
Unique among Nigerian states, indirect rule in Kaduna State had subju-
gated non- Hausa- Fulani indigenes (mostly Christians by the late colonial 
period) to the control of emirate rulers. If not de jure, aspects of this colonial 
imposition had continued de facto during the postcolonial period as Nigeria 
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went through vari ous po liti cal transformations. For Christians in Kaduna 
State, expanded sharia meant a forced return to an oppressive  legal system still 
fresh in the memories of local elders.9 Following the colonial imposition of 
earlier de cades, the lines of citizenship  were being redrawn; “by defining po-
liti cal self- determination in religious terms and excluding  others from central 
aspects of public legislation, Muslims redefine the demos that it is entitled to 
rule,” to the exclusion of Christians in Kaduna State.10 Clearly, such rigid  legal 
interpretation precluded any compromise. Christians who  were obviously 
concerned about the implications of expanded sharia argued that the modern 
pro cess of Islamization that the Hausa- Fulani po liti cal class was determined to 
impose must be stopped at all cost. Claims like  these had been commonplace 
in Nigeria’s po liti cal discourse. We  will recall that during the oic crisis in the 
1980s, Christian theologians and Southern commentators argued that Nigeria’s 
membership in the oic during the Babangida regime was an attempt by Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim rulers to dominate the country.11 Anti- sharia analyst Moni Odo 
Ngban pointed out that the push for expanded sharia by emirate rulers was the 
final confirmation of a trend that went back to the npc’s northernization and 
Islamization policies of the 1950s and  1960s.12 Moreover, since each North-
ern state implemented sharia differently, critics argued, the princi ple of Islamic 
unity was compromised, with serious  legal and po liti cal implications for state 
affairs throughout the country.13
Opponents of sharia  were also concerned that the reforms would under-
mine Nigeria’s nascent demo cratic transition.14 Although expanding Islamic 
law appeared to have popu lar appeal among Northern Muslims voters, oppo-
nents of sharia claimed that it would undermine Nigeria’s demo cratic princi-
ples  because sharia, by its very nature, stifles civil liberties and liberal values.15 
Indeed, some commentators suggested that the sharia movement was purpose-
fully erected to subvert the shift in presidential power to a Southern Christian, 
the Egba- Yoruba Olusegun Obasanjo.16 Consequently, Southern,  Middle  Belt 
and Northern minority Christians cloaked themselves as defenders of the Ni-
gerian demo cratic republic, keeping faith with the country’s nationalist and 
republican traditions,  going back to the colonial period.17 Expanded sharia, 
they asserted, would set a dangerous pre ce dent, indicating that majoritarian 
rule allowed state governments to enact nefarious Islamic laws that would 
trample on the constitutional rights of Christian minorities.18 In a cacophony 
of opposition to the Northern states’ sharia policies, prominent Nigerians 
from vari ous walks of life, most of them Christians, and even some “progres-
sive” Muslims registered strong objection to what they considered an assault on 
the Nigerian Constitution and the country’s vaunted “federal character.” One 
influential Pentecostal leader, Archbishop Abraham Oyeniran of the United 
Global Church Association of Nigeria, opined: “ There is no doubt that some 
 people are bent on seeing an end to this democracy.”19 Aishat Ismail, Nigeria’s 
minister for  women’s affairs and a Muslim  women’s rights activist, stated that 
the Northern states’ sharia policies  were a distraction from national develop-
ment and demo cratic consolidation.20
Prominent journalists including Tope Adeboye and Fred Egbe21 wrote essays 
that reproduced Southern anx i eties, contending that expanded sharia policies 
would deepen sectarianism and ethno- religious vio lence22 and accelerate Ni-
geria’s disintegration along ethno- religious lines.23 Southern- based Christian 
newsletters  were strident in their criticism, depicting the Zamfara State sharia 
initiative as a “Legislative Monster.”24 Unsubstantiated reports had it that the 
Northern Muslim states of Nigeria had mobilized funds to promote sharia in 
Southern states with substantial Muslim populations and thereby expand the 
po liti cal trou ble.25 Many sharia foes  were united in their concern that sharia 
would further reify ethno- religious identities and carve permanent fault lines 
in Nigeria’s fragile federal state. They feared that, just as colonial authorities 
had reinforced Northern Muslim rule, expanded sharia would permanently 
define rigid communal divisions along Christian- Muslim lines, dangerously 
undercutting the dynamic pro cess of social interaction that was beginning to 
emerge in the postcolonial era.26 In addition, mixed parentage, and the pres-
ence of other religions (particularly indigenous religious traditions and reli-
gious syncretism) scuttled any attempt to divide Nigerians into neat Christian 
and Muslim enclaves. Overlapping identities muddied the  water, particularly 
in the case of  Middle  Belt and Hausa Christians.27
Religious riots have been particularly severe since the 1980s in Kaduna 
State, where the population historically has been evenly divided between Mus-
lim and Christian indigenes; and the state’s Christian- Muslim divide is further 
complicated by the large proportion of Christian Southerners. The trend of 
religious conflict reemerged when the Kaduna State House of Assembly passed 
legislation to implement expanded Islamic law and thousands of Christians 
registered their opposition by flooding the government’s exploratory commit-
tee with petitions.28 This was followed by violent riots between Muslim and 
Christians.29 Igbo Christian traders in urban areas have always been vulnerable 
targets in Northern sectarian attacks.30 More than four hundred  people  were 
killed and property worth billions of naira destroyed following waves of at-
tacks and counterattacks in the state.31 Even the proposal by the Kaduna State 
government to create a new local government administration for Kataf com-
munities (that is, non- Hausa- Fulani Christian indigenes) was stiffly resisted by 
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Hausa- Fulani communities, who argued that such a move would encroach on 
their land; indeed, it ignited fresh communal vio lence32 in which more than 
three hundred  people  were killed and more than one thousand buildings  were 
destroyed.33 The Kaduna sharia riots exposed preexisting tensions, despite the 
state’s seeming cosmopolitan outlook.
Yoruba Christian analyst Ben Oguntuase’s account of the Kaduna riots cap-
tures the suffering of thousands of Nigerians caught in the sharia crossfire in 
Kaduna State. What began as a drive for Islamic law led to open communal 
vio lence and consequently a national debate on public safety and the constitu-
tional rights of Nigerian citizens. Revealing the extent of the crisis, Oguntuase 
recounts:
A soldier drove in a Mercedes Benz car into the station narrating how 
he was forced to seek refuge. Other vehicles started arriving with shat-
tered win dows. Then a man was brought in with a machete cut on his 
head. Two armed policemen escorted the victim to a hospital. It  will be 
a miracle if the man survived. The cut was deep and part of his brain was 
already gushing out. . . .  Four officers agreed to escort us, all . . .  armed. 
We formed a 10- vehicle convoy. A young police officer in mufti [North-
ern civilian clothes] volunteered to lead the convoy on a motorcycle. We 
headed for the Nigerian Defense Acad emy. All the way, we  were meeting 
re sis tance. The policemen fired sporadically into the air to clear the way. 
Red- hot roadblocks mounted by the rioters  were all along the route. As 
we approached a crowd, the policemen would fire into the air, the crowd 
would dis appear. As soon as the last vehicle passed, they would start haul-
ing stones at the convoy. Along the way we saw at least five roasted bodies.34
Religious vio lence was so severe that critics of the state government’s sharia 
policy called for the creation of separate neighborhoods based on fixed reli-
gious affiliations. But can condemned the idea as outrageous. Tony Uda, the 
organ ization’s state chairperson, dismissed the proposal: “All  those involved in 
such movements are promoting the disintegration of the nation.”35
Overall, the riots did more than destroy lives and property; they deepened 
communal suspicion in the state and  etched intolerance into national con-
sciousness.36 Eco nom ically, opponents of expanded Islamic law argued that the 
campaign for sharia was a costly program that diverted resources from pressing 
national priorities in economic development. Anti- sharia commentator Moni 
Odo Ngban said that sharia would further harm Northern Nigeria’s already 
fragile economy, as new regulations on the region’s weak industrial sector 
would put many out of work.37 Bee Debki, another anti- sharia analyst, argued 
that the sharia program was a “po liti cal gimmick” with which the masses of the 
Northern Muslim poor  were given the false hope of economic re distribution 
through the implementation of new sharia policies.38
Interparty dialogue may have produced positive outcomes on the sharia 
question. In Zamfara State, for example, the state’s opposition party (the pdp) 
called on the ruling party (the app) to drop its sharia program and face the 
challenge of community development.39 General Zamani Lekwot, a Christian 
Kataf stalwart and previous military governor of Rivers State, lamented the 
north- south development gap and held that it was the government’s respon-
sibility to invest in education reform instead of sharia. Condemnation of the 
Zamfara State government reached greater heights in the Yoruba states. The 
Lagos- based National Concord mocked Governor Sani: “What has happened 
to all the lofty election campaign promises made to the Zamfara electorate 
about better health care, improved infrastructure, good potable  water supply, 
qualitative education, and enhanced farming subventions?  These pragmatic 
programmes are now thrown into the dustbin in the mad chase for a religious 
El- Dorado [sic].”40
Christian leaders  were particularly concerned about the implications of 
sharia for the rights of Christian minorities in Northern states.41 In the highly 
contentious case of Niger State, with its substantial Christian population, the 
Right Rev. Jonah G. Kolo, Anglican bishop of Bida in the state capital and the 
state can chairman, urged national Christian leaders to protect Niger State’s 
Christian minorities against the state government’s expanded sharia policy.42 
Representing Christians, can also opposed the Kano State government’s 
sharia policy, arguing that the state’s implementation of sharia policy would 
undermine the rights of non- Muslims.43 A national Christian organ ization 
called the Eclectic Movement of Nigeria denounced the sharia- inspired attacks 
on Christians in Northern states.44 And Archbishop Peter Akinola, primate of 
the Nigerian Anglican Church, called for the withdrawal of state funding to 
religious groups.45
As would be expected, Nigeria’s vibrant Pentecostal movement posed the 
most vociferous Christian opposition to expanded sharia. Many Pentecostal 
leaders  were strongly against applying sharia to criminal law  because of its im-
pact on their church members in Northern states. Nigeria’s Pentecostal church 
movement reflected the shifting po liti cal, social, and economic realities that 
went hand in hand with moving from military rule to democracy. Drawing 
on new national and transnational networks, in which evangelical churches 
positioned themselves to engage in pressing national debates (see chapter 6), 
prominent Pentecostal leaders argued that expanded sharia was a cynical 
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 attempt to recover the North’s loss of presidential power following the demise 
of General Abacha’s regime.46 As they had done to confront the Abacha threat, 
Pentecostal leaders mobilized their members to confront a new menace of 
Zamfara sharia with the spiritual force of prayer. They presented Zamfara Gov-
ernor Sani as spearheading the evil mission to undermine Nigeria’s destiny as 
a prosperous demo cratic republic.47 The general superintendent of the Gospel 
Light Redemption Church, the Rev. Isaac Orihaki, attacked the federal legis-
lature for not protecting Christian minorities against the sharia policies of the 
Northern states.48
The challenge from the Pentecostal movement was most severe in the 
 Middle  Belt states and among Northern Christian minorities. In the case of the 
 Middle  Belt, Lubeck’s apt summary of how religious identity has  shaped po liti-
cal conflicts since the nineteenth  century is worth quoting at length:
From the 1980s  until  today [2011], the borderline regions with their mix 
of Christians and Muslims have been the site of bloody inter- communal 
vio lence. Ironically paralleling the Islamization pro cess, the pro cess of 
Christianization has served to unify smaller ethnic groups in this region 
and facilitated the formation of the common Christian identity in op-
position to a long- dominant Muslim rule. Christian memories of exploi-
tation by Muslim slave raiders in the precolonial era and discrimination 
since in de pen dence stoke grievances that found an effective voice in 
militant Pentecostal Chris tian ity. Historically, communal vio lence was 
based upon ethno- national (e.g. tribal) identities, but as religious identi-
ties became increasingly politicized and nurtured by militant global net-
works, religion gradually displaced ethnicity as an identity marker. . . .  The 
specific disputes provoking  these violent conflicts arose from many issues: 
conversion, land rights, mi grant rights, po liti cal reputation, control over 
schools, accusation of blasphemy, po liti cal patronage, Nigerian member-
ship in the Or ga ni za tion of Islamic Conference, state subsidies for the 
hajj and, of course, the place of sharia in the 1987/1988 constitution. In 
a classic example of mirror image victimization, each side accused the 
other of seeking to dominate, marginalize, and convert its opponents.49
The archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, visited Zamfara State, 
now widely recognized as the spiritual headquarters of Northern Nigeria’s 
sharia movement. During his visit, Williams expressed misgivings about harsh 
sharia punishments. Governor Sani defended his state policy, insisting that 
Zamfara’s expanded sharia policy enjoyed the support of the masses of local 
Muslims.50 In addition to Christian leaders, many prominent po liti cal leaders 
from Southern states actively opposed the Northern states’ expanded sharia 
policies  because they infringed on the constitutional rights of non- Muslim mi-
norities in Northern states.51 Vice President Atiku Abubakar, a Northern Mus-
lim from Adamawa (one of the two predominantly Muslim Northern states 
that did not impose expanded sharia), would drop the po liti cal bomb on the 
sharia  matter when he said that the sharia riots  were the upshot of po liti cal 
agendas: specifically, that Northern Muslim stalwarts  were determined to frus-
trate the presidency of Obasanjo, a Southern Christian, and cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of his pdp federal government.52
Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka was critical of the Northern states’ 
sharia policies and rendered scholarly views that reaffirmed the popu lar Christian 
arguments on the preeminence of national state secularity and citizenship. Soy-
inka told the nation that expanded sharia ipso facto nullifies Nigeria’s existing 
Penal Code and that it effectively threatened to destroy the  legal essence of the 
Nigerian federal republic. More pointedly, Soyinka wanted President Obasanjo 
to take  legal action against the twelve Northern states on grounds of criminal 
negligence; he said the governors  were neglecting their official responsibility to 
protect Christian minorities, “indigenes,” and Southern Christian immigrants 
caught in a vast network of religious irrationality.53 When the bloody Kaduna 
State riots erupted, state pdp leaders condemned app politicians for instigat-
ing the sharia movement for po liti cal gains. Since sharia prohibits interest rates, 
the new laws  were also opposed by commercial banks. When  those banks threat-
ened to pull their ser vices from Northern states following the promulgation of 
expanded sharia, the Zamfara State government announced that the state was 
on the verge of securing external assistance from Arab states to establish Islamic 
banks and that Saudi Arabia and Libya  were potential business partners.54
Some in ter est ing subdebates did occur among Christian groups and within 
Muslim leaderships. A minority of Christian leaders argued that religious 
institutions— including sharia courts— have impor tant roles to play in stem-
ming Nigeria’s rapidly slipping morality. For example, Olubi Docasta of Zaria’s 
Celestial Church of Christ argued that sharia could remedy the erosion of 
moral values and serve as an antidote for societal decay. Likewise, Frieder Lud-
wig points out that some Christian leaders contend expanded sharia is princi-
pally against “social vices” such as alcohol and gambling.55 He writes:
Conservative Nigerian Muslims and conservative Nigerian Christians 
often agree in the demand to ban “social vices,” and in their list of such 
vices both sides tend to include the consumption of alcohol, gambling, 
and homo sexuality— all issues which are tolerated within the Western 
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 legal systems. In addition, since Christians also witnessed the collapse 
of law and order in Nigeria and often have personal experiences of crime 
and corruption, many of them  favor severe punishments for criminals 
and advocate the death penalty and other harsh punishments.56
Other Christian critics thought that pro- sharia supporters  were self- 
righteous57 and that enforcement of new sharia laws would put undue pres-
sure on Nigeria’s already weak criminal justice system. Surprisingly, support for 
moderation in the pursuit of sharia came from an unlikely source in Sokoto 
State: the  grand qadi, who saw that sharia- derived alcohol regulations  were not 
enforceable,58 in part  because alcohol vendors in several Northern states had 
devised creative ways of packaging and selling alcoholic beverages.59 Per for-
mance evaluations of post- sharia policies showed that “social vices” targeted 
for elimination did not dis appear automatically; expanded sharia did not seri-
ously undermine prostitution, gambling, and alcohol distribution in Northern 
states, particularly in areas frequented by members of the armed forces.60 An 
article in the influential Britain- based periodical Africa Confidential indicated 
that  there was a rise in crime but no vis i ble reduction in poverty.61 Harnisch-
feger summed up  these apparent policy shortcomings of expanded Islamic law 
many years  after sharia’s imposition:
Divine justice has not materialized, so the masses of the faithful feel be-
trayed. Most of them had greeted the proclamation of Sharia with en-
thusiasm;  today they defy many of its laws. The official gender separation 
is ignored in most places, alcoholic drinks are readily available, and the 
usual vices are back, though relegated to some hidden corners. . . .  Sharia 
has created  legal insecurity; its criminal laws, dress codes and dietary 
taboos cover a wide area of social activities, but they are enforced only 
sporadically and arbitrarily.62
Some critics went further, not only divorcing sharia from the prevention 
of crime but also linking it to endemic corruption and po liti cal vice by em-
bedding it in the legacy of military rule.63 Nigerian Christian church leaders 
condemned sharia as not only violating the religious rights of Christians, but 
also leaving “unpunished the failings of the power ful and wealthy.”64 Harnisch-
feger contends that sharia allows for systematic corruption  under the guise of 
centralized zakat (alms) collection.65 The Southern Nigerian commentator Tee 
Mac sarcastically queried:
How is it that an unknown  cattle thief loses one arm for being caught 
and tried  under sharia, yet Mariam Abacha [former military ruler Sani 
Abacha’s  widow] lives comfortably in her huge mansion? And every body 
knows that she is one of the main actors in a multi- million dollar steal-
ing scam or looting of our trea sury.  Shouldn’t all  those around her who 
helped to defraud Nigeria of billions of dollars be tried in sharia courts 
in their respective states?66
For some observers, when the Southern- dominated National  Human Rights 
Commission gave support to expanded sharia with the provision that it would 
be enforced “on Muslims only,” the announcement struck a dismissive tone, 
something like “Let them do what they want with their  people.”67 This atti-
tude of disengaging from Northern Muslims is widely held by the Southern 
Christian intelligent sia, which argues Northern Islamic culture is antithetical 
to Southern Nigeria’s modernist  traditions.68
Anti- sharia critics noted many other areas of discrimination against Chris-
tians in emirate society.69 Ludwig cites how Christian hospitals and schools 
had been converted to Islamic institutions since the 1980s. He also describes 
a history of vio lence against Northern Christians and their exclusion from 
state office.70 When Niger State, with its significant Christian minority popula-
tion, expanded sharia, Reverend Kolo, can’s state chair, stated that “Christians 
have been witnessing systematic marginalization . . .  from se nior state appoint-
ment.”71 One prominent Christian critic cata logued Zamfara State’s discrimina-
tory mea sures:
no Christian held a position of authority in [Zamfara]. Even the Reli-
gious Affairs Ministry set up to look into relevant areas of the two re-
ligions had no Christian member/representative, yet  there are more 
than 77 qualified professionals who are indigenes and of the Christian 
faith. . . .  The radio station in the State has closed its doors to Christians. 
Commercials and paid adverts containing Christian lit er a ture are not 
aired. . . .  There is no Christian pilgrims’ welfare board. Other restric-
tions include churches not being allowed to be built on any land sold to 
them, and Christians being evicted from rented apartments and in some 
cases not getting  houses to rent.72
Conversely, Sani maintained that sharia would not have an adverse effect on 
non- Muslims  because he had established a good rapport with Christians, 
 established a Christian Complaints Commission, supported Christian pil-
grims, admitted Christian students to the state’s university, supported Christian 
education, and encouraged dialogue between Christians and Muslims.73 At the 
same time, however, Zamfara State paid the salaries of imams and funded the 
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building and maintenance of mosques, while many Christians  were forced to 
relocate outside the state, especially  those who ran nonsanctioned businesses.74 
In other Northern states, Christian critics insisted that non- Muslims  were 
subjected to justice  under sharia.75 Moreover, the resources of Northern state 
governments  were used to promote vari ous Muslim activities at the expense of 
Christian groups. As Ludwig writes:
Katsina can leaders pointed out that the admission of Christians to pub-
lic secondary schools in the state is very difficult if not impossible. Thus, 
Christians have to send their  children to other states to get post- primary 
education. Moreover, Christians cannot enroll in the army and head 
major establishments or institutions. When the time comes for them to 
occupy higher positions, Muslim ju niors are imposed on them or they 
are transferred to other places to occupy subordinate positions.  There 
is no provision for Christian programs on the state radio and tele vi sion 
stations. The ban on public preaching seems to apply only to Christians. 
Most importantly, application for building plots for Churches are sel-
dom approved and Christians are often denied burial grounds.76
In addition to the task of dealing with cases of discrimination, most Christians 
found it difficult to tolerate the moral implications of what they considered a 
medieval penal code that was undermining the pro gress of their country. While 
Northern Muslims asserted sharia’s humanity, Christians claimed that its dra-
conian rules, outlined in the Penal Code, proved Islamic law promoted cruel 
and inhumane punishment.77 This sentiment permeated the Southern Christian 
print media. For example, the Lagos- based National Concord editorialized: “The 
proclamation of sharia and the series of reports about public flogging of adults, 
the Governor’s threat to expel the local military formation in the state and the 
specter of beheadings, amputations, honor killings and stoning to death which 
form part of Islamic Hudud gave a picture of Iran rather than a state in the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria.”78 Yoruba Christian commentator Fred Agbaje, 
in reference to Zamfara, drew on the Western concept of natu ral law to con-
demn the reforms.79 Elsewhere, Southern Christian commentator Festus Obin 
thundered: “In this twenty- first  century when  every country on planet earth is 
working hard to be technologically recognized, it would be shameful for any 
geo graph i cal enclave or living space to contemplate the introduction of sharia, 
a  fourteenth  century code of conduct.”80
Built into  these condemnations was a streak of paternalism, often asso-
ciated with the Western- oriented Southern Christian elite, especially from 
public intellectuals, who predominated in Nigeria’s influential Lagos- Ibadan 
news corridor. The most scathing condescension by Southern Christians was 
reserved for one of emirate society’s most dominant social institutions, the 
almajiri system of Qu’ranic education. They denounced this age- old system as 
a reflection of the decay of emirate urban life. To  these detractors, almajiri re-
tarded the development of Northern states, especially at a time when modern 
education was essential for the modernization of Nigerian society.81 However, 
the almajiri system has a long history in Northern Nigeria, dating back de cades 
before the Sokoto Jihad, and is integral to the con temporary Qu’ranic educa-
tional system, in which Muslim teachers (mallams) retain control over their 
student wards.82 Many scholars have implicated the almajiri system in the wave 
of religious riots in Northern states from the 1980s onward, especially the ‘Yan 
tatsine riots of the 1980s, the ethno- religious riots in Zangon- Kataf in the early 
1990s, the sporadic religious riots in the 1990s, the sharia riots of 2000–2002,83 
and Boko Haram attacks since 2008. Indeed, allegations of the almajiri harass-
ing female students at Kaduna Polytechnic in July 2000 appeared to confirm 
some of  these critics’ contentions.84 Thus, many Southern,  Middle  Belt and 
Northern Christians viewed Northern Muslim commoners as being in need 
of liberation from their scheming rulers, who imposed a backward  legal 
system to advance narrow po liti cal agendas.85 One anti- sharia editorial in the 
Lagos- based National Concord notes: “The almajiris, urchins, the poor and the 
oppressed should now be rescued before it is too late.”86 However, this conde-
scension from Southern Christian commentators is ironic, too: they are arguing 
that the Northern Muslim poor must be “saved” from the system enacted by the 
very po liti cal leaders they elected.
Substantial opposition also was mounted against expanded sharia through es-
tablished national public agencies. A notable illustration of this was carried out 
through the National Youth Ser vice Corp (nysc), the mandatory national 
integration and development ser vice program established by the Gowon 
regime in 1973. The nysc promoted national integration by dispatching its 
new recruits to communities far removed from their birthplace. However, 
following Zamfara’s sharia declaration, some Southern government officials 
expressed a lack of confidence in the Northern states’ ability to ensure the con-
stitutional rights of non- Muslims and discouraged nysc recruits from their 
states from taking up their postings in Northern states.87 Since this program 
had become critical to the provision of essential ser vices to most states, Sani 
intervened, promising Zamfara’s nysc members permanent appointment in 
the state civil ser vice.88
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Expanded Sharia: National and Global Connections
In their analyses of Nigeria’s post-1999 sharia movement, Paul Lubeck, Ron-
nie Lipshutz, and Erik Weeks argued that economic globalization and “global 
Islam” are “mutually constitutive forces.” As globalization disrupts the rela-
tions between state and society, they contend, nation- states with strong ethno- 
religious groups and weak state system such as Nigeria, experience uncertainty 
that can encourage the resurgence of Islamist movements. In Northern Nigeria, 
this pro cess had, in fact, started with the reformism of Izala in the 1980s, especially 
among younger, upwardly mobile Muslims. Consequently, Lubeck, Lipshutz, and 
Weeks contend that reformist Islamic movements like Izala provided the impetus 
for Nigeria’s sharia movement in the formative years of the Fourth Republic.89
With  these national and global connections, the sharia crisis thus compli-
cated the old ethno- regional and ethno- religious alliances that have sustained 
power configurations from decolonization in the 1950s to the period of mili-
tary rule in the 1990s. Indeed, during the previous military regime, fringe 
militant Southern po liti cal movements had gained prominence as impor tant 
ethno- regional movements opposing the perceived Hausa- Fulani Muslim dom-
ination of national politics. One such group was the Yoruba militia movement, 
the Oodua  Peoples Congress (opc). Formed in 1993  after General Babangida 
annulled Abiola’s election as president, opc embarked on a militant agitation 
program for “Yoruba freedom” that reached its peak in the late 1990s.90 In 
response to such intense identity politics, several Niger Delta militia groups, 
especially Ijaw, also solidified their power during military rule in the 1990s on 
the injustice over the exploitation of oil from the Niger Delta region.91 Follow-
ing the trend set by  these groups, many Christian organ izations took on more 
deci ded opposition as the sharia crisis intensified in the Northern states. With 
the apparent weakness of Nigerian state authorities, Southern,  Middle  Belt 
and Northern Christian organ izations forged global alliances to confront the 
Northern states’ expanded sharia policies.
However, with the exception of Pentecostal churches, Nigerian Christian 
denominations seemed to gain  little from their global connections. Thus, the 
Vatican worked for peace, but had  little influence on the country’s diverse 
Christian communities. Even worse, doctrinal differences drove a wedge between 
Nigerian and Western Protestant clergy, leaving the latter in effec tive during 
the sharia crisis. For example, Nigeria’s chief Anglican, Archbishop Akinola, 
was joined by his charismatic Ugandan colleague, Bishop Orombi, to lead a 
global opposition of conservatives in the Anglican Communion (mostly from 
the Global South) against the liberal theological doctrines of Western Anglican 
churches.92 While denouncing the liberalism of Western Anglican and Epis-
copalian churches, the out spoken Akinola also led a strong opposition against 
expanded sharia in Nigeria’s Northern states.93 The effect of  these divergent 
ideological perspectives had been to separate Nigerian mainline churches from 
their potential allies in the West, crippling the latter’s ability to have an impor-
tant influence on Nigeria’s sharia crisis. When the archbishop of Canterbury vis-
ited Zamfara State in his capacity as titular head of the global Anglican Church 
in February 2001, the impact of his lobbying for Christian rights was minimal.94
Nevertheless, Nigerian opponents of sharia drew a contrast between Is-
lamic and international law, particularly the global treaties and  human rights 
agreements to which Nigeria is a signatory,95 including the African Charter on 
 Human and Peoples’ Rights, the un Universal Declaration on  Human Rights, 
and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against  Women. 
Agitation by activists following the first court- ordered amputation in Zamfara 
State led the Committee for the Defense of  Human Rights to petition the 
state government.96 Furthermore, detractors of sharia challenged the claims of 
sharia advocates that expanded sharia had been effective in other countries.97 
For example, in an editorial in the Lagos- based weekly magazine Tempo, an 
analyst argued that many countries that experienced Islamist revolutions in 
recent de cades  were now retreating from it.98
Equally, while expanded sharia seemed to have popu lar appeal in North-
ern Muslim states, many emirate leaders  were ambivalent about the new poli-
cies  because of their potential to destabilize the country. Indeed, misgivings 
for expanded sharia sometimes came from unexpected sources. For example, 
Ibrahim Zakzaky, the popu lar reformist Muslim cleric who led a militant op-
position against the emirate establishment during the Abacha regime, claimed 
that strong Christian re sis tance meant that Nigeria was not ready for this type 
of reform; Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, an influential emirate potentate and Muslim 
scholar who was installed as emir of Kano in 2014, argued that sharia must 
stick to its primary thrust of social justice, which the current codifications had 
not done.99  These discordant voices provide a glimpse into some Northern 
Muslim ambivalence over expanded sharia.
Religious Reconciliation and Coexistence
Despite the clarity of the  battle lines between pro- sharia and anti- sharia ad-
vocates, especially in Kaduna State, a quiet transition took place in many of 
the twelve Northern states between October 1999, when Governor Sani first 
introduced expanded sharia, and late March 2000, when many on both sides 
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of the conflict began to moderate their strong positions. This trend  toward rec-
onciliation  after the devastation in Kaduna State was apparent when several 
Northern Muslim states deci ded to moderate some of sharia’s harshest provi-
sions and some Christian leaders grudgingly accepted that Islamic law reflected 
aspects of Northern Muslim identity.
With the devastating consequences of the religious rift, many antagonists 
and protagonists in the confrontation  were compelled to moderate their po-
sition on Islamic law. Many Northern Muslim leaders  were more ambivalent 
 because of the cost of expanded sharia to national unity.100 For example, fol-
lowing the announcement of Sokoto State’s expanded sharia policy, the state 
government convened a committee of Muslim clerics led by the  grand qadi 
to investigate its implementation. This committee recommended that state 
authorities postpone the implementation of sharia so that the government 
could educate local  people about the new laws.101 Although this plea went un-
heeded, state authorities took on a moderate position, especially with regard to 
implementing the policy for Christian minorities. Also,  because of the po liti-
cal crisis, many Southern Christian elites  were willing to concede if the official 
interpretation of sharia was more “progressive.”102 Thus, the fallout from the 
sharia riots, especially in Kaduna State, forced Christian leaders to embrace the 
idea of a more moderate sharia policy that would re spect the rights of Chris-
tian minorities in Northern states. Consequently, the backlash from the sharia 
conflict temporarily encouraged some Christian leaders to embrace a more 
centrist position as the sharia crisis intensified.103 Progressive Northern theo-
logian Dr. Matthew Hassan Kukah of the Catholic Secretariat seemed to have 
accepted the idea of a partial expansion of sharia at a Jama’atu Nasril (jni) sem-
inar in February 2000. Even the relatively shrill Eclectic Movement released 
a ten- point statement that only denounced the vio lence of sharia riots, while 
acknowledging the pre ce dent for Islamic law in the Nigerian judicial system.104
With the transfer of presidential power to Obasanjo, a Yoruba Christian, 
Southern Christians, especially Obasanjo’s Yoruba coethnics, soon felt it ben-
eficial to tone down their strong opposition to expanded sharia. Indeed, the 
unique Yoruba experience with Chris tian ity and Islam was called upon in this 
regard.105 With the tragic religious riots in the Northern and  Middle  Belt states, 
the remarks of a po liti cal scientist at Sokoto’s Usman dan Fodio University ef-
fectively captured this softening conciliatory trend: “For the Hausa, Islam is a 
total way of living. For the Yoruba, it’s not a total way of living. The cultural 
aspects of the Yoruba are stronger than religion,  whether it’s Chris tian ity or 
Islam.”106 A New York Times journalist quoting him may have exaggerated the 
affinity between Yoruba Christians and Muslims: “Indeed, Yoruba Christians 
and Muslims marry each other without a second thought. It is not unusual for 
Yoruba to have members of both faiths in their families; some even practice 
both religions. But among Northerners, being a Christian Hausa is considered 
a contradiction in terms.”107 This relative balance between the world of Yoruba 
traditions and Islam is evident in the writings of prominent Yoruba Muslim 
intellectuals such as Lateef Adegbite, the Yoruba secretary-general of Nigeria’s 
leading Islamic organ ization, Jamat- Ul- Islamiyya; and Tajudeen Gbadamosi, 
a renowned scholar of Islam at the University of Lagos.108 Fi nally, the biggest 
catalyst to general moderation was one that moved all actors alike:  after more 
than a de cade of recurring conflict, the impasse created by the sharia crisis en-
couraged a rapprochement among vari ous religious and po liti cal groups.
Consequently, many national and regional organ izations intervened to 
find solutions to the conflict. For example, a co ali tion of civil society organ-
izations joined forces with traditional rulers and religious groups to press 
for a comprehensive peace arrangement. Five Northern states si mul ta neously 
agreed to suspend their plans to implement their sharia proj ects in order to 
mitigate additional episodes of bloody religious clashes.109 Additionally, in-
terfaith efforts expanded considerably. In a public show of solidarity, Muslim 
groups invited Christians on pilgrimages to Mecca. can and jni publicized 
a joint peace agreement that underscored the common brotherhood between 
Christians and Muslims, though it also condemned the po liti cal manipulations 
undergirding the sharia crisis.110 National seminars and conferences  were or ga-
nized by vari ous civic and religious organ izations to chart pathways to recon-
ciliation.111 Several Pentecostal churches urged peaceful coexistence between 
Christians and Muslims.112 The federal government established the Nigerian 
Inter- Religious Council, and Yusuf Ameh Obaje was appointed as national co-
ordinator.113 Several prominent intellectuals proposed an Acad emy of Peace to 
design a moral code for religious reconciliation between Nigerian Christians 
and Muslims.114 One such regional dialogue included a Catholic priest, a Pen-
tecostal theologian, and a Muslim cleric.115 Indeed, Christians and Muslims 
throughout Nigeria joined in a cross- country initiative for peace; prominent 
Igbo Christians such as B. O. Nwabueze embarked on personal missions to en-
gage Muslim organ izations in dialogue;116 and among leading Yoruba Muslims, 
Lateef Adegbite devoted extensive time to calls for peace and reconciliation.117
Catholic and Protestant bishops called on church leaders to teach reconcili-
ation and peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims.118 Pastor Ade-
boye, the influential leader of the power ful Pentecostal church the Redeemed 
Christian Church of God, counseled Christians against carry ing out reprisals 
on mosques and Muslim institutions.119 The celebrated  human rights  lawyer 
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Gani Fawehinmi, a Yoruba Muslim, sued for peace and advised the government 
to investigate the religious riots.120 In a burst of uncharacteristic self- awareness, 
public figures on both sides of the sharia divide said they wanted an end to media 
sensationalism that exacerbated religious divisions in Northern states.121
One of the most dramatic consequences of the sharia imposition was the 
flight of local capital from Northern states. Zamfara State saw a massive exodus 
of Igbo traders. As a result also, local banks saw savings evaporate, numerous 
businesses vanish, and markets shrink.122 Moreover, when sharia came into 
force, financial ser vices  were no longer able to charge or bear interest, which 
further displaced banks and other financial institutions from Northern states 
and brought to a halt businesses that depended on credit and loans. Addition-
ally, everyday economic transactions  were seriously impeded by sharia’s strict 
requirement to separate local communities on the bases of gender;  women of 
all faiths attempting to take okada (the motorcycle public transportation)  were 
harassed by vigilante sharia enforcers, effectively barring half of the popula-
tion from the only affordable means of transportation in Northern communi-
ties.123 In Kaduna State, as a result of the riots, over forty thousand Southerners 
fled, including numerous students, leaving the state’s universities empty, and 
skyrocketing gas prices prompted bus  drivers to charge exorbitant prices for 
transit, adding to the general economic chaos.124 State government losses  were 
compounded when churches affected by the vio lence sued for damages,  after 
state authorities promised to reimburse 20  percent of the reconstruction costs 
of destroyed places of worship.125
Nigeria’s international image was of course compromised by the recurrent 
vio lence. Conscious of the harm to foreign investment, the federal government 
hired international public relations firms to reassure Western partners that Ni-
geria was still safe for business. Professor Tam David- West, a former petroleum 
minister from the Niger Delta region, captured the sentiments of most observ-
ers on the economic implications of the sharia crisis:
The collective madness and sadism displayed on the screens of global 
tele vi sion cannot be inviting signals for foreign investments in our limp-
ing economy. Only a compound fool or a mad entrepreneur  will invest 
in a country with doubtful sociopo liti cal stability; a country so primi-
tive in the manifestation of its hate. And no amount of foreign globe- 
trotting or sweet sermons and beautiful assurances for investment in our 
economy can impress any serious prospective businessman. It’s as  simple 
as that. Is this the Nigeria that anyone should be proud of ? Is this the 
Nigeria whose “positive” image (laundered, obviously) we want to sell to 
the  outside world, inviting them with open arms, to bask in the sunshine 
of a said fledgling democracy? We should all hide our heads in shame.126
Much of the debate that ensued following the imposition of sharia in the 
Northern states effectively tilted national attention  toward the parlous state of 
po liti cal instability and massive economic disruption in pro- sharia states. Many 
analysts also said that sharia was a grossly misplaced priority given the severe 
underdevelopment of Northern states. In responding to criticisms,127 Zamfara 
Governor Sani unveiled an ambitious state development policy. Many of the 
sharia states followed the Zamfara example, publicizing vari ous social welfare 
programs. In fact, the Bauchi government suspended the implementation of its 
sharia policy  because it diverted resources away from essential social ser vices.128 
 These policy pronouncements may have been motivated by po liti cal expediency 
rather than a genuine commitment to development, but at least the sharia con-
flict provoked a new discourse on governance in some Northern states.129
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Following many years of repressive military rule, the euphoria that welcomed 
the arrival of Olusegun Obasanjo’s pdp federal government turned into de-
spair when the sharia crisis became a platform for prolonged religious vio lence 
in Northern states. With the federal government unable to provide security 
for Christian minorities in Northern states, Southern activists together with 
irate Christian leaders in Northern and  Middle  Belt states  were dismayed 
that Obasanjo’s federal government had no effective response to the crisis.1 Rt. 
Rev. Peter Jatau, Anglican bishop of Kaduna, chastised Obasanjo’s government 
for remaining  silent while the state was consumed by religious vio lence. He 
blamed Obasanjo for inaction: “This ambivalence  will not do. The President 
must tell the sharia  people  whether what they are  doing is permitted in the 
Constitution. He must make a declaration now before it is too late.”2 Catho-
lic archbishop Okogie advised Christian groups to shame the government 
into positive action.3 Rev.  Isaac Orihaki, general superintendent of the Gos-
pel Light Redemption Church, a popu lar evangelical church, supported pub-
lic reaction against Obasanjo’s administration, but also argued that the federal 
legislature had been negligent in tackling the crisis.4 Anger at the Obasanjo 
c h a p t er  n i n e
s h a r i a  p o li t i c s ,  o ba s a n j o ’ s 
p d p  fed er a l  g ov er n m en t, 
a n d  t h e  1999  co n st i t u t i o n
federal government reached a boiling point as sharia vio lence escalated in Feb-
ruary and March 2000: Obumna Abiakam, a well- known attorney, sued Presi-
dent Obasanjo in court for negligence, arguing that the president had a duty to 
demonstrate that the Northern states’ expanded sharia policies  were unconsti-
tutional.5 Ben Nwakanma, a prominent Owerri  lawyer (in the southeast Igbo 
region), also sued the government and asked for the resignation of the federal 
attorney general.6 The Catholic archbishop of Owerri, the Rev. Dr. Anthony 
Obinna, expressed his disappointment in the federal government’s failure to 
protect Igbo (Christian) settlers in Northern Muslim states.7 Bishop Abraham 
Oyeniran, a prominent Pentecostal leader, also sued the government, saying 
that President Obasanjo’s delay in dealing with the crisis had compromised 
public safety.8 Equally revealing of public frustration about perceived federal 
government ineptitude, Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka blamed Obasanjo for al-
lowing a  legal dilemma to become an intractable po liti cal crisis.9
In hindsight, Obasanjo’s tardiness in responding to the crisis might have 
been the product of a complex po liti cal calculus. Two  factors, not mutually 
exclusive, seemed to have  shaped Obasanjo’s response as the crisis intensified in 
2000 and 2001. The first can be observed in the contingent nature of party po liti-
cal alignment  after the transition from military rule to demo cratic government at 
the turn of the  century. Although the president is a Yoruba Christian, Yoruba po-
liti cal networks had long been suspicious of him; his election had largely been 
engineered without their support; instead, Obasanjo depended on po liti cal 
support from Northern Muslim power brokers as well as the po liti cal class of 
the Igbo, Niger Delta, Cross River, and  Middle  Belt regions. Obasanjo was hes-
itant to engage the fight on sharia, perhaps  because of the fear that such a move 
would alienate his most coveted constituency in the core Northern states. Sec-
ond, Obasanjo was reluctant to hand the sharia  matter to the Supreme Court 
for a constitutional solution  because it was assumed that a  legal quashing of 
Northern Muslim aspirations would intensify the conflict, particularly along 
ethno- religious lines, if the Hausa- Fulani po liti cal class interpreted a decision 
as a product of Southern Christian po liti cal assertiveness.10 According to Mur-
ray Last, such a move would cause “populist pandemonium” in the core North-
ern Muslim states.11 Or, in Johannes Harnischfeger’s formulation: “If a Christian 
[Southern Yoruba] president had attempted to outlaw sharia, this would have 
stirred up millions of [Northern] Muslims against the central government.”12 
Besides, many Hausa- Fulani Muslims already viewed the Constitution itself 
as illegitimate, therefore a  legal decision derived from that document prob-
ably would have had  little moral authority and could have even backfired by 
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deepening the divisions. Even worse,  were Obasanjo to challenge sharia in the 
Supreme Court and lose, the result would have been disastrous.13 He opted, in-
stead, for a po liti cal solution, which he said would “end up without any victor 
or vanquished,” co- opting the hugely successful reconciliation slogan that was 
 adopted by Gowon’s military regime  after the civil war.14 With so much at stake 
for their long- term interest, Obasanjo felt that Nigeria regional power brokers 
would ultimately embark on a po liti cal compromise to resolve the sharia crisis.
Sharia and the 1999 Nigerian Constitution: Contending Issues
Mohammed Bello, a former Nigerian chief justice and the most prominent 
Northern jurist, had once argued that while major provisions in the Nigerian 
Constitution limited the scope of sharia, many  legal princi ples in the same 
document also empowered it.15 Many Nigerian lawmakers at the national as-
sembly agreed with Bello and cited his views in the debates that unfolded in 
the federal legislature.16 Principally, the debates on sharia  were not always de-
fined along strict ideological, partisan, or ethno- religious lines; for example, 
while President Obasanjo, the Christian Yoruba pdp leader, felt that expanded 
sharia was largely unconstitutional, Balarabe Musa, the noted radical socialist 
governor of Kaduna State during the Second Republic, saw sharia as superior 
to the Constitution.  These two renowned national figures held views on sharia 
that reflect the complexities of defining the sharia crisis along conventional ide-
ological, religious, or regional lines. The fierce conflict hinged on  whether the 
Constitution ultimately had authority over sharia or  whether sharia retained an 
infallible  legal authority over Nigeria’s Muslim citizens. Former federal minister 
of justice Olu Onagoruwa, a Yoruba Christian, contended that as the Consti-
tution was Nigeria’s ultimate  legal document, all other  legal systems must defer 
to it. For Onagoruwa, therefore, by expanding sharia the twelve Northern state 
governments had subverted the Constitution, leaving the federal government 
no other choice but to challenge the constitutionality of sharia through ap-
propriate  legal channels. Similarly, interpreting Islamic jurisprudence, analyst 
Jemila Nasir noted that sharia (as “God’s law”) places sovereignty in Allah, 
violating the basic tenet that the Constitution is sovereign over the Nigerian 
state.17 Conversely, Islamic  legal scholar Abdulmumini Adebayo Oba writes: 
“Islamic law, having accepted the sovereignty of Allah and His Laws, cannot ac-
cept the ‘supremacy’ of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the  people.”18 
Furthermore, Governor Sani, the lightning rod for all  those who opposed ex-
panded sharia, underscored the supremacy of sharia over the  legal affairs of 
Nigerian Muslims. Affirming Sani’s position, the emir of Ilorin, Alhaji Ibrahim 
Sulu Gambari, drew extensively from the Qur’an and hadith to challenge the 
secular state argument, contending that in Nigeria’s religiously plural society, 
the Constitution gives Muslims the right to be governed by expanded sharia.19 
Indeed, Northern Muslim opposition to the secularity argument had consis-
tently featured in  these debates even before the sharia crisis of 1999. For in-
stance, in a debate in the 1980s, Northern analyst Ibrahim Suleiman described 
the secularity of the Nigerian state in rather colorful language. Nigerian secu-
larity, he proposed, is “a child, albeit a bastard, of Chris tian ity . . .  [that] has 
become a sinister but con ve nient mechanism to blackmail Muslims and im-
pede the pro gress of Islam.”20  Others simply traced the roots of common law to 
Christian traditions.21
Despite the strong Northern Muslim opposition to the idea of Nigerian 
state secularity, influential Southern Christian  legal analysts continue to ex-
ercise considerable influence in the debate on the role of sharia. For example, 
 legal scholar Vincent Nmehielle looks at section IV of the 1999 Constitution 
and proceeds to pres ent two primary questions at the core of the debates on 
the sharia conflict.22 He argues that the imposition of a comprehensive sharia 
policy in the Northern states undermines the role of the Constitution to medi-
ate the jurisdiction between federal and state authorities. Nmehielle further 
contends that expanded sharia “encroaches on fundamental  human rights 
guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution and in vari ous international treaties 
and conventions that Nigeria is party to.”23 He also observes: “Freedom of reli-
gion is not an absolute freedom, but one that is limited by another individual’s 
freedom in that one person’s freedom to practice his or her own religion cannot 
legally impede another’s freedom.”24 Nmehielle concludes:
The zeal and determination of the twelve northern governors to provide 
leadership to Nigerian Moslems through the implementation of the 
Sharia are insensitive to the balance required. . . .  The po liti cal zeal of a 
par tic u lar leader on an issue that has overwhelming sectarian support 
must be expressed within the confines of the Constitution no  matter 
how strong that zeal may be. It does not justify taking “unconstitutional 
mea sures” for the sake of providing sectarian leadership.25
Given the serious contradiction between the expanded sharia policies of the 
twelve Northern states and the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, the analyses that 
follow  will explore major national challenges posed by expanded sharia to the 
Nigerian state and society in the Fourth Republic.
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Sharia and  Women’s Rights in Historical Perspective
Nigeria’s anti- sharia and  human rights advocates have long been concerned 
that expanded sharia poses severe threats to the constitutional rights of  women 
and girls, particularly since unrestricted Islamic law excludes  women from pub-
lic office, positions of authority, and personal interactions with men not their 
relatives. On this, expanded sharia contravenes the constitutional guarantee of 
equal rights to all Nigerian citizens.26 One critical editorial in a Lagos- based 
newspaper, the National Concord, amplified this constitutional anomaly: “In 
our encounter with the Governor [of Zamfara], we  were surprised when he 
said two  women  were equivalent to one man especially in serving as witnesses 
in a sharia court.”27 Even the most casual observer of Nigerian society would be 
aware that expanded Islamic law is not particularly attentive to  women’s rights in 
Northern communities and that the application of expanded sharia to the every-
day lives of  women is problematic in the context of a modernizing society. This 
systemic marginalization of  women through expanded sharia has a long history 
in emirate Northern Nigeria,  going back to the Sokoto Jihad in the early nine-
teenth  century.
Historians of Northern Nigeria generally agree that local my thol ogy rec-
ognized  women’s participation in the royal courts of many Hausa city- states; 
for example, Hausa oral traditions show that in a few notable cases, such as the 
warrior Queen Amina of Zaria, a few  women retained considerable power in 
Hausa city- states.28  Women’s power, however, steadily eroded in public affairs 
with the growth of Islam from the sixteenth  century, and was severely curtailed 
 after the Sokoto Jihad in the nineteenth  century.29 However, it is noteworthy 
that  there is some scattered information about the role of  women in public 
affairs, despite the restrictions imposed by the reform of the jihadists in the 
early years of the Sokoto Caliphate. A perusal of the works of the found ers of 
the new Islamic confederacy— notably Usman dan Fodio; his  brother, Abdu-
lahi; his son, Mohammed Bello; and his  daughter, Nana Asma’u— confirm that 
some  women performed impor tant roles in the new emirate communities dur-
ing the jihad and immediately  after the establishment of the caliphate.30 Kath-
leen McGarvey says that while  women supported the military efforts of the 
jihadists through impor tant domestic activities, such as nursing the wounded 
and feeding the fighting men in Usman dan Fodio’s jihad, leading reformists 
also highlighted the need to incorporate  women into the new emirate society.31
Nevertheless, Barbara Callaway argues that the institutionalization of sharia 
 after the Sokoto Jihad significantly curtailed the rights of  women in critical 
 family  matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody of  children. 
As emirs and members of their courts dominated public institutions, Hausa 
 women, as  mothers and wives,  were effectively relegated to the  house hold, 
further marginalizing them. This pro cess was particularly apparent in Hausa 
marriage practices that continued  after the Sokoto Jihad. In many local com-
munities, marriages are arranged, usually with a bride price. Although divorce 
was easy to obtain and carried  little stigma, it generally favored husbands.32
Within the colonial system of indirect rule and the colonial cash- crop econ-
omy,  women’s autonomy in the public sphere was further curtailed. For exam-
ple, the practice of wife seclusion seems to have grown in response to the new 
colonial economic system, in which rigid gender roles became an essential part 
of a cotton- and groundnut- export- oriented economy. In addition, as emirate 
society embraced greater religiosity in re sis tance to colonial rule,  women’s role 
outside of male- headed  house holds was severely curtailed in local communi-
ties, and their voices  were marginalized in the leadership of the two dominant 
Sufi  orders in the region— the qadiriyya and the tijaniyya.33
This entrenched gendered structure continued in the relationship between 
men and  women of all social classes since the period of decolonization in the 
1950s. In postcolonial emirate communities, elite  women, for example, who 
 because of minor government reforms embrace  careers in the modern profes-
sions, are sometimes alienated in a deeply patriarchal emirate society. In short, 
over the centuries, ideology, religion, marriage, law, and culture have systemati-
cally circumscribed  women and girls’ lives, effectively subordinating them to men 
and boys in Northern Nigerian Muslim society.34
Despite the entrenched patriarchal practices of emirate society, an increas-
ing number of  women and some male allies have consistently resisted male 
domination, especially since the late colonial period. During decolonization, 
re sis tance to the domination of the patriarchal masu sarauta was carried out 
by their rival, the Northern Ele ments Progressive Union (nepu), especially 
in Isa Wali’s commentaries in Gaskiya, the popu lar Hausa newspaper in the 
1950s and 1960s. Wali insisted that in Islam,  women and men have equal rights 
and the marginalization of emirate  women had more to do with local cultural 
practices. While this position achieved limited success in the strug gle against 
the dominant emirate po liti cal party, the Northern  Peoples Congress (npc), 
progressive po liti cal activists have drawn from this enduring tradition to shape 
con temporary social realities since the attainment of in de pen dence in 1960. For 
instance, nepu’s ideological successor during Nigeria’s failed Second Repub-
lic (1979–1983), the  Peoples Redemption Party (prp), though dominated by 
a male leadership, embraced this perspective in its support for comprehensive 
education for both boys and girls in emirate society. In one form or the other, 
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Hausa- Fulani  women’s organ izations have drawn from  these narratives at the 
intersecting histories of marginalization and re sis tance, especially since the de-
colonization pro cess.
 Women made some impor tant inroads into the public sphere of Northern 
Muslim society  after the introduction of the Federal Military Government’s 
Universal Primary Education (upe) scheme and the 1979 constitutional re-
forms that gave Northern Nigerian  women the right to vote.35  After Nigeria 
signed the treaty of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against  Women (cedaw) in 1984 (ratified in 1985), the Federation of Mus-
lim  Women’s Association of Nigeria (fomwan) was established, and many 
Muslim  women’s groups emerged to articulate the concerns of Nigerian Mus-
lim  women.36 However, in con temporary emirate society, Islam continues to 
impact social relations in divergent ways, and  women consistently have devel-
oped creative strategies to counteract patriarchal traditions that are embed-
ded in religious structures.37 Thus, a key aspect of the discussion on expanded 
sharia is how to engage the rights of  women, both within Islamic jurisprudence 
and the wider rights of citizenship guaranteed by the Constitution. Callaway 
argues that many Northern Nigerian  women feel that progressive change is 
most expedient if they avoid Western feminist discourse and strategically ar-
ticulate their re sis tance politics within the framework of Islamic law and prac-
tice.38 This is the perspective taken by a group of Northern Muslim  women 
who challenged the patriarchal voice that dominated the implementation of 
expanded sharia in the twelve Northern states, especially in two landmark zina 
cases where two talakawa  women, Safiya Hussaini (October 2001) and Amina 
Lawal (March 2002),  were charged with adultery as the sharia crisis raged on 
in Northern states.
Thus, the impact of expanded sharia on  women’s rights exploded onto the 
national and international scene following the sentence of death by stoning 
of  these two  women for the crime of zina (adultery, fornication) when they 
became pregnant outside of marriage in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The de-
tails surrounding  these cases are complicated, but  here it suffices to explain that 
both  women  were divorcées, and the men alleged to have fathered their un-
born  children denied paternity  under oath and  were acquitted  because of lack 
of evidence to prosecute them in accordance with sharia. As the controversy 
engulfed the country, anti- sharia advocates, reinforced by the fierce opposition 
of Nigerian and international  women’s and  human rights groups, argued that 
the death sentence underscored the main objections to expanded sharia: that 
is, the strict application of sharia to criminal law is incompatible with modern 
ideas of  human and civil rights that have evolved in Nigerian jurisprudence 
since the colonial period. Nevertheless,  these cases set the stage for “a vitriolic 
confrontation between international  human rights and  women’s group and 
sharia advocates.”39
Following many tense months, the two  women  were eventually acquitted 
on appeal through the hard work of a group of Nigerian  women  lawyers, some 
of them trained in both Islamic and common law. They engaged Islamic law to 
challenge the  women’s convictions. Indeed, so impor tant  were  these cases that 
President Obasanjo, who  until then had kept a low profile on the sharia crisis, 
lent support to the defense of the two  women’s constitutional rights.40 Nev-
ertheless, “a problematic area in the application of sharia lies in the control of 
the public be hav ior of girls and  women. The sharia movement’s orga nizational 
apparatus is partly based on the hisba [volunteer community police on pub-
lic morality].” Controlled by “overzealous, conservative and narrowly trained 
ulama,” the hisba has consistently regulated “the be hav ior of  women, especially 
 those who are poor, uneducated, and powerless.”41
Debates on the rights of  women  under expanded Islamic law by Northern 
Muslim organ izations is consistently advanced by groups such as fomwan 
and baobab for  Women’s  Human Rights. During many seminars and work-
shops to explore strategies to protect  women’s rights, members of  these North-
ern Muslim organ izations focused on  Women’s  Human Rights against the 
backdrop of theological interpretations, especially in the context of the Qur’an 
and the hadith. They distanced their discourses from Western feminist thought 
and from the perceived liberal values of Southern Nigerian Christians.  These 
Northern Muslim  women’s groups focused on exploring new analytical hori-
zons in Muslim scriptural interpretation of the rights of  women to life, equal-
ity, freedom of thought, and economic advancement.42 Drawing on the con-
cept of Islamic feminism, Margot Badran contends that rather than confront 
Islamic traditions, with its pop u lism in Muslim society, Muslim  women activ-
ists have challenged the conservatism of Muslim clerics by insisting on the 
rights of  women (and girls) through more progressive interpretations of re-
ligious texts.43 Consequently, Nigerian advocates for Muslim  women’s rights 
argue that the promotion of  women’s rights in Northern Nigeria  will not be 
realized from international conventions’ pronouncements such as cedaw, 
which calls for the removal of  legal discrimination against  women from the 
perspective of Western- oriented international  legal conventions. Strategic 
campaigns for  women’s rights must also take into account a dynamic pro cess 
of local religious and social conditions that advance freedom and social justice 
for talakawa  women.44
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Sharia, Chris tian ity, and the Discourse on National Disintegration
As the sharia crisis intensified from 2000 and 2002, Obasanjo’s federal gov-
ernment cultivated leaders of thought across the country, especially former 
government leaders, emirs, ulamas, and Christian leaders, for religious recon-
ciliation and national integration. Obasanjo convened the National Council of 
State (ncs), the advisory board composed of current and former heads of the 
federal government’s three branches, to define a clear pathway for a resolution 
to the sharia crisis. As an initial response to the crisis, the federal government, 
evoking the support of the ncs, called on the pro- sharia Northern states to 
suspend the implementation of their sharia policies.
Former presidents Shehu Shagari and Muhammadu Buhari, both Hausa- 
Fulani Muslims, despite frustrations with the religious riots in Northern 
states,45 denounced the federal government’s interference in the affairs of the 
twelve Northern states. A much more confident Obasanjo would take  things 
in stride; in a national broadcast  after Shagari and Buhari’s announcement, he 
reassured the nation: “I must not end this brief address without assuring all 
our fellow citizens of the firm determination of our Government to resist any 
attempt from any quarters to pursue a line that can lead to the disintegration 
of this country.  Those who break our laws  will be punished to the full extent of 
the law.  There  will be no sacred cows. And  those that extend the hand of fellow-
ship to their fellow citizens  will find understanding and friendship.”46
Nevertheless, the Zamfara State government questioned the legitimacy of 
the federal government to interfere in its affairs; this was followed by the Kano 
State governor’s insistence that the federal government had no constitutional 
authority to interfere in his state’s sharia policy.47 However, the federal order 
was respected in Bornu, Jigawa, and Niger States, whose governors temporar-
ily suspended their sharia policies, pending further dialogue with the federal 
government to find a lasting resolution to the crisis.48 And with the resolve of 
Zamfara to implement sharia by carry ing out  actual amputations, federal Min-
ister of Justice Kanu Godwin Agabi cautioned Governor Sani: “Life is sacred 
and should be treated sacredly.”49
National support for the federal government began to build  because 
Obasanjo now seemed determined to encourage national mobilization against 
sharia advocates in the twelve Northern states. As reflected in the theology 
of prominent Pentecostal leader, Pastor Kehinde Osinowo, many Christian 
leaders, following the arrival of the Fourth Republic, increasingly connected 
their theological disposition to Nigerian nationalism, linking Obasanjo’s na-
tional po liti cal proj ect with God’s divine plan for Nigeria’s pro gress. They 
 contend that Obasanjo had first risen to power in the 1970s  after Hausa Mus-
lim military leader Mohammed’s assassination, and successfully handed power 
to Shehu Shagari (a Hausa- Fulani Muslim) through a transition program to 
civil- democratic government  after sixteen years of military rule. Imprisoned by 
General Abacha (a Hausa- speaking Muslim), Obasanjo reemerged as a demo-
cratically elected head of state with strong Northern Muslim support. Calling 
on Nigerian Christians to pray for the president, Osinowo claimed that the 
sharia crisis was “engineered” by Nigeria’s spiritual enemies, who  were deter-
mined to destabilize the country’s nascent democracy.50 Ebenezer Obadare 
captures this sentiment:
To many Christians, Obasanjo’s “second coming” was a spiritual meta-
phor, one that went beyond the ordinary fact of his fortuitous emer-
gence as a beneficiary of a po liti cal compromise between the country’s 
geo- political power blocs. . . .  For Christians, it was a fulfillment of God’s 
promise to liberate his  children (southern Christians) from the yoke of 
northern (Muslim) leadership. . . .  Obasanjo’s messianic status had been 
enhanced by his personal circumstances before his election as president. 
Jailed by Abacha on charges of plotting to overthrow the government, 
Obasanjo languished in vari ous jails in the country  until his eventual re-
lease by General Abubakar following Abacha’s death. Following his release, 
Obasanjo went public with the fact of his “spiritual rebirth” in prison.51
Nevertheless, Pastor Osinowo, like many other Pentecostal leaders, had by now 
situated Obasanjo as a leader of destiny at the center of Nigeria’s po liti cal nar-
rative, positioning the president in major historical landmarks such as the Civil 
War, successful ser vice as military head of state, escape from General Aba-
cha’s clutches, and emergence as elected civilian president in 1999. Osinowo 
and other Pentecostal leaders called on Christians everywhere to focus their 
prayer on the spiritual warfare that confronted Obasanjo and the Nigerian 
state. Prophet Samuel Kayode Abiara, leader of the Christ Apostolic Church, 
Igbala- Itura, declared the sharia crisis a plot from Satan, while Bishop Margaret 
Odeleke of the same church called on devoted Christians to “chase the sharia 
demon out of Nigeria.”52 For Southern,  Middle  Belt, and Northern- minority 
Christians, Buhari and Shagari’s public opposition of Obasanjo’s moderate 
position was packaged into a populist Christian script. Christian critics con-
tend that the Hausa- Fulani Muslim leaders’ opposition to the administration’s 
policy was a desperate attempt by the Northern Muslim oligarchy to dominate 
state affairs.
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By April 2000, much of Obasanjo’s Christian (especially Yoruba) support 
had arrived, and condemnation of his initial hesitance on the sharia crisis was 
effectively turned to praise for a leader they said was mea sured and far- sighted. 
Influential Pentecostal Yoruba minister Felix Oke argued that Obasanjo’s cau-
tion was wise, praising him for exercising restraint given Nigeria’s contentious 
ethno- religious politics.53 In the midst of the sharia conflict, the power ful Pen-
tecostal leader of the rccg (the Redeemed Christian Church of God), Pastor 
Adeboye, predicted Obasanjo’s triumph, while another prominent Pentecostal 
leader, Pastor Tunde Bakare, preferred Christian vigilance through prayer to 
challenge sharia. Indeed, several Pentecostal leaders called for prayers to prevent 
religious wars that could lead to the disintegration of Nigeria. Obasanjo’s cau-
tious response to the sharia crisis was intertwined with “God’s master plan to take 
Nigeria to its prophetic destiny where justice, peace, love, unity, pro gress, power 
and prosperity would be induced by holiness reigning supreme.”54 In support of 
Obasanjo’s rule, a prominent Pentecostal leader named Pastor Fidelis Omoni 
sent a scripted message to Governor Sani of Zamfara in the biblical tradition of 
Jeremiah’s prophecy: “Your days as Governor are numbered.” He called on Sani 
to repent of his sins.55 The Nigerian Baptist Convention’s fiftieth anniversary 
meeting was similarly highlighted with exhortations of support for Obasanjo.56
This resurgence of Christian support for the president coincided with a 
sustained public discussion of the po liti cal machinations  behind the sharia 
movement. Southern Christian suspicion of Northern Muslims was translated 
into the straightforward conclusion that the sharia crisis was precipitated by 
the Hausa- Fulani Muslim elite’s master plan to contain Southern ascendancy, 
embodied in Obasanjo’s presidency.57 The Yoruba International Network, a 
diaspora organ ization with branches in New York and Washington, DC, ar-
gued that a corrupt Hausa- Fulani Muslim aristocracy, seeing its power erode, 
responded by imposing expanded sharia to strategically mobilize Northern 
Muslims against Southern Christians.58 The governor of Ogun State in the 
Yoruba Southwest, Olusegun Osoba, argued that the conspiracy aimed not just 
to undermine Obasanjo, but to derail Nigeria’s pro gress.59 Many other promi-
nent Yoruba politicians agreed.60 This had been the official position of the pres-
ident’s party: at a leadership meeting to assess the cause of the Kaduna riots, 
pdp leaders concluded that some Northern power brokers masterminded 
the violent attacks to undermine Obasanjo, a Southern Christian president.61 
The plethora of anti- sharia analysts from the Southern and  Middle  Belt states, 
as well as Northern- minority Christians, chimed in to register their condemna-
tion of the Northern Muslim po liti cal class. In Debki’s account, insistence on 
expanded  Islamic law is a reflection of the eroding power of oppressive Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim rulers.62 Nwobi contended that the violent rage of sharia ac-
tivists against vulnerable Christian minorities in Northern states reflected the 
desperation of a fading Northern Muslim hegemony;63 Shehu, another anti- 
sharia activist, noted that the frenzied call for expanded sharia is not an expres-
sion of religious piety, but a strategic po liti cal maneuver;64 and Emekwue, an 
analyst from the Igbo southeastern region, disparaged the agenda of sharia ad-
vocates as a push- back on the slipping emirate control over their local masses.65
Furthermore, many prominent national personalities  were genuinely con-
cerned about the prospects of national disintegration. Olu Falae (a Yoruba 
Christian), the national ad/app leader who had won the Yoruba vote against 
Obasanjo in the 1999 presidential election, argued that the application of sharia 
to criminal law amounted to Northern secession from the federal republic.66 
Following the killing of Igbo Christians in Kaduna’s sectarian crisis, Governor 
Orji Uzor Kalu “warned that his government could no longer guarantee the 
safety of any Northerner living in his state if the killings of Easterners [Igbo 
Christians] living in the North continued.”67 Adetunji Adeleke, former gover-
nor of Osun State in the Yoruba region, lamented that “some ex- leaders  were 
using their enormous wealth to cause confusion and disaffection.”68
The sharia crisis also complicated religious and ethnic relations among 
 Middle  Belt Christians and Muslims.69 Despite the intensification of the uni-
fying force of Chris tian ity in reaction to the encroaching influence of Hausa- 
Fulani Muslim power in the region,70  Middle  Belt local communities have 
continued to experience recurring ethnic factionalism  under growing po liti cal, 
demographic, and economic stress, especially since the neoliberal reforms of 
the 1990s. Harnischfeger notes:
In order to withstand the superior strength of the Hausa and Fulani, who 
number about 40 million  people in Nigeria, leaders of the  Middle  Belt 
Forum have called upon their  people to develop a distinct  Middle  Belt 
identity. During clashes between Christians and Muslims, some soli-
darity appeared as members of diff er ent minorities fought shoulder to 
shoulder. But apart from such short- term alliances, neighboring villages 
or ethnic groups are caught in escalating conflicts over land resources. The 
so- called “ethnic nationalities” are so fragmented internally, that they are 
not able to act as po liti cal units in defence of a common “national” inter-
est. Moreover, the Tangale, Dadiya, Tiv or Jukun have found no means 
of settling boundary disputes among themselves. So their demand to 
 handle land affairs autonomously has  little chance of realization.71
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The push for  Middle  Belt Christian unity during the sharia crisis, how-
ever, carried more than symbolic weight. Emirate attempts to assert a unified 
Northern Muslim agenda pushed against the aspirations of a unifying Chris-
tian identity. Obasanjo’s po liti cal fortunes significantly improved thanks to the 
unified support of Southern and Christian electorates. Conversely, Northern 
Muslims leaders  were beginning to feel the po liti cal pressure that per sis tent 
religious riots  were inflicting on Northern communities. Overall, however, as 
Obasanjo’s Christian supporters grew throughout the country, his core North-
ern Muslim support eroded during the sharia crisis.72
Expanded Sharia, Communalism, and  
the Resurgence of Ethno- religious Vio lence
Citizenship is not portable in Nigeria— and this runs against the letter and 
spirit of the Nigerian Constitution.  Under the British colonial indirect rule 
system,  people without deep roots in the “traditional” structure of ancestral 
hometowns and city- states  were commonly considered “native settlers” with 
less access to land- rights claims and public offices. In Northern and  Middle  Belt 
states, indirect rule hardened  these claims by formally establishing non- Hausa 
quarters in sabon garuruwa (singular: sabon gari), or “new towns,” for Southern 
Christians who had migrated to the region as traders, artisans, and lower- level 
civil servants. Consequently, most Northern Nigerian communities— and 
other regions in the country— ignore the full rights of residency for all citizens 
enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. Instead, it is one’s lineage, substanti-
ated by ascribed claims to ancestors, that serves to establish full rights of resi-
dency. Such distinctions form a strong, if complex, primary identity, with eth-
nicity, class, and local origin intersecting to divide communities into “indigenes” 
and “nonindigenes.” Indeed, the growing migration of Southern Christians to 
Northern and  Middle  Belt communities in the postcolonial era continues to 
complicate this pro cess; and demographic transformations between Northern 
Muslim states and predominantly Christian  Middle  Belt states in recent de-
cades intensified tensions between native “indigenes” and settler “nonindigenes” 
across urban areas in  these states.73
However, as previously discussed, the most vis i ble nonindigenes  were usu-
ally economic mi grants, often Igbo Christian traders from the Southeast, who 
 were resented for their more prosperous economic conditions. This reference 
by Abubakar Gumi in his autobiography captures the feeling of resentment 
by Hausa- Fulani Muslim “indigenes” against Igbo Christian “settlers” or “non-
indigenes”: “One could hardly buy a sack of corn in the market except from 
an Igbo man, nor could one take one’s bicycle to be mended other than to an 
Igbo mechanic. . . .  The Northerner [Hausa- Fulani Muslim] was always some-
thing less than a citizen in his own country.”74 In Kano, such characteriza-
tion of Igbo “nonindigenes” or “settlers” as objectified mi grants was further 
complicated by the city’s population explosion. Kano’s population grew from 
250,000  people in 1961 to 2.8 million inhabitants in 2006, and 95  percent of 
this population is Hausa- Fulani Muslims.75 Against this backdrop, and in ad-
dition to sharia- induced vio lence, tensions would erupt between “indigenes” 
and “nonindigenes” over access to scarce resources in Northern and  Middle 
 Belt states.
Recurring religious vio lence in Bauchi State in 2001 seems to have been ag-
gravated by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. On 
September 12, 2001, internecine strife exploded in several communities in the 
state, reportedly leading to the killing of more than three thousand  people.76 
Reflecting on the origins of the killing, one observer wrote: “Districts in which 
the Christians have driven out the Muslim inhabitants have been given new 
names such as Jesus Zone, New Jerusalem or Promised Land. Similarly, the 
Muslims have renamed their quarters, indicating to whom they belong: Jihad 
Zone, Saudi Arabia or Seat of [Osama bin] Laden.”77 In October 2001, about 
five hundred  people  were killed in Zaki- Biam in Benue State in retaliation for 
the murder of nineteen soldiers by Tiv militiamen who had apparently been 
mistaken for their Jukun rivals from Taraba State, with whom they had been 
fighting over access to farmland.78 This crisis, in addition to its ethnic over-
tones, occurred against the backdrop of strained military- civilian relations in 
vari ous troubled spots in the country, especially the Niger Delta region. As the 
sharia crisis ravaged the Northern and  Middle  Belt states, Nigeria’s news media 
 were fed with a continuous narrative of sectarian vio lence.
Tensions again erupted in 2002 when Nigerian federal forces began to crack 
down on sharia- related disturbances. Po liti cal vio lence again occurred in the 
 Middle  Belt cities of Jos and Yelwa in May, and religious conflict exploded in 
Jigawa State, where Muslim youths destroyed many churches.79 This wave of 
riots was sparked by an article written in a Lagos- based national magazine, 
ThisDay, about the Miss World pageant that was scheduled to be held in Abuja, 
Nigeria’s federal capital. Isiome Daniel, a Southern Christian, had reportedly 
blasphemed against the Prophet Muhammad in the newspaper article.80 As 
riots raged in several Northern cities, Muslim youths attacked churches, killing 
more than two hundred  people, displacing thousands, and destroying property 
worth millions of dollars.81 As  Human Rights Watch  later reported,
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Many  people believed that if the Miss World contest had never been 
planned to take place in Nigeria, and even if the article in ThisDay had 
not been written or published, some other incident would have been 
seized upon instead, and sooner or  later, vio lence would have erupted 
due to the same caustic mix of Northern power politics, hometown loy-
alties, economic slowdown, and ethnic differences.82
A bbc journalist noted the economic implications of Nigeria’s sectarian vio-
lence: “[Many young men have] no jobs and no education, and frustrations 
over economic hardship leave them prey to po liti cal opportunists who want to 
foment vio lence.”83
In the midst of so much vio lence, efforts  toward peace  were ongoing in 2002 
and 2003, especially in Kaduna, home to some of the worst vio lence in the 
country.  These efforts  were led by the Reverend James Wuye and Imam Mu-
hammad Ashafa, who had brokered the peace from the Miss World fiasco. 
Together they founded interfaith organ izations, held workshops, and wrote 
pamphlets to encourage reconciliation between Christians and Muslims. 
Though both had been “radicals,” they had become leaders of a burgeoning 
peace movement as early as 1992,  after the Zango Kataf riots. Referring to the 
communal vio lence as po liti cally motivated, they pushed for reconciliation 
among the warring parties.84 Despite such efforts, in February 2004, commu-
nal vio lence again erupted in Shendam, Yelwa Local Government area, in Pla-
teau State, with 78 Christians killed and several churches destroyed. On May 
2, Christians retaliated and roughly 660 Muslims  were killed, and  60,000 
 people displaced.
The National Assembly passed emergency power regulations in June 1, 2004, 
giving an interim military governor of Plateau State, Major General Moham-
med Chris Alli, sweeping powers to deal with emergency situations in Plateau 
State.  After establishing security, he set up special courts for all vio lence that 
had been committed since 2001 in Plateau State, and 1,284 suspects eventually 
 were prosecuted.85 Alli also developed the Plateau Peace Program, encouraging 
dialogue between leaders of religious and ethnic groups, as well as a statewide 
peace conference. Alli encouraged warring militants to surrender their weap-
ons by granting amnesty to  those who did so. In 2005, state and federal authori-
ties uncovered similar dynamics of po liti cal vio lence in Kebbi State, along with 
a high prevalence of sexual assault.86 However, while religious vio lence contin-
ued, a  Human Rights Watch study found that the initial enthusiasm for sharia 
had eroded: “Many Muslims who had initially supported sharia have become 
disillusioned with the manner in which it has been implemented. They told 
 Human Rights Watch that this was not ‘real sharia’ but ‘po liti cal sharia,’ but 
[ were] fearful of being labeled ‘anti- Islamic’ if they said so publicly.”87
Though the sharia crisis had largely subsided, unfortunate national and 
global events triggered a rash of religious explosions in the last years of the 
Obasanjo administration, revealing enduring tensions between Christians and 
Muslims in Northern and  Middle  Belt states. In February 2006, for example, 
riots broke out in Northern cities  after the publication of a Danish cartoon 
mocking the Prophet Muhammad. In Maiduguri, the Bornu State capital, riots 
by irate Muslim youths led to the deaths of more than five hundred  people. 
Then, in June of the same year, another polarizing incident occurred when a 
Christian  woman in Niger State reportedly preached to Muslim youths. When 
Muslim clerics expressed strong objection, a mob of Muslim youth clubbed her 
to death while she was in police protection.88
Elsewhere, in Ilorin, the southernmost post of the Sokoto Caliphate in the 
predominantly Northern Yoruba region, the sharia crisis opened up old claims 
between Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and descendants of the former Yoruba 
ruling lineages of the precaliphate era over the traditional “owner ship” of the 
city.89 This conflict over the legitimacy of “traditional” structures and symbols 
of local power are embedded in the distributive resources of the state. In a 
specific Northern context, Harnischfeger outlines the pro cess of  these fierce 
contestations for power as expressed through the prism of the ethno- religious 
identities of “indigenes” and “nonindigenes”:
When land disputes are brought to court, the ethnic and religious prefer-
ences of the judge are often decisive, and in cases of armed conflict, when 
police or army units intervene, it may be even more crucial to have one’s 
own  people among the decision- makers. Consequently, the mi grants 
have a vital interest in wresting positions of authority. . . .  As soon as the 
mi grants constitute a critical mass within the population, they direct 
their efforts to occupying key positions in the district administration. In 
this way they, or their leaders, gain access to the state revenues that flow 
from the capital into the coffers of the local government councils.90
Furthermore, focusing on the  Middle  Belt region, Harnischfeger offers an 
insightful perspective on how shifting demographic conditions intensified 
 these ethno- religious tensions during the sharia crisis. Largely dominated 
by the diverse ethnic groups in the region, such as Berom, Dadiya, Tangale, 
Tarok, Tiv, Tula, and Waja, most of whom had been converted to Chris tian ity 
by the 1950s, religious and ethnic conflict complicated the sharia crisis in the 
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region. Concomitantly, as Hausa- Fulani Muslims had migrated southward to 
the  Middle  Belt region since the late colonial period, the demographic balance 
in the region had steadily tilted in their direction.  These new settlers contested 
property rights with the “indigenous”— non- Hausa- Fulani communities. As 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim mi grants and their descendants transformed the region’s 
demography, Muslims as “non- indigenes,” by their sheer numbers are well po-
sitioned to dominate some  Middle  Belt local authorities. This situation was 
further exacerbated by communal conflicts among the non- Muslim “indi-
gene” communities over the distribution of state resources, especially over land 
claims and control of local government agencies. Consequently, Harnischfeger 
argues: “[Hausa- Fulani Muslims] can send for relatives from their homelands, 
enlarge their enclaves, and claim further stretches of land. In many places this 
has brought them right up to the fields tilled by the local population, leading to 
disputes over bound aries. Out of all the groups of settlers [one observer notes] 
it is the Muslims [Hausa- Fulani] that want to claim the owner ship of Jos. . . . 
The Igbo and Yoruba have never claim[ed] Jos nor care[d] to take over po liti cal 
power.”91
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, ethnicity, long associated with 
religious labels, was tied into  these overlapping po liti cal and economic interests 
of communal groups as the sharia crisis intensified.92 Thus, enduring religious 
conflicts further polarized Christians and Muslims in  Middle  Belt states, hard-
ening religious and ethnic identities across the region. Thus, many “indigenes” 
of the  Middle Belt’s major city, Jos, maintained their in de pen dence from 
perceived Muslim hegemony by asserting their Christian identity. This trend is 
not new. As Last writes, as far back as the formal unification of the Northern 
and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria in the early colonial period, the “im-
plicit boundary . . .  between dar al- Islam and dar al- harb, remained; certainly 
the antagonism between the two worlds persists even to this day, some would 
say in a new, fiercer form than before as the creation of well- financed local gov-
ernments has sharply raised the value of being ‘indigenous,’ as against the old 
value associated with ‘becoming Hausa.’ ”93
Consequently, as discussed in the cases above, ethnicity was subsumed  under 
religious identity to rationalize collective po liti cal action as the sharia crisis ex-
posed communal fault lines and fissures. While Hausa- Fulani Muslims called 
for expanded sharia, indigenous ethnic groups— most of them Christians— 
mounted fierce opposition against an institution they considered anathema to 
the traditions of their local communities. This under lying sense of insecurity 
encouraged recurring vio lence as the fallout of the sharia crisis continued.94 
For example, when communal riots broke out in Jos in 2000, killing 165 and 
wounding 928, it was sparked by the appointment of a Hausa- Fulani Muslim 
to head a federal agency in a predominantly Christian area.95
While ethnic nationalism served as a centrifugal force in Southern states, 
it is religion that has filled this role in Northern states, complicated by ethnic 
identity in the  Middle  Belt region. Since decolonization, Islam has provided a 
structural framework on which intra- and intercommunal conflict is contested 
and mediated. Sufi  orders are strong social identities, and elite groups draw 
strongly on Islamic practices to sustain their po liti cal legitimacy in vari ous 
communities.96 Indeed, shifting demographic conditions have further driven 
“a wedge between the younger generation and the old guard of former rulers 
and emirate leaders, who refused to hand over northern power. Their frustra-
tion eroded the po liti cal and cultural legitimacy of emirate society from the 
bottom up.”97
Despite deep communal divisions along religious and ethnic lines, some 
leaders,  because of the delicate position they occupy in society, had to walk a 
tight line during this period of per sis tent crisis. For example, the police com-
missioner in Zamfara State, Ahmed Abdulkadir, a Muslim and Alhaji, refused 
to use the Nigerian police force to enforce the new sharia law in the state. He 
declared: “We  will not enforce any law that goes contrary to and is in conflict 
with Nigerian law  because we have sworn to defend the country and the citi-
zens as a  whole,” referring to the institutional mandate of the Nigerian Police 
Force as a federal agency.98 Similarly, in Kaduna, Deputy Speaker of the House of 
Assembly Gideon Gwani, a Kataf Christian, had to walk a tightrope, demanding 
Christians’ inclusion on the state’s sharia exploratory committee while agreeing 
with expanded Islamic law for Muslims: with a relatively large Christian popula-
tion, particularly in the south of Kaduna, Gwani was forced to make overtures to 
both sides.99 This occurred despite per sis tent animosity between Hausa- Fulani 
Muslims and the largely Christianized Kajes and Katafs, who had been subor-
dinated to the Hausa- Fulani emirate structure through the indirect rule system.
This is, of course, not to argue that ethnicity was not an impor tant  factor 
in the sharia conflict. Clearly, ethnic divisions mattered in varying degrees to 
social and po liti cal actors. Yet even if ethnic identities motivated vio lence, this 
certainly did not amount to the all- consuming importance accorded it by some 
commentators.100 With  these enduring structures of society, the imposition 
of expanded sharia and the attendant strug gle over its constitutionality  were 
rooted in ideas of the past that continue to influence power relations through 
time and space.
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Policing Sharia in Northern States
Despite the enthusiasm for expanded sharia, the complexities of Nigerian soci-
ety curtailed the impact of the Northern states’ sharia policies on emirate com-
munities during the Obasanjo administration.101 Significantly, this limitation 
in the implementation of the new sharia policies was vividly expressed in the 
activities of the hisba, the local Muslim militia established to enforce the new 
sharia laws in the twelve Northern states.102 Ludwig notes that hisba law en-
forcement groups had been in existence in some Northern states before 1999; 
however, they  were elevated in emirate society only  after the spread of expanded 
sharia in 2000.103  Under the caliphate, hisba was used to keep the peace in 
many emirate communities and uphold “proper” Muslim practices and moral 
standards stipulated by Islamic law.104 With the introduction of expanded 
sharia, hisba, following in the tradition of state- sponsored “civic groups” in 
Northern Nigeria, was expanded to defend sharia policies.105 Last suggests that 
hisba resulted from “widespread unease” among Muslims, brought on by a feel-
ing of vulnerability to attack from “outsiders.” Consequently,  because it was 
recognized as the only  viable  legal instrument for the enforcement of sharia, 
hisba had the primary responsibility to secure dar al- Islam within the Nigerian 
state and society.106
Kano State developed its hisba program most extensively among the twelve 
Northern states. From 2000 to 2002, hisba flourished in Kano as an unoffi-
cial militia force  under Governor Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso before being in-
stitutionalized at the state, senatorial, district, and village levels in 2003. At 
the village level,  there  were three divisions: advisory, management, and hisba 
corps. Within smaller communities, operations  were further divided based on 
the zauren sulhu unit, “such as streets/areas, markets, schools, and transport 
stations.” To show the importance of  women’s issues in the new laws, state au-
thorities stipulated that the  women’s division of this militia force should be at 
least 10  percent of the overall hisba force. The main duties for the nine thou-
sand Kano State hisba corps members included ensuring sharia compliance in 
commerce, defending sharia court decisions, reporting on interference with 
Islamic justice, keeping rec ords of prison inmates with pending criminal cases, 
preventing social vice, enforcing modesty standards, and educating the public 
about the new sharia policy.  These extensive statutory duties clearly indicate 
the significance of the hisba force in Kano State’s new sharia policy. To achieve 
 these extensive  legal responsibilities, the state government established a radio 
station, Muryar Hisba (The Voice of Hisba), to disseminate information to the 
public.107
While Kano State’s hisba was by far the most elaborate, it was not the only 
one at work in the Northern states. During the ethno- religious crisis in Jos, 
Nigeria’s principal  Middle  Belt city (where sharia had not been enacted), hisba 
corps operating in the city distributed relief materials to victims of communal 
riots. Kaduna and Katsina States also established hisba boards to supervise the 
activities of a myriad of religious and social groups, and Zamfara State passed 
laws in 2003 that created official organ izations, including hisba, to educate the 
public about the state’s sharia policy. Across Northern states, members of hisba 
boards and commissions  were drawn from government ministries, emirs’ courts, 
and local Muslim clerics.  These newly appointed state officials drew salaries and 
benefits as civil servants. In short, their official duties included encouraging 
“proper” Islamic be hav ior, discouraging corruption, mediating civil disputes, and 
assisting with traffic control and emergency relief, as well as coordinating their 
activities with the federal police forces and other state security agencies.108
However, as the hisba forces took on more law- enforcement responsibili-
ties, it became apparent that they generally lacked the professional expertise to 
discharge their duties.109 This was complicated by growing tensions between 
hisba officers and the Nigerian federal police force, the main source of law 
enforcement in the country. With re spect to this tension between the state 
government– sanctioned hisba and the federal police force, Last observes: 
“Given that the legality of the sharia vis- a- vis the Federal Constitution is it-
self a contested issue, the police are reluctant to get involved in any action 
the hisba may get up to. Similarly, prisons and [teaching] hospitals are federal 
institutions; prisons therefore are unwilling to  house prisoners found guilty 
of crimes  under sharia, just as doctors are unwilling to amputate limbs as the 
sharia requires.”110
Despite such distinctions, hisba soon became the central component of many 
Northern governments’ extraconstitutional police power.111 Indeed, Kano State 
sought funds from abroad to support its hisba institutions, in breach of the Con-
stitution.112  After several years of disagreement, in 2006, the inspector general 
of the Nigerian Police Force accused the Kano State government of develop-
ing an illegal state police force. Federal authorities subsequently banned the 
Kano State hisba and other sharia- enforcement agencies and arrested some of 
their leaders,113 a move that the state governor deemed unconstitutional. More 
importantly, conflicts between hisba and federal law enforcement authorities 
only reinforced entrenched ethno- religious identities, solidifying divisions be-
tween Christians and Muslims in Northern and  Middle  Belt states. As power 
over security came  under the control of federal authorities in  later years, the 
federal police assumed greater regulatory control over sharia in Northern 
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states.114 Indeed, by the end of Obasanjo’s second term in office in 2008, fed-
eral policing had been re- established in Kano State, not simply as a reassertion 
of federal power but, rather, as a practical response to pressing challenges of 
security in local communities.115
With growing frustration in the implementation of expanded sharia, a new 
militant Muslim reformist group, Boko Haram (which means “Western civili-
zation forbidden”), emerged to insist on the establishment of an Islamic state 
in Nigeria by the end of Obasanjo’s presidency. Like Mohammed Marwa, the 
charismatic leader of Maitatsine (see chapter 5), Boko Haram’s founder, Mo-
hammed Yusuf, preached a messianic neo- Salafi revivalism that denounced 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers as an essential component of Nigeria’s de cadent 
po liti cal class.116 Accompanied by lethal vio lence unpre ce dented in Nigerian 
history, the militancy of Boko Haram in the years following the Obasanjo 
administration reflects the deepening crisis of the Nigerian nation- state, re-
vealing unbridled po liti cal corruption by the holders of state power, flagrant 
abuse of power by the country’s security system, massive erosion of essential 
social ser vices, recurring religious vio lence in the Northern and  Middle  Belt 
states, and the abjection of talakawa commoners.117 Additionally, the threat 
of Boko Haram, like that of previous fringe militant Islamic movements in 
Northern Nigeria, is intimately connected to prevailing religious, social, po liti-
cal, and economic conditions in the region.118 In this context, Boko Haram’s 
militancy did not cause Nigeria’s po liti cal crisis in the years  after Obasanjo’s 
presidency; rather, it reflects the endemic crisis of governance, especially in 
Northern states. Indeed, this crisis was further aggravated by ineffectual fed-
eral and state governments’ security policies in Boko Haram’s strongholds in 
the northeastern states of Bornu, Yobe, and Adamawa. While it is inconceiv-
able that the entrenched po liti cal structure that fuels Boko Haram’s militancy 
can be overturned in the short term, well- focused social and security policies 
orientation by the federal authorities—in collaboration with Northern state 
governments— can erode the extensive social space captured by Boko Haram 
in northeastern Nigeria. All told, Boko Haram emerged out of the failure of 
the restorative vision of Islamic reformism promised by expanded sharia in the 
early years of the Fourth Republic.
The Limits of Sharia: An Overview
It was in this context of po liti cal strains that Nigeria began its first- ever transi-
tion from one demo cratically elected administration to another in 2007. During 
this period of transition, two impor tant developments  were particularly notable: 
first, with limited constitutional intervention from the federal government, 
the impact of expanded sharia in Northern Muslim communities waned con-
siderably, and second, sharia’s application varied significantly throughout the 
twelve Northern states. To bring this long and tragic episode of Nigeria’s sharia 
saga to an end, I briefly review some notable outcomes of the Northern states’ 
sharia programs when Obasanjo completed the second term of his presidency 
in 2007.
By the end of Obasanjo’s presidency, Zamfara continued to provide the vi-
sion for all  those committed to implementing expanded sharia. Governor Sani 
was reelected in 2003, and his former deputy, Mahmud Shinkafi, succeeded 
him in 2007. With a tiny Christian minority, a major prob lem that confronted 
the state’s sharia agenda was the restriction placed on  women that kept them 
from taking okada— the motorcycle taxis that are relied on for their ubiquity, 
speed, and low cost and are thus the state’s major means of public transportation. 
can worked with the state government to devise a system to circumvent the 
restriction: Zamfara state authorities issued Okada taxi  drivers “Association of 
Christian Motorcycle Operators” cards that helped taxi operators drive non- 
Muslim  women without harassment from hisba officers and other state author-
ities.119 Overall, despite its strict sharia laws, Zamfara State’s reforms  were the 
most po liti cally effective and bureaucratically successful.120
In Kano State, Governor Kwankwaso, a moderate, implemented sharia 
gradually  because of Kano city’s massive size and cosmopolitan character. How-
ever, the governor underestimated the forces  behind sharia: as discussed above, 
Islamic clerics  there established a robust hisba. In 2003 Kwankwaso had lost 
reelection to conservative Ibrahim Shekarau of the All Nigeria  Peoples Party 
(anpp), who won reelection in 2007. As of 2008, the governor and Abubakar 
Rabo Abdulkarim, head of the state hisba board, attempted to extend sharia’s ju-
risdiction to sabon garuruwa and compelled all students in the state— including 
 those in Christian schools— to comply with the Muslim dress code.121
In Katsina State, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua served two terms as governor be-
fore being elected president in 2007 (he died three years into his term). An-
other pdp stalwart, Ibrahim Shema, replaced him. Sharia implementation  here 
did not rival that in Zamfara or Kano, but was nevertheless a major reform. 
Despite the limitations of Katsina’s sharia policy, Christian opposition was 
poorly or ga nized and splintered. Additionally, the governor was a member of 
Obasanjo’s party, and voting for him kept a hardliner anpp candidate— who 
would have pushed implementation further— out of office.
Compromise between a Muslim majority and Christian minority gener-
ally prevailed in Bauchi State. Governor Ahmadu Adamu Mu’azu was slow in 
220 Chapter 9
Sharia Politics, Obasanjo, and the 1999 Constitution 221
implementing sharia and took care to balance it with pro- Christian policies. 
He appointed Christians to se nior positions in the Ministry of Justice and high 
courts, refused to expand sharia to Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro (Christian areas), 
and made it pos si ble for residents in the state to access the courts of their choice. 
He also urged Islamic judges to be cautious on adultery cases, and expressed 
disapproval on punishments that violate con temporary norms of  human rights. 
The reason for  these countervailing mea sures lies in the strong opposition of 
Bauchi’s substantial Christian minority to expanded sharia. Despite Gover-
nor Mu’azu’s best efforts, Christian minorities consistently contested the state 
government’s sharia policy. In one notable case in 2002, twenty- one Christian 
nurses  were fired from their positions at the Federal Medical Center in Azare 
for refusing to comply with Muslim dress code; they won their positions back 
in a  legal  battle that lasted two years. Although Mu’azu won reelection in 2003, 
sharia remained a polarizing issue, and in 2007, the majority- Muslim state 
elected a conservative, Isa Yuguda, of the pro- sharia anpp.  After this election, 
Yuguda, the Sharia Commission, and other Islamic groups pressed for more 
comprehensive sharia.122
The policy of moving  toward sharia with safeguards for non- Muslims 
worked best in Kaduna State. Following the wave of ethno- religious vio lence, 
Governor Ahmed Mohammed Makarfi of the pdp won reelection in 2003 
and was elected a senator in 2007. His successor, Namadi Sambo, also a 
Muslim pdp, was elevated to the vice presidency of the federation when Good-
luck Jonathan, a Christian from the Niger Delta, became president following 
Yar’Adua’s death. Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa, Sambo’s deputy governor, was sub-
sequently elevated to the office of governor, to which he was elected; he was the 
first Christian from Southern Kaduna State to hold the office. Unlike Zamfara 
State, where sharia was the new baseline and common law only reigned in mili-
tary and police barracks, Kaduna State limited Islamic law to predominantly 
Muslim areas, with common law the baseline everywhere  else.123 Kaduna sharia 
court judges  were screened more carefully than their common- law counter parts, 
and separate bureaus for Christian and Islamic  matters  were established. Each 
had a permanent secretary, and the two frequently met to discuss state policies. 
In Kaduna State, then,  because of its evenly divided Christian and Muslim pop-
ulation and the religious vio lence that immediately followed the announcement 
of expanded sharia, the state government  adopted a moderate sharia policy.
Among the twelve Northern states, Gombe State exemplifies the limitations 
of sharia during the Obasanjo years. anpp governor Abubakar Habu Hashidu 
followed fellow Muslim governors in other Northern states by establishing 
a tripartite  legal system or ga nized around magistrate, customary, and sharia 
courts from September 2000 and May 2001. The last to implement sharia, he 
tried to balance religious repre sen ta tion by creating a Sharia Committee and 
installing an Anglican bishop on the Customary Courts Committee. However, 
he lost reelection to pdp candidate Mohammed Danjuma Goje in 2003, who 
dropped sharia entirely and went on to win reelection in 2007. Among the 
Northern states to enact expanded sharia, Gombe has one of the largest Chris-
tian populations. It is no surprise that Gombe was one of the states where the 
implementation of sharia was least successful.124
222 Chapter 9
co n c lus i o n
In April 2014, Boko Haram became a global  house hold name following the 
militant Islamist group’s abduction of 276 schoolgirls from a secondary school 
in Chibok, a remote town in Nigeria’s northeastern state of Bornu. Although 
Boko Haram had been unleashing terror on Nigerian civilians and state of-
ficials since 2008, this tragic event called world attention to the intense dan-
ger of Islamic extremism in Nigerian society. While it is true that this radical 
group’s brutal activities do not represent the myriad role of Muslim groups in 
Nigerian society, it would be shortsighted to dismiss Boko Haram as an aber-
ration in Muslim Northern Nigeria. Despite the unique context in which it 
exploded on the Nigerian public scene, Boko Haram is another example of 
militant Northern Muslim movements insisting on the radical transformation 
of the state in Northern Nigeria,  going back several centuries. In the context 
of con temporary Nigerian politics, Boko Haram’s horrific attacks have put a 
global spotlight on the deepening crisis of the nation- state, revealing the dam-
aging consequences of the sharia crisis, neopatrimonialism, and neoliberalism 
in the context of the post-9/11 “global war on terror.” Interestingly, Boko 
Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf— who was murdered in 2009 by Nigerian 
security forces— had criticized the custodians of state power in a way that curi-
ously resembled critiques by previous militant Islamist groups analyzed in detail 
in this book, notably neo- Mahdi in the early colonial period and ‘Yan tatsina 
 under military rule in the 1980s.  These groups had fought Nigerian colonial and 
postcolonial regimes, denouncing them as illegitimate and corrupt. However, at 
the other end of the spectrum of the world religions— either challenging or af-
firming the legitimacy of the holders of state power—is the myriad of mainstream 
Muslim and Christian movements that have sought to transform Nigerian so-
ciety through peaceful means since the imposition of colonial rule at the turn 
of the twentieth  century. For over two centuries, this broad range of po liti cal 
and social activities by Muslim and Christian structures has consistently re-
flected the complicated role of  these world religious movements in the making 
of modern Nigeria.
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Focusing on the social, po liti cal, and economic transformation of the di-
verse  people of Nigeria since the turbulent nineteenth  century, in this book I 
have analyzed how the entangled histories of Islam and Chris tian ity are embed-
ded in structures of society and how  these religious forces profoundly  shaped 
the colonial and postcolonial Nigerian state and society. Muslim and Christian 
movements not only have been dynamic in shaping the contours of the nation- 
state but also have been foundational in the making of modern Nigerian soci-
ety. Specifically, Islamic reformist and evangelical Christian movements  were 
integral to the social structure and ideological framework on which the mod-
ern Nigerian state and society  were grafted  after the imposition of colonial rule 
at the turn of the twentieth  century. The intersections of contending regional 
and global religious movements  were decisive in transforming Nigeria into a 
modern state and society— and  these religious structures themselves  were 
transformed by the enduring social, po liti cal, and economic imperatives of Ni-
geria’s diverse communities.
Although the imbrications of  these religious forces had an enduring impact 
on the structures of Nigerian society, their intersecting currents also greatly 
influenced a complicated po liti cal pro cess, shaping power configurations in the 
modern Nigerian state. With fierce power strug gles in a fragile nation- state,1 
the interactions between Christian and Muslim movements have consistently 
transformed Nigerian social relations since the imposition of colonial rule at 
the turn of the twentieth  century. In the Hausa- Fulani Muslim North, Islamic 
structures anchored on the Sokoto Caliphate sustained the transformation 
of emirate society. In the  Middle  Belt and Yoruba Southwest, however, it was 
Chris tian ity that provided a crucial framework for articulating a pathway to 
modernity within a structurally imbalanced Nigerian state and society.
Rather than seeing Islam and Chris tian ity as anachronistic and atavistic, in 
my estimation, Nigeria’s varied communities’ encounters with  these world reli-
gious movements have been pivotal to creating tapestries that reflect dialectical 
tensions between tradition and modernity, local and global, national and trans-
national, since the turbulent nineteenth  century. At vari ous stages of Nigeria’s 
po liti cal history,  these complicated religious forces have evolved in multilayered 
local, national, and transnational contexts. Their dynamic manifestations have 
influenced power configurations in a colonial context,  shaped power relations 
during decolonization, helped mold Nigeria’s problematic postcolonial nation- 
state, and responded to the forces of globalism at the turn of the twenty- first 
 century. Overall, in postcolonial Nigeria, Muslim and Christian movements, 
along with their vari ous segmented identities— Sufi, neo- Salafi, Protestant, 
Catholic, Pentecostal, and African- initiated church movements— are integrated 
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into the fabric of Nigerian society, exposing the fault lines of the country’s en-
trenched ethno- regional, ethno- religious, and neopatrimonial nation- state.
It would be presumptuous to suggest that the extensive Muslim and Chris-
tian currents that transformed Nigeria’s diverse communities could fully be 
analyzed in a single book. Nevertheless, I have sought to offer a detailed analy-
sis of major Muslim and Christian movements that are integral to the pro cesses 
of social change in three critical regions where they have repeatedly intersected 
over the past two centuries. Although the nineteenth- century Sokoto Jihad 
in the Hausa- Fulani region of Northern Nigeria and the Christian mission-
ary movement in Southern Nigeria  were in de pen dent religious currents, their 
convergence at the turn of the twentieth  century, propelled by British imperial 
objectives, provided dynamic structures, ideologies, and doctrines that pro-
foundly transformed Nigeria. The Sokoto Jihad provided a structural frame-
work and legitimating ideology for Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers to articulate 
the hierarchies of power2 in Northern and central Nigeria’s diverse communi-
ties, while, starting in the mid-1800s with the arrival of Christian missions and 
propelled by favorable regional conditions, Christian evangelization rapidly 
transformed social relations in many Southern Nigerian communities.
Following the conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate and the Kanem- Bornu Em-
pire, British administrators co- opted the caliphate’s politico- religious structure 
as the fulcrum of the colonial administrative system of indirect rule in the 
Northern Nigerian Protectorate. By embracing Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, 
British administrators strengthened the authority of the potentates of the So-
koto Caliphate while si mul ta neously marginalizing other centers of Muslim 
authority in Northern Nigeria. More importantly, British rule entrenched the 
hegemony of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers over non- Muslim communities in 
the protectorate. This expedient system intensified contestations of power, 
prompting  Middle  Belt Christian- educated elites to resist Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim domination. 
Given the significance of mission Chris tian ity in Britain’s Southern Ni-
gerian Provinces— and Northern Nigeria’s  Middle  Belt communities— the 
trajectory of social transformation was vastly diff er ent in  these regions  under 
British colonial rule. Starting with Atlantic Yoruba communities, and fueled 
by British imperial objectives, Christian missions embarked on the transforma-
tion of Southern and  Middle  Belt communities by the end of the nineteenth 
 century. Indeed, by the early de cades of colonial rule, mission Chris tian ity had 
established a framework for rapid social change in key Southern Nigerian com-
munities. In Yoruba coastal communities, doctrines of modern advancement 
and pro gress  shaped profoundly by Yoruba Christian returnees from Sierra 
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Leone— and to a lesser extent Afro- Brazilian and Afro- Cuban repatriates— 
and embedded in Yoruba traditions of industry  were adapted to the rapidly 
changing social conditions of the turn of the twentieth  century. Indeed, the 
monumental transformation of Yoruba communities during this period was 
propelled by the desire of Yoruba missionaries and Christian converts to re-
imagine a new world following several de cades of turbulence in much of the 
nineteenth  century. Consequently, the devastations of the nineteenth- century 
Yoruba wars gave way to the development imperatives of a Yoruba Western- 
educated Christian elite within only a few de cades of colonial rule in Yoruba 
communities.3 In this context, the impact of mission Chris tian ity in local com-
munities was far- reaching, though Yoruba cosmology did not wither away.4 As 
mission Chris tian ity further expanded  under colonial rule, new charismatic 
Christian movements emerged to enrich religious life in Yoruba communities. 
In turn, this pro cess accelerated the pace of Yoruba ethno- national conscious-
ness  under British colonial rule. This pro cess would sustain a formidable Yoruba 
ethno- national identity in the context of the formation of the Nigerian postco-
lonial state.
The enduring structures, practices, ideologies, and legacies of the Sokoto 
Caliphate in emirate society and mission Chris tian ity in Southern and  Middle 
 Belt communities  were essential  factors in Nigeria’s decolonization pro cess 
from 1946 to 1960, when the country gained in de pen dence from Britain. As 
Nigeria embarked on constitutional reforms, the contentious relations be-
tween Southern nationalists and Northern Muslim rulers revealed major fault 
lines between the Northern and Southern Provinces, now reconstituted in 
three newly established regional governments— the Northern Region (the old 
Northern Provinces), and Eastern Region and Western Region (the old South-
ern Provinces). While predominantly Christian Southern nationalists insisted 
on acceleration to in de pen dence, Northern Muslim rulers  were inclined to 
slow down the pace of po liti cal change  because of their vulnerability to the 
modern development that Christian missions had encouraged in Southern 
Nigeria. Consequently, while Southern nationalists called for a strong central 
government to encourage the integration of Northern Muslim society into the 
rest of the country, Hausa- Fulani rulers insisted on strong regional government 
structures to protect the Muslim North from the onslaught of Southern Chris-
tian elite. In the end, assuaging the fears of Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers, British 
authorities opted for a federal system that strengthened the regional governments 
at the expense of the central government. This regionalization of state power had 
broad implications for the role of religion in Northern Nigeria’s diverse commu-
nities, especially in the immediate years  after the attainment of in de pen dence.
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In addition to the structural and constitutional divide between the North-
ern and Southern Provinces, the decolonization pro cess also intensified endur-
ing po liti cal contradictions between Hausa- Fulani Muslim rulers and Chris-
tian minorities of the Northern Provinces. Indeed, the volatile mix of religious 
and ethnic identities, along with changing demographic conditions in the re-
gion,  were essential ele ments in the strug gle for state power and control over 
the distributive resources of the state during decolonization.5 As decoloniza-
tion intensified, Christian missionary influence provided essential ideologi-
cal and structural frameworks for the disparate non- Muslim ethnic minority 
groups in central and northeastern Nigeria to resist Hausa- Fulani Muslim 
domination. Unlike the multitude of “tribal,” “pagan” religions of the Northern 
Nigerian Protectorate in the early years of colonial rule, Christian missionary 
impact provided an effective universal institutional node of re sis tance to unite 
diverse ethnic groups against the real and  imagined threat of Hausa- Fulani 
Muslim domination that had been consolidated  under the colonial system of 
indirect rule.  These developments  shaped so profoundly by Muslim and Chris-
tian identities not only  were essential to the articulation of ethno- religious al-
liances during decolonization, but also provided a framework for  Middle  Belt 
and Northern Christian minority re sis tance to the Hausa- Fulani Muslim po-
liti cal class  after Nigeria’s in de pen dence. Consequently, the enduring structures 
of the Sokoto Caliphate, the indirect rule system, and the Christian missionary 
impact all combined to shape competing po liti cal interest among vari ous com-
munal groups  after decolonization. The structures and ideological orientations 
of  these po liti cal alliances continue to have serious implications for governance 
and development in postcolonial Nigerian politics.6
In this fragile postcolonial nation- state system, contending and competing 
religious movements have consistently promoted divergent ideologies and doc-
trines that fuel recurring religious vio lence in Nigeria’s Northern and  Middle 
 Belt states. Complicated by the insistence of a Southern Christian intelligent-
sia for the secularization of the Nigerian state, religious- based conflicts— such 
as the controversy over Nigeria’s membership in the Or ga ni za tion of Islamic 
Conference and the ‘Yan tatsine crisis in the 1980s— have intersected with ethnic 
identities to fuel ethno- religious vio lence in Northern and  Middle  Belt states. 
 These enduring religious conflicts  were further ignited by the politics of sharia 
during Nigeria’s Fourth Republic— after military despotism in the late 1990s.
With the growing neopatrimonialism of the holders of state power and the 
devastation of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s, the insistence on  expanded 
sharia by a new generation of Hausa- Fulani po liti cal elite provided an alterna-
tive vision for the governance of emirate society. The popularity of expanded 
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sharia in the twelve Northern states earlier in the Fourth Republic reflects the 
extent of the alienation of Hausa- Fulani Muslims from the rest of the coun-
try and reveals the depth of the crisis of the Nigerian nation- state. Hausa- 
Fulani advocates of sharia contend that pious Muslim traditions, embodied 
in expanded sharia,  were continually assaulted by Nigeria’s Western- oriented 
state in several ways. First,  under colonial rule, sharia was subordinated to En-
glish common law by British authorities. Second, sharia’s influence suffered 
 because of the modernizing effects of Christian missions in non- Muslim sec-
tions of Northern and  Middle  Belt regions; and, fi nally, sharia was assailed by 
the secularist agenda of vari ous Nigerian postcolonial civilian and military 
governments. Overall, the sharia crisis served as a structural platform for the 
expression of ethno- religious and ethno- regional strug gles between Muslims 
and Christians in Northern and  Middle  Belt states and between the dominant 
po liti cal classes in Northern and Southern states.  These recurring po liti cal alli-
ances and conflicts illuminate numerous strug gles for state power among major 
ethno- regional po liti cal classes in the country. Thus, during the early years of 
the Fourth Republic, the Hausa- Fulani Muslim elite insisted that expanded 
sharia reflect Northern Muslim traditions and stem eroding moral values. In 
turn, the po liti cal elite within Southern,  Middle  Belt, and Northern Christian 
minorities contended that expanded sharia was irreconcilable with Nigeria’s 
constitutional integrity not only  because it promotes Northern Muslim sec-
tarianism but also, more importantly,  because it violates the liberal traditions 
enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution. The crisis of sharia during the Fourth 
Republic certainly reveals the depth of the structural imbalance in Nigerian 
state and society and highlights the massive gulf between Northern Muslims 
states, on the one hand, and Southern and  Middle  Belt states, on the other. 
With serious implications for the safety of Christian minorities in North-
ern states, along with growing ethno- religious confrontations in  Middle  Belt 
states— where rapidly changing demographic conditions have transformed 
communal relations since the late colonial period— recurring ethno- religious 
vio lence has emerged as an essential ele ment of power politics in Northern and 
 Middle  Belt states. The structures, ideologies, and doctrines in this dynamic 
pro cess have become an essential component of postcolonial Nigerian politics.
At its most extreme level, Muslim militancy has encouraged po liti cal vio-
lence in Northern communities, especially since the 1980s. Islamic radicalism 
has a long history in the Northern Nigerian region,  going back to the re sis tance 
of fringe Muslim movements to British rule, notably neo- Mahdist groups, at 
the turn of the twentieth  century. Concomitantly, militant Islam has had many 
violent manifestations in postcolonial Northern Nigeria, notably ‘Yan tatsine 
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militant opposition to Nigerian state authorities in the 1980s and Boko Ha-
ram’s bloody attacks on churches, state agencies, emirate rulers, and civilians 
(mostly Northern Christian minorities) since the collapse of expanded sharia 
in 2007. To be sure, the recurrence of  these radical Muslim movements indi-
cates a profound crisis of the postcolonial Nigerian nation- state: in the specific 
case of Boko Haram, its militancy does not simply reveal the extent of the crisis 
of national governance; it shows the eroding legitimacy of traditional Mus-
lim rulers in Northern communities  because of their essential role as a criti-
cal component of Nigeria’s neopatrimonial state system.7 Furthermore, since 
militant Islamist groups such as Boko Haram have consistently exploited 
the pressure for sharia to stake their claims in Northern Muslim communities, 
the custodians of the Nigerian state have had to confront a major constitu-
tional dilemma between Nigerian state secularism and a clamor for an Islamic 
theocracy in postcolonial Northern Nigeria. Additionally, given the marginal-
ization of Northern Muslim youths, especially with the social consequences of 
neoliberalism since the 1980s, militant Islamic groups, increasingly embracing 
radical neo- Salafi doctrines, insist on a Muslim state that would be governed by 
expanded sharia, as the alternative to Nigeria’s problematic Western- oriented 
secular po liti cal system.8 At the same time, since the militant Islamic group 
Boko Haram has flourished in the context of deepening state crisis and the 
“global war on terror,” Nigerian state authorities have demonstrated limited 
capacity to control vast territories in Muslim Northern Nigeria, especially in 
the northeastern states of Bornu, Yobe, and Adamawa.
Focusing on a concerted response to the serious threat of Boko Haram to 
the Nigerian state following several years of government ineptitude, the New 
York Times op-ed piece of Nigeria’s president- elect, Muhammadu Buhari, in 
April 2015 to commemorate the one- year anniversary of Boko Haram’s abduc-
tion of the Chibok schoolgirls captures the extent of the crisis posed by the radi-
cal Islamic group to the Nigerian state. Buhari’s op-ed is worth quoting at length:
My administration would welcome the resumption of a military training 
agreement with the United States, which was halted during the previous 
administration. We must, of course, have better coordination with the 
military campaigns of our African allies, like Chad and Niger. But, in the 
end, the answer to this threat must come from within Nigeria. We must 
start by deploying more troops to the front and away from civilian areas 
in central and southern Nigeria where for too long they have been used 
by successive governments to quell dissent. . . .  There are many reasons 
why vulnerable young  people join militant groups, but among them are 
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poverty and ignorance. Indeed Boko Haram— which translates in En-
glish, roughly, as “Western Education Is Sinful”— preys on the perverted 
belief that the opportunities that education brings are sinful. If you are 
starving and young, and in search of answers as to why your life is so dif-
ficult, fundamentalism can be alluring. . . .  So we must be ready to offer 
the parts of our country affected by this group an alternative. Boosting 
education  will be a direct counterbalance to Boko Haram’s appeal. In 
par tic u lar we must educate more young girls, ensuring they  will grow up 
to be empowered through learning to play their part as citizens of Nige-
ria and pull themselves up and out of poverty.9
Fi nally, in the predominantly Christian Southern and  Middle  Belt states, this 
crisis of the nation- state also has encouraged the explosion of Pentecostal— and 
other charismatic— Christian movements. Similar to the resurgence of Islamic 
reformism in Northern states, the exponential rise of Pentecostal movements 
in Southern,  Middle  Belt, and Northern minority communities reflects dis-
ruptions of the postcolonial era, expressed profoundly through the Nigerian 
Civil War, statism, and neoliberalism. In an environment of unbridled po-
liti cal corruption, enduring uncertainty, and prolonged economic insecurity, 
Pentecostalism has emerged as a heuristic movement that mediates tensions 
between the temporal and the transcendent. This remarkable movement has 
empowered its adherents, nurturing a vision that anticipates the  future in the 
context of globalization and transnationalism. Like the Islamic reformism that 
propelled expanded sharia in Northern Muslim states, the explosion of Pente-
costalism was religion’s response to the crisis of the nation- state in Southern, 
 Middle  Belt, and Christian minority communities in Northern states. While 
Pentecostalism generally operates outside the purview of formal state agencies, 
its remarkable capacity to bridge the religious and secular, tradition and mo-
dernity, and national and global speaks not only to its resourcefulness but also 
to its deep engagement with the dialectical tensions between state and society. 
What is significant about the “reformism” of Nigeria’s Pentecostal movement 
is how it differs from the reformism of Northern Nigeria’s neo- Salafi move-
ment. The reformism of Nigeria’s neo- Salafi movement drew its legitimacy 
from scriptural texts that insist on imposing a righ teous Muslim theocracy that 
would transform the inner core of the Nigerian state, while the “reformism” of 
Pentecostal churches evokes the gift of the Holy Spirit that proclaims a new 
Christian moral order for its adherents.
The dynamism of Nigeria’s Muslim and Christian movements refutes pre-
dictable ideas that religious structures inherently are retarding forces against 
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modern transformation. The Nigerian experience reveals that  these religious 
movements have been integral to the pro cesses of state- society formation since 
the turbulent nineteenth  century. Thus, it stands to reason that the doctrines 
of  these religious forces are intricately connected to and deeply embedded in 
the structures of the Nigerian state and society. For more than two centuries, 
Islam and Chris tian ity—in what we may refer to as mirror- image dialectical 
tensions— consistently have confronted, strategically contested, occasionally 
accommodated, and referentially shadowed each other as they have trans-
formed Nigeria’s social and po liti cal landscape.
The pro cess of colonial rule in Nigeria, exemplified by the Lugardian system 
of indirect rule and the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Provinces 
in the early twentieth  century, provided the basis for the articulation of Mus-
lim and Christian movements in the drive for state power. On one side of the 
mirror, Islam provides the structural framework for consolidating Northern 
Hausa- Fulani Muslim identity in modern Nigerian politics and society. As this 
hegemony crystalizes, Chris tian ity—on the other side of the mirror— provides 
a strong framework to articulate an ethno- religious re sis tance ideology in the 
po liti cal theaters of Nigeria’s Northern and  Middle  Belt regions.
Rather than focus on a theoretical perspective that suggests a Western con-
stitutional solution to Nigeria’s multifaceted crises, I have delved into the deep 
structural and historical roots of Islam and Chris tian ity in the Nigerian po liti-
cal pro cess since the transformative nineteenth  century. Since Chris tian ity and 
Islam are structural ele ments of Nigerian society, I contend that their promi-
nence in the public sphere is a response to the deepening crisis of the nation- 
state.  Until the custodians of the Nigerian state sustain a durable constitutional 
and po liti cal framework to effectively respond to the country’s entrenched 
ethno- religious and ethno- regional fault lines,10 the endemic religious crisis in 
Nigeria’s Northern and  Middle  Belt states  will continue to tragically under-
mine the viability of Africa’s most populous and complicated nation- state.
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